THE American POLITICAL SCIENCE Review

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INTENSITY, VISIBILITY, DIRECTION AND SCOPE*

E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER
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I want to sketch a line of reasoning about politics, a way of looking at politics. Every point of view must stand on its own legs; it is not something that can be proved. An analysis is a way of looking at something, a way of seeing something we could not see before we made it. We adopt a point of view because it is suggestive and persuasive in its own inner logic.

More specifically, I want to examine politics as a strategic concept. The concept of political strategy is itself a point of view loaded with implications for the study of politics.

Strategy is the heart of politics, as it is of war.

What are the implications of the concept? Any strategy of politics assumes that there is something that we can do about politics, that we have choices, and that what we think and do and want makes a difference. It assumes that we have something to talk about and that what we think and say and do is likely to have consequences. Without these conditions there can be no political strategy.

Strategy is predicated on the notion that politics is important, important to *us*, for people do not take the pains to produce a strategy about anything unless they are involved in it. Somewhere along the line that extends from the trivial to the overwhelming is a point at which we become involved. We cannot help being concerned about anything provided only that it is big enough, and near enough, and moving toward us rapidly enough. If the stakes of politics are the survival of civilization, what is going to be our attitude? At the root of the idea of political strategy is the suggestion that the world is a dangerous place in which to live. Politics, seen from this standpoint, is more than drift and more than the sum of things happening to us. It begins when we begin to fight back. This is also the point at which strategy has its origins. From

* Presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 5, 1957.

the strategic point of view the meaning of politics is that it means something to *us*.

In a world in which we are not perfectly free, the concept of strategy implies that we are willing to attempt to discover what kind of freedom we have. Our options, it seems to me, inhere in the nature of the raw materials themselves, as demonstrated by the very inconsistency of the explanations of politics. Political strategy consists of the search for a middle ground between two inconsistent pessimistic theories about the fluidity of opinion. At one extreme, government itself is treated as if it were a figment of propaganda. At the other extreme it is assumed that attitudes are so fixed by interest and the social structure that intelligence has no function in public affairs. The realm of politics lies somewhere between these extremes.

Strategy consists of the application of intelligence to the achievement of great ends. The strategy of politics is related to the meaning of politics, for if we can do nothing about politics, politics becomes a meaningless vibration. We are bound to look for the meaning of politics in the efforts of people to accomplish things because the effort to accomplish things is the essence of politics.

The word "strategy" is borrowed from the language of war; it has something to do with conflict. The exploitation of conflict in the deliberate pursuit of power places a renewed emphasis on the use of the historic democratic devices for winning power and making decisions: majority rule, elections, agitation, organization, and the formation of alternatives. I assume that it will continue to be necessary in the future to bring great decisions to a head. If I may tamper with a sentence attributed to General MacArthur, "In politics there is no substitute for victory in a national election."

In dealing with the problem of strategy it might be said, perhaps, that we have a navigator's freedom. Perhaps we can justify the opinion of Gibbon that the winds and tides are always on the side of the ablest navigators. On the other hand, we are not relieved of the necessity of doing something about our future because people are sometimes stupid, for when all has been said that can be said, we can't help being prejudiced in favor of the human race.

The very fact that there is a multiplicity of interpretations of politics suggests that we may have some freedom. At least we have a choice of dogmas. This is an area in which political scientists have something to do. We need a theory of politics or a theory of political action and organization. Surely this is a legitimate academic interest. Political scientists cannot do the work of politicians, but they can provide politicians with the rationalizations involved in power and the use and

functions of power, rationalizations without which politicians cannot work well.

As political scientists we are committed to the quest for meaning in politics; to commit ourselves to meaninglessness is to abandon the obligations of scholarship. Let no man boast that he has discovered chaos because chaos is the easiest thing in the world to find! It takes intelligence to make sense of politics, but it takes intelligence to make sense of anything. Political science, like Genesis, begins with chaos but it does not end there.

The foregoing statement about political strategy rests on the proposition that the system is dynamic, for there is little point in discussing strategy in a static system. What makes the political system dynamic? The dynamics of politics has its origin in strife. Political strategy deals therefore with the exploitation, use, and suppression of conflict. Conflict is so powerful an instrument of government that all regimes are of necessity concerned with its management. We are concerned here with the use of conflict to govern, the use of conflict as an instrument of change, growth, and unity. The grand strategy of politics deals with public policy concerning conflict. This is the policy of policies, the sovereign policy—what to do about conflict.

All politics begins with billions of conflicts. There are billions of potential conflicts in any modern society, but only a few become significant. A democratic society is able to survive because it manages conflict, usually at the point of origin; it imposes a kind of birth control on conflict. (I have heard it said that the male alligators eat 999 of every 1000 eggs laid by the females. If this were not true there would be more alligators in the world than we could use.)

Americans hold more elections than all the rest of the world put together; but there must be millions of issues on which we cannot vote, or we cannot vote on them when we want to vote on them or how we want to vote on them. One of the most conclusive ways of checking the rise of conflict is simply to provide no arena for it or to create no public agency with power to do anything about it. There are an incredible number of devices for checking the development of conflict within our system. It is difficult to make an issue of the Supreme Court of the United States because it is difficult to bring the conflict to a head. It is difficult to translate the frustrations of urban life in metropolitan areas into effective governmental action because the institutions for action do not exist. Sectionalism has been an effective device for submerging some kinds of conflicts. All legislative procedure is loaded with devices for controlling the flow of explosive materials into the governmental apparatus. All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of

some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias.

Perhaps it would not be inaccurate to say that there are Republican and Democratic concepts of political organization. It seems to me that the Democratic party tends to be the pro-party party, while the Republican party tends to be the anti-party party. Much of the controversy about the future of the party system stems from the prevalence of partisan differences of opinion about the nature and objectives of political organization. This is not evidence of the meaninglessness of party politics but of its importance, for people do not invent competing theories of organization and antagonistic concepts of strategy about unimportant things. All I want to say is that the quarrel in politics is as apt to be about the means as about the ends of politics. Why should this surprise us? Theories of political organization are identified with the things people want to accomplish.

The government itself, the government above all else, is never fully neutral in political struggle. One major party tends to be pro-government while the other tends to be anti-government. One prominent partisan political philosopher said to me recently, "I hate government!" Do I need to tell you what his party allegiance is? We have assumed the neutrality of our institutions too easily, without regard for our history.

The very fact that politics deals largely with procedure rather than substance (with power, institutions, concepts of organization, rights, and government itself, none of which are ends in themselves) demonstrates its strategic character. We get confused about the meaning of politics because we underestimate the importance of political strategy.

One difficulty scholars have experienced in interpreting American politics has always been that the grand strategy of politics has concerned itself first of all with the structure of institutions. The function of institutions is to channelize conflict, but they do not treat all forms of conflict equally, just as the football rules discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence. This is the bias of institutions which are never neutral about all kinds of conflict.

Nobody knows what American politics would be like if we had the institutions to facilitate the development of a wider span of political competition. No matter what we do about the problem, however, it is unlikely that we shall ever become hospitable to all conflict, for the function of institutions is to discriminate among conflicts.

If politics is the management of conflict, it is necessary first to get rid of some simplistic concepts of conflict. Political conflict is not primarily or usually a matter of head-on collisions or tests of strength, for a good

reason: intelligent people prefer to avoid tests of strength, about matters more serious than sports, unless they are sure to win.

Nor is political conflict like an intercollegiate debate in which the opponents agree in advance on a definition of the issues. The definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power; the antagonists can rarely agree on what the issues are because power is involved in the definition. He who determines what politics is about runs the country be-because the definition of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power.

Nor does political conflict express a one-to-one relation with economic interest or grass roots opinion. Politics is a highly strategic activity which takes account of interest and opinion but is not the same thing.

Is it possible to formulate a theory of the dynamics of politics based on more comprehensive concepts of conflict than the foregoing? I would like to substitute a new image of conflict for the more familiar picture. The proposition I would like to examine is that American politics is in a dynamic condition (*i.e.*, it is a proper subject of strategy) because it is sensitive to changes in the dimension and nature of conflict. More specifically, the proposition is that relatively slight changes in the intensity, visibility, direction, and scope of conflict are likely to produce great consequences. Nearly all of politics can be subsumed under these four headings: intensity, visibility, direction and scope.

I. INTENSITY

At the risk of seeming to imitate the schoolboy who wrote that the processes common to all living things are nutrition, digestion, exhaustion, and discretion, I want to say something about the intensity, visibility, direction, and scope of conflict and the relation of these factors to the dynamics and strategy of politics.

Political scientists have traditionally shown a strong predisposition to underestimate the future. This may be due to an historical illusion, the illusion that everything is at a standstill in the present. This is an illusion about time, but our view of the future may be affected also by the fact that we do not know what change looks like. What makes the system dynamic? What do we look for? Simplistic concepts of conflict make the political system look stagnant because they conceal change.

There is some evidence that there has been an increase in the intensity of public involvement in politics in the past generation. Not only is the government larger and more expensive than it was a generation ago, but there has been a change in the agenda of the government and assumptions about the stability and survival of the social system can no longer be made as confidently as they were made fifty years ago.

Considering the extent to which the historic patterns of the political organization of the United States have been based on assumptions about public indifference, a very slight change in the temperature of the mass may have important consequences, at a time when the whole involvement of modern man in politics seems to be undergoing a general revision.

II. VISIBILITY

How do we see conflict?

Changes in intensity bear none of the familiar earmarks of conflict conceived of as head-on collisions or tests of strength.

The dynamics of American politics is affected by the tendency of the system to move by indirection. The process of legislation and administration is largely the discovery of focal points at which remote controls may be applied. A few people, druggists, bankers, common carriers, public utilities magnates, importers, government contractors, manufacturers of military supplies, farmers, food processors, financiers, and corporation lawyers are likely to be acutely conscious of the government because the government uses them to implement its policies. Most of the rest of us see the government at a distance most of the time.

Generally speaking, indirection might be expected to produce a low-grade political infection. The political consequences of public policies are likely to be highly unequal, therefore, depending on their visibility.

The place of indirection in political strategy is illustrated by the efforts of interests opposed to public housing to get local referenda on housing projects, an attempt to manipulate the visibility of the policy, or the attempt to reduce public expenditures by making taxes visible. Perhaps the government could not finance itself today if everybody who now pays taxes knew what he was doing when he paid them. The strategy of painless taxation is based on low visibility; so is private tax collection. It is by no means certain what the ultimate effects of the attempt to make the government more visible may be.

A substantial segment of the literature of political science dealing with governmental reorganization, lines of command and responsibility, simplification of procedures and structures, publicity and reporting, has a bearing on the general strategy of visibility.

In spite of growing complexities the ultimate responsibility of the government to the people remains a reality, for the visibility of public policy depends to a great extent on what the public is looking for, on its concept of responsibility. All I mean to say here is that it seems to me that a slight change in the visibility of government or in the public habit

of seeing the government is likely to have a great impact on the outcome of conflict.

Changes in intensity and visibility have very little to do with the tug-of-war concept of politics.

III. DIRECTION

The most powerful instrument for the control of conflict is conflict itself. A generation ago Professor E. A. Ross wrote:

> Every species of social conflict interferes with every other species in society . . save only when lines of cleavage coincide; in which case they reinforce one another. . . . A society, therefore, which is ridden by a dozen oppositions along lines running in every direction may actually be in less danger of being torn with violence or falling to pieces than one split just along one line.

This is an extremely important statement and I think you recognize the implications it has had in political theory. Let us examine it. The unstated assumption made by Professor Ross is that there is a kind of equality of conflicts. If this were really true the rise of a multitude of inconsistent conflicts would tend to weaken all of the antagonisms generated in the political system, producing a system of low-grade tensions. Is this a reasonable assumption?

Is it not much more reasonable to suppose that conflicts are of unequal intensity? What are the logical consequences of the inequality of conflicts? It seems to me that the inequality of conflicts determines the nature of the political system. If we assume that conflicts are unequal in intensity, it follows logically that the more intense conflicts are likely to displace the less intense conflicts. What follows from the inequality of conflicts is a system of domination and subordination of conflicts. No conflict can become important unless inconsistent conflicts are subordinated. This is an essential condition of all conflict. Since this is true, every great conflict overwhelms a multitude of lesser ones. The greatest hazard in the development of any conflict is not a frontal attack by the opposition but a flank attack by bigger collateral, inconsistent and irrelevant competitors for the attention and loyalty of the public. If there are degrees of intensity, the more intense conflicts will subordinate the less intense. What is the result? The result is a reduction in the number of conflicts that can become important.

If I may refer once more to the ubiquitous schoolboy who described chemistry as "the study of how a thing that is busted gets together and how them that's together gets separated," his definition has the virtue of emphasizing combinations as well as divisions. The generalization

applies equally to politics. The process is not to divide and divide and divide to infinity but to divide and unify at the same time and as a part of the same process. Unification and division are parallel processes, for no conflict can develop without a tremendous consolidation of forces on both sides of the cleavage.

This process limits the multiplication of conflicts. For this reason it may be said that there are great numbers of potential conflicts in the community which cannot be developed because they are subordinated to stronger systems of antagonism. This line of reasoning has something to do with the scale and scope of conflict.

In the struggle among conflicts there is nothing sacred about our preference for big or little conflicts. All depends on what we want most. The outcome is not determined merely by what people want but by their priorities. What they want more becomes the enemy of what they want less. Politics is therefore something like choosing a wife, rather than shopping in a five-and-ten-cent store.

I conclude that the inequality of conflicts is the decisive factor in this situation because it gives shape and form to the political system.

It now becomes proper to ask, what is the regnant form of pluralism in the modern world? Perhaps it is nationalism, the greatest divisive force in the world today. Nationalism has produced the most powerful organizations the human race has ever known. Says Professor Hans Kohn,

> Nationalism can claim today to be a worldwide force, the first worldwide force in history to which the peoples of all continents pay homage and loyalty.

Nationalism is the most drastic pattern of pluralism in the world. It follows that nationalism conditions profoundly the development of all other conflicts. If this statement is accurate it ought also to dispose of the notion that organizations are powerful and intense in inverse proportion to their size, because the national state is a large organization. Nationalism is a unifying as well as a divisive force. It is not true therefore that there is something about the political world that suggests that a modern community necessarily and inevitably breaks up into a great multitude of microscopic minorities. The scale of organization is related to what we want most and what kind of organization is appropriate to the dominant desires or fears of people.

In the conflict of conflicts, what the conflict is about is never independent of the organization of politics. But in the very nature of things, we have some kind of choice about the sorts of things we want to make dominant.

I would be very bold, indeed, if I pretended to be able to tell you what politics is about, but the task is not as difficult as it has sometimes

been made to seem. There is no more certain way to destroy the meaning of politics than to treat all issues as if they were free and equal. The inequality of issues simplifies the interpretation of politics.

The outcome of conflict is determined by changes in the direction of cleavages, and relatively slight changes of direction are likely to have great consequences. The displacement of conflicts is therefore a prime instrument of strategy.

IV. SCOPE

The fourth factor in the dynamics of American politics is the scope of conflict, because the scope of conflict is likely to have a decisive effect on its outcome. In its simplest terms, the proposition is that the intervention of Harry in a conflict between Tom and Dick will change the nature of the conflict no matter what Harry does. Thereafter every addition to the number of participants changes the conflict. Any conflict is likely to be influenced decisively by changes in its scope. Political strategy deals therefore with the inclusion and exclusion of contestants because it is never true that the balance remains the same if the number is changed.

A look at the literature of American politics reveals that there is an eternal struggle between the conflicting tendencies toward the privatization and socialization of conflict. On the one hand there is a battery of ideas calculated to restrict the scope of conflict or to keep it entirely out of the public domain. Ideas concerning individualism, free private enterprise, localism, privacy, and economy are designed to privatize conflict or to restrict its scope. The outcome of any conflict can be predetermined by confining it so narrowly that the balance of forces is known in advance. By far the most effective device is the effort to keep conflicts wholly outside of the public domain. This stratagem, if successful, makes it impossible to involve public authority in the resolution of the conflict. A tremendous fraction of all conflict is managed by this device.

On the other hand, there is another battery of ideas conducive to the socialization of conflict. Universal ideas in our civilization, ideas concerning equality, consistency, equal protection of the laws, justice, freedom of movement, freedom of speech and association tend to socialize conflict.

Governmental procedures which lend themselves to delay and structural complexities which postpone decisions tend to socialize conflict by providing occasions for the kind of agitation that is likely to increase the scope of conflict, contrary to the common opinion that the separation of powers, bicameralism and similar arrangements are antidemocratic.

The direction of political cleavages has a bearing on their scope. Sec-

tionalism tends to restrict the scope of conflict; it tends also to suppress intrasectional conflict. This is true of all procedures tending to localize conflict. On the other hand, horizontal, national cleavages inevitably extend the scope of politics. Thus the direction and scope of cleavages are related.

Pressure politics is an instrument for the socialization of conflict. Pressure tactics result when the losers in a private conflict find themselves in an intolerable situation and appeal to public authority for relief. The important point about pressure politics is not that it is a conflict of private interests, but the fact that private conflicts are taken into the public domain. Pressure politics is therefore a stage in the socialization of conflict; it represents the breakdown of the attempt to privatize conflict.

The socialization of conflicts shows how conflict can be used to expand the community.

Throughout this discussion it is evident that the greatest prerequisite for the development of conflict as an instrument of public policy is an amplitude of public power. It is for this reason that the drive for privatization of conflict takes the form of an attack on government, often seen as a movement for economy. The objective is a reduction of the governmental capacity to intervene in conflict and the capacity of the community to use conflict as an instrument of public policy.

The enormous importance of the nationalization of politics becomes evident as we look at these strategies. The nationalization of politics represents both a change in the direction of political cleavage and an expansion of the scope of these cleavages. It illustrates the proposition that the greatest of all civil rights is the right of freedom of movement which has played an incalculably great role in the development of the American nation. Freedom of migration has been the most effective single device in the development of a free American people. We see its significance today in the migrations of the American Negro which have nationalized the question of race relations. It is impossible to understand the role of conflict in American politics apart from the examination of the scope of conflict. Even a slight change in the direction and scope of conflict is likely to have great consequences.

The intensity, visibility, direction, and scope of conflict are instruments of political strategy. If we look at the political system from this point of view it appears that our resources are very great.

THE PLACE OF PARTIES IN THE STUDY OF POLITICS*

AVERY LEISERSON
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When the beginner approaches the study of politics, one of the most natural questions for him to ask is: what is it that political science studies? This is a way of asking what is the political scientist's conception of reality. More often than not, the teacher finds the student looking for an objective physical structure, simplified yet concrete, like the astronomer's reduced-scale construction of the solar system, the biologist's photographic reproduction of microscopic cellular organisms, or the physicist's diagram of atomic structure. It is important for the student of human affairs to realize that while individuals, small groups, mass meetings, and even whole cities can be photographed or diagrammed, social scientists have never succeeded in reproducing satisfactory physical models of such concepts as personality, social structure, bureaucratic organization, the price system, or government. Nor do the ends and criteria of government, like order, justice, freedom, welfare or security, lend themselves to analysis in terms of physical or chemical elements like oxygen, carbon, iron, or uranium. Perhaps the closest physical analogy to politics and government is an automobile engine or an electric power plant; but no one would claim that the driver of a car has learned the principles of the engine if all he knows is how to operate it, any more than the power plant engineer understands generation if all he learns is how to read dials and pull switches. Theory is required, and its function is to identify and abstract from total reality the essential minimal concepts and to formulate statements describing the relationships between those concepts whereby the world of experience becomes comprehensible.[1] Theory is never identical with the totality of phenomenal experience; the propositions and principles of theory provide a means by which aspects of reality can be explicitly analyzed and verified, in the hope that some synthesizing minds will make the efforts toward a synthetic reconstruction of reality on the basis of understood principles.

I. PARTIES AND THEORY: THE PROBLEM OF A LOGICAL MODEL

The classical model of political philosophy was the State, an artificial construct defined as a population occupying a definite territory, rendering habitual obedience to an organized government or body of ruling officials independent of external control, and possessing an attribute called internal sovereignty (supreme legal authority over its citizens). With this model, political analysis con-

* This article draws on a forthcoming book: *Political Parties and the Study of Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958).

[1] H. Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy* (Berkeley, 1951). For non-institutional, mathematical formulations, see H. Simon and A. Newell, "Models: Their Uses and Limitations," in L. D. White, ed., *The State of the Social Sciences* (Chicago, 1956), pp. 66–84; D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell, eds., *The Policy Sciences* (1951), Chs. 1, 8–9.

sisted of observing and comparing different kinds of states, their forms and processes of government, the relations between government and citizens, and the methods by which states and governmental forms were changed or transformed. States were classified according to the purposes or ends of human nature or society assumed by the philosopher, and political specialists were supposed to be experts upon organizational and policy methods, either (a) conducive to establishing or changing governmental institutions to conform to the postulated ends or principles (the idealistic school), or (b) conducive to establishing or maintaining rule by the individual, group, class, or body of persons with whose interests the analyst identified the welfare of the State (the realistic school).

The history of natural science is full of discarded concepts, as of ether and phlogiston, and with cases of complex systems which have been superseded by simpler ones (the Ptolemaic and the Copernican). Something like this appears to be happening to the theory (model) of the State. As an analytical construct, it was not of much help in discriminating or analyzing governmental systems; the concept of sovereignty was defective both for understanding the historical evolution and contemporary distribution of political forces within countries, and it failed to provide any explanation of revolution or governmental transformation. Its principal use was as a justification of political independence and intransigence in international politics, where the term retains its most plausible applicability and most frequent usage. But the history of science, together with the development of logico-experimental reasoning, also suggests that fruitful scientific progress may be made under the influence of quite erroneous and misleading overall models (theories), and that, given the limitations of human understanding it is quite possible that two or more theoretical models may be necessary to provide adequate explanations of experience. The history of political thought provides ample confirmation of the pluralistic, contingent, and hypothetical character of ideals of the State.

Similar considerations are relevant to the famous Aristotelian classification of governmental forms into the rule of one, the few, or the many. The principal utility of these distinctions lies in the opportunity for logical disputation about, and the inquiry they suggest into, the "real" location of political authority, and the "imputed" values and superiorities of each form. When Aristotle himself applied his categories to the empirical analysis of actual Greek city-states, (Books IV–VI of the *Politics*) his "best" forms disappeared and he found himself talking almost entirely in terms of two non-ideal categories, oligarchies and democracies. But the most serious defects of the classical distinction between forms of government emerged with the realization (a) that people and politicians under quite inconsistent governmental structures insist that their governments are "true" democracies, and (b) that similarities as well as differences in political behavior and governance can be detected and stated not only between governmental systems but across national complexes or cultures.[2] This does not mean that differences in political ideals and expectations are unreal or un-

[2] G. A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18, pp. 391–409 (1956).

important, particularly to people entertaining them. It is quite possible and instructive to develop a typology of political ideologies (liberalism, democracy, fascism, socialism) in terms of aims or preferences about the relative roles of freedom and authority. But this is not the same kind of model, nor is it necessarily an appropriate procedure for analyzing political systems with respect to their bases of political consensus, their methods of choosing and controlling political leaders, and their processes of arriving at authoritative decisions on public policy. In short, there is something wrong with a logical theory, or analytical model, of the State and a classification of governmental systems which is based wholly upon ideals and purposes, and is too far removed from the practices and material interests by which people are also governed. Nevertheless, this is just about the position (the intellectual arsenal) of political science during the last quarter of the 19th century, when it first received academic recognition as a discipline separate from moral and practical philosophy, and from schools of law, and abandoned its uneasy liaison with economics under the name "political economy."[3]

[3]The modern reaction from speculative theories of sovereignty and the State may be traced to a series of Anglo-American studies of that period analyzing the political systems of specific countries. None of these studies found it necessary to depend to any observable extent on such concepts in order to show how people governed themselves.[4] On the contrary, the outstanding features of these works were (1) their direct observation and analysis of political processes and governmental institutions in operation, and (2) their sharp differentiation of formal constitutional-legal structure and symbolism from the effective processes of selecting rulers, regulating the relations between the formal branches or parts of government, conducting the business of government, and formulating public policy. So persuasive and brilliant were these books that they almost immediately achieved the status of classics, and were incorporated into the literature as a separate branch of the subject, not as a part of political theory or philosophy, but as empirical data for the comparative analysis of governmental institutions and processes. Research and analytical elaboration of governmental systems in terms of *process* (constituent, electoral, legislative, executive, judicial and administrative) proceeded so far that by 1930 their connection with formal political theory was so tenuous as to be highly embarrassing.[5]

[3] Some representative works of this period are: J. B. Bluntschli, *Theory of the State* (1885); J. W. Burgess, *Political Science and Constitutional Law* (1890); J. R. Seeley, *Introduction to Political Science* (1893); W. W. Willoughby, *The Nature of the State* (1896).

[4] J. S. Mill, *Representative Government* (1861); W. Bagehot, *The English Constitution* (1872); W. Wilson, *Congressional Government* (1885); J. Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (1888); A. L. Lowell, *Governments and Politics of Continental Europe* (1897); F. J. Goodnow, *Politics and Administration* (1900).

[5] The dualism appears sharply in the organization of such works as W. F. Willoughby, *The Government of Modern States* (1918); H. J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics* (1925); J. W. Garner, *Political Science and Government* (1928). Recent efforts to transcend this separation are C. E. Merriam, *Systematic Politics* (1945); R. M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (1947).

But while the empirical scope of political science progressed to the point of recognizing and absorbing the disparate processes of public law and constitutional symbolism, political behavior and organization (public opinion, political parties, pressure groups, legislation) and public administration, by the end of the first third of the twentieth century it had not produced modern counterparts of the classical system-builders of political philosophy. The second third of the century has been occupied with clarifying the connections between the social sciences and grasping the ancient truth that an adequate science of politics cannot be confined to a body of data concerned *solely* with the institutions *conventionally labelled* as political or governmental. The empirical data of politics are interlinked with, and on the analytical level political theorists are explicitly trying to take account of, human personality (which used to be called "human nature"), social structure (groups and classes), economic organization, geography (natural and human resources), and culture (norms, beliefs and technology). Awareness of these linkages compels a re-examination of the analytic focus of political science, unless we are to fall back upon the definition of the scope of political science as government and related phenomena. The principal vehicle of this theoretical shift has been the notion of politics as authority and power relations among people, enforceable by sanctions (rewards or deprivations) of physical force, economic goods, and moral compulsion or persuasion.[6]

Some major variations of the concept of politics as power relationships among people have been the idea of *legitimate authority* (Weber), the act of deliberate social control toward explicitly chosen ends (Catlin), the *power situation* (Merriam), the exercise of influence (Lasswell), and the efforts to symbolize politics as the making of important decisions in society (in Easton's phrase, the "authoritative allocation of values"). Robert A. Dahl has suggested a pluralistic model of four overlapping patterns of decision-making in any given society, based on different types of organized relationships between leaders and non-leaders: (1) hierarchy (non-leaders highly controlled by leaders); (2) democracy (formal leaders highly controlled by non-leaders); (3) bargaining (reciprocal control among leaders); (4) the price system (control of leaders by competitive market conditions and by the limits of rational choice).[7] Once again, this conceptual multiplicity of models (theories) should not be misinterpreted by the student as meaning that scientific knowledge is impossible. Rather it should encourage him in the historical conviction of the non-determinism of the great problems facing man-in-society, and of the degree of choice

[6] M. Weber, *Theory of Economic and Social Organization*, Part III (1919, English translation by Parsons, 1947); G. Catlin, *The Principles of Politics* (1930); C. E. Merriam, *Political Power* (1934); H. D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (1935) and, with A. Kaplan, *Power and Society* (1950); D. Easton, *The Political System* (1953). But see T. I. Cook, "The Methods of Political Science," in *Contemporary Political Science* (UNESCO, Paris, 1950).

[7] R. A. Dahl and C. E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (1953), Part IV; R. A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, 1956).

that is possible for man by reflecting about and participating through politics to guide his collective destiny with his fellowmen.[8]

The common residue in all contemporary analytical-empirical theories of politics consists in their agreement that in order to understand the ultimate, perhaps unknowable nature of influence and power relationships among men, it is necessary at least to understand how the major systems of belief operate in respect to relationships between social organization and political authority, how political power is organized and distributed between officials and citizens, how political opinion is generated and shaped in choosing rulers and formulating public policy, and what relationships between public officials and non-governmental leaders affect the determination and execution of public policies. Such empirically based concepts and meaningful hypotheses or propositions as the political scientist is able to formulate concerning the personal relationships of influence and power among men constitute the body of knowledge he has to contribute to the service of his fellow men in seeking the common values they can agree upon as achievable through institutions of government.

II. THE RELATION OF PARTIES TO PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

Why theorize about political parties? In the previous section it was observed that thinking about politics implies some basic structural concepts. Whether or not the State is necessary or adequate as one of these, political science starts with the assumption of a community made up of human personalities sharing both common values and conflicting interests, who recognize and accept certain beliefs as legitimizing the authority of a formal organization of rulers and officials to define and carry out these purposes. But while some thinkers may enjoy the game of elaborating the logical (formal) implications of the separation, and consequent relations, between rulers and ruled in a politically organized community,[9] such a game provides the student with little synthetic (factual) knowledge about the functional roles of rulers (politicians), their recruitment and selection, the personal, social and organizational bases of their influence, and how their political organizations affect the making of important public decisions.

If the latter questions indicate the kinds of data we want to get at, and the sort of relationships we want to study, it should be clear that the patterns of interpersonal behavior called "political parties" do not constitute the whole of politics. Yet whether we define parties and party systems as patterns of social interaction, as mass-membership ideological groups, or as historico-legal organizations nominating candidates for public office, we still find that the political

[8] L. Lipson, *The Great Issues of Politics* (New York, 1954), esp. ch. 4.

[9] H. Simon, "On the Observation and Measurement of Political Power," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 15, p. 500 (1954); J. G. March, "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence," this REVIEW, Vol. 49, p. 431 (1955); R. A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 2, p. 201 (1957); F. Oppenheim, "Control and Causation," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 19 (1958).

party is a strategically critical concept for understanding, in any developed political system,[10] the practices that permit and justify the exercise of political authority, that regulate the effective choice and removal of political rulers, and that prescribe and delimit the authority of the government in power; as well as the processes by which public policy-makers are guided by and subjected to the broad movements of popular sentiment and the balance of inter-group pressures. The political party, or party system, provides the major connective linkage between people and government, between separate, formal agencies and officials of government, and between official and non-official (extra-governmental) holders of power. The political party cuts across, and must be taken into account in, any analysis of at least four of the conventional processes of government: the electoral, the legislative, the executive, the administrative; and most analysts would also agree that the appointment of judges is not unrelated to political beliefs and party affiliation.

Formal governmental structure and symbolism can be understood without reference to party history and behavior, but the "living constitution," the structure of "effective power in the commonwealth," requires recognition of the organization and distribution of power in society that is reflected and mobilized in the membership, organization and customary practices of political parties. One of the most fascinating and recurrent problems of political science is the relationship of constitutional symbolism and political organization to the distribution of military force, economic power and social ranking in the community. Several historic and contemporary ideologies present various *preferred* answers to the problem, but all of them agree that political authority and organization are related to the distribution in society of power over persons, property and prestige. Political organization, whether the formal, constitutional structure of government or the formal-informal systems we call interest groups and political parties, is rooted in social structure; that is to say, political organization *represents* the geographic and group distribution of social, economic and military power. If power is unequally distributed, and complicated by the variation of political opinions within and between the subclasses of each type, this will be reflected in the units and levels of political organization. In other words, political organization is not identical with, but functionally related to (dominated by, superior to, or integrated with) the spatial, functional, and interpersonal distribution of power in society. It is tempting to assume, and many social theorists have concluded, that political power is necessarily inferior to and determined by the holders of economic or military influence:[11] but

[10] The contrast intended here is with political systems based on tribal, kinship, nomadic, agricultural, or primitive, localized communities, where hereditary authority, the persistent resort to violence, religious symbolism and organization, or monolithic mass movements variously prevent the development of representative government through party politics. See W. C. MacLeod, *The Origin and History of Politics* (New York, 1931); E. Jenks, *State and Nation* (London, 1919); H. M. Clokie, "The Modern Party-State," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 15 (1939), 139–157.

[11] The most recent formulation of this thesis is C. W. Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, 1956). Although Mills protects himself by presenting facts of personal interpenetra-

this is not the only form of the relationship, and when formulated in this way it rejects too many empirical facts which complicate the problems of governance through a multiplicity of politically significant organizations.

In addition to their external relations, political parties in their internal organizations present all the phenomena and varieties of centralization-decentralization, coordination-uncoordination, of which complex, large-scale systems of human relationships are capable. Just as the corporation has been labelled the *representative* institution of capitalistic enterprise, so the political party may be designated as the representative institution of *political* enterprise. Again, while some social scientists have committed themselves to a conception of "boss-controlled," tightly organized, hierarchic authority as the prototype of political party organization, systematic and comparative observation indicates that a more flexible, multi-dimensional model is required.[12] What this means for the political analyst is that he should not infer, from the hierarchy and centralization that logically flows from the division of power between leaders and led in political parties, that a wide continuum of alternative forms of political organization is inconceivable or unfeasible.[13]

Finally, the study of political parties is virtually a prerequisite to a realistic understanding of the problems of democracy, both in theory and in action. Since the leaders of almost all independent political systems insist that their governments embody the true principles of democracy and self-government, merely formal definitions of these terms seem somewhat beside the point. Whether or not we try to solve the difficulties by asserting normative or formal criteria of democracy, *e.g.*, popular sovereignty, majority rule, group consultation and minority rights,[14] the student of politics must come to grips with the realities of: (1) power and value-seeking individuals and groups; (2) differentials in human involvement, knowledge and skill in public affairs and self-government; (3) coercive authority and responsibility exercised by voluntary

tion between corporate, military and governmental hierarchies, the whole weight of his argument reproduces the Marxist and determinist thesis of the subordination of political to other forms of social power. The more general statement, and more adequate interpretation, goes back to Aristotle, but relevant recent formulations in terms of the *functional requirements of the political order* may be found in Merriam's *Systematic Politics*, chs. 1, 6; G. Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York, 1939); R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Free Press, 1949), ch. 1; F. Neumann, "Approaches to the Study of Political Power," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 65, p. 161 (1950).

[12] Compare Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (Glencoe, Ill., 1949) with M. Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York, 1954), or S. Neumann, ed., *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago, 1956). For an attempt at synthesis of organizational theory ranging from primitive tribes through local communities to industrial factory organization, see G. C. Homans, *The Human Group* (New York, 1950).

[13] Historic examples of this reasoning are: Democracy (rule by the majority) implies organization (oligarchy). Organization means control of members (followers) by officers or a minority of leaders. Therefore democracy is impossible (19th century conservatives) or undesirable (20th century fascists).

[14] Examples of these approaches may be found in A. Ranney and W. Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York, 1956) and R. A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, 1955).

groups, as well as by public representatives and officials; and (4) the establishment and maintenance of conditions whereby such authority is limited and brought into viable, working relationship with group interests and with the common political aspirations or objectives of the whole political community. These are the enduring problems of governance under all political ideologies and variations in governmental practices. While the study of politics may be approached through other processes besides political parties, notably the judicial or the administrative, the growth and evolution of democracy and rule by public opinion have been uniquely connected with the rise of party government since the 17th century. Analytical approaches to the study of politics through political parties will not demonstrate whether democracy according to preferred criteria is possible or desirable, but will inquire, assuming the necessity of multiple political organization through parties and interest groups, what are the requirements and consequences of party government: to what extent and through what processes parties articulate felt public demands, choose political leaders, influence political decisions, shape public opinion and control public officials; and will assess the possibilities of personal and collective choice with respect to political systems for the accomplishment of these functions.

III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS

The attainment of knowledge and wisdom through the study of political science seems to proceed through a series of stages:[15] (1) the manipulation of values, goals, ideological systems—what Sigmund Neumann has called "political alchemy"; (2) the empirical description and classification of political forms and process (morphology); and (3) the identification of dynamic political elements (concepts or variables) and the formulation of significant, strategic relationships in differing politico-cultural settings.

Political parties may be analyzed from several points of view. Externally and historically, parties constitute a central institutional link between social and governmental structure in mass-participation political systems. A natural series of hypotheses arises from speculation concerning the mutual effects of formal governmental structure upon party and interest group behavior and organization, as well as of social structure upon the legal framework. Secondly, on the psychological level, party doctrine and perceptions of party membership help the individual to resolve the inner tensions between his several group affiliations and his responsibility for the selection of political-governmental leaders. Thirdly, as organizations, the internal processes of party management and policy-making may be visualized not as closed, self-contained elite groups, but as complex patterns of leader-follower relationships (exhibiting varying degrees of interpersonal control, rivalry, submission) with other political entities (interest groups, public administrative agencies, mass communications media), with which the parties intersect and overlap in the vital functions of political education, organizing political participation, providing access to and

[15] S. Neumann, *Comparative Political Parties* (1956), pp. 1–4, 395–421; "Comparative Politics: A Half-Century Appraisal," *Journal of Politics* (August, 1957).

consultation with public officials and coordinating the elective and administrative branches of government.

Finally, we should seek to develop a classification not just of parties, but of political party systems. One such typology may be based upon the variables of: (a) legal-institutional arrangements for political representation, (b) the personal-mass psychological concept of party membership and identification, and (c) the status-and-role relations between party leaders and governmental officials. From these we may derive the following:

TYPES OF PARTY SYSTEMS

(I) the Representative-Majority Type
(II) the Responsible-Majority Type
(III) the Multi-party Coalition
(IV) Predominant Single-Party

It is not scientifically or logically possible to assert that such a classification is complete and internally consistent, that any one of these types necessarily occurs in connection with a particular type of social structure, or that any one will necessarily recur in any specified conjuncture of political events. Historical research discloses no inevitable historical sequence, cycle, or evolutionary pattern of party development. Furthermore, each category contains sub-categories based upon differing structural arrangements that present varying contexts of equilibrium and strategy to the participant political actors and groups.

For example, the multi-party system operates quite differently in a three-party situation where a rising or declining party-group occupies a balancing role between two major parties, than it does when there are six or more fairly identifiable party groupings, or in a stable, four-party division of the electorate and legislature. Differences also exist within the predominant, single-party category, which may refer to such different situations as: (a) the tradition-bound, caste-divided, pre-industrial society in which the dominance of a single dynasty, ideology, and ruling class is accepted as necessary and inevitable, (b) a social order undergoing rapid, violent transition, characterized by both domestic and foreign ideological competition and organized opposition, (c) a complex, transitional social system in which strong overt intra-party factional struggle exists upon all but one vital issue, upon which political consensus depends. Finally, both types of majority-party systems exhibit internal factional cleavages and relationships with non-party groups which must be taken into account if a majoritarian political system is to be comprehended.

Thus perhaps the basic relevance of comparative party politics is not the mastery of a classification which enables the observer-analyst to label and pigeon-hole a country or community. The classification provides him merely with an analytical framework whereby he can probe more deeply to identify the significant political groupings in different societies, their role structure and functional differentiation, their interplay in the political processes of opinion formation, representation, and decision-making. The instrumental and variable

quality of conceptual categories and classifications seems particularly marked when the political scientist turns his attention from the relatively stabilized, developed, differentiated political systems of Western Europe and the United States to the pre-industrial, technologically underdeveloped societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In these areas, cultural factors are "being transformed from constants to variables" with explosive ideological effects, the key political groupings are not highly organized and do not recognize the institutional division of political labor characteristic of Western countries (with its high substitutability of roles); and the formal governmental structure is apt to be both alien and misleading as a guide to the repositories and channels of effective political power.[16]

To repeat, the theoretical and comparative analysis of political systems is a basic precondition to self-orientation in the contemporary world. Politics can be and has been studied in a policy-oriented context. To do so, however, implies that the student makes some prior commitment to a concept of national, public or international interest, or identifies himself with an institutional center of political authority. In this context he must cast his findings and recommendations in a framework acceptable to a mass political audience, to the owners or editors of a mass communication medium, to the policy-makers of a political interest or research group, to the higher-level officials of governmental departments or agencies, to legislative committees and chief executives, perhaps even to the bureaucratic and political levels of the U.N. In private and in public, such policy criticism and discussion is vital to a democratic process of opinion formation and representation.

Fundamentally, however, comparative knowledge of the dynamic processes of leadership recruitment, political opinion and policy formation, deserves scientific investigation long before one enters the policy arena of debate over domestic policies of inflation, employment or welfare; foreign policies of national security, diplomacy, trade, aid and stabilization; or programs of international communication and education. Single individuals as well as whole peoples are involved in the process of self-knowledge and clarification of political goals under the challenge of alternative value systems from abroad. As a vehicle both of value conflict and value integration, the political party as no other political institution reaches down, up, across and through the individual, the group, the nation and the cross-national associations of individuals and social classes. The different modes of articulating, through party politics, popular sentiments and group, class, national or international interests constitute a central clue to comprehension, not only of the world-wide ideological struggle between democracy and dictatorship but, beyond ideology, of under-

[16] On these points, see the report of the Committee on Comparative Politics, this REVIEW, Vol. 49, pp. 1022–49 (1955); D. A. Rustow, "The Comparison of Western and Non-Western Political Systems" (Washington: American Political Science Association, 1956); G. A. Almond, "The Seminar on Comparative Politics," *Items*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1956).

standing the requirements, costs and consequences of personal awareness and responsibility for political decision-making, wherever one may live.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS

The conditional and contingent state of political knowledge based upon the classical disciplines of philosophy, history and public law, combined more recently with the empirical study of political and administrative organization, comprises the perceptual and analytical equipment of the main body of modern political science. Collectively, and with its distinctive focus upon government, the oldest tradition in political *science* (as distinct from the philosophical tradition of postulating and elaborating ideal forms of society and government) emerges in what may be called *institutional analysis*, *i.e.*, the historical, legal and logical bases of political institutions, their modes of operation, and their differential effects in terms of broad categories of organizational behavior in operation. Around the beginning of the present century there arose a new emphasis, associated with new developments of anthropology, psychology, and sociology, upon explicit observation and measurement of the perceptions and attitudes in the population at large toward politics, and the effects upon individual perceptions and attitudes of such variables as social group membership, personality, institutions, and events. In recent years, this systematic, social-psychological, methods-oriented approach to politics in terms of people has acquired the label and status of *behavioral analysis*, and through the efforts and writings of such theorists and analysts as Graham Wallas, Charles Merriam, and Harold Lasswell, a process of reconstruction in political theory was set in motion that is not yet completed.[17] A younger generation of political scientists has grown up under the influence of ideas and methods drawn from sociology, psychology and statistics, but applied in a context of investigating specific propositions about behavior in the complex institutional situations of government and politics rather than in the informal, interpersonal relationships of individuals in family, kin, ethnic, religious and work groups.

The principal effects of these influences in the last twenty-five years have been methodological: (1) to sharpen the conceptual focus of political science upon role structures and decision-making processes in power-oriented situations, (2) to improve the training and increase the emphasis of students upon advancing the status-as-knowledge of demonstrable propositions about the behavior of *people*, (3) to encourage the commitment to search for analytical categories capable of ordering the explaining kinds of experimental data that the traditional methods of political analysis ignored or neglected. Not unnaturally, many political scientists resented, resisted and actively fought the incursion of strange methods and odd language, particularly when it was discovered that

[17] D. B. Truman, "The Impact on Political Science of the Revolution in the Behavioral Sciences," The Brookings Institution, *Research Frontiers in Politics and Government* (Washington, 1955), pp. 202–231.

the advocates of the newer methods had similar motivations and were intrinsically interested in the same phenomena.

In spite of such conflicts it is becoming increasingly evident that the institutional and behavioral approaches are complementary and necessary to each other. The weakness of the institutionalists lies in their inability to identify and measure the factors which produce the variations in personal and mass behavior from the formal requirements and expectations of the political system; hence their emphasis on coercion, moral values and ideologies, and the importance they ascribe to an x-factor of political skill and judgment in supporting their institutional description and prescription. The weakness of the behavioralists lies in an over-emphasis upon methods of data collection and quantitative analysis of minuscular problems of uncertain relevance to the sweeping institutional complexes of politics. But both the macroanalysis of legal, structural, traditional and multi-group institutions and processes of government, and the microanalysis of the variables affecting *individual* political attitudes and behavior are essential components of political knowledge. Whatever form the ultimate theoretical integration of the categories of institutional and behavioral analysis may take, the proposition no longer seems seriously in doubt that competent political analysis includes not only the impact of governmental structure and leadership upon behavior but the consequences of group-based personal attitudes, expectations and demands upon the functional operation of the collective processes comprising the political system as a whole.

SENATE RULES AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS BILL:

A CASE STUDY

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The rules of the Senate of the United States are only 40 in number and comprise only 49 of the 832 pages of the *Senate Manual*. Yet, when literally invoked they can bring Senate business to a standstill. They are most often ignored or circumvented by unanimous consent in order that the Senate may operate conveniently as a deliberative and parliamentary body. To pass legislation when they are invoked is a formidable enterprise.

Just as the law is said to be no better than the procedures by which it is carried out, so the substance of legislation is shaped and modified by the procedures that may be required under the Senate rules, or by the mere threat to invoke those procedures, for they are compelling. The procedures preceding and surrounding the passage of the first civil rights bill in over 80 years illumine and illustrate the effect of the rules on the substance of legislation as have few other legislative controversies in recent years.

The Senate rules are the product of sectionalism. They were designed to prevent action unacceptable to a sectional minority. Among the more important specific rules with this design are: sections 2 and 3 of Rule XXII—the filibuster rule; section 1 of Rule XXII, which makes a tabling motion not debatable and which, therefore, acts as a "negative" form of majority cloture for, if successful, it can stop talk and kill a bill or amendment without a vote on the merits;[1] Rule XXVI, which requires that all reports and motions to discharge a committee of a bill must lie over one legislative day—in practice this can mean several weeks if the Senate recesses from day to day rather than adjourns; Rule XL which requires one (legislative) day's notice to suspend the rules; Rule VII, which requires that a petition to discharge a committee be filed in the so-called morning hour, except by unanimous consent; and the same Rule VII which when literally followed requires the reading of the Journal in full, the presentation of messages from the President and reports and communications from executive departments, and numerous other time-consuming procedures in the morning hour, and so may preclude the opportunity for discharge petitions to be reached, for at the close of that hour the Senate must proceed to the unfinished or pending business; and two unwritten rules, first, of seniority, and second, the rule of recognition under which the chair recognizes either the Majority or Minority Leader as against other Senators who are seeking recognition. This can prevent a Senator from making a timely motion or point of order to which the leadership is opposed and so helps give the leadership command of the parliamentary situation.

[1] The Senate has no similar form of "majority" cloture which could end debate and bring a vote on the substance of a bill or an amendment.

How these rules affected the course of the civil rights debate and the strategy of both sides in the 1956 and 1957 sessions is now to be shown.

I. THE ABORTIVE CIVIL RIGHTS BILL OF 1956

With only a few days of the 84th Congress remaining in July, 1956, the House of Representatives, by a margin of 279 to 126, passed H.R. 627, a bill substantially the same as H.R. 6127 of the 85th Congress, part of which is now the law of the land. A small band composed of Senators Hennings, Douglas, and Lehman and finally supported by Senators Langer, Ives, and Bender, attempted to gain Senate action on the bill when it came from the House. This move was made notwithstanding the determined opposition of both Majority and Minority Leaders which, in the end, proved crushing.

Senator Douglas was guarding the Senate floor as the House passed the bill, and left his seat to go to the House chamber to escort H.R. 627 through the long corridor from the Speaker's to the Vice President's desk. As he was walking to the House he was passed, unknowing, by a messenger carrying the bill to the Senate. With Senator Douglas outside the Senate chamber and with Senator Hill of Alabama in the chair, the bill, with jet-age speed, was read a first and second time and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee where its Senate counterparts had languished for two years.

This action took place by unanimous consent and so by-passed the specific provisions of Rule XIV, which require three readings of a bill prior to passage, "Which [readings] shall be on three different days," but state that bills from the House of Representatives ". . . shall be read once, and may be read twice, on the same day, if not objected to, for reference. . . ."

An attempt was then made under Rule XXVI, section 2, to file a petition to discharge the Judiciary Committee from the further consideration of H.R. 627. Except by unanimous consent the petition must be introduced in the morning hour.

On the same calendar day the bill came from the House a unanimous consent request to file the petition was blocked by a motion of the Majority Leader to recess overnight. At the beginning of the next day's session, in what would ordinarily have been the morning hour, the Senator from Georgia, Mr. George, ruled that the petition could not be filed, except by unanimous consent, for the Senate had recessed the previous evening and, in fact, had not adjourned since the evening of July 13, *i.e.*, 10 days previously. Although the date was then July 24, the legislative day was July 16, and thus technically there was no morning hour for the routine business of filing bills, reports, petitions, etc. Individual Senators then objected to further unanimous consent requests to file the petition. The Senate recessed that day and did not adjourn overnight until July 26, the evening before adjournment *sine die*. In the meantime a motion by Senator Douglas to adjourn for five minutes, in order to bring a new legislative day and a morning hour, was defeated by the crushing vote of 76 to 6.

In the morning hour on the last day of the session, the discharge petition was finally filed. But a discharge petition, under section 2 of Rule XXVI, must lie

over one further "legislative" day. If consideration of the petition is not reached or is not concluded in the morning hour or before 2 o'clock on the next "legislative" day, it goes to the calendar. Then the motion to proceed to its consideration and the motion on passage of the petition are both subject to unlimited debate, unless cloture is applied to each. Such action, even if successful, would only result in placing the bill itself on the calendar, where it in turn must lie for another "legislative" day. The motion to proceed to its consideration and the motion on final passage are also both subject to unlimited debate, unless cloture is applied. Thus the filing of the petition came too late to bring action in the 84th Congress. Even if commenced at the beginning of a session, and even if 64 votes were obtainable for cloture on each of the four occasions when they are potentially necessary, the process of discharging a committee can be drawn out over several weeks, and even months, if the rules of the Senate are literally invoked.

Although this attempt was abortive the experience was useful to the civil rights proponents in 1957. It brought a familiarity with the rules of the Senate which can only be gained from step-by-step proceedings under them; from it they concluded that action must begin very early in the session if it were to be successful; they saw that the route of discharging a committee meant meeting countless roadblocks, which could only be stormed and surmounted by determined efforts and with overwhelming bi-partisan support; and they concluded that a fight to change Rule XXII was essential because the inadequacy of cloture had either killed previous civil rights bills or brought their death by the mere threat of a filibuster.[2]

II. THE FIGHT TO CHANGE RULE XXII

The effort to change Rule XXII was made at the opening of the 85th Congress in January 1957. In the past Rule XXII has been the gravedigger in the Senate graveyard for civil rights bills. Section 2 of Rule XXII requires 64 affirmative votes to limit debate and section 3 provides that on a motion to proceed to the consideration of a change in the rules there can be no limit on debate of any kind. The rules of the Senate have carried over from Congress to Congress and changes in them have been made only after a unanimous consent agreement has been reached narrowly limiting the language and amendments which could come before the Senate.

Because of section 3, the only chance of success seemed to lie in a move at the beginning of a Congress that the Senate proceed to adopt new rules, relying on Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution which provides that ". . . each House may determine the rules of its proceedings." Such a motion was made in 1953 and was defeated by a vote of 70 to 21. Its opponents argued then that a civil rights bill would be passed, and that the rules should be changed only by ordinary processes of piecemeal amendment.

[2] Since 1917, or for 40 years, cloture has been successful on only four of twenty-two attempts and never on a civil rights bill. Sixty-four votes have been forthcoming only three times, all in the period 1917 to 1927. Thus, no cloture motion has successfully prevailed in the last 30 years.

In 1957 the vote to table the motion to proceed to the consideration of new rules was carried, 55 to 38. Three absentees, Senators Neely and Wiley, and Javits, who had not yet taken his seat, opposed tabling and so brought to 41 the total who favored adopting new rules. Thus a shift of seven votes, plus a Vice President's favorable vote or ruling, was all that was now required to change Rule XXII. This was a major gain over 1953, for these 41 votes were obtained over the concerted objections of the leadership of both parties.

The size of the vote and its near success caught Southern Senators on the horns of a dilemma. They knew that any actual and organized use of the filibuster would ultimately bring an end to Rule XXII, and they also knew that if they did not use the filibuster Congress would most likely pass a civil rights bill. The fight to change Rule XXII thereby produced a climate in which not only a meaningful bill could pass but, it can be persuasively argued, a bill much stronger than that which was actually passed. The arguments and the parliamentary strategy involved in the Rule XXII fight were therefore crucial.

The opponents of the change relied basically on a single argument, namely, that the Senate was a continuing body, and as two-thirds of its members carry over from Congress to Congress, its rules should therefore also carry over from Congress to Congress as they have in the past.

The proponents argued that whatever the Senate had done in the past it had explicit constitutional power to adopt its rules at the beginning of a new Congress. Unlike their course in 1953, when the attempt to adopt new rules was hastily devised, the proponents did not meet the continuing body argument head on, but argued instead that it was immaterial whether the Senate was a continuing body or not. Acceptance of the continuing body argument did not deny to a majority of the Senate the right to adopt its own rules. Proponents also argued that proceedings on all bills and resolutions, as well as on treaties, begin again in a new Congress; that the Senate is newly organized and new committees are appointed; and that the newly elected one-third, even though only one-third, could alter the party alignment and thus provide a new majority and a new mandate which it had the right to carry out.

A second argument by the opponents, less used but probably more telling than the first, was that until the adoption of new rules the Senate would be in a parliamentary "jungle." Senator Russell combined with this argument a threat to proceed to rewrite each of the 40 rules of the Senate.

In rejoinder the proponents argued that the House of Representatives entered and left the parliamentary "jungle" in a very few minutes at each new Congress. They proposed that until the rules were adopted the Senate should proceed under general parliamentary rules including the motion for the previous question under which debate could be shut off by a simple majority. The proponents also relied on the precedents of the Senate to support the contention that majority cloture could be applied, for it was shown that the previous question rule was a part of the Senate rules from 1789 to 1806 and was used to bring debate to a close on several occasions.

The potential parliamentary moves were extremely involved, but basically the proponents sought to gain a ruling from the Vice President that their mo-

tion to proceed to the immediate consideration of the adoption of new rules was in order. This was their strongest position but, in the end, it was not gained.

It was their strongest position for a variety of reasons. To succeed, strong bipartisan support was needed. The Democratic Party, by its nature, was split on the issue and could not provide a majority of votes. This was true even though the Democrats have traditionally supplied more votes on procedural issues in support of civil rights, and occasionally more on substantive civil rights issues, then the Republicans. In 1953, of the 21 votes for the adoption of new rules, 15 were Democratic. Only 5 Republicans and Wayne Morse, then an independent, voted for the change. That year Vice President Barkley let it be known that he would rule such a motion in order. But he had no opportunity to do so for Senator Taft gained the floor and gave immediate and prearranged notice that he would move to table the motion and thus shut off argument after a short debate. In 1957 with a Republican Vice President and with Republican votes needed to win, it was obvious that the strongest position would follow from a favorable ruling by the Vice President, and on the vote to uphold or overturn his ruling. The Democrats could provide no more than half of their numbers in support of such a favorable ruling. But the Republicans could provide, potentially, almost all of their votes if the issue were one of supporting their own Vice President.

In 1953 it mattered little whether the motion to proceed to the adoption of new rules were tabled, or whether a point of order were made and a ruling sought, for there would still have been a limit to the number of potential Democratic votes on this issue in support of a Democratic Vice President. The Republicans were obviously under no political pressure to support the ruling of a Democratic Vice President who was to leave office in a very few days.

In 1957 it was a different matter. Whether the vote came on a motion to table or on an appeal from the ruling of the Chair was critically important. If a Republican Vice President now ruled favorably, he would no doubt be supported by more than a majority of his own party which, combined with the Democratic support, could provide the winning margin. The proponent group knew that they would make gains over 1953 however the Vice President ruled, but if he ruled for them there was an opportunity for spectacular gains and perhaps a victory.

The strategy was therefore devised that the mover of the motion to proceed to the consideration of new rules for the Senate should also couple with his motion a parliamentary request for a ruling from the Chair that the motion was in order. If this were not done a motion to table would no doubt be made, thereby cutting off debate and bringing an immediate vote. The proponents of a change in Rule XXII not only had more to gain from a ruling from the Chair but also felt that time for debate, which could educate and arouse public opinion, was necessary to the success of the effort. A steering committee representing those who favored adoption of the new rules therefore met with the Vice President to advise him of their proposed course of action. They did not seek nor did they receive the Vice President's opinion as to the merits of their proposal.

They were advised, however, that the Majority Leader had informed the Vice

President that immediately following the motion to proceed to the consideration of new rules he would seek recognition for the purpose of tabling that motion. The Vice President then gave his opinion that under the precedents of the Senate a point of order could not be coupled with the substantive motion, and that under the unwritten rule of recognition he must recognize the Majority Leader as against some other Senator seeking the floor. This meant, of course, that once the motion was made the Majority Leader would be recognized to move to table that motion and thereby shut off debate before any other Senator, including the mover of the motion, could raise a point of order.

The unwritten rule of recognition thus brought the vote on the issue of Rule XXII on the least advantageous grounds for the proponents of new rules and an end to the filibuster. It was, however, very ironic that the proponents of unlimited debate should immediately move to shut off debate on the question of changing Senate Rule XXII which, in effect, provides for unlimited debate. Recognition of this anomaly led to a unanimous consent agreement which fixed a limited time for debate on the tabling motion. When the motion to proceed to the consideration of new rules was made, consequently, and was sent to the desk and read by the clerk, the Majority Leader sought and gained recognition. He proposed to table the motion which, but for the unanimous consent agreement, would have cut off debate immediately; as it was, debate was limited and the issue came to a vote as had been planned.

In the course of these events the Vice President gave it as his informal opinion, though not as a formal ruling, (1) that a majority of the Senate could adopt new rules at the beginning of a new Congress if it wished; (2) that Section 3 of Rule XXII was unconstitutional for it allowed a previous Senate to bind a majority of a future Senate;[3] and (3) that until such time as the Senate either adopted new rules or by some action, such as the tabling motion, acquiesced in the old rules, the Senate would proceed under its previous rules except for those which could deny a majority of the Senate the right or opportunity to adopt new ones, or, in short, sections 2 and 3 of Rule XXII.

Thus, the unwritten rule of recognition and the use of the tabling motion as a negative form of majority cloture, not available to the proponents of a motion, bill, or amendment, were decisive parliamentary weapons in the fight over Rule XXII and the filibuster.

Although the fight was lost it nevertheless brought several clear gains to the proponents of the civil rights bill and of majority rule, apart from the dilemma of the Southern Senators over their future use of the filibuster. First, rhetorically, it foreshadowed the end of the effectiveness of the argument that the Senate is a continuing body with necessarily continuing rules. The debate

[3] It has been asked why, if the Vice President believed section 3 was unconstitutional, Senators did not press the issue later in the session. The answer is that the Vice President's position was that it was unconstitutional to the extent that it bound one Senate by the actions of a previous Senate. However, if the new Senate agreed to be bound, *i.e.*, acquiesced in the old rules as it did when the tabling motion was successful, section 3 would remain in effect throughout the 85th Congress.

showed it to be irrelevant as well as circuitous to argue that the rules carry over because the Senate is a continuing body, and that the Senate is a continuing body because the rules carry over. Second, substantively, the episode brought clear bi-partisan gains over 1953; the Democratic vote increased from 15 to 21, and the Republican from 5 to 17. While the press was predicting an overwhelming defeat for the 1957 effort those close to the scene estimated quite accurately that approximately 40 would support the motion to proceed to the adoption of new rules. Third, tactically, this fight gave a political urgency to civil rights legislation which it might not otherwise have had, and improved immeasurably the chances for a meaningful bill.

III. FILIBUSTER BY COMMITTEE

H.R. 6127 passed the House on June 18, 1957. In the Senate its companion bill, as well as some 15 other civil rights bills, still had not been acted on by the Judiciary Committee.

This inaction followed precedent. In the 83d Congress four civil rights bills were reported from the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights to the full Judiciary Committee, where they died. In the 84th Congress, the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee reported three bills on February 23, 1956 and a fourth bill on March 4, 1956, to the full Judiciary Committee; but they too died following 10 days of hearings by the full committee spread over the 11-week period from April 24 to July 13. In the 85th Congress, after every legitimate attempt by Senator Hennings and his colleagues to gain action on the bills, not one was reported to the Senate during the entire session. A chronology of the efforts to report a bill to the Senate will show how filibuster by committee takes place.

A number of civil rights bills were introduced during the first days of the session. On January 22, Senator Hennings moved in committee that February 18 be set as the deadline for ending hearings on them and that a vote on the legislation and the reporting of a bill to the Senate should not be delayed beyond one further week. This motion was not acted on.

Four days later, on January 26, the 14 bills by then in committee were referred to the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee.

On January 30 Senator Hennings, the chairman, presented an omnibus bill to the subcommittee and moved that it be reported to the full committee. The motion was defeated.

The subcommittee then agreed to hold hearings and Senator Hennings moved that these should begin on February 12 and be limited to two weeks, after which the subcommittee should act on the bills immediately. This motion was defeated.

Hearings by the subcommittee did begin on February 14 and ended after three weeks on March 5. On March 19, the subcommittee approved S. 83 and reported it, along with majority and minority views, to the full committee.

On March 21, Senator Hennings introduced S. 1658; its language was identical with that of H.R. 6127.

On April 1, in the full committee, Senator Hennings moved that the Judiciary Committee dispose of civil rights legislation by April 15. He was unable to obtain a vote on this motion.

On April 8, Senator Hennings intended to renew his motion, but there was no meeting of the committee owing to the absence of a quorum.

On April 15, Senator Hennings moved that S. 83 be voted on by May 6. The committee took no action.

On May 13, at the next meeting, Senator Hennings desired to move that the committee meet every morning and all day, when the rules of the Senate permitted, and in the evenings if necessary, so that a vote on the bill could be taken by May 16. He was unable to obtain recognition to make this motion.

On June 3, the committee added the sweeping "jury trial" amendment to the bill.

On June 10 and June 17, Senator Hennings was unable to gain recognition during committee meetings.

On June 18 the House passed H.R. 6127 and it was sent to the Senate.

How was it possible for the Judiciary Committee, which contained only a minority of Southern Senators, to delay action on civil rights for such a lengthy period of time? Under Section 134 (c) of the Legislative Reorganization Act, "No standing committee of the Senate . . . shall sit, without special leave, while the Senate . . . is in session." Under Section 133 (a) of the same Act, each standing committee is required to fix a regular day on which to meet. The regular meeting day of the Senate Judiciary Committee is Monday. While the Senate is often in recess on other days of the week, it is invariably in session on Monday, because that day is set for the call of the calendar of unobjected-to bills, and because the Constitution provides that neither House may adjourn for more than three days without the consent of the other. Consequently, when the hour of 12 noon arrives or when, as in the latter stages of the session the Senate meets at an earlier hour, any member of the Judiciary Committee may make a point of order that the Committee may no longer sit. This was done, and was one means of postponing action.

In addition, by the chairman's power to recognize an opponent first, and by his power to hold off a vote on a motion until such a member has concluded his remarks on it, it was easy for the chairman either to prevent a motion from being offered or to prevent action on a specific bill during the Committee's normal two-hour meeting. Further, the unwritten rule of seniority has generally placed a Southern Senator in the chair when the Democratic Party controls Congress. While Rule XXIV reads that ". . . the Senate, unless otherwise ordered, shall proceed by ballot to appoint severally the chairman of each committee. . .", this rule was not enforced either when Senator Eastland was first appointed chairman, on the death of Senator Kilgore, or at the beginning of the 85th Congress when he was reappointed. There was neither a ballot nor a motion to "order otherwise." Finally, on several Mondays it was impossible to muster a quorum.

IV. PLACING H.R. 6127 ON THE SENATE CALENDAR

Faced with this situation, a small group of pro-civil-rights Democratic Senators met a few days prior to the passage of H.R. 6127 by the House of Representatives, to determine on a course of action when that bill arrived in the Senate.

Several possibilities were canvassed. These included: (1) moving to send H.R. 6127 to the Judiciary Committee with instructions to report it to the Senate on a specific date; (2) allowing H.R. 6127 to go to Committee but moving to discharge the Judiciary Committee from further consideration either of that bill or of one of several of the Senate bills; (3) moving to suspend the rules under Rule XL in order to place H.R. 6127 on the calendar; and (4) moving to place the bill on the calendar under Rule XIV.

After consultation with the Senate Parliamentarian the group ruled out the first possibility, of sending the bill to committee with instructions to report it to the Senate on a day certain. Such instructions may be added to a motion to refer or to commit only when the bill itself has been motioned up and is actually before the Senate. Before the bill could come before the Senate it had first to be placed on the calendar, and then to be motioned up. Such a motion is subject to unlimited debate unless cloture is applied. This procedure was therefore evidently impossible, notwithstanding later statements by Senator Morse who, in justifying his opposition to placing the bill directly on the calendar, asserted that instructions to report the bill on a day certain could have been added after the second reading.

Similarly, as we have already seen, the method of discharging a committee is lengthy, and was probably impossible for legislation as controversial as a civil rights bill. More specifically, the steps involved in this procedure include:

1. Filing a discharge petition during the morning hour.
2. A successful motion to adjourn so that a new legislative day may arrive.
3. Reaching the petition during the morning hour, in which case it would go to the foot of the calendar if debate were not concluded in two hours; or, if it was not reached in the morning hour, motioning it up at a later stage.
4. Moving to proceed to consideration of the petition, after it has reached the calendar, and after one legislative day has elapsed (which requires an intervening adjournment), when such a motion becomes in order.
5. Securing a vote on this motion, which is debatable and requires either unanimous consent or cloture and 64 affirmative votes to bring the debate to an end. Passage of this procedural motion requires only a simple majority.
6. Securing a vote on the next motion, to agree to the petition to discharge the committee. This motion too is debatable and requires cloture.
7. Placing the bill, now discharged from committee, at the foot of the Rule VIII calendar, which follows automatically if the previous steps are successful. It must remain there for another legislative day, which re-

quires another successful motion to adjourn in order to reach a new legislative day.

8. Moving to proceed to consideration of the bill and securing a vote on this motion, which is by now in order, is debatable, requires cloture to end debate, and a simple majority for passage.
9. Moving to agree to the bill and securing a vote on it, after all amendments have been dealt with; this again is debatable and requires cloture.

In the face of determined opposition, and without the help of the party leadership, the procedures outlined here would take a minimum of five to eight weeks even if there were 64 votes in support of action at every stage, which was by no means certain. The group therefore determined that the route of discharging the Judiciary Committee was impractical; indeed, that the votes and physical endurance necessary to break four successive potential filibusters made it impossible.

Suspending the rules of the Senate in order to place the House-passed bill on the calendar was also considered. This procedure is no near cousin of the method of moving to suspend the rules and pass the bill, which is a short-cut frequently used in the House of Representatives and common in state legislatures, where with the backing of the party leadership and a disciplined two-thirds vote at hand an opposition minority can be steam-rollered. In the Senate version it has the advantage merely of reducing from four to three the number of potential filibusters and cloture motions to be met.[4] On the other hand, in comparison with the discharge procedure, it has two immediate drawbacks. First, because the tradition that all matters, unless by unanimous consent, should go to a committee before floor action is rightly very strong, suspension of the rules is open to the charge of by-passing the committee; the discharge procedure at least makes a gesture of giving the committee a chance to act. Second, because the suspension procedure has been so rarely used, it is open also to the charge of novelty in procedure—an unorthodox means of gaining an unorthodox end. The steering group of civil rights senators therefore discarded this alternative, and

[4] The steps involved in suspending the rules in order to place the bill on the calendar run as follows: (1) When the bill arrives from the House, either a motion that it be laid before the Senate, or a wait until the presiding officer laid it before the Senate in order to object to the second reading of the bill on the same day. (2) Simultaneously giving notice of an intention to move to suspend the rules, and reading or placing in the *Record* the terms of the motion. (3) Gaining an adjournment to bring a new legislative day. (4) On the new legislative day and after the reading of the Journal, either calling up the motion to suspend the rules, or waiting until the presiding officer laid the bill before the Senate for a second reading. At this time, and prior to the customary referral to committee, gaining recognition to prevent such a reference by calling up the motion to suspend the rules. Since no motion to proceed to the consideration of that motion would be necessary, one potential filibuster is avoided at this point. (5) Securing a vote on the motion to suspend the rules, which is debatable and would require cloture to stop a filibuster. An affirmative two-thirds vote of those present and voting on this motion would send the bill to the calendar. (6) From this stage on the procedure is the same as with the discharge method—an adjournment to bring a new legislative day, when a motion to proceed to the consideration of the bill would be in order; a vote on this motion, which is debatable and would require cloture; disposition of amendments and a vote on final passage, which again is debatable and would require cloture.

in fact concluded that if a choice had to be made between the two, the discharge route was preferable.

Finally, the possibility of placing the House-passed bill on the calendar under Rule XIV was canvassed. The relevant parts of Rule XIV read as follows:

> No bill or joint resolution shall be committed or amended until it shall have been twice read, after which it *may* be referred to a committee; bills and joint resolutions introduced on leave, and bills and joint resolutions from the House of Representatives, shall be read once, and may be read twice, on the same day, if not objected to, for reference, but shall not be considered on that day nor debated, except for reference, unless by unanimous consent. (Section 3, emphasis added.)

> Every bill and joint resolution reported from a committee, not having previously been read, shall be read once, and twice, if not objected to, on the same day, and placed on the Calendar in the order in which the same may be reported; and every bill and joint resolution introduced on leave, *and every bill and joint resolution of the House of Representatives which shall have received a first and second reading without being referred to a committee, shall, if objection be made to further proceeding thereon, be placed on the Calendar.* (Section 4, emphasis added.)

Although infrequently used, this seemed to be a relatively simple and direct method of placing the House-passed bill on the calendar. If it could be attacked for by-passing the committee, it was nevertheless a well settled part of the rules of the Senate; and, compared with many rules, its meaning appeared to be crystal clear. On that count it was therefore preferable to suspending the rules. And although perhaps less orthodox than discharging the committee, it reduced the potential number of filibusters in finally passing the bill from four to two. It was decided, therefore, that this method had the best, and perhaps the only, chance of success.

On June 14, following press reports that a group of Republican senators, including their leadership, were also considering using Rule XIV to place the bill on the calendar, a group of 15 Democratic liberals issued a statement in which they (1) urged the Judiciary Committee to report out a bill promptly, (2) stated that, while they preferred to act on a Senate bill, if a Senate bill were not reported they would join and cooperate with any other senator or groups of senators on either side of the aisle who wished to place the House bill on the calendar under Rule XIV, (3) gave formal notice of their intention to do so to the leadership and whips on both sides of the aisle, to the Parliamentarian, and to all other Senators, and (4) gave notice that they would not give unanimous consent to any motion to refer the House-passed bill to committee and formally requested that they be notified before the bill was laid before the Senate or referred, so that they might be in their places to ask certain parliamentary questions or to make certain motions. This last request grew out of the experience in 1956, when the House-passed bill was referred to committee while interested Senators were not on the floor. A further important reason for giving notice was that bills from the House as well as bills introduced in the Senate are ordinarily, for the convenience of all, read perfunctorily, not actually laid down by the presiding officer, and automatically referred to committee. Even when a bill is actually laid before the Senate, this can be done at any time and while the floor is unguarded, for under section 7 of Rule VII,

The Presiding Officer may at any time lay, and it shall be in order at any time for a Senator to move to lay, before the Senate, any bill or other matter sent to the Senate by the President or the House of Representatives, and any question pending at that time shall be suspended for this purpose. Any motion so made shall be determined without debate.

Thus with a senator who opposed civil rights in the chair, another senator could move to, or the chair without a motion could, lay the House bill before the Senate and have it referred before another senator could gain recognition to object.

Certain precautionary steps were therefore taken. The first was to try to make certain that a senator in sympathy with the move to place the bill on the calendar, or the Vice President, would be in the chair when the bill arrived at the desk. Teams of senators were organized to guard the floor at all times. Arrangements were made with House members to notify key senators of the step-by-step actions on the bill in the House. Further, it was publicly pointed out that when the bill arrived the Senate would be in executive session considering the Atomic Energy Treaty, and hence that the bill would remain in limbo at the desk until the Senate moved back into legislative session. As the Senate can move back and forth from legislative to executive session by a simple unanimous consent request, attention was called to this fact so that senators would not lower their guard and stay off the floor during executive sessions under the mistaken impression that no action on the bill could be taken. Sheets of instructions were issued to the Democratic senators in sympathy with the move, in which parliamentary details were outlined; these instructed them to object to any attempt to read the bill a second time or to refer it, and to call for a quorum when in doubt. As a result, the rights of individual senators were protected as they had not been in 1956. Agreements were entered into at almost every stage for a specific time when action would take place and motions would be made, so that the rights of each senator could be asserted.

H.R. 6127 was laid before the Senate on June 19. It was read a first time, after which Senator Russell asked unanimous consent that it be read a second time on that day. Objections were heard from Senators Knowland and Douglas.

At this time Senator Russell argued that Rule XXV took precedence over Rule XIV. He claimed that following the procedures under Rule XIV would ". . . throw out the window the laws, the rules, and the Constitution in order to get at 'these infernal southerners' in a hurry." His major argument rested on the premise that the changes made in the rules by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 superseded other rules with which they were inconsistent. In his view the language of Rule XXV, which enumerates the subject matter over which specific committees have jurisdiction, was in conflict with Rule XIV and therefore took precedence over that rule. He quoted Section 101 (a) of the Reorganization Act which reads, in part, ". . . such rules shall supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith," and Section (k) of Rule XXV which reads:

Committee on the Judiciary, to consist of fifteen Senators, to which *shall be referred* all

proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the following subjects. (Emphasis added.)

A list of subjects then follows, including "civil liberties." Senator Russell urged specifically that the phrase "shall be referred" is mandatory and superseded sections 3 and 4 of Rule XIV.

The proponents of the move argued that nothing could be clearer than the language of Rule XIV; that Rule XXV was not mandatory concerning referral but merely a specification of the subject matter over which each committee had jurisdiction; that the history of the Legislative Reorganization Act showed this to be true; that there were numerous examples of House bills going directly to the calendar both by precedent and under Rule XIV; and that the phrase "shall be referred," should not now be construed as mandatory when it had not been so on hundreds of other occasions.[5]

Development of the argument brought out examples of House-passed bills which were automatically placed on the Senate calendar when a Senate companion bill was already on the Senate calendar, and examples of a House-passed bill placed on the calendar prior to the Senate bill being placed there, when it was known that a Senate bill would soon be reported. Further, although this point was not made on the floor, it is well known that, especially on the last day of a session, numerous House-passed bills are motioned up on the floor of the Senate when there are no Senate companion bills. There have even been examples of the bill clerk officially referring a bill to a committee and entering that referral in the Journal, only to find that the House bill is motioned up and passed in the last few hours before adjournment. In such cases the Journal has been corrected after the fact to show that the bill was sent to the calendar, in order to be there legitimately when motioned up. These examples added considerable weight to the argument that the phrase "shall be referred" in Rule XXV was by no means mandatory. Since these bills were sent to the calendar by a private decision of the Vice President or his agent, it was argued that what one man could do *in camera* under the precedents a majority of the Senate could do openly under the provisions of a specific rule.

[5] There were only a few examples of a bill going to the calendar under Rule XIV prior to 1946. Since then procedures under this rule were followed once on May 3, 1948 when Senator Downey of California objected after second reading to further proceedings on the Tidelands Oil bill, which then went directly to the calendar. Immediately following that action and on the same day Senator Fulbright attempted to do the same thing to the oleomargarine tax repeal bill. However, the chair (then the President pro-tempore, Mr. Vandenberg) had first recognized Senator Wherry, who raised the issue of committee jurisdiction before Senator Fulbright made his objection. In a series of parliamentary questions and votes the bill eventually went to committee, but it is quite clear from a thorough reading of that incident that it did not conflict with Senator Downey's action. Senator Vandenberg stated not only that it did not conflict but that the issue turned finally " . . . upon the pure question as to who is first recognized by the Chair to assert his rights under these conflicting rules." He said specifically:

There is no collision whatever between the precedent of yesterday and the precedent of today. . . . It is the view of the Chair that the question of precedence in a case of this character depends entirely on who raises the point first. Since the question of jurisdiction has been raised first it is the view of the Chair that the question of jurisdiction takes priority.

On June 20, Senator Knowland objected to the "further proceeding thereon" immediately after H.R. 6127 was read a second time. Senator Russell raised the point of order that Rule XXV took precedence; and debate on this point, which is not debatable except at the pleasure of the Chair, took place for several hours. One problem concerning the use of Rule XIV bothered some Senators, namely, that a "single" Senator, by objection, could prevent a bill going to committee. The proponents of the move argued that while such a case might theoretically arise, there would no doubt, on an issue of such importance as a civil rights bill, be a point of order, such as Senator Russell raised; and that a majority of the Senate would, in fact, decide whether the bill should go to the calendar or to the committee.

Senator Case of New Jersey was particularly concerned about a single Senator's objection sending the bill to the calendar, and felt that greater support for the move could be obtained if some method were found to decide the issue more directly by majority vote. He proposed that, after the second reading, a motion rather than an objection should be made, to send the bill to the calendar. He had numerous discussions with the Vice President on this point and prepared a detailed memorandum outlining his views. The Vice President's opinion on the Russell point of order reflects, to a considerable extent, these original views of Senator Case.

The leaders of the liberal Democratic group, while sympathizing with Senator Case's position, believed that if a specific motion were made to place the bill on the calendar following the second reading, rather than an objection by a single Senator under Rule XIV, such a motion would be debatable and hence would require 64 affirmative votes and cloture to end debate. If this were true then the attempt to place the bill on the calendar could not succeed.

This point was overcome by the opinion of the Vice President, who stated (1) that Rule XXV did not require a mandatory referral to committee; (2) that if objection were made under Rule XIV and no point of order were raised the bill would go directly to the calendar; but (3) that if a point of order were raised the effect of it would be to put the substantive question, "Shall the bill be referred," in which case the issue would be decided by a majority vote. A filibuster at this stage was precluded when the Vice President went on to state that a motion to table could lie against the point of order. A simple majority, therefore, could end debate by moving to table the point of order. No such tabling motion was made, but the fact that it could be made allowed the Senate to vote on the substantive issue, "Shall the bill be referred?" The vote was 35 to sustain Senator Russell's point of order and 45 who opposed; and the bill went to the calendar.

Major Results of the Maneuver. There were at least three major, and perhaps historic, results of this action. In the first place it was probably the only method by which a civil rights bill could have been placed in a position to come before the Senate. Without it the civil rights bill would no doubt have languished again in the Senate Judiciary Committee until the end of the Congress. This procedural move was a major and essential step towards the final passage of the bill.

Secondly, for the first important occasion since 1938, the coalition of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans was shattered. The *quid pro quo* of that coalition has long been that Southern Democrats would provide enough votes to defeat liberal social and economic legislation while the conservative Republicans provided the votes to defeat civil rights moves. Now, for the first time, a coalition of Northern Republicans and liberal Northern Democrats had acted together on a procedural issue to further the progress of a civil rights bill. This was all the more significant for, in the past, the conservative Republicans had furnished their votes in support of the South mainly on procedural rather than substantive issues, such as the 1949 appeal from the decision of the chair and amendment to Rule XXII which made it even more difficult than before, to shut off debate. They provided just enough votes or absentees so that cloture could not be applied to previous civil rights bills. They opposed and defeated the 1953 and 1957 attempts to adopt new rules of the Senate at the beginning of a new Congress. In that way the Republicans hoped to avoid the charge of opposing civil rights, for they professed their willingness to support, at least in part, the bills themselves on which, in almost every case, they prevented action. This was playing both sides of an issue and, because procedural niceties are little understood by the public and even more difficult to explain, they avoided condemnation for opposing civil rights which was the real effect of their actions.

In place of this coalition two new coalitions emerged. One was the Knowland-Douglas Axis, as Senator Russell referred to it, on the civil rights issue. This coalition is probably limited to civil rights and was more the result of public opinion, of the Republican gains in the Negro districts in 1956, possibly of the personal Presidential ambitions of individual Senators, and of the effective filibuster by committee, than the basis for any agreement or tacit arrangement for mutual support on other issues.

The other coalition was a revival of cooperation between the Southern and Western Democrats together with the remaining hard core of the Republican right wing. In many respects this coalition was not new for it has operated for years on such economic issues common to both areas as legislation on sugar cane and sugar beets, rivers and harbors and reclamation projects, the wool tariff, the silver subsidy, aid to the Western mining industry, and similar matters. As the course of the civil rights debate continued, this combination became dominant and civil rights, apparently, was added as a part of the bargain.

A third and most important effect of the vote was that for the first time in many years the Senate asserted a disciplinary jurisdiction over one of its committees. In theory, at least, committees of the Senate should be the servants of the Senate as a whole. Notoriously, in practice this has not been so. Examples include the unwillingness of the Senate to deal with the excesses of investigating committees; the tacit arrangement whereby the leadership, committee chairmen, and those Senators who are within or who are seeking admittance to the "inner circle" join to provide 52 to 55 votes to defeat motions and amendments on the floor when offered by individual Senators who are not members of the

committee; and the unwritten rule of the Senate leadership that it supports the substance of committee action without regard to opposition by what may be even a majority of the party. In this respect, placing the civil rights bill on the calendar was unique and precedent setting. Although committees will no doubt continue to operate substantially as they have in the past, the possibility or threat of similar action may well serve to allow action by the full Senate on controversial bills of great importance for which there is overwhelming support and which otherwise would die in a committee stacked against them.

V. THE DEBATE ON H.R. 6127

Although the vote to take up the bill was 71 to 18, the new Southern-Western coalition proved powerful enough to effect major changes in the bill itself. They forced the deletion of Section III of the bill and they added a jury trial amendment to the voting section which, as it passed the Senate, would have made the bill least effective in those areas of the Deep South where it was most needed.

Apart from the coalition, two other major factors operated towards weakening the bill. The first was the press conference statement of the President on Section III, saying that it was not his intention that the Attorney General should have the power to initiate civil rights suits under that Section and the 14th Amendment. The second was the fact that the press centered its coverage almost wholly on the contest—the strategy and maneuverings in connection with the bill—and avoided, almost completely, the moral and substantive grounds for supporting it in the first place. For example, Senator Douglas placed in the Record a detailed legal brief on the jury trial amendment and contempt proceedings, showing that no "right" to trial by jury was being denied by the provisions of the bill. This was ignored by the press. County-by-county figures on Negro registration in the South were also detailed, as were the various subtle methods by which Negroes are denied the franchise; and these too were largely, although not entirely, ignored. Further, Senator Javits and others made lengthy and even brilliant rebuttals of the attack on Section III of the bill which were little reported and went almost unnoticed even by such papers as the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*.

On three further occasions after the bill was taken up the rules of the Senate, together with other internal and external factors, affected the substance of the bill materially. These include the abortive attempt on the part of the Knowland-Douglas forces to modify Section III when it was clear, following the President's press conference, that it would otherwise be stricken; the various revisions of the jury-trial amendment; and the successful use of the unanimous consent device to bring a third reading and deny the possibility of further amendments at the late stages in the debate.

Striking Out Section III. Once the bill was before the Senate, Senators Anderson and Aiken moved to strike out Section III. This section would have permitted the Attorney General to seek injunctive remedies under the equal rights provisions of the 14th Amendment in cases affecting the use of schools, busses, public parks, etc., either on his own initiative, or at the request of an

aggrieved party, or at the request of local public authorities which, in practice, would generally have meant school boards. Despite repeated claims to the contrary during the course of debate, the bill gave him no power to issue court orders or to decide how fast school integration must proceed. The remedies sought were milder in form, though easier, it was hoped, to obtain, than the criminal penalties now available against those who deny rights guaranteed under the Constitution; they were to supplement, not supplant, these penalties. The Little Rock, Arkansas case has since shown something of the potential effectiveness of the injunctive remedies. But the Attorney General was able to act in that case only because the original court order was sought by the Little Rock School Board, and because the court then invited him to intervene. Section III would have given the Attorney General the right to take the initiative.

When it was clear, after the President's press conference, that Section III would be deleted, the Knowland-Douglas forces sought to reach agreement on some substitute which could gain majority support. The Knowland position was that such an amendment should allow the Attorney General to intervene only when he was requested to do so by the local school boards or officials. The Douglas group's position was that the amendment should enable the Attorney General to intervene in these cases and also when an aggrieved party sought his intervention. Both versions abandoned the provision for the Attorney General to initiate action on his own and without specific request.

The parliamentary situation was that the amendment to strike out Section III could only be decided after perfecting amendments to the section in its original form had been offered and voted on. Under the rules even though the motion to strike out was offered first its priority for purposes of voting was last. The Knowland forces were unable to agree to the Douglas amendment, largely because they felt they could not push beyond the President's position; but the two groups tried to work out a strategy whereby they would fall back step by step, attempting to pick up strength as they did so. They decided that Senator Knowland should first offer his amendment, and that Senator Douglas would then move to substitute his own amendment for it. In this way they hoped that the liberal Democrats and other supporters of the stronger position could vote for the Douglas motion and when defeated, as they no doubt would have been, they could join the Knowland position as the next defensive move.

Because of the rules and precedents of the Senate this strategy had eventually to be abandoned. The supporters of the Douglas position were willing to fall back a step at a time, but could not agree to support a weaker provision when it was presented against a stronger position. They could vote for the Douglas motion as against the Knowland motion. They could vote for the Douglas or the Knowland motion as against the Anderson-Aiken motion to strike out Section III. They could not vote for the Douglas or the Knowland motion if either were to lie against Section III.

The parliamentary situation made it impossible to carry out their strategy. Once the Douglas motion was defeated there was no way in which the Knowland motion could be made to lie against the Anderson motion to strike Section

III. The issue would have been between the Knowland motion and Section III, in which case the liberal Democrats and some Republicans would have felt compelled to vote against the Knowland motion. This was true because of the precedent that a motion to strike is only voted on after the perfecting amendments to the basic provisions of a section have been disposed of. Efforts to substitute a weaker provision for the existing Section III were therefore abandoned at this stage. It was decided to let the vote come on the Anderson motion to strike, and to offer a revised Section III at a later stage, preferably following a victory on some substantive issue.

The Moving Target. Yet another example of the effect of the rules of the Senate on the substance of legislation may be seen in the successive revisions of the jury trial amendment. It is a cardinal principle of most parliamentary procedures that once a motion is offered it belongs to the full body and not to the mover. The parliamentary body determines what action should be taken, *i.e.*, to amend, commit, refer, etc. This is not true of the Senate of the United States. An amendment, even after it is offered, belongs to the mover of the amendment and until such time as the yeas and nays have been ordered, he may amend it, revise it, or change it as he sees fit. In this fashion the jury trial amendment was changed almost from day to day, not by any vote of the Senate but by the offering or acceptance of revisions on the part of its mover, Senator O'Mahoney. As Senator Douglas said on the floor, the opponents of the jury trial amendment were "shooting at a moving target." The initial point at issue was the definition of the criminal contempts to which a jury trial would be made applicable—an exceedingly intricate technical question.

The first version met strenuous objection. The distinction it drew between civil and criminal contempt was whether or not questions of fact were at issue. As any good defense lawyer could raise a question of fact, the effect of this version was to allow a jury trial in all contempt cases.

The second version attempted to distinguish between civil and criminal contempt on the basis of whether or not the act committed was a crime. The traditional distinction between the two types of contempt, often hard to draw in practice, turns on whether the action of the court is for the purpose of compelling compliance with a previous court order, or for the purpose of punishment for failure to carry out the order. Thus in a voting case, a local registrar could be held in contempt for failing to carry out the court's order, but so long as he could remove that contempt by compliance with the order it would be civil contempt. Once the day for election had arrived and passed, and the defendant was no longer able to remove his contempt by compliance, then the contempt would be criminal, for the court could send him to jail or impose a fine only for the purpose of punishment. Since almost all obstructive actions connected with voting in federal elections are criminal, the effect of the second version was to grant a jury trial in contempt cases arising from interferences with voting.

In the third version of the O'Mahoney amendment the orthodox distinction

was finally drawn between civil and criminal contempt. In an attempt to gain more widespread support for it, however, the amendment was broadened to apply not only to voting cases but to all contempt actions under federal law. At least 40 other statutes were affected, but primarily this revision was aimed at gaining labor support, particularly from the Railroad Brotherhoods and the United Mine Workers who were sensitive about past abuses of labor injunctions and who, in turn, influenced a number of key votes in the Senate. This provision was a most radical departure from existing procedures. Like the second version, it was merely accepted on the floor by Senator O'Mahoney, and no vote was taken on the question of substituting it for the previous version.

At this stage the question of passage of a jury trial amendment was touch and go. Those opposed to it still appeared to be in the majority. Finally, a fourth version was offered to meet the complaints over the absence of Negroes from Southern juries, and so to pick up a few more votes. Federal law sets certain standards for service on Federal juries, but also provides that no one may serve on a federal jury who is incompetent to serve on the grand or petit jury under the laws of his state. As one must be a voter or qualified elector in Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, and the Parish of New Orleans in order to be eligible to serve on a local grand or petit jury, and as Negroes are largely excluded from voting in these states, this means that by law Negroes are also excluded from federal jury service there. The fourth version, offered by Senator Church, repealed the provisions of the United States Code which excluded those from federal jury service who could not meet state qualifications. The effect of this final version was to provide the margin of strength to pass the jury trial amendment. However, as Negroes are excluded from jury service in other Southern states, in practice and by other means, it is doubtful that this change will have much practical effect.

The right to revise and modify an amendment at the will of its sponsor played a large part in attaching a jury trial amendment to the bill, for had the vote come on the first, second, or possibly the third version, it appears fairly certain that the amendment would have been defeated; and that, once defeated, the forces favoring it could not have recovered enough strength to pass even a greatly modified new amendment.

Unanimous Consent. The final instance in which parliamentary practice affected the substance of the bill occurred following the jury trial amendment vote and prior to the vote on the remaining amendments. Senator Russell referred to it in a speech on August 30, after the bill had passed, in which he justified and explained the failure of Southern Senators to filibuster the bill and took great credit for watering it down. He had this to say on the floor:

> When we had arrived at this particular stage of the proceedings in the Senate I happened to learn that a determined effort would be made to revive some of the provisions of Part III that had been stricken from the bill. The new amendment appeared harmless on its face, but if it had been adopted it would have placed the stamp of congressional approval on the erroneous, if not infamous, decision of the Supreme Court requiring the mixing of the children in the public schools without regard to the wishes of the parents of either

race. We, therefore, quickly closed the bill to amendments in order to assure that none of the victories that we had gained would be snatched from us.[6]

What happened was that a bi-partisan group determined to try to revive a part of the Section III previously stricken. Before they could offer their amendment a unanimous consent agreement was reached, at a time when there was general commotion on the floor, limiting further proceedings to those amendments which had already been offered and printed and confining the time for debate to 30 minutes on each amendment. Senator Douglas was within minutes of offering the revised Section III amendment and was prevented from doing so by Senator Johnson's unanimous consent request which was made and agreed to at a time of confusion when his request could not be heard in the chamber. Apparently a gentlemen's agreement had also been reached that all further amendments would be voted down by voice vote and without a roll call.

VI. THE FILIBUSTER: A PAPER TIGER?

One final point should be made concerning the effect of the rules of the Senate on the substance of the civil rights bill. A number of highly competent journalists who were not close to the debate, or who have since been misled by the interpretations placed on it by some, have asserted that the absence of a filibuster at any stage in the proceedings on the floor represented a willingness on the part of the Southern opponents to accommodate themselves at least to the voting rights provisions of the bill. A closer view leads to the opposite conclusion, that the passage of the bill represents no compromise or accommodation on the part of the Deep South Senators at all. Rather, the failure to filibuster may be regarded as a carefully calculated decision to avoid consequences which would have been worse, from the Southern point of view, than those of the bill as it passed the Senate.

Throughout the debate, and preceding the votes on Section III and the jury trial amendment, the threat of a filibuster was used to gain support for both these amendments. Senator Russell has since frankly admitted what many on the inside felt sure of at the time, namely, that the South would not filibuster and that the threat of doing so was more effective than the reality would have been. Notwithstanding the arguments made earlier in the year, that no meaningful civil rights bill could be passed unless Rule XXII was changed, the filibuster, after the Rule XXII fight and after the bill was placed on the calendar, became a paper tiger. In retrospect it seems clear that the Southerners did not dare to use it because they feared the results would be the loss of Rule XXII and the passage of a much stronger bill than was passed. They were sufficiently convinced that a filibuster would so outrage the country and the Senate that they had more to lose than to gain by its use. This accounts for the severe condemnation of Senator Thurmond by his Southern colleagues following his 24-hour "talkathon."

The Southern group decided, instead, to attempt to filibuster the bill to death

[6] *Congressional Record*, August 30, 1957, p. 15171 (daily ed.).

in committee. In this they were successful; they could have kept it throttled there indefinitely. However, as a result of the great increase in votes for a change in Rule XXII and the vote to place the bill on the calendar, they knew they could not successfully transfer that filibuster to the floor. In Senator Russell's words:

> In years gone by, it has been a great source of pride to me that our group was able to defeat bills of this nature when they were forced to the consideration of the Senate. In the case of H.R. 6127 we were from the outset faced with greater odds than ever before . . .[7]
>
> There was not a man among us who was not willing to speak against this iniquitous bill until he dropped in his tracks. We would have done so, but for the conviction, growing out of our knowledge of the Senate and the experience of many years in this body, that a filibuster was certain to make a bad bill infinitely worse . . .[8]
>
> Our group held numerous meetings and the wisdom of launching a filibuster was often discussed. All members of the group were living with the problem from day to day, defending the things dearest to our heart while under heavy fire. At no time did any member of our group declare in any of our meetings that it was his belief that a filibuster was advisable, much less that one could be successfully waged. The contrary view was expressed on innumerable occasions . . .[9]

They therefore decided to avoid a filibuster while using the threat of it to gain their points. They decided also to keep debate relevant, and with one or two very glaring exceptions this was done. With the wholehearted support of Senator Johnson, the Democratic leader, they then pressed for the two basic amendments which, from their point of view, would gain the least offensive result. In this, too, they were successful. They took this course not from any desire for accommodation or willingness to compromise but because a different course would, from the Southern position, "make a bad bill infinitely worse."

Although the filibuster was not used, the existence of Rule XXII made it still possible for Senator Russell to claim that:

> . . . the fact that we were able to confine the Federal activities to the field of voting and keep the withering hand of the Federal Government out of our schools and social order is to me, as I look back over the years , the sweetest victory of my 25 years as a Senator from the State of Georgia.[10]

Because of the filibuster rule, the unwillingness of some professed supporters of civil rights to see that the South dared not filibuster at this time, the consequent surrender to the mere threat of its use, and the skillful tactics of Senators Russell and Johnson, the bill as passed by the Senate was largely a victory for the forces of segregation. As civil rights proponents saw it, all their sweat and struggle to overcome the parliamentary obstacles had led to a bill which, except for a few minor gains, was almost form without substance. They took what consolation they could in watching the House revise it enough to make it a modest forward step.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 15172.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 15171.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 15171–2.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 15172.

ALCOHOL AND POLITICS IN FRANCE*

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"On jongle trop avec la structure d'un Pays qui a été, dans le monde, le défenseur de l'individu, de la liberté, du sens de la mesure. Un petit paysan sur sa terre, n'est-il pas humainement autre chose que le chômeur de demain ou l'ouvrier qui sera condamné à fabriquer toute sa vie des boulons?"

Le Betteravier Français, September 1956, page 1.

Large-scale state intervention in the alcohol market in France dates from World War I, when the government committed itself to encourage the production of alcohol. Two chief reasons then lay back of this decision: a huge supply of alcohol was needed for the manufacture of gunpowder, and the devastation of the beet-growing regions of the north had severely limited production of beet alcohol, thereby throwing the domestic market out of balance. A law of 30 June 1916, adopted under emergency procedure, established a state agency empowered to purchase alcohol. At the end of the war, a decree of 1919 accorded the government the right "provisionally" to maintain the state monopoly. In 1922 the beetgrowers and winegrowers gave their support to the principle of a state monopoly which, in effect, reserved the industrial market for beet alcohol and the domestic market for viticulture. In 1931 the state was authorized to purchase alcohol distilled from surplus wine. The interests of *betteraviers* (beet growers) and *viticulteurs* were thereby happily gratified, but the state soon found itself in possession of huge stocks of alcohol. As a means of providing an outlet for the surplus, the government in 1923 had required oil refineries to add a specified amount of alcohol to gasoline. A decree-law of 30 July 1935 modified previous legislation and decrees with respect to alcohol and confirmed the absolute monopoly of the state. In the language of a decree of 21 April 1939, "the economic *régime d'alcohol* is the keystone of French agriculture." After World War II beet production was again stimulated by the Monnet Plan, on the assumption that beets would be used in the manufacture of much-needed sugar, and also that beet cultivation would render the soil productive and help prevent erosion.[1] The purpose of this paper is to investigate the policy and pressure group ramifications of these successive steps in governmental intervention.

I. DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

In effect, an oversupply of alcohol on the French market has been virtually guaranteed by statute. It has been estimated that the domestic needs of France

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[1] On the history of the alcohol statute see: Gabriel Taix, *Les problèmes posés par les excédents d'alcool* (Paris, 1953), p. 9; Charles de Silva, "La production de l'alcool et l'économie nationale," *Chronique Sociale de France* (15 February 1956), pp. 10–12; Philippe Marckert, "L'alcool: notion multiple, problème complexe," *Economie et Réalités Mondiales* (December 1955), p. 27; and Norbert Marfaing, *Contrôle de la production de l'alcool en France* (Paris, 1940).

do not exceed 1.8 million hectoliters of alcohol a year; yet since the Liberation the yearly production has averaged 3.9 million HL. The situation became desperate in 1953, when the State purchased over four million HL of alcohol, considerably more than twice as much as the market could safely absorb.[2]

The problem created by overproduction of beet-alcohol is made even more acute by overproduction of ordinary wine. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, a phylloxera ravaged the vineyards of France. Many wine cultivators, with the encouragement and aid of the state, moved to Algeria and were successful in converting large areas of that territory to viticulture. However, an American vine capable of resisting the dread phylloxera was introduced into the Midi—and yielded fifty per cent more wine per acre than did the vineyards of Algeria. Since 1950, wine production in France has been in the vicinity of 60 million HL, and that in Algeria between 12 and 14 million HL. In spite of unsettled conditions in North Africa, the year 1955–56 brought the highest production in twenty years—18.6 million HL. Inasmuch as the market for wine in France has been estimated at approximately 60 million HL, and since only one million HL are exported, perhaps nearly 20 million HL are generally surplus. Much of this must be purchased by the state for distillation into alcohol. To further complicate matters, apples are grown throughout the west of France for the express purpose of being made into cider; any excess production is distilled into alcohol for purchase by the state at the usual loss (approximately two billion francs a year on cider alone).[3]

The following figures for the year 1953–54 indicate the extent of the problem:[4]

TABLE I. STATE PURCHASES OF ALCOHOL IN FRANCE, 1953–54

Alcohol Derived from	Amounts Purchased (thousands of HL)	Expenditures (billions of francs)
Beets	2,359	26.6
Molasses	800	2.8
Wine	405	10.6
Diverse sources	632	7.7
Total	4,196	47.7

[2] One hectoliter equals 26.42 U.S. gallons; one U.S. barrel (or 42 gallons) equals 1.59 HL. The official exchange value of one U.S. dollar after the general currency devaluations of 1949 was 350 francs; thus, one million dollars equaled 350 million francs, etc.; a further 20 percent devaluation to 420 francs took place in two stages in the fall of 1957. In general, see Gilbert Tixier, "L'alcool dans les finances publiques," *Revue de Science et de Législation Financière* (April–June 1954), pp. 360–363.

[3] See Georges Malignac and Robert Colin, *L'alcoolisme* (Paris, 1954), pp. 37–41; Philippe Marckert, "L'alcool," *op. cit.*, p. 27; and "La situation du marché viticole," *Le Monde*, 7 December 1956. There is no problem whatsoever with respect to fine wines—which account, however, for only six to eighteen percent of the total harvest. In 1955 only 14.7 million HL of "vin d'appellation" were declared, compared to 45.4 million HL of "vin ordinaire." Cf. Sully Ledermann, *Alcool, alcoolisme, alcoolisation* (Paris, 1956), pp. 27, 37.

[4] Figures cited by Charles de Silva, "La production de l'alcool," *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 17–18.

The anti-alcohol decrees of the Mendès-France government succeeded in bringing about a notable reduction in alcohol purchases for the period September 1954 to August 1955. Total production was only 2.5 million HL (beet alcohol accounting for 1.5 million HL, less than half of the preceding year's production). However, the alcohol interests' successful political counter-attack brought a new supply to the market in the following year. Between 1 September 1955 and 30 April 1956 production of alcohol was 2.6 million HL—approximately 500,000 HL more than in the corresponding period of 1954–55. In spite of all the agitation aroused, on 30 April 1956 there remained in stock 4,294,482 HL of surplus alcohol.[5]

For the years 1948–52, the following figures represent the average yearly market for alcohol purchased by the *Service des alcools*:[6]

TABLE II. AVERAGE ANNUAL SALES OF ALCOHOL FROM STATE STOCKS, 1948–52

Use	Amounts Sold (thousands of HL)	Price Received per Liter (in francs)
"Bouche" (beverage)	322	320
Vinegar	52	180
Perfume, pharmaceutical	115	320
Chemical products	380	70
Heat, light	657	34
Export	206	65–100
Total	1,732	

So a considerable portion of the alcohol owned by the state is sold at a high price for ultimate human consumption, and in that sense, the state has a vested interest in encouraging the sale of alcoholic drinks. In any case, the normal needs of the country can account for only one half, or less, of the alcohol habitually purchased by the *Service des alcools*. In ridding itself of the domestic surplus, the state has two main outlets: the "national carburant" and export.

Although large quantities of alcohol were used in the manufacture of gasoline from 1923 to 1939, the practice was resumed only in 1952 when alcohol stocks were about to inundate the country. The "national carburant" is bitterly resisted by the oil companies as well as by the Finance Ministry; but its restitution was compelled as a result of pressure exerted by the beet growers and distillers.[7] The national carburant is generally considered unsatisfactory on two

[5] *Le Monde*, 13 January and 18 July 1956. See also Henri Trinchet's articles, "L'alcool, problème gouvernmental permanent," *ibid.*, 22 and 23 January 1957. The Suez crisis created a sudden demand that has reduced stocks considerably.

[6] Figures are from Gabriel Taix, *Les problèmes posés par les excédents d'alcool*, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–21.

[7] In bringing about a favorable decision on the national carburant, the IFA (*Institut Francais d'Alcool*) in 1952 negotiated with the Director of Chemical Industries, the Director of Carburants, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Industrial Production and the Secretary of State for the Budget. See *Alcools et Dérivés* (October 1952), p. 2.

grounds. First, it is a wasteful operation. A liter of alcohol costs the *Service des alcools* 100 francs; it replaces a liter of gasoline whose refinery price is only 14 francs. Each liter of alcohol replacing a liter of gasoline costs the nation 86 francs. Second, the addition of alcohol to gasoline, according to the technical experts of the oil industry and the Economic Council, impairs the quality of the product. The national carburant evaporates more easily, reduces mileage per gallon, and apparently leaves an engine deposit to boot. In spite of the objections of the oil industry the beet growers have succeeded, since 1952, in securing the use of at least 700,000 HL of alcohol in the national carburant each year; indeed, one million HL were so used in 1955. In order to reduce losses to the State, the minister of finance, M. Ramadier, ordered the amount to be cut by half for the following year;[8] and on June 1, 1957, for the same reason, the mixture of alcohol in gasoline was stopped altogether.

Export of a large quantity of alcohol has become a necessity, but since the world price of alcohol is considerably below the French domestic price the operation always entails staggering losses. In 1951 five million HL of alcohol were sold to the United States, and used in the manufacture of synthetic rubber. The alcohol had been purchased by the *Service des alcools* for 48 billion francs, and was sold at a net loss of over 26 billion francs, or more than 50 percent. Additional quantities were sold in 1954–55 to both the United States and the Soviet Union—again at a severely low price. Naturally, the beet growers were incensed by the unfavorable publicity the *régime d'alcool* thereby received. Their answer was to demand the creation in France of a synthetic rubber industry capable of absorbing large amounts of alcohol—a project far beyond the financial capacity of the country.[9]

Alcoholism. Demographers and physicians have become intensely concerned with the incidence of alcoholism in France. According to a recent study, Frenchmen consume about 8.2 million HL of pure alcohol each year—an average of 28 liters per adult. The consequences of this alcoholic impregnation are said to be serious: the number of deaths due to cirrhosis of the liver is relatively high; about 23 per cent of all patients admitted to psychiatric institutions are alcoholic; about 17 per cent of industrial accidents are caused by alcoholism; and 30 to 40 per cent of all criminals are notorious alcoholics. Approximately 9 per cent of the family budget in France goes for the purchase of alcoholic bever-

[8] M. Ramadier explained his decision in a letter of April 1956 to the chairman of the *Conseil Supérieur des alcools:* "My department has calculated that the utilization of one million HL of alcohol for the manufacture of *supercarburant ternaire* represents in reality a loss of ten billion francs for the public finances." Quoted in *Le Monde*, 31 July 1956. The subsequent complete ending of the practice was protested by the beetgrowers, of course, even more violently. See *Le Betteravier Français* (June 1957), p. 19. In general, see Gabriel Taix, *Les problèmes posés par les excédents d'alcool, op. cit.*, pp. 89–101; Alfred Sauvy, "Excédents agricoles et alcool carburant," *Bulletin des Transports* (August–September 1950), pp. 592–595; and Henri Trinchet, "La pénurie de carburants ne doit pas servir à encourager la production d'alcool," *Le Monde*, 21 November 1956.

[9] Gabriel Taix, *loc. cit.*, pp. 20–21, 29–31; *Le Betteravier Français* (February 1956), p. 18.

ages, compared to 6 per cent for health, and 4 per cent for housing. As viewed in a report drawn up for the Economic Council by Dr. Etienne May: "Alcoholism at the present time is one of the great perils of France. . . . It can be said that 15 per cent of the adult male population is in a state of certain alcoholic impregnation, that an additional 30 per cent pass reasonable limits and run the risk of impairing their health. Not all the drinkers in the second category become alcoholics, in the medical sense of the word, but a menace hangs over them."[10]

The financial losses incurred by the state in subsidizing beetgrowers, distillers, and wine cultivators are compounded by the cost to the state of the battle against alcoholism. Considerable revenue, of course, is derived from taxes on alcoholic drinks ("droit de circulation" and "droit de consommation sur les alcools de bouche") and from the sale of licenses. Total receipts from taxes on alcoholic products are approximately 54 billion francs a year. On the other hand, public agencies spend a tremendous sum maintaining sanitaria for alcoholics, providing hospital facilities for diseases induced by alcoholism, paying social security benefits for accidents, sickness and unemployment caused by alcoholism, etc. State expenses traceable to alcoholism have been estimated by the Economic Council at 152 billion francs a year, and by an agency of the Finance Ministry at 215 billion francs—making an annual "alcohol deficit" of from 100 to 160 billion francs.[11]

II. THE ALCOHOL LOBBY

An astonishing number of people in France derive a livelihood from alcohol or are at least vitally interested in its production, transport and sale. One and a half million persons are engaged in viticulture, and 150,000 in beet culture; perhaps 500,000 are employed in related industries, such as bottling, canning and transport; and there are three and one half million *bouilleurs de cru* (home distillers). In addition, there are those who own or are employed by 450,000 *débits de boissons*, along with numerous distilleries and apéritif firms. It would appear that between four and six million Frenchmen profit in some manner from alcohol.[12]

In fact, however, there is no single "alcohol lobby" that coordinates the efforts of all those so interested. Of course, all alcohol groups have a common

[10] Etienne May, *Problèmes de l'alcoolisme en France* (Paris, 1954), p. 13. The following figures on consumption of alcohol in 1951 (in liters, per adult) permit a comparison of alcohol consumption in France and other countries: France, 28.0; Italy, 14.2; United States, 8.8; United Kingdom, 8.8; West Germany, 5.1; Denmark, 4.9. *Cf.* "La consommation d'alcool en France et à l'étranger," *Population* (July–September 1954), pp. 537–540. Also Malignac and Colin, *L'alcoolisme, op. cit.*, pp. 31–36; Robert Debré and Alfred Sauvy, *Des Français pour la France* (Paris, 1946); and Léon Dérobert, *L'Economie de l'alcoolisme* (Paris, 1953).

[11] Figures cited by Malignac and Colin, *L'alcoolisme, op. cit.*, pp. 63–65; May, *Problèmes d'alcoolisme, op. cit.*, pp. 31–33; and J. S. Brunaud, "Le coût annuel et la prévention de l'alcoolisme," *Chronique Sociale* (15 February 1956), pp. 64–65.

[12] May, *Problèmes d'alcoolisme, op. cit.*, p. 14; and Debré and Sauvy, *Des Français pour la France, op. cit.*, p. 139.

goal in wishing to maintain the *régime d'alcool*. As Eugène Dubois said in addressing an emergency meeting of the *Union Nationale des Groupements des Distillateurs d'Alcool* in September 1954: "the measures taken today against the beetgrowers can be envisaged tomorrow against apples and cider, and the day after tomorrow against wine."[13] But collaboration seems to be limited to the beetgrowers and the distillers who, with the support of twenty-one less important organizations, have created the *Institut Français d'Alcool*. The IFA puts out a monthly journal, *Alcools et Dérivés*, in an attractive and expensive format. Viticulture and the *bouilleurs de cru* have no apparent links with the IFA.[14]

The Betteraviers. Beet cultivation has been encouraged by the French state since the time of Napoleon in order to provide alcohol for the manufacture of gunpowder, and to increase the fertility of the soil. Since World War I beets have been grown in France to be made into either alcohol or sugar. The state has established a parity of price for beets destined alike for sugar refineries or distilleries. Since distilleries are less costly to run than sugar refineries, they can afford to guarantee crop purchase early in the season, so that beets tend to be sent preferably to distilleries. Economic links also appear to exist between certain wealthy *betteraviers* and distilleries.[15]

The beetgrowers have been able to maintain their privileged position by exerting powerful pressure on the administration and the parliament. The 150,000 members of the *Confédération Générale des Planteurs de Betteraves* are among the most prosperous farmers in France. The concentration of beet culture in the northern departments makes it necessary for all political parties to take the demands of the *betteraviers* into account. Furthermore, the CGB receives the closest possible support from the *Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles*. M. Blondelle, when president of the FNSEA, regularly attended the *betteraviers'* annual assemblies, and spoke frequently in favor of the *régime d'alcool*. His successor, Jean Lépicard, was in fact president of the *Syndicat Betteravier*—which assured rather close ties between the beetgrowers and the national farm organization.[16]

According to the officers of the CGB, it is in the public interest to encourage beet cultivation (primarily in order to maintain soil fertility), but it is uneconomic to make sugar out of beets. It appears that 500,000 tons of sugar, out of a total average production of 1.7 million tons, have to be stocked and sold at a

[13] *Alcools et Dérivés* (October 1954), p. 7.

[14] Henri Cayre, secretary-general of the beetgrowers' group, recently suggested that the IFA be reorganized as an interprofessional group to include viticulture interests. See *Le Betteravier Français* (May 1957), p. 17.

[15] For the over-all financial problem: Gilbert Tixier, "L'alcool dans les finances publiques," p. 362. See also Jacques Callen, "Les secrets du 'lobby' betteravier," *France-Observateur*, 13 May 1954. This article occasioned a celebrated suit for libel brought against *France-Observateur* by the CGB. The suit was dismissed on the grounds that the article constituted legitimate criticism. *Cf. Le Monde*, 19 and 20 December 1956.

[16] After the enactment of the Mendès-France decrees, M. Lépicard threw his full support to the CGB. See his letter, *Le Betteravier Français* (November 1954), p. 8.

loss each year on the world market, because the world price of sugar is lower than the purchase price of beets. Said Henri Cayre, secretary-general of the CGB: "We are obliged to state that it is more profitable to make alcohol than sugar, even if we make jump out of their seats certain *maîtres* who condemn us in the name of production of meat and milk, for which the world market is not very promising either."[17] Therefore, conclude the beet spokesmen, the state must support beet production by purchasing at least four million HL of alcohol each year. Any surplus alcohol can conveniently be disposed of by requiring the addition of *two* million HL annually to gasoline (an operation that would cost the state about 15 billion francs).

Bouilleurs de Cru and Viticulteurs. One of the "achievements" of the French Revolution was an Act of the National Assembly suppressing taxes on all beverages. Even though the exigencies of the public finances required reestablishment of the taxes shortly thereafter, the Act of 1790 has become part of the "mythology" of the home distillers. It was decided by the Consulate to require a license of *all* distillers, "for reasons of economic order, but also in the interest of public morality and health." In 1808, an exemption was accorded the *bouilleurs de cru*—the beginning of the "privilege" that has played such an amazing role in French politics.[18]

The privilege conferred upon *bouilleurs* by statute consists in being able to produce ten liters of pure alcohol each year, exempt from tax and also from supervision by the *Service des alcools.* Anyone owning fruit trees or a vineyard can ask the commune for a certificate enabling him to benefit from the statute. The number of *bouilleurs de cru* (or "petits récoltants," as they prefer to call themselves) in France has increased from 90,000 in 1862 to 3,650,000 in 1954. It is extremely difficult for the state to supervise home distillation, particularly in the West. The Economic Council has estimated the *bouilleurs'* annual fraudulent production at 200,000 HL of pure alcohol (approximately as much as is legally permitted). According to Dr. May: "The alcohol distilled by the *bouilleurs de cru* represents, after the excessive production of wine, the great cause of alcoholism in our country. The privilege of the *bouilleurs de cru,* originally conceived to permit farmers to consume small quantities of alcohol from their own harvest, has become, bit by bit (because of the weakness of the public powers) a vast organization that not only cheats the Treasury, but also diffuses

[17] *Alcools et Dérivés* (November 1953), p. 3. Cayre is probably correct. The price of beet-sugar made in France is 72 francs a kilo, while the price of cane sugar received in French ports is 38 francs a kilo. The CGB, however, shrinks from the obvious conclusion: since production of both beet-alcohol and beet-sugar is uneconomic, the only sensible course of action is to reduce acreage allotted to beets and undertake large-scale conversion to other culture. *Cf.* Henri Trinchet in *Le Monde,* 9 November 1955. In spite of its previous propaganda, the CGB in 1957 proposed a long-range Sugar Plan to further develop the beet market.

[18] For a detached view of pre-war legislation affecting *bouilleurs de cru,* see Norbert Marfaing, *Contrôle de la production de l'alcool en France, op. cit.* Also, Malignac and Colin, *L'alcoolisme, op. cit.,* p. 100.

(in rural households first, then in all of France), increasingly great quantities of alcohol."[19]

The *bouilleurs* are organized in a *Syndicat National des Bouilleurs de Cru*, which was reactivated after the Liberation (mainly through the efforts of André Liautey) to secure the abrogation of a Vichy decree suppressing certain privileges of the *bouilleurs*. Membership dues are insignificant. Financial support seems to come primarily from the distillers who travel throughout the *bouilleur* departments. The SNBC publishes a monthly newspaper, the *Bouilleur de France;* the travelling distillers publish their own journal, *La Défense des Distillateurs Ambulants et des Bouilleurs de Cru*. The strength of the *bouilleurs* obviously resides in their numbers, not their financial resources.

The third large group within the "alcohol lobby" consists of the *viticulteurs*. Out of 1,570,000 persons engaged in wine cultivation in metropolitan France, 94 per cent (1,480,000) produce less than 100 HL annually, accounting for 44 per cent of the total production. Thus, a huge number of relatively poor electors are interested in protection for the wine industry, while a small number are able to furnish financial aid. Inasmuch as viticulture is the mainstay of whole regions (especially the Midi), it is inconceivable for a deputy with a "wine" clientele to criticize the Alcohol Statute. All deputies, regardless of party affiliation, from l'Aude, l'Hérault, Gard, Pyrénées-Orientales, Var and la Gironde, are firm defenders of viticulture. The most vigilant among them come from regions where bad wine is cultivated for the express purpose of being distilled into alcohol.[20]

The increasing sensitivity of French opinion to the agitation of alcoholism issues has created a serious public relations problem for the alcohol groups. The *betteraviers* and distillers, *bouilleurs de cru* and *viticulteurs* all contend that "alcoholism" is primarily an invention of selfish foreign interests. The beetgrowers argue that the so-called "alcohol crisis" became acute only when the sturdy French peasantry was successful in producing enough alcohol to make feasible a "national" carburant. The president of the CGB has hinted that a plan was hatched in Washington during the war (an oblique reference to M. Monnet) to suppress the creation of a French national carburant for the benefit of oil importers. Those who resist the just demands of the beetgrowers are therefore serving the interests of foreign oil companies and Arab nationalism to the detriment of France.[21] The wine growers have also suspected the existence

[19] May, *Problèmes d'alcoolisme, op. cit.*, p. 43. See also the pertinent comments of Bernard Lafay, Minister of Public Health and Population, *J. O., Assemblée Nationale* (25 October 1955), p. 5260.

[20] On the wine lobby: Sully Ledermann, *Alcool, alcoolisme, alcoolisation, op. cit.*, p. 32; and Jacques Callen, "Le lobby du Noch," *France-Observateur*, 27 May 1954.

[21] *Alcools et Dérivés* (October 1956), pp. 3–5; and Charles de Fretay, "Mort à l'alcool français, mais vive le pétrole arabe," *Le Betteravier Français* (October 1956), p. 8. The betteraviers have organized sporadic boycotts of those oil companies (particularly Shell and Esso) reluctant to make use of alcohol in their products. See *ibid.*, March and May 1953.

of a vast conspiracy by foreign companies to attack French mores and customs. The viticulture press has given considerable publicity to the fact that the Pepsi-Cola Company of Casablanca recently awarded prizes for essays having as their theme "the liberation of Algeria from French imperialism." The *bouilleurs* have likewise discovered that French alcoholism was "invented" by the Anglo-Saxons, who thereby hope to sell their fruit juices, soda and whiskey in place of French alcohol.[22]

Insofar as alcoholism is admitted to be a problem, each alcohol group blames the other two for the "fléau." The beetgrowers contend that "industrial" alcohol is in no way responsible for alcoholism.[23] The *bouilleurs* assure the public that their sole concern is to defend the Revolutionary principle of "liberty" (the right to "bouillir" being one of the precious gains of the Revolution) and the interests of the "little man" against alcohol trusts and foreign companies.[24] The viticulture groups indignantly deny that wine could possibly cause alcoholism, and have even recently established a correlation between consumption of water and the incidence of cancer. "To drink water may be dangerous," proclaims *Le Moniteur Vinicole* of 10 November 1956, "fight against cancer by drinking alcohol."

III. PRESSURE TACTICS

One of the primary concerns of organized alcohol groups is to influence decisions made by the *Service des alcools* relating to the quantity and price of alcohol to be purchased by the state. The *Service des alcools* was created as a temporary agency by a decree of 13 August 1919, when the Minister of Finance was charged with the duty of buying and selling alcohol. A decree of 29 September 1935 regularized its status as a "régie commerciale" endowed with financial autonomy. The agency is administered by a Director, who is responsible to the Minister of Finance and assisted by a committee consisting mainly of representatives of the Treasury and the Budget.

The Administration. Under the terms of the 1935 decree, the economic groups are associated with the work of the *Service des alcools* through a *Conseil Supérieur des alcools.* According to article 4 of the decree, the Council "*must* be consulted on all modifications concerning the *régime* of alcohol." It may also be called upon to give its opinion on questions submitted by the Minister of Finance, and is permitted to take the initiative in addressing suggestions to the public powers. The Council consists of 36 members: 23 representatives of occupational groups (farmers, distillers and consumers of alcohol), 5 parlia-

[22] *Alcools et Dérivés* (July-August, 1956), pp. 129–130; *La Journée Vinicole*, 28 November 1956; and *Le Bouilleur de France*, June 1955. The Pepsi-Cola Company of Casablanca is a wholly Moroccan concern whose essay contests are beyond the control of its American counterpart. Ambassador Douglas Dillon's comments on the affair may be found in *Informations et Documents* (15 January 1954), p. 5.

[23] As has been pointed out, the *Service des alcools* sells 300,000 HL of its stock annually at premium prices for beverage uses. See Ledermann, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

[24] *Le Bouilleur de France*, June 1955. See also *J. O., Assemblée Nationale*, 27 January 1955, p. 322.

mentarians, and 8 delegates from interested ministries. The Minister of Finance formally designates the representatives of these groups as well as the president of the Council, though actually he approves of the choices made by the groups themselves. A decree of 21 April 1939 also permits eight representatives of beet-growers and distillers to participate in the deliberations of the inter-departmental committee that fixes the price of beets, which in turn serves as the basis for the price of alcohol derived from all other sources. The *commission du prix de l'alcool de betterave* includes the Director of the *Service des alcools* and representatives of the departments of Agriculture, Finance and National Defense, and is responsible to the Minister of Agriculture. In practice, the interested representatives are allowed to express their views, but the responsibility for decisions is reserved to the civil servants.[25]

The alcohol groups have made effective use of the *Conseil Supérieur des alcools* as a sounding board and a means of establishing contact with the state. In 1951 the Council adopted resolutions echoing the views of the IFA regarding the export price of alcohol and the desirability of creating a synthetic rubber industry. The Council was used by the alcohol groups as a coordinating agency during the René Mayer cabinet crisis in 1953. In October 1954 the Council set up several study committees, headed by officers of the lobbying organizations, to present suggestions and documentation to the state. The reports, made public in March 1955, were distributed to all members of parliament and the appropriate ministries.[26]

Until recently the alcohol groups had satisfactory relations with the administrative agencies most directly concerned with their problems. The *Service des alcools* traditionally has been receptive to the viewpoint of its alcohol clientele. The situation changed radically in 1956 as a result of the firm decision reached by M. Ramadier, the Minister of Finance, to place the agency on a commercial basis. Ramadier informed the National Assembly in December 1956 that he had been concerned about the alcohol deficit ever since taking office. "The situation of the *Service des alcools* . . . is catastrophic. [It] constitutes an extremely heavy burden which, from year to year, varies between 10, 20 and 22 billion francs and is balanced by advances from the Treasury that attain 60 to 80 billions—advances, naturally, that there is not the slightest chance of recovering." The Minister of Finance then revealed that a study group had arrived at "serious conclusions" concerning the *Service des alcools*, and that the government intended to resolve the problem with the aid of a "commission des économies" consisting of the prime minister and the secretaries of state concerned with alcohol.[27]

In order to facilitate the reorientation of the *Service des alcools*, the Minister of Finance on 28 October 1956 named Charles Frappart, a dynamic young member

[25] For the view of the IFA on the work of the committee, see *Alcools et Dérivés* (January 1957), p. 4.

[26] See *Alcools et Dérivés* (December 1954), p. 8, and *ibid.* (July–August 1955), pp. 25–64. By tradition, the civil servants abstain when the Council votes its political resolutions.

[27] *J. O., Assemblée Nationale*, 8 December 1956, p. 5757.

of Robert Lacoste's *cabinet*, as Director.[28] It appears that M. Frappart, who brought with him a complete new staff, has been especially active in pressing for a reduction of the agency's deficit. Of course, the new Director has continued the practice of consulting the interested groups before important decisions are made, explaining the reasons for decisions and accepting suggestions. But the alcohol groups are manifestly unhappy over the recent evolution of the *Service des alcools*. Henri Cayre has charged that the *régime d'alcool* has ceased to be a "normalizing element" in agricultural production. "The *Service des alcools* no longer serves agriculture, it serves the budget of the State." Nor is any redress provided, in Cayre's opinion, by the *Conseil Supérieur des alcools*. "The Council comprises an overly extended range of representatives, and its labor, whatever may be the good will of those who engage in it, is essentially consultative, if not merely academic."[29]

Speaking on behalf of the *Conseil Supérieur des alcools*, Cayre has urged the creation of an autonomous alcohol *régie* (similar to the *Régie des Tabacs*), which would above all be closely associated with the affected groups. "It is necessary for a Director of the *Régie Commerciale des alcools* to depend upon an Administrative Council in which all the economic forces interested in the production and sale of alcohol are represented." A proposal to this effect has been introduced in the National Assembly.[30] In view of the current determination of the Ministry of Finance to effect economies it is highly improbable that such a reform will be carried out. Nonetheless, the proposal is a significant indication of the dissatisfaction of the economic groups with existing administrative arrangements.

Parties and Parliament. There is a political rule of thumb in France, that "beets are radical, apples are moderate, and wine is socialist." This is a vast oversimplification. In truth, alcohol finds supporters among all parties and enemies among only a few. The most extreme position has been adopted by the Poujadists, for whom the problem of alcoholism does not exist. The Poujadists not only support the beetgrowers' demands for a national carburant, but have also introduced a *projet de loi* to extend the privilege of the *bouilleurs* to all French citizens, even those not eligible to receive it under existing law. The peasant deputies are, of course, steadfast defenders of the *régime* of alcohol. The position of the Left parties is more complicated. In principle, the Communists call for utter abolition of alcoholism. But alcoholism can be effectively dealt with, the party claims, only by revolutionizing French society (slum clearance, decent salaries, clean living, etc.). "In a word," said one Communist deputy, "by adopting a social policy that you do not practice at present." Meanwhile,

[28] Frappart's predecessor as Director, M. René Petit (who served from 1947 to 1956) was popular with his clientele. See the tribute paid him in *Alcools et Dérivés* (November 1956), p. 27.

[29] For Cayre's views: *Le Betteravier Français*, July–August 1957, p. 8, and May 1957, p. 17.

[30] Cf. *Alcools et Dérivés* (December 1956), pp. 4, 21–26.

any attempt to revive the anti-alcohol measures of the Pétain *régime* would only injure the "little people"—and is therefore opposed by the party.[31] The Socialists accept the "Marxist" analysis of the causes of alcoholism, but tend to support "reformist" measures in order to alleviate somewhat the human tragedy. On the other hand, Socialist deputies from the Midi have traditionally been champions of viticulture in parliament. In general, only the MRP, because of its interest in the family and natality, along with some Socialists, Radicals, and Independents, can be counted on (deputies from beet, *bouilleur* and wine regions excepted) to support anti-alcohol measures.

The tactics of the three main alcohol lobbies are dictated by the strategic position of each group in French society. The beetgrowers and distillers are relatively small, cohesive groups, with considerable financial reserves at their disposal; their main effort is directed at key members of the Assembly and above all, at the administration. The wine growers and *bouilleurs*, on the other hand, are relatively poor, but numerous. They therefore prefer to organize masses of voters, and tend to exert their pressure on the Assembly rather than the administration.

The beet-culture departments of the North (particularly the Somme, Pas de Calais, Nord, Aisne, Oise, Ardennes, Seine-et-Marne, Marne, and Haute-Marne) have a total parliamentary representation of about seventy, most of whom can be counted on to come to the aid of the beetgrowers. The CGB can generally depend on the parliamentary support of the IPAS (*Indépendents et paysans d'action sociale*—a loose alliance of moderates from industrial areas and peasants), and cooperation from numerous Radicals, Social Republicans and Poujadists. In general, the influence of the CGB in the Assembly depends on the position of agricultural representatives in the constellation of forces. When deputies from rural areas are indispensable members of a cabinet coalition, the beetgrowers are assured of a voice in deliberations of the cabinet concerning the *régime d'alcool*. For example, the beetgrowers established very friendly relations with the government under the prime ministership of Joseph Laniel, an Independent and Peasant from Calvados.[32]

All alcohol groups are overrepresented in the *commission des boissons* and the *commission de l'agriculture* of the two chambers. The *commission des boissons* (beverages committee) is a vigilant defender of wine interests. Twenty-seven out of forty-four members of the committee represent wine-growing departments, including four from l'Hérault, and three each from Aude, Pyrénées-Orientales, la Gironde, and Gard. The president of the committee, Alexandre Baurens

[31] For the Communist position: *J. O., Assemblée Nationale*, April 1954, pp. 1777–82, and December 1954, p. 5699.

[32] On 5 November 1953 a delegation of deputies from beet departments (including Mm. Legendre, Couinaud, Verneuil and Pluchet) met with the prime minister. M. Laniel listened to the deputies with obvious interest (since they were all supporters of the government coalition), comments the CGB journal, and accepted the principle that beet-alcohol quotas had to be raised in certain cases. *Cf. Le Betteravier Français*, November 1953.

(Gers, Socialist) is also a member of the Agriculture Committee; and the president of the latter committee, Albert Lalle (Côte-d'Or, IPAS) is likewise a member of the *commission des boissons*—which ensures a certain degree of cooperation. Both committees are regularly used by alcohol groups as a forum and channel of communication. For example, in January 1957 the CGB made public a Sugar Plan to regularize production of beetsugar, guarantee prices, and provide for stockpiling. The entire Agriculture Committee, after approving the Plan, met with Félix Gaillard (Ramadier's successor as Minister of Finance and later, in November 1957, to become France's youngest premier in recent times) in an effort to secure his support. Similarly, in 1956 the *commission des boissons* unanimously requested the government to reduce taxes on alcoholic products.[33]

The beetgrowers in particular benefit from the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture is usually accorded to a deputy from a rural district. For example, in March 1951, Camille Laurens (Cantal, IPAS) addressed the IFA's General Assembly and approved of its program. He was hailed by alcohol spokesmen as "an ardent defender of the profession."[34] When the IFA stepped up its campaign for a national carburant in the spring of 1954, it found ready support in the Ministry of Agriculture. On 10 April 1954 the Minister of Agriculture, M. Houdet (Senator, Independent) made the following statement in a letter to the president of the IFA: " I have noted the information in your letter. . . . I have intervened with the Minister of Industry and Commerce who has given me the assurance that 700,000 HL of alcohol could be used, as of this year, in the manufacture of *supercarburant ternaire*. Nonetheless, I have brought the matter up again with the president of the Council and the relevant technical services so that the figure might be increased to one million HL—by asking that all means be used to facilitate the normal sale of excess alcohol production."[35]

The role of the beet lobby in the ministerial crisis of May 1953 is an excellent illustration of its parliamentary tactics. In January 1953 M. René Mayer received his investiture with the solid support of the RGR, MRP, Independents, Gaullists, and most Peasants. Immediately upon taking office, however, he found himself with a huge budgetary deficit on his hands. The Ministry of Finance began consideration of various measures involving a reduction of state expenditures; it became known that the alcohol statute in particular was being reviewed. The CGB thereupon held a mass meeting in January 1953 and offered its solution to the budgetary problem: prohibition of construction of new sugar factories, and the compulsory addition of two million HL of alcohol to gasoline each year. In May, M. Mayer submitted to the Assembly a *projet de loi* for the economic and financial restoration of the country. Article two of the *projet*

[33] *Le Betteravier Français*, June 1957, pp. 8, 20, and July–August 1957, pp. 1, 18, 24 Also *Alcools et Dérivés* (June 1956), p. 5.

[34] Laurens also attended the general assembly of the *Fédération nationale des coopératives de transformation de la betterave*, and endorsed their demands. *Cf. Alcools et Dérivés*, December 1951, p. 22, and October 1952, pp. 13–17.

[35] Meetings of IFA delegations with the Minister of Industry and Commerce, the Director of Carburants, and the Director of the *Service des alcools* are described in *Alcools et Dérivés* (November 1953), p. 5. Houdet's letter is reprinted, *ibid.* (April 1954), p. 5.

accorded the executive special powers to deal with a range of problems by decree. The government made it clear that the decree power would be used to reduce purchases of alcohol, and to reconvert agricultural production. Indeed, article 17 of the *projet* was specifically entitled, "*révision du régime économique de l'alcool.*"

Inasmuch as the project affected the alcohol régime, on May 9 the government (as required by law) informed the *Conseil Supérieur des alcools* of its intentions. The Council met on May 17, and registered its violent opposition to the proposal. On May 18, M. Blondelle of the FNSEA assembled seventy parliamentarians to hear M. Cayre expound the views of the beetgrowers. The agricultural press labelled M. Mayer, "l'assassinat de l'agriculture française." Two defenders of the beetgrowers, deputies Charpentier and Pluchet, managed to enlist the support of the Finance Committee of the National Assembly for a modification of article 17 of the *projet.* On May 21 the prime minister posed the question of confidence on the proposed decree power (article two); he was denied this confidence by an absolute majority (328 against, 244 for), and therefore was compelled to resign. In January, 34 Peasants had voted for Mayer's investiture and 11 abstained. In May, only 22 Peasants voted for the government, 17 voted against, and 7 abstained. Fifty-five Independents, Peasants, Radicals and Popular Republicans who had voted for Mayer in January either abstained or voted against the government in May. The IFA, in a report to its membership on the Mayer crisis, characterized its role in the following way: "Alerted by the representatives of agriculture, *our* deputies reacted. And that is probably one of the reasons for the fall of the Mayer government." Eugène Dubois, president of the IFA, later boasted that if René Mayer had not linked reform of the alcohol régime with special powers, he might have remained in office. Dubois' view, however, is an oversimplification. The beet and alcohol lobby was effective in this particular crisis because of a change in the parliamentary situation: the decision of the Gaullists to go into opposition enabled the supporters of agriculture to hold the balance of power. When the Gaullists later supported M. Laniel's request for similar decree powers, the alcohol groups were unable to block its passage.[36]

A second instructive example of the beet lobby's pressure tactics is the effective rear-guard action that was fought against the anti-alcohol measures of the Mendès-France cabinet. A number of decrees by the Mendès-France government had as their object to: reduce the number of *bouilleurs de cru;* make it more difficult to receive licenses for new *débits de boissons;* encourage the production of fruit juices; and above all, reduce the size of the beet crop and cut down on the amount of alcohol distilled from beets. In addition, a decree of 13 November 1954 created the *Haut Comité d'étude et d'information sur l'alcoolisme,* charged with the function of assembling information on questions relating to alcoholism, informing the public and interested economic groups of its find-

[36] The IFA's view of the crisis may be found in *Alcools et Dérivés* (May 1953), p. 3; and *ibid.* (June 1953), p. 5.

ings, and participating in deliberations by the government concerning the alcohol problem. Its members serve without pay, and are responsible directly to the president of the council.[37]

According to a survey conducted in January 1955 by the *Institut français d'opinion publique*, the anti-alcohol decrees of the Mendès-France government were approved by a great majority of the citizenry. Eighty-one percent of those polled opposed the payment of subsidies to beetgrowers, while only five percent favored them and 14 percent had no opinion. Sixty-one percent supported the attempt by Mendès to limit the privileges accorded to *bouilleurs de cru*, while 22 percent had no opinion. Nonetheless, the counterattack of the alcohol lobby was powerful enough to reverse most of the government's measures. The decree limiting the privileges of the *bouilleurs* has never gone into effect (each year the Assembly has postponed its application); the higher license fees for *débits de boissons* were repealed; most of the privileges of the beetgrowers were reestablished; and a number of distilleries soon reopened their doors.[38]

The impressive comeback of the alcohol groups was due to the position of the peasant and allied groups in the succeeding government of Edgar Faure. Seventy-seven Independents and Peasants had voted no confidence in Mendès-France on 6 February 1955; one hundred and one members of the same groups voted for investiture of the Edgar Faure government on 23 February 1955. Two members of peasant groups (Sourbet and Antier) entered the government, as ministers of agriculture and of the merchant marine, respectively. The effect on the fortunes of the CGB was immediate. A decree of 20 May 1955 was favorable to the beetgrowers, and permitted the reopening of some distilleries. In June a conference was held at the office of the prime minister. It included members of the CGB executive bureau, deputies Lalle, Charpentier, Legendre, and Bricout, the prime minister and the director of his cabinet. Demands were made concerning the price of beets, and the manufacture of a national carburant. According to a participant, the prime minister gave satisfaction on all counts. M. Cayre announced to the CGB membership several months later, "his promises were kept." The Minister of Agriculture, M. Sourbet, was also praised for his "understanding attitude" toward the beetgrowers. As Cayre summed up the situation: "Our revival dates from the month of May. The obscure battles we led, the demonstrations in the provinces, the kilometers of corridors we paced in the ministries, began to bear fruit."[39]

The pressure tactics of the *bouilleurs de cru* constitute an interesting contrast

[37] On the *Haut comité*, see the explanatory note in *Population* (July–September 1955) pp. 592–93.

[38] *Cf.* "Alcoolisme et opinion publique," *Population* (July-September 1955), pp. 539–40. Henri Cayre claims that demonstrations by *betteraviers* against the Mendès-France decrees compelled the government to negotiate a truce. Henri Cayre, "Trêve, avant le soleil ou l'orage?", *Alcools et Dérivés* (January 1955), pp. 3–4.

[39] *Le Betteravier Français* (January 1956), p. 2. However, the Guy Mollet government was able subsequently to adopt several anti-alcohol measures.

to those of the wealthier beetgrowers. The action of the *Syndicat National des Bouilleurs de Cru* is necessarily more "public" than that of the CGB, since the widely scattered *bouilleurs* must be mobilized and organized. The SNBC is continually exhorting its supporters to write to deputies, present petitions and hold protest meetings.[40]

Shortly after its reactivation in 1947, the SNBC proceeded to establish contacts with deputies and the administration. A parliamentary *comité de patronage* was created, and the secretary-general, M. André Liautey, secured interviews with the Minister of Finance and the General Director of Indirect Taxation. The SNBC succeeded in obtaining the signatures of twenty-four members of the Assembly's Agriculture Committee (including seven Popular Republicans, two Radicals, three Socialists, two Independents, and six Communists) in support of its parliamentary projects.

The SNBC intensified its political activities as the general elections of 1951 approached. As has been pointed out by Ledermann, in 23 departments there is one *bouilleur* for every two male voters; in 24 departments, one *bouilleur* for every three male voters; and in 14 departments, one *bouilleur* for every four male voters. That is, in 61 departments there is one *bouilleur* for every two to four male electors. Letters were addressed to all candidates in the departments where *bouilleurs* are numerous, requesting the recipients to state publicly their position with respect to the *bouilleurs*, and to sign the following declaration:

"I, the undesigned M. _____, candidate in the legislative elections of 17 June 1951, hereby engage myself, if I am elected to the National Assembly: 1) to depose in my name, or to counter-sign, in the form of a bill, the conclusions of report no. 12339 of the preceding legislature envisaging the reestablishment of the freedom of distillation at home; 2) to sign a request for a roll call vote envisaging urgent discussion of that proposition before 1 June 1952. Signed, _____."

The answers of all candidates were publicized, though it would appear that the effect on the electorate was not decisive. The greatest success of the SNBC was the election of its secretary-general, M. Liautey, as deputy from the Haute-Saône. M. Liautey immediately organized a *Comité interparlementaire d'étude du statut des bouilleurs de cru*, which was joined by twenty-four deputies. The "study group" constituted the parliamentary base of operations for the *bouilleurs* throughout the life of the Assembly.[41]

The power of the SNBC in parliament was revealed on several occasions. *Bouilleurs de cru* were required to secure licenses by a law of 13 July 1953. The

[40] Typical declaration of the SNBC: "The *bureau national* invites all its adherents to secure the adoption of motions of protest by departmental and communal assemblies. A great many *conseils généraux* are going to meet this month. It is necessary to obtain from them the adoption of motions favorable to our just cause. It is urgent that, in each department, deputies be presented with numerous written or verbal protests." *La Défense des Distillateurs Ambulants et des Bouilleurs de Cru* (October 1956), p. 3.

[41] *Le Bouilleur de France*, May 1951; and Sully Ledermann, *op. cit.*, p. 44. M. Liautey was defeated in January 1956, apparently because of his failure to negotiate an *apparentement*.

SNBC worked diligently on the deputies from the *bouilleur* departments; on 31 December 1953 the obnoxious law was repealed, and all fees that had been paid up to that time were refunded. An even greater threat was then posed by the Mendès-France decree of 13 November 1954, which provided: 1) that *bouilleurs* were to pay a tax of 860 francs per liter of alcohol; and 2) the privilege was extended only to those registered with the agricultural family allowance office—thereby eliminating a large number of workers who cultivated small plots in their spare time. The SNBC denounced the decree as a victory for the alcohol "trusts," and warned that "Mendès, hope of international capitalism, wants to destroy the middle classes, and to enslave the peasantry that he despises so profoundly."[42] A number of deputies, at the behest of the SNBC, introduced proposals to postpone or abrogate the decree of 13 November 1954. After considering all suggestions, the Finance Committee recommended (with only one dissenting vote) that the application of the decree be postponed from 1 January 1956 to 1 September 1956. Although many pressing domestic and international problems confronted the nation in the fall of 1955, the National Assembly decided to devote three sessions (on October 25 and 28, and November 8, 1955) to a debate on the committee's recommendation. The discussion extends over some forty pages of the *Journal Officiel*.

A series of speakers defended the *bouilleurs* as honest, hard working folk, entitled to consume a petty ten liters of alcohol per year without payment of an onerous tax. A Communist deputy, denouncing the ravages of alcoholism in France, called for improved working conditions. But he then declared that since the November decrees put the blame for alcoholism on the "little people" instead of the great trusts, he and his party would vote for the total abrogation of the decree.[43] One deputy from the Manche reminded the Assembly that the men who fought in the trenches in World War I received a daily allotment of alcohol, and were considered heroes, not alcoholics. Naturally, the anti-alcohol forces were outraged by an appeal to patriotism in this context. In any case the defenders of the *bouilleurs* easily carried the day. The Assembly approved a motion to postpone enforcement of the decree to 1 September 1956.[44] In one last desperate effort to deal with the problem, Mme. Lipkowski introduced an amendment, in the session of November 8, stating simply, "the privilege of the *bouilleurs de cru* is abolished." The amendment was supported by M. Bernard Lafay, minister of public health and population; and was opposed, naturally, by M. Liautey, *rapporteur* for the Finance Committee (and secretary-general of the SNBC as well as president of the *comité interparlementaire d'étude du statut des bouilleurs de cru*). The amendment was defeated by the overwhelming vote

[42] *Le Bouilleur de France*, January 1955. Also, *ibid.*, November 1954.

[43] *J. O., Assemblée Nationale*, 25 October 1955, p. 5275. An MRP deputy caustically remarked: "One declaims against alcoholism, but one votes for alcohol."

[44] The National Assembly in 1956 voted to postpone the effective date of the decree to 1 September 1957. It is probable that the decree will be either postponed indefinitely or abrogated.

of 408 to 147—an impressive demonstration of the political power of the *bouilleurs*.[45]

* * *

Objectively, the measures to be adopted in France with respect to the problem of alcohol and alcoholism are beyond debate: 1) *Reduce the consumption of alcohol*—by limiting the number of *débits de boissons*, levying higher taxes on alcohol, and prohibiting excessive sale of alcoholic products in the overseas territories. Above all, it is essential to encourage the consumption of non-alcoholic beverages. This entails a vast program to provide sanitary drinking water for the entire nation, and to develop the fruit-juice and milk industries. 2) *Reduce production of alcohol*—by cutting down on purchases by the State, abolishing the privilege of the *bouilleurs*, reconverting vineyards, eliminating the subsidy to beetgrowers and replacing beets with other kinds of culture.[46]

In fact it would appear that a solution of the alcohol problem is part and parcel of the whole process of modernization of the French economy and society. The question of an alternative to beet and wine culture requires intensive study in university and government laboratories, and a willingness on the part of *betteraviers* and *viticulteurs* to develop more useful forms of agriculture. Furthermore, a fruit juice industry can hardly be created until mass production makes possible a low-priced product; in turn, a mass market for frozen fruit juices is based on widespread ownership of refrigerators—which is out of the question, given the depressed standard of living of the French working class.

The impetus for a rational solution of the alcohol problem comes from university faculties, civil servants, and representatives of dynamic elements in the French economy (oil, automobile, steel and chemical industries, etc.) to whom it is vital that France rationalize its institutions. But the four to six million people who live off the production and sale of alcohol, and who have votes, are not eager to be sacrificed on the altar of modernization. For the *betteraviers*, a way of life represented by the "family farm" is at stake; the schemes of the Ministry of Finance would lead to "great farms, more or less collectivized, cultivated by an army of functionaries who obey the officials of the State without a murmur."[47] Beet culture, it is occasionally admitted, is irrational, and viticulture is inefficient; yet this is the price that must be paid by the nation for the existence of an honest peasantry, "incorruptible as the ocean."

[45] The minority consisted mainly of Socialists (including Moch, Mollet, and Daniel Mayer) and Popular Republicans (Abelin, Pflimlin, Robert Schuman, Maurice Schumann, etc.), along with a few Radicals and Independents. Curiously, Mendès-France joined the Communists and Liautey in voting against the Lipkowski amendment, while Edgar Faure voted in favor. *Cf. J. O., Assemblée Nationale*, 8 November 1955, p. 5513.

[46] These are essentially the recommendations of Malignac and Colin, *L'alcoolisme*, *op. cit.*, pp. 108–122.

[47] See the statement by Fernand Bieuville, president of the CGB, in *Le Betteravier Français* (August-September 1956), p. 1. It is never satisfactorily explained by alcohol publicists why the Communist party receives such a large percentage of the votes of the supposedly sober peasantry.

Distrust of civil servants—particularly those recruited since the Liberation—is widespread among the alcohol groups, and reflects the basic differences between their respective social values. There is little doubt that young civil servants in the departments of finance and health have been able to convince a series of ministers of the dangers of both overproduction of alcohol and alcoholism.[48] But utter dependence of the prime minister upon the various parties whose members compose his cabinet frequently makes it difficult to hold out against the demands of highly organized pressure groups.[49] Whenever the parties of the center and right are indispensable to a governing coalition, the interests of all "traditional France" (including, of course, the alcohol groups) tend to receive careful political protection.

[48] Bitter criticism of the attitude of the civil service is expressed by Jean Closier, "La bataille de l'alcool," *Alcools et Dérivés* (June 1953), pp. 4–5; and by Senator Bataille, president of a distillery syndicate, *ibid.* (May 1954), p. 20.

[49] As Georges Lavau has observed: "L'émiettement de nos forces politiques permet aux groupes d'intérêts de jouer sur un clavier extrêmement étendu et de profiter de la concurrence très vive entre les divers partis." "Note sur un 'Pressure Group' français," *Revue Française de Science politique* (April–June 1955), p. 371.

MEXICO'S ONE-PARTY SYSTEM: A RE-EVALUATION

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Because Mexican politics since the Revolution of 1910–17 have operated mainly within the framework of a one-party system and because in the past strong men have sometimes occupied the presidency, writers in the United States have tended to treat the system as authoritarian.[1] Emphasis upon presidential rule and the corollary explanation of the role of the Revolutionary Party as nothing more nor less than an instrument of presidential domination have served to create an oversimplified picture of presidential power. It is the purpose of this paper to outline at least four checkpoints on which the authoritarian interpretation seems to have involved miscalculation of the realities of the Mexican political system. The nature of membership in the "official" party, the degree of centralization within and without the party structure, the threefold role of the party within the political system, and the ideological bias of the political elite all seem to indicate the necessity of a re-evaluation of the politics of the republic on our southern border.[2]

I. MEMBERSHIP AND CENTRALIZATION

A directly affiliated membership significant in either numerical or disciplinary terms has not been characteristic of Mexico's Revolutionary Party. It is true that during the period of the presidency of Miguel Alemán Valdés the party announced a policy of direct affiliation. But only in the Federal District has noteworthy effort been made to enroll a dues-paying rank and file. Regional

[1] Frank Tannenbaum, *Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread* (New York, 1950), p. 94: "The head of the party is appointed by the President. . . . In effect the official government party has become the recognized electoral machinery of the administration." *Cf.* J. Lloyd Mecham, "Mexican Federalism—Fact or Fiction?" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (March, 1940), Vol. 208, pp. 34–35: " . . . the party system . . . is completely subordinated to presidential control. Here without doubt is the principal extra-legal instrumentality at the disposal of the executive to effect a personal dictatorship."

[2] The analysis that follows is based upon material gathered in Mexico, 1952–53. Approximately 150 persons active in Mexican politics were interviewed. Individuals active at the municipal level as well as those prominent in state and national politics were included. Some policy makers opened their correspondence files to the writer in order that the nature of their work might be more clearly understood. Election reports on file in the national Chamber of Deputies as well as those in the archives of state legislatures were examined. In geographical terms the area of most intensive research included the states of Veracruz, Puebla, Michoacan, and Jalisco as well as the Federal District. Expressions of gratitude go to Professor George I. Blanksten of Northwestern University for his valuable advice and encouragement, to Dr. Howard F. Cline of the Library of Congress for pertinent suggestions and help in making necessary contacts in the field, and to the Doherty Foundation for indispensable financial aid.

committees in the states have not taken the idea seriously.[3] For most persons party membership has continued to be a by-product of joining one of the various functional organizations which embrace peasants, workers, bureaucrats, teachers, professional men of all categories and small landholders.[4] Together such groups have formed what might be termed the "Revolutionary Association" and, though members of party-affiliated groups have automatically become members of the party itself, collection of dues has been in the hands of the functional group leaders. The latter have decided how much money from the dues-paying rank and file will go to finance party operations. Thus, the concept of a disciplined rank and file does not fit with the party for the simple reason that there has been no rank and file to discipline. In fact, the party as a concrete structure has been little more than a skeletal framework of committees following a vertical-horizontal arrangement corresponding to the national, state, and local levels of government.

The links among the party committees at the various levels have not been so firm or constituted such a clear cut pattern of hierarchy or centralization of power at the summit as has been supposed. Within the party structure the Central Executive Committee has attempted to dominate neither the selection of state and municipal committee personnel nor the various roles such personnel must play in the decision-making process at the respective levels of government. The key to this arrangement has been party finance. Without rank and file of their own the party committees have depended upon contributions from the treasuries of the organized sector groups and government in the respective spheres—national, state and local. There has been no national party treasury for state and municipal committees to draw upon. The Central Executive Committee has been run with funds collected from the national committees of the functional organizations[5] and the national government. Similarly, the party regional committees in their turn have looked to the state governments and state committees of business, agrarian, labor and professional groups as the principal sources of supply for day-to-day operating expenses.[6] Finally, the

[3] This, however, does not mean that a party rank and file will not emerge in the future. Observers of Mexican politics should be on the lookout for such a development and be alert to implications with regard to changes in the Mexican political system. As things now stand a party rank and file might mean a step either in the direction of representative democracy or totalitarianism.

[4] These groups have been recognized by the party rules of organization as divided among three sectors—agrarian, labor and popular.

[5] Of particular importance have been the committees of the National Peasants' Confederation, the Association of Small Agricultural Property Owners, the Confederation of Mexican Workers, the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants, the Revolutionary Confederation of Mexican Workers, the General Workers' Confederation, and the National Confederation of Popular Organizations which includes teachers, professional people of all types, participants in cooperatives, artisans and small businessmen.

[6] For example, the regional committee at Puebla in 1953 was receiving five thousand *pesos* per month from the state government. The regional committee president was expected to pay for staff, materials and rent with this money along with whatever could be collected from the functional committee organizations.

party municipal committees, like those at higher levels, have been without financial support of a rank and file and have thus remained dependent upon the charity of municipal governing councils (*ayuntamientos*), and local interest group committees.

Strong personal-political ties between the President of the Republic and the president of the party Central Executive Committee on the one hand and between party regional (state) committee presidents and the respective state governors on the other have been corollaries of the financial arrangement. This has also been true of the links between presidents of party municipal committees and ranking members of local government. At any given level the chief of the party committee has been cast in the role of extraofficial but necessarily integral element of the executive's governing "team" in that jurisdictional division. Accordingly, it has been universally expected that the party national assembly will honor the preference of the President of the Republic in selecting the head of the Central Executive Committee; that the state assemblies of the presidents of the party municipal committees will accept the suggestions of the state governors in choosing party regional committee presidents;[7] and that the presidents of the *ayuntamientos* will have their way when party municipal assemblies meet to choose heads of party municipal committees.

Decentralization has been reflected in the party CEC's well-established practice of leaving decisions on selection of candidates for state level offices to persons intimately connected with the state political situation. This pattern in turn has been linked to tendencies toward decentralization external to the party structure—particularly in connection with relationships between state governments and the central government.

On this latter point it should be noted that the consensus of scholarly opinion has had "political federalism" at "an ebb" in Mexico.[8] Such a conclusion seems

[7] *Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Declaración de Principios, Programa de Acción, y Estatutos* (Mexico, 1953). The party rules of organization make the process seem more closely tied to the decision of the CEC than it really is. The CEC has been given formal power to issue the *convocatoria* (a combination order of convocation and rules of the meeting) for the assembly of party municipal committee presidents which will select the president of the regional committee in a given state. But the outcome is determined beforehand by a gubernatorial decision with which the CEC does not concern itself. In fact, the authority of the CEC relative to the selection of the regional committee presidents—even the authority to make an interim appointment in case a regional committee presidency becomes vacant—will have substantial importance only when a governor has shown such ineptitude that the national government has begun to consider use of the Constitutional power of intervention. Similarly, the regional committees have been formally vested with authority to approve the selection of presidents of the party municipal committees but have been reluctant to reverse a locally made decision unless a municipal council has shown itself unfit to govern and has provoked the state government to the point of intervening in local affairs. At all levels deference will be paid the wishes of those chosen to preside over the party committees with regard to the selection of committee general secretaries and treasurers. The wishes of the sector organizations determine choice of other secretaries—agrarian, labor and popular.

[8] Harry Bernstein, *Modern and Contemporary Latin America* (New York, 1952), p. 151.

warranted only if it means that Mexican federalism allows state governments less independence than has been evident in some other systems such as that of the United States. It has certainly been true that persons aspiring to be governors of states have had little chance of realizing their ambitions unless smiled upon by the President of the Republic. On the other hand, new factors have been emerging which have tended to limit presidential power to bring about removal of governors prior to expiration of the gubernatorial term of office. Public opinion has played an increasing part in conditioning removal decisions.[9] Also important has been the growing complexity of the task of governing. Industrialization has moved forward, the social and economic functions of government have multiplied and demanded more specialized knowledge and the numbers of organized interests have increased proportionately. As a result the Mexican President no longer is able to govern in detail as he once could. Responsibility must be delegated to an increasing degree. Broad national policies such as President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines's "March to the Sea" plan must be complemented by state policies requiring good administrators for execution. Moreover, conflict of diverse interests in the various states must be reconciled. Persons capable of holding the governorships of the states under such con-

[9] A great Mexican dictator of another era, the former President Porfirio Díaz, was able to appoint and remove governors at will according to currents of "palace politics." Subsequent to the Revolution of 1910 decisions made by Mexican presidents continued to determine who could be governor and for how long. However, the liberal policies of the Avila Camacho, Alemán and Ruiz Cortines administrations in regard to expression of opinion and group organization as well as the continued emphasis upon literacy have been working to create a public opinion factor which must be weighed by the national executive in dealing with the executives of the states. To take the initiative in removing a governor when there has been no persistent and widespread public demand for such a measure is to reveal schisms and disagreements within the Revolutionary group to the newspapers and ultimately to the entire country. Rifts signify weakness; and politicians, no matter what the country, tend to think twice before providing their constituents with spectacles of intra-group tensions. On the other hand, it has become increasingly evident that presidents cannot ignore popular demands for the central government's intervention against governors whose corruption and/or incapacity have created powerful opposition in a given state. Either spontaneous mass public manifestation of discontent on a statewide scale or signs of disorder and unrest continuing over a span of months can bring about the use of the interventor power. During the period 1951–54 the events leading to the resignations of Manuel Mayoral Heredia and Tomás Marentes Miranda, governors of Oaxaca and Yucatán respectively, as well as the congressional declaration of a "disappearance of powers" in Guerrero forcing the abdication of governor Alejandro Gómez Maganda provided three pertinent illustrations.

In August, 1953 I was fortunate in obtaining two interviews with *Licenciado* Cosío Villegas, noted historian and economist of Mexico's National University. Cosío Villegas, who can scarcely be classified as an apologist for the Revolutionary Party, took the position that gubernatorial-presidential relationships had undergone substantial change. He recognized the necessity of a person's having the support of the President in order to become governor, but he noted that the power of the President to use federal intervention in order to bring about a governor's removal has become much more limited: "If a governor gains respect and confidence of the people of his entity through wise policy choices and their implementation—if he is a good governor—it is politically unwise, perhaps impossible, to apply the interventor power in order to secure the governor's removal."

ditions are hard to find and their removal is not to be lightly considered. Finally, the effect of air travel and a constantly expanding highway net upon political relationships cannot be dismissed.[10] There is to be noted at this point a most significant paradox—particularly apparent in Mexico since 1946. The physical facilities permitting greater centralization have in fact encouraged decentralization in the governmental process. Broader area of discretion can be allowed the governors of the states without risk of isolation encouraging the erection of political machines capable of challenging the central government to a duel at arms.

In summary, the proposition that the national government reigns supreme in Mexico is not challenged. But it is emphasized that achievement of supremacy has made it possible for the national government, particularly the President, to delegate increasing authority to the governors of the states in order that local problems may be solved in accord with local aspirations and needs. The same tendency has been reflected in the evolving pattern of power within the party structure. Neither the executive branch of government nor the "official" party has been directed toward imposition of policies and candidates regardless of local, popular sentiment. Neither the concept of personal dictatorship nor that of the elite-dominated monolithic state fits the changing Mexican situation.

II. THE THREEFOLD ROLE OF THE OFFICIAL PARTY

If the "official" or Revolutionary Party has not been an instrument for shaping the dominant power pattern into a monolithic structure, what has been its socio-political function? The answer has more than one side since the party's role has in fact been threefold. The three aspects have formed the parts of a complete whole. But for analytical purposes they should be treated separately.

In the first place, the party has obviously had an electoral function. For election purposes it has served as a procedural device in the formalization of candidacies for public office, and it has organized the election campaigns for the persons nominated. Most important, however, has been its usefulness as a symbol of mutual interest. The party banner has become an emotional solvent for diverse economic groups and conflicting personal ambitions. As a symbol, it is the external manifestation of the rational conviction that the rewards of unity in terms of control of public office outweigh the occasional temporary disadvantages suffered from interpersonal or intergroup disagreements within the Revolutionary sector. The symbol seems to have become so venerated that it offers a reason in itself for unified electoral operations. Thus, during the election of 1952 when Avelino Navarro A., president of the District Committee *Pro* Adolfo Ruiz Cortines of Colotlán, Jalisco, sent a letter to the agrarian secretary of the party Central Executive Committee and expressed real dissatisfaction with party nominees for deputy and senator, the official's answer was couched

[10] Dirección General de Estadística, *Anuario Estadístico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos—1946–50* (Mexico, 1953), pp. 446–447. In 1928 Mexico had only 241 kilometers of paved roads. By the end of 1945, 8,163 kilometers had been paved, and this amount had been increased to 13,585 kilometers at the end of 1950.

in terms of the loyalty and unity of interest symbolized by the party emblem:

> . . . I feel I should point out that regardless of whoever may be designated to run as candidates for deputies and senators, our obligation as members of the *Partido Revolutionario Institucional* is to uphold the party candidates. We should strive to prevent any division among the *campesinos* which might occur because none of our friends was nominated. On the contrary, we should continue supporting the candidacy of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines with all possible enthusiasm.[11]

It is noteworthy that in answering Navarro the Secretary of Agrarian Action did not try to defend the choices that were made. Instead he appealed to the values of unity and electoral success for the Revolutionary group as a whole as reflected in the triumph of its presidential candidate.

A second aspect of the party's total function has been its liaison role within the Revolutionary association. Daily throughout the year party committees work to facilitate the flow of information and the reconciliation of conflicting interests among the various groups and leaders associated in the revolutionary circle at a given level of government. In concrete, operative terms this has meant that the party central committee has been responsible for furthering understanding and a sense of common cause among federal legislators, state governors, the President and his cabinet, national committees of labor, peasant, professional, industrial, commercial and small property groups. On any typical weekday—between the hours of 10:00 and 2:00 in the afternoon and 4:00 and 8:00 in the evening—the central offices of the party in Mexico City teem with government officials, legislators, and interest group leaders who find there a kind of lodge or meeting place for exchanging confidences, swapping political gossip, sounding attitudes of colleagues and patching up differences. Similarly, at the state level the party regional committees have worked for exchange of views and compromise of differences within the net of relationships involving functional groups, executive and legislature as well as the *ad hoc* groups of ordinarily apolitical persons which frequently emerge to demand civic improvements or redress of grievances. Day-to-day activity in the regional committee offices is not so great as in the party offices in the Federal District, but at election time it would be difficult to find a busier place than the headquarters of the regional committee in any one of the state capitals. The weakest point of party operation in terms of the liaison function has been at the municipal level where lack of finances and the consequent tendency to function on a part-time basis have limited the effectiveness of the party municipal committees.[12]

The third aspect of the party's threefold role has been its operation as an intermediary between government and people. In this connection the party has acted as a channel of communication and an agency of mediation between policy

[11] Secretaría de Acción Agraria del Comité Central Ejecutivo del P.R.I. *Expedientes*. No. 153 (Dated May 26, 1952).

[12] It should be pointed out that in some *municipios* which are geographically extensive, heavily populated and economically well-situated, local groups have felt the need for a liaison and communication device on a full-time basis and have contributed the necessary financial support. However, such conditions seem to be the exceptions rather than the rule.

makers in the executive branch of government, municipal, state and national, on the one hand and the majority and minority points of view at the grassroots on the other.

A relatively clear division of labor has emerged in connection with the party committees' communication and mediation function. The Central Executive Committee has worked with problems arising where national government officials and policies have had a direct effect upon the everyday lives of citizens. The agrarian secretary of the central committee, for example, has had to treat cases involving numerous federal agencies. Among the most important of these have been the Agrarian Department, the Secretariat of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, the Secretariat of Water Resources and the National Bank of Ejido Credit. Dealing with these agencies under various provisions of the Agrarian Code have been *ejido* farmers, those who would like to become members of *ejido* communities,[13] and farm owners of small as well as relatively large properties. From the relations of these popular groups with the authorities there have arisen four typical problem categories: (1) claims that elections in an *ejido* community have been conducted unfairly; (2) disputes between large landholders and neighboring *ejido* communities as, for example, when a landlord refuses to allow *ejidatarios* to use the land that is theirs by dotation under the Agrarian Code; (3) disputes between the owners of small properties and neighboring *ejidos* because boundary lines have not been clearly marked or because one or the other party has decided to ignore the decree governing the division of land; (4) finally, the perennial problem of water and the question of how inadequate local supplies will be allocated among *ejidatarios*, small farmers and the larger landholders. A case typical of this latter category involved the small property holders of Tepotzotlán in the state of Mexico. These humble people failed to receive an answer to their request that the Secretariat of Water Resources hand down an opinion on allocation of water. The waters of the local Arroyo de Lanzarote dam were being used as the exclusive property of two large landholders in the area. On that account the small scale farmers had suffered some severe crop losses. Petitioned to intervene by the small property group, the central committee agrarian action secretary took up the cudgel in a lengthy correspondence (approximately two years) with officials of Water Resources. The result was an engineering survey and report which culminated in an administrative ruling that provided for a more equitable distribution of the area's water supply in the future.[14]

At the state level party regional committees have served in a number of ways

[13] Nathan L. Whetten, *Rural Mexico* (Chicago, 1948), p. 182. "The term '*ejido*' as now used in Mexico, refers to an agrarian community which has received and continues to hold land in accordance with the agrarian laws growing out of the Revolution of 1910."

[14] Secretaría de Acción Agraria del Comité Central Ejecutivo del P.R.I., *op. cit.*, Nos. 4.080, 4.126, 7.224, 7.268 (April 16, 1951 through February 17, 1953). Examples of the activity of the central committee secretariats are drawn from cases made available to this writer by the Secretary of Agrarian Action. Although there was no similar opportunity to cull the files of the other party secretariats, conversations with officials indicated essentially similar functions in spite of the fact that different groups were involved.

to link together government and people. Complaints from the *municipios* concerning behavior of state tax collectors and law enforcement officers have been called to the attention of governors and state department heads. Again, when official administrative channels have been stopped, requests by local groups for state aid in construction of rural schools, neighborhood roads, bridges and sanitation facilities have been funneled through regional committees. Important also has been the work of the regional committees in bridging the gap between the rank and file members of the Revolutionary association's organized groups on the one hand and the governors and national field officials on the other. Such an alternate channel of communication has been particularly vital when personality conflicts and minority interests have tended to frustrate peasants, workers, small business and professional men in their efforts to obtain representation through the committees of their own organizations.

The regional committees have acted as auxiliary welfare agencies and social clubs. Corn has been sold to the poor at prices below those prevailing in the open market. Medical care and legal advice have been provided for those to whom such advantages would otherwise to unavailable. Sports contests and social events have been arranged.

The last of the regional committee activities to be mentioned in this overall connection has been more important than any single one of the others. This is the work of the regional committees in the interpretation of popular sentiment with regard to selection of candidates for municipal offices.[15] The sensitivity of this task stems from the prevalence of relatively clear cut, emotionally volatile preferences with regard to candidates for the municipal council. Concern for the composition of these bodies has been nearly universal, and persons customarily apathetic in their attitudes toward electoral arrangements have demanded consideration of their opinions in selection of the *planillas* or slates of party candidates submitted to municipal party nominating assemblies.[16]

In order to avoid placing state officialdom's stamp of approval upon arbitrary and corrupt practices by individuals and groups at the muncipal level, members of the regional committee in a given state will visit the various *municipios* during the two months preceding convocation of the party municipal nominating assemblies. In the course of these visits regional committee members try to contact all factions in a given *municipio*. Informal conferences are held with persons currently active in politics and also with those who have been politically

[15] Perhaps this should have been mentioned in connection with the party's role as an electoral device, but it makes more sense to the writer to consider it as a facet of the party's communication and mediation role.

[16] In other words the area of political consensus has been relatively much broader with regard to municipal problems and decisions than has been the case with problems and decisions of wider scope. The term "political consensus" is used in the sense suggested by Professors Kahin, Pauker and Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries," this REVIEW, Vol. 49 (December, 1955), p. 1039. "Political consensus, as we use the term, denotes the condition of *conscious* involvement in the political process, where members of a territorial group or community feel the right and/or obligation to participate in the determining of a particular political decision."

active in the past. On the basis of these conversations an effort is made to form a ticket which distributes offices among the various factions and organized groups in such a way as to compromise differences and create an arrangement acceptable to the community as a whole.

The next step involves the gathering of the organized groups in what are termed "sector" assemblies—agrarian, labor and popular. These assemblies select the persons to fill the places allotted the various groups on the party's ticket for the *municipio*. If the group leaders and rank and file are relatively well satisfied with the outcome of the sector assemblies, the ticket thus constituted will be sent by the party municipal committee to the regional commitee president in the state capital for approval. Following regional committee approval, the party nominating assembly will be held in the *cabecera* or head city of the municipality; and the approved ticket will be unanimously endorsed.[17]

But the process does not always work so smoothly. When I observed the operations of the party regional committee at Puebla, there were at least ten appeals made against the tentative slates of municipal council nominees that were to be formalized by the party assemblies. In each case adjustments were made conceding something, though never all, of the dissident group's demands.

All cases were variations on a single theme: bossism and the effort of some local figure to dominate the succession in the *municipio*. The dissident group from San Martín Texmelucan pointed up weaknesses in the party nominating arrangement but also indicated the availability of remedial measures. The San Martín people crowded into the offices of the P.R.I. regional committee on the eve of the day for holding municipal nominating assemblies. About one hundred persons composed the delegation, and they represented groups of all three organized sectors—agrarian, labor and popular. Their complaint to the regional committee stated that the municipal president and his personal following had completely misrepresented the pattern of political preference at San Martín and that the tentative list of nominees for the municipal council was grossly unrepresentative of majority interests. Specifically, it was charged that the

[17] On the question of unanimity one of the more significant insights for the researcher focusing upon the decision-making process in Mexican society has been contributed by Kahin, Pauker and Pye. *Ibid.*, p. 1040. "In what way are consensus-based decisions arrived at? In a great many non-Western societies, particularly at the village level, this process—though well institutionalized—is often more subtle and difficult to observe than is the case in the West. Here the Western-trained researcher is likely to encounter consensus-based decisions which resemble more closely the Quaker 'consensus' of the meeting idea than the simple numerical majority decision usual in the Western environment. In fact, to many non-Western groups accustomed to decision-making based upon unanimous accord, it is difficult to understand how majority decisions are compatible with the minimum degree of inner harmony required by the group or community."

Many aspects of Mexican society do not fit in the "non-Western" category, but there are also strong folk culture tendencies which have clearly affected Mexican political behavior and to which the observation of the authors quoted above is clearly applicable. The Mexican practice of formalizing decisions by unanimous declaration can easily be interpreted as evidence of iron-fisted dictatorship, but as Kahin *et al.* have pointed out such a conclusion may be far removed from reality.

municipal president had arranged a mock convention of the popular sector to endorse a slate of nominees and had used his influence to prevent the convening of agrarian and labor sector conventions. It was suggested that the regional committee must have been misled or uninformed with regard to these developments, and it was pointed out that it would be expedient as well as more democratic should the regional committee decide to arrange new sector assemblies to determine the popular will before holding the formal nominations. The high degree of cohesion, the broadly representative character of the group and the capacity of the leaders to present their arguments all combined to further the cause of readjustment.[18] In the end the regional committee president agreed that new sector assemblies should be held in San Martín prior to the convening of the party municipal assembly. The strength of the San Martín protest had set the stage for a full scale adjustment of the slate of nominations. *Continuismo* and *Caciquismo* had lost a battle at the local level.

From the Puebla observations as well as those of regional committee operations in Veracruz, the Federal District, Michoacán and Jalisco there seems to emerge a fairly clear pattern in the re-shuffling of tentative nominees prior to party assemblies. Confronted by a municipal delegation composed of rival groups, the regional committee president and his aides will seek to arrange a compromise which will send each faction back to the *municipio* with a sense of some reward for the trip to the capital. For example, a group seeking to obtain for its candidate the party nomination for president of the municipal council may be offered the second ranking position of *síndico* or some lesser position on the council depending upon the group's strength.

Confronted by a delegation composed of one dissatisfied group, the regional committee president will try to persuade the group to accept the existing ticket arrangement. However, if the group persists in its claims of unfair treatment and appears to possess the requisite elements of strength, as happened in the case of the San Martín representatives, one or more delegates of the regional committee will be dispatched to the *municipio* to reconvene the sector assemblies and observe proceedings to be sure that no illegal measures such as admission of non-sector persons or threat of force influence the results.[19]

[18] More persons capable of civic leadership are in evidence as the total number of literate individuals, and particularly the total number of professional people, in Mexico tends to expand. The most significant statistical category with regard to the efforts to combat illiteracy has been that of school enrollment between the ages of six and fourteen. The number in this category for 1942 was approximately 2,154,441. Whetten, *op. cit.*, p. 413. By 1950 the number of those enrolled stood at 3,026,691. *Dirección General de Estadística, op. cit.*, p. 139. For the growth of the number of professional persons the central category is that of degrees issued annually. The number of professional degrees granted, including architects, agronomists, veterinarians, dentists, doctors, lawyers, teachers, and commercial and academic specialists averaged 6,087 per year for the period 1946–50. *Ibid.*, p. 227. In the Mexican political system the numbers in this latter category loom larger because of the interest which professional people of all types have traditionally manifested in politics.

[19] The impressions recorded here need to be checked by observers focusing on other states.

The effectiveness of the regional committees as avenues of communication between state officialdom and the people at the grassroots has been an important factor in determining the success of state administrations. If the municipal governments are named in a manner acceptable to the majority of citizens, if petitions are heard, if the edge of poverty is dulled, state governors will be free to focus their attention on material improvements in line with broader national policy. Under such circumstances no governor need fear for his political future; and, in addition, the dominant power pattern as a whole is strengthened.

Failure of party regional committees to bridge the gap between government and people in some instances has tended to reflect a general pattern of ineptitude on the part of the state governors and their administrative teams. The penalty for incapacity has become quite clearly defined. Disturbances occur in the *municipios*. Repetition of such happenings brings editorial comment in state and national newspapers. Continuing tensions, conflicts and press criticisms finally drive the beleaguered state administration to abuse of police power. Petitions of grievances then pile up on the desks of policy makers at the national level. If events do not change course, reports in newspapers of national circulation as well as statements in the regional press will build popular pressure for intervention by the national government. Such is the pattern of the downfall of state governors, and the extent to which regional committees do or do not fulfill their appointed mission constitutes a central factor in determining the course of events which lead a governor to success or to an ignominious demise.

III. THE ROLE OF THE PARTY AND THE IDEOLOGICAL BIAS OF THE POLITICAL ELITE

When a party system of government—two or more parties or coalitions of parties approximately equal in strength and share of electoral success—is lacking, the choice of means by which the political elite seek to maintain their power position becomes extremely important. The vital question is whether reliance will be placed primarily upon physical and psychological coercion or upon persuasion and compromise. In Mexico there has been a growing tendency toward the latter. This tendency has gathered strength from the expansion of literacy, the private ownership of mass media of communication, the constantly improving highway network—and particularly from the way decision-makers have interpreted their role, the value system of their countrymen and the history of the Mexican nation since Independence. These ideological factors are central to an understanding of "why" the party's role has developed as it has.

In the first place the self-ideal of those holding power has not been essentially authoritarian in character. The concept of an elite meriting unlimited discretion as the right of total omniscience has been lacking. Claims to legitimacy, in other words, have not been advanced in terms of a political theology centering upon revealed, universal truth as the single means for achieving social salvation. Instead, those who have aspired to and held power have emphasized the prin-

ciples of free choice and majority rule as determined by elections. Practice has sometimes fallen short of ideological prescriptions, but theory has not been devoid of significance on that account since accepted norms have made room for political pluralism as a social value to be sought rather than stamped out.[20]

Of particular significance has been the sense assigned the symbol "democracy" in the value system of the average Mexican. Democracy has not signified the institutions of party government nor the elaborate procedural-judicial arrangements for guaranteeing individual rights so characteristic of Anglo-Saxon political organization. As defined in Mexico, democracy has been less concrete, less rationalized and less closely tied to the institutional context. Primary emphasis has rested upon liberty in the more general and very basic sense of the capacity of the individual to move about, to associate freely, to discuss, to criticize—in summary to assert that independence without which there can be no dignity for the person. Liberty has been an ideological current running side by side with that of authoritarianism in the heritage of Spanish thought which has molded the Mexican value system. The institutional patterns by which rights for the individual have been secured in the United States and Western Europe have not taken root in a large way, but this should not obscure the fact that the concept of personal liberty has been familiar, deep-bedded, and emotionally potent.

A second emphasis evident in the Mexican definition of democracy, particularly since the Revolution, has involved the execution of social and economic reforms for the purpose of raising the living standard of the poverty-ridden rural and urban masses. The rights of urban and rural labor to organize and strike, the land reform program, the social welfare and security measures, and the efforts to reduce illiteracy all have been manifestations of the social justice bias of Revolutionary democracy. But it has never been assumed that social justice precludes individual liberty, as has been the case with the political doctrine of some other revolutionary regimes of the twentieth century.

As a matter of fact, a prime conditioning factor in the development of the political institutions of Mexico has been the close interrelationship of these two emphases in Revolutionary ideology. Both facets have been treated as necessary parts of a whole. This was clearly pointed up by Adolfo Ruiz Cortines when he spoke to the people of Puebla as the candidate of the Revolutionary Party during the presidential campaign of 1952:

> . . . reaffirming our purpose to take care . . . that Mexico shall follow without pause the path of dignity, of social justice and of unceasing progress . . . the Revolutionary administrations consolidate more each time the public liberties which are the root of our *mexi-*

[20] The importance of the role of ideas in social change has been pointed up with great clarity in Barrington Moore's excellent study of the Russian revolutionary experience, *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power* (Cambridge, 1950). Valuable theoretical guidance for the researcher who would undertake a detailed analysis of the role of ideology in shaping the institutions of a political system has been contributed by Roy C. Macridis, *The Study of Comparative Government*, Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science (Garden City, 1955), pp. 50–55.

canism: the liberty of belief, of thinking and of writing, of criticism of government, of association and all the rest which dignify man and the citizen and which our Great Charter consecrates. Such liberties we shall never set aside.[21]

The ideological commitment with regard to liberty, particularly important for purposes of this study, has interlocked with the interpretation of Mexican history officially set forth and widely accepted in terms of personal conviction on the part of the political elite themselves. On the one hand the Revolutionary regime has been presented to the people as the logical, historical link in the heritage of popular revolutions led by heroes of other eras—such giant symbols of the folk struggle for liberty and self-determination as Padre Hidalgo, José María Morelos, and Benito Juárez. Also included have been such latter day prophets as Francisco Madero and Emiliano Zapata—even Lázaro Cárdenas. The stories and myths surrounding these leaders have formed the historical bases of the argument for legitimacy. On the other hand, in the process of forging the institutions of the Revolutionary regime the members of each succeeding administration have themselves been affected in their thinking and in their actions by the historical symbols which have been invoked as instruments for achieving and maintaining power.

This latter factor has been central to the creation of a widespread conviction in Revolutionary circles to the effect that the ideal of liberty in the Mexican system of values has made it difficult in the past to establish a lasting system of rule based upon organized, arbitrary coercion of the Mexican masses. It has been accepted as gospel that the Wars of the Reform and the defeat of the French puppet Maximilian in the nineteenth century as well as the overthrow of the Porfirio Díaz regime in 1910 and the ensuing years of bloody revolution all had among their primary causes the Mexican sentiment with regard to liberty.

Taken from this point of view, the lesson of history for those who wish to maintain their dominant power position in the Mexican political system has been clear enough, namely, ways and means must be found to prevent a sense of discontent and personal injustice from becoming widespread among Mexican citizens. In metaphorical terms, one way to remove the fuse from the political dynamite has been to institutionalize devices by which dissident groups can articulate their grievances and aspirations and have them considered.

Under the stimulus of this felt need the Revolutionary Party has been developing into something more than an electoral mechanism, symbol of unity for diverse groups and agent of intra-association communication for the various elements of the dominant power group in their relationships with each other. The party has become all these things; but, from the standpoint of stability within the Mexican political system and citizen participation in the molding of policy, the emerging function of the party as an instrument of mediation between government and people has been most important. For this latter aspect of the party's role reflects the understanding of Revolutionary leaders as to the im-

[21] Public address delivered in the city of Puebla, 1 June 1952. See *Discursos de Ruiz Cortines* (Mexico, 1952).

portance of individual liberty, dignity and differences in the minds of the Mexican people. It reflects the recognition of the fact that the only course by which the existing power pattern can be maintained without threat of rebellion on the one hand or resort to organized control of social action in a total sense on the other must be the development of multiple points of access by which citizen and official can meet to adjust differences and reach new understandings. An "official" party need not necessarily be an instrument of imposition. It may be a device for bridging the gap between authoritarianism and representative democracy.

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CONTROL*

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Liberal democrats, like all those who elect to paddle in the placid waters of liberalism, show a charming imperviousness to the existence of power. It is the ingenuousness which permitted the ideology of individualism to flourish for well over a century in the Western world. But all chickens—political as well as others—eventually come home to roost; and the failure to imbibe the home truths set down by such ungentlemanly characters as Thrasymachus, Machiavelli, and Pareto now accounts for the dilemmas, reconsiderations, and tortured defenses of liberal democracy which we see abounding on all sides.

Liberal democracy—that uneasy compromise which was never a compromise at all—is, from the moral standpoint, the worthiest of political creeds.[1] It can arouse the enthusiasm of the humane, the heretical, and the responsible: in short, of all men of good will. But the tenets of liberal democracy can only be a guide for governors and governed in a community if there exists a halcyon situation in which the traditional status system is placidly taken for granted by all in the community. Only in this way can attention be focussed on the preservation of liberties and the encouragement of individual development. For social arrangements set the stage for the allocation of power, interests, and status. As long as these arrangements are not questioned in their fundamentals, then the conditions for promoting the liberal democratic ethic are possible of attainment. It goes without saying that any community must maintain a consensus if it is to survive. The question to be explored continually, then, is what propositions must be agreed upon. The startling fact of our time is that there are fundamental propositions about the allocation of power which were

* A revised version of a paper delivered at a conference on "Political Theory and the Organization and Processes of Modern Democracy," under the sponsorship of the Social Science Research Council, at Swarthmore College, June 12–14, 1957.

[1] "Liberal democracy," for present purposes, must be defined briefly and arbitrarily. It describes both an ideology and an institutional system; and its appeal is to those who claim to be fearful alike of the consequences of elite rule and of direct democracy. Both ideology and institutions, therefore, postulate a dynamic equilibrium between two values: (1) majority rule and human equality, *i.e.*, that each shall count for one in political arrangements and that self-government, with the majority decision prevailing, is the best government; and (2) individual rights and constitutional guarantees, *i.e.*, that there shall be an optimum area in which neither government nor society shall interfere with the individual in his pursuit of activities he thinks good. Both these values, Liberal Democrats postulate, are crucial: neither must be allowed to overwhelm the other. The means by which a majority is to be brought to respect minorities, and the areas in which individuals are to be left unhindered, as well as the methods for ensuring that in "proper" cases a majority shall have its way—these questions are open to constant discussion, compromise, and accommodation. This creed seems to be the received doctrine among academic political scientists; and the juxtaposition of majority rule and individual liberty is the alpha and omega of most introductory courses and textbooks. For the definitive exposition, see J. Roland Pennock, *Liberal Democracy: Its Merits and Prospects* (New York, 1950).

sublimely taken for granted heretofore and which are now being called to the bar to defend themselves. That they have no ultimate defense is the tragedy of liberal democracy in the modern world.

Liberal democracy in America never had a politics. It was essentially an upper-middle-class and upper-class creed. Unable, through ignorance—or unwilling, because of sensibility—to make explicit its class basis, its proponents persuaded themselves that the ideology was accepted on its merits. In point of fact, it was the class and not the ideology which was accepted. Liberal democracy, the creed of that class, was the received ideology simply because the men who promulgated it were the men who had deference automatically and unquestioningly accorded to them. The liberal democratic tradition in America has had an infinitely smaller constituency than we prefer to believe. The man in the street accepted political, economic, and social arrangements the basis for which he did not in the least perceive or comprehend. If he occasionally rebelled at them, it was not for the purpose of furthering individual liberty in the liberal democratic sense; it was rather status or interest revolt in the name of popular or direct democracy. For if liberal democracy never had a politics it never had to have one either. The classes, which supplied the personnel for the positions of power and prestige, had the built-in means of control which exist in any stratified society. In short, the basis of power of liberal democracy has traditionally been deference to a ruling class.

I. THE CLASS BASIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Whether we like to admit it or not, a society which encourages the full flowering of individual liberty is, and can only be, a stratified society. Such encouragement requires a strong measure of tolerance on the part of those with power. The man in the street, as John Stuart Mill never ceased repeating, is fearful of the unusual and the idiosyncratic. It is only a secure class which can afford to set down the conditions which allow for non-conformist behavior. This means that social controls must exist which, on one side of the coin, will allow a ruling class to exercise the significant power without having to worry about the emotional insecurities of the mass of men; and, on the other, will divert the mass of men from questioning the fact that a small class has arrogated to itself the privilege of deciding what forms of behavior are to be tolerated.

For almost a century and a half, America had just such an unquestioned class. It ruled the country without having to worry about public opinion or popular emotion. And the social control which permitted this class to hold informal sway was the very traditional one of deference. Deference here is not to be thought of as an Old World retainer tugging at his forelock as the lord of the manor drives by. It means more simply that the bulk of the community defers to a small section and does not think to question that this class will hold the important positions and make the vital decisions. America has had such a class, and to it has been delegated national power in its economic, political, and social aspects. These "old" Americans possess, for the most part, some common characteristics.

First of all, they are "WASPs"—in the cocktail party jargon of the sociologists. That is, they are white, they are Anglo-Saxon in origin, and they are Protestant (and disproportionately Episcopalian). To their Waspishness should be added the tendency to be located on the Eastern seaboard or around San Francisco, to be prep school and Ivy League educated, and to be possessed of inherited wealth. Talcott Parsons has generalized about such a group:

> There is a continuing tendency for earlier economic developments to leave a 'precipitate' of upper groups, the positions of whose members are founded in the achievements of their ancestors, in this case relatively recent ones. By historical necessity these groups are strongest in the older parts of the country. Hence the cities of the Eastern seaboard have tended to develop groups that are the closest approach we have—though still very different from their European equivalent—to an aristocracy. They have generally originated in business interests, but have taken on a form somewhat similar to the mercantile aristocracies of some earlier European societies, such as the Hanseatic cities.[2]

There is no point in belaboring the definitional question of whether or not this group or groups constitutes a "class." What is being said is simply that it was these people who, without serious question on anyone's part, entered, *au naturel*, the positions of power in the political and economic worlds. They provided the presidential candidates, the diplomatic personnel, the cabinet officers, the judges and influential lawyers, and the heads of the important banks, investment houses, commercial interests, and the boards of directors of many of the great corporations. They also, of course, dominated the churches and the institutions of higher learning. In short, it was this group which exercised national power. Of course, immigrants gained access to seats of municipal power quite soon; and on the frontiers of the economy trails were blazed by men who, if of old American stock, did not spring from the ruling class. But the power of the city politician was localized, and the Robber Baron was too busy on the industrial front to worry much about national politics and social arrangements. At all events, we must not overestimate the national power of the city boss or the entrepreneur, despite their flamboyant behavior and the publicity which attended it.[3] In reality, it was members of the traditional ruling group who made the decisions which set the tone and atmosphere in which American politics was to be conducted. It is, of course, true that this pool of the privileged was not a caste. Failure to possess any one of the requisites mentioned above did not debar a potential entrant. Certainly, inherited wealth did not have to

[2] "Social Strains in America," in Daniel Bell, ed., *The New American Right* (New York, 1955), p. 125.

[3] The American mythology, of course, is that most nineteenth-century businessmen were shrewd, ill-tutored freewheelers like Jay Gould and Daniel Drew. In fact, studies in entrepreneurial history show that, for the most part, the men who headed the great enterprises were from a privileged background. See Mabel Newcomer, *The Big Business Executive* (New York, 1955), and W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abegglen, *Big Business Leaders in America* (New York, 1955). For an evaluation and comparison of these studies, see Morroe Berger, "The Business Elite: Then and Now," *Commentary*, Vol. 22 (October, 1956), pp. 367–74.

go back further than one generation. Analogy with the European aristocracies is, as Parsons points out, misleading. A better comparison would be with what has been referred to in contemporary Britain as "The Establishment."[4] The basis of this group is partly family, education, and social standing; but it is also to be defined in terms of a set of position-holders, or role-players. As long as people from a narrow and specified background have virtually automatic access to the seats of power, then we are speaking of a "ruling class." When recruitment for these positions is based primarily on talent, the power inherent in the roles does not necessarily diminish, but it would be more proper to refer to an "elite." However, one of the "talents" demanded for ascendency may often be possession of the manners and attitudes acquired only through the breeding and education gained by virtue of membership in the dominant class.

At all events, nothing is lost if we refer to an old ruling class in American life. This group did not possess the corporate self-awareness of the British aristocracy. Furthermore, it would be idle to accuse its members of any conspiratorial designs. If there were common objectives and common outlooks among this ruling class, it was simply because those who belonged to it were pretty much the same kind of people. Through constant contacts in clubs, churches, boards of directors, governmental bodies, and in each others' homes, they informed one another of what was going on. But again it must be stressed that such transmission, consultation, and concert can hardly be construed as "a plot against the people." Rather it was a spontaneous—and oftentimes childlike—effort to perform the tasks and duties they sincerely believed to be theirs by right.

The spontaneous character of this activity ought to be apparent if we consider it in its ideological aspect. The promotion of liberal democracy was one of the chief endeavors of the old ruling class. This was not for the sake of that ideology's own intrinsic beauty, nor was it for the purpose of giving the mass of the community an opportunity to develop their potentialities. Rather, the idea of a limited government was for their own class benefit. The reasons for this, on the economic side, are quite clear. But in the process, this class came to defend the Bill of Rights, the common law, and the whole idea of decency, civility, and fair play—in short, the framework of liberal democracy. The judges and lawyers who came from this class were willing to interpret the Constitution in such a way that dissenters would be allowed free rein to express their thoughts. This tolerance, however, came not from any abstract love for civil liberties.[5] It is simply that the ruling class itself counted *among its own members*

[4] See Henry Fairlie, "Political Commentary," *Spectator*, Vol. 195 (September 23, 1955), pp. 379–81; and (October 21, 1955), pp. 516–17.

[5] This point has been well made by John Roche in his "Communication" in this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (June, 1957), pp. 484–88. Roche also discusses the lack of a libertarian strand in the American tradition in his excellent articles, "We've Never Had More Freedom," *New Republic* Vol. 134 (January 23, 1956), pp. 12–15; (January 30, 1956), pp. 13–16; and (February 6, 1956), pp. 13–15. If it seems outrageous to suggest that a ruling class was only concerned with keeping its own children out of trouble, a recent example may bring this unwelcome truth home. Contrast, for a moment, the reaction of the upper-

individuals who possessed radical views and who tended to display idiosyncratic behavior. In order to protect its own kind, it was prepared to give strength to the law by ensuring that the Bill of Rights was a living doctrine. Tolerance, therefore, was an internalized class tolerance. The Harvard atheist of good family, the transcendental rebel with manners and breeding, the Utopian socialist who paid heed to the rules of gentlemanly intercourse—these were, after all, "our kind of people" and had to be safeguarded from the coercive power both of the state and of society in general.

The whole rationale of the liberal democratic scheme—incorporating the ideas of individual liberty and limited government—was that it could work as long as it had only to protect a particular section of the community. It takes power to guarantee freedom. And the power of the ruling class was exercised only to carve out an area of freedom for its own members. On the one hand, it shaped the law so that property rights and freedom of expression would be sanctioned; on the other, it kept the emotions of the majority at bay. It is vital to take note of this because there are many who believe that the protection of the Bill of Rights ought to be extended to cover *all* men and not simply a privileged few. In abstract terms this, of course, is a worthy belief. But what must be confronted is the question of *who*, if there is no established ruling class, is to defend the liberties of the larger constituency of citizens which has developed. It must not be thought that their fellow-citizens, or the state, or even the courts are in a position to protect *any* dissident whatsoever. Certainly, in the past, the nonconformist, if he was simply an average citizen, was not so protected. This privilege was reserved for a few.

For the Constitutional gentlemen who acted as the guardians of the common law and the Bill of Rights were traditionally in a position where they could well form a bulwark around those in need of such a hedge. If the Overseers of Harvard College or the Justices of the Supreme Court wished to condone an unpopular act, the deference they commanded stood between them and the breath of popular criticism. And even if at times, the deference showed a tendency to wear thin, the established position of these lawyers, judges, educators, and businessmen in the social and economic structure gave them the ability to ignore the clamorings of the ordinary man. The ruling class, then, combined civility and power. Educated in a humane tradition, conscious of the value of free expression, and willing to protect their own sort, they shaped the instru-

middle-class liberal to the indictment, trial, and conviction of Alger Hiss, on the one hand, and of the Rosenbergs, on the other. In terms of the overall record, there may be equal reason to wonder at the justice of both convictions. Yet the good people who were (and still are) much aroused about the treatment of Hiss seem to find it difficult to worry about the Rosenbergs, or Morton Sobell. Would it be too much to suggest that this is because Hiss was one of the "right people"—in terms of stock, education, manner, etc.,—whereas the Rosenbergs were not? There are, of course, all sorts of complicating factors which bedevil a comparison of the two cases. Yet in light of the contemporary liberal reaction—or lack of it—to the plight of the Rosenbergs, perhaps the limited civil liberties vistas of the old ruling class become more plausible.

ments of law and social institutions so that at least the civil liberties of a few were protected.[6] The man on the street might well wonder at the wisdom of tolerating such behavior. But he did not consider it his province to question his exclusion from participating in making these mysterious judgments.

Furthermore, it must be stressed that the ruling class was quite conscious of the limitations on its power. It made no effort to educate the population to the *merits* of liberal democracy. Nor did it seek to protect those outside its own membership. The civil liberties of the trade union organizer in Colorado, of the Negro in Alabama, of the disabled factory worker in Pennsylvania or of the nonconformist professor of economics in a small Midwestern college—these persons were not considered proper materials for defense. Had the ruling class sought, say, to put its power behind the radicals of the I.W.W. it would have so endangered its foundation of deference that the existence of the class itself would come into question. Courts, universities, boards of directors all drew a firm line as to who would merit their help. This could not be otherwise. The dynamics of American growth let the ruling class know in no uncertain terms that its power had perceptible limitations.

It is proper, therefore, when speaking of the defense of liberal democracy to ask just *who* the defenders are. In the first century of our Republic's existence, one could readily point to these guardians: the old ruling class. Through the deference accorded to them and by virtue of their established economic power, they were able to carry the shield for those they chose to protect. The existence of these people cannot be taken for granted. Liberal democracy would have had no meaning without their intervention and interpretation. And if this class was needed to give meaning to the idea of freedom, then one has to ask how long liberal democracy can last without the presence of its protectors.

II. THE NEW MEN

It is common knowledge that the power of the old American ruling class has diminished over the past fifty years. There are at least two major reasons for the toppling of the traditional hegemony and the rise of new men of power. These are the Americanization of the immigrant and the expansion of the economy.

The deference which was accorded to the old ruling class was founded on the premise that our doors would always be open to new arrivals from Europe.[7]

[6] For a good statement of the tone and propriety which developed under the aegis of gentlemanly politics, see Edward Shils' chapter entitled, significantly, "The Deformation of Civility," in his *The Torment of Secrecy* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1956), pp. 153–175: "As long as the political ruling classes were recruited from the aristocracy or from the classes whose conduct was guided by an aristocratic ideal of life, there was an inevitable diffuseness in their range of interest and in their attitude towards their major tasks. The aristocrat was expected to act like a gentleman, to be interested in the administration of his estate, to be interested in sports and proficient in military skills, and he was naturally expected to take his place in the government of the country, locally and nationally" (p. 156).

[7] There has been surprisingly little written by political scientists on the political implications of the Americanization process. The task appears to have been left to journalists

For this flood of immigration ensured the continued existence of a large mass of people who were, in reality, second-class citizens. To be sure, in municipal politics they might sell their votes to the machine. But above this level they would not—nor would their party bosses—think to question national leadership. This proletariat for a generation provided an acquiescent base for the old family rulers. The process is made clear in the party of the immigrant: the Democrats. Ed Flynn might boss the Bronx, but he would defer to Franklin D. Roosevelt (of Harvard); Carmine De Sapio rides behind Averill Harriman (of Yale); and Jake Arvey cleared the way for Adlai Stevenson (of Princeton). The seeming inconsonance of the fact that the party of the immigrant accepted old-stock patricians as its leaders is good evidence of the deference that was paid to the *ancien regime*. And as long as this unquestioning attitude was bolstered by the arrival of boatloads of new immigrants the old families stood secure.

More important, in many ways, was the fantastic expansion of the economy. For with tremendous expansion could go tremendous waste. There is little doubt that the old ruling class produced many brilliant leaders. But it also produced its fair share of uninspired mediocrities. A man who went effortlessly to Groton, Harvard College, and Harvard Law School then went on, without strain, to a Wall Street law firm and perhaps to a Cabinet post in time. If he had ability, it was strictly a matter of genetic probability. Yet success was not hard to achieve, for his only competition was from members of his own class. And the rules which governed this competition were those of gentlemen. The talented Harvard "poor boy," even if Protestant and Anglo-Saxon, was not urged to enter this race which was not a race. And the application of the brilliant Fordham Law School graduate was not even considered. Such an imperviousness to talent could be afforded. The rate of expansion and innovation in our economy was such that the casual, the amateur, and even the stupid in high places were cushioned by automatic profits and prestige. It was possible, and thought preferable, to have the "right" man rather than the best men. The law, for example, was conducted among gentlemen in a leisurely way. There was no imperative that the Cravath firm had to have the best tax man. Taxes, like everything else, were far simpler in those days; and at all events, it was better to preserve traditions of civility by associating with people of one's own kind. The price of tolerating mediocrity was not high; and organizational life was sufficiently cushioned so that efficiency did not have to be the chief value.

These conditions allowed the ruling class to rule, and to rule according to its own standards of what constituted meritorious leadership. As a result, these

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and members of other academic disciplines. Samuel Lubell's *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1952) and *The Revolt of the Moderates* (New York, 1956) are good essays in casual empiricism. William S. White's " 'Consensus American': A Portrait" in *The New York Times Magazine* (November 25, 1956) is an interesting attempt at a theory. Perhaps the best analyses (brilliant when read individually and chaotic when read at one sitting) are the papers by Peter Viereck, David Riesman, Richard Hofstadter, Seymour Lipset, Nathan Glazer, Talcott Parsons, and Daniel Bell in *The New American Right*, *op. cit.* While this book is a discussion of the McCarthyite-nativist fringe, much of the analysis can be applied to a far larger segment of the American population.

rulers were ill-instructed in the grammar of power. It is altogether explainable that we never produced a Machiavelli or a Burke to set down the rudimentary facts of political life. From Henry Adams to Woodrow Wilson to Dean Acheson, the old-stock leaders have assumed that they stood or fell on their intelligence, honesty, or administrative skill. Never did they ask the forbidden question: "*Why* should men follow me? *Me* of all people?" It took an Edmund Burke, who was always on the fringes of Britain's Establishment to see that deference to a ruling class can be maintained only by consciously fostering the sentiments of habit, custom, and prejudice. The opium of religion, and the myth of the natural superiority of prescriptive rulers, Burke said quite frankly, must be maintained in the minds and hearts of the common people if it is to be assured that they will continue to defer to their betters. Yet the American ruling class had to do without the superstitious—and feudal—basis of its European counterparts.[8] This meant that its power could last only as long as the patterns of deference held up of their own strength. And just as unrestricted immigration and an exuberantly expanding economy were its mainstays, so changes in these areas led to the decline of the old ruling class.

For once the barriers to new Americans were closed, our second-class citizenry began to disappear. With the closing off of immigration it was soon evident that a race of "pure" Americans, without benefit of hyphens, would develop. The last generations to come in during the decades before the gate clanged shut would, for a time, remain humble and deferential. But they would be the last. From then on, their children and grandchildren would become full-blooded and first-class citizens. This new citizenry would be able to take at face value the rhetoric of equality. The son of the Irish truck-driver and the grandson of the Italian shoemaker can find no compelling reason to think of themselves as other than Americans. Already the Scandinavians and the Germans have lost their ethnic identity. The Slavs and Jews are well on the way to assimilation. In a brief span, only the Negroes, Mexican-Americans, and Puerto Ricans will stand outside the pale.[9]

By all traditional lights, these new Americans are arrogant.[10] It was arrogant of the Boston Irish to want one of their own—a Curley—as their mayor rather than a Beacon Hill Brahmin. This new arrogance is coming into its own; and it

[8] Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, 1955).

[9] Even the assimilation pattern of Jews—long thought a special case—is going according to form. See Oscar Handlin, "What Will U.S. Jewry Be Like in 2000?", *The National Jewish Monthly*, Vol. 71, No. 9 (May, 1957), pp. 5, 32–33. And for a glimpse of the way middle-class Negroes are preparing themselves for the immersion, see E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1957).

[10] "Arrogance" is certainly the word which comes immediately to mind when one reads, say, Peter Viereck's *The Unadjusted Man* (Boston, 1956), or Walter Lippman's *The Public Philosophy* (Boston, 1955). It is the view of both "conservative" and "liberal" liberal democrats that humility ought to be the most noticeable characteristic of the man in the street. However, Viereck's flaming indictment of direct democracy ends up being not so much clarion as pathetic. Down deep, Viereck must know that the ruling class he so respects will never again command the deference of the American public.

is now beyond the bounds of control. No longer can deference be counted on as a means of political and social control. The old families have had to join combat with the new. No one can be sure whether it was the Secretary of the Army or the Wisconsin Senator who won the televised battle several years ago, but it is certain that for all his New England heritage, Stevens was not the hands-down victor. The point is not that the *ancien regime* had had its day. Centuries of prestige are not dashed in an hour. Rather the old regime must now face the competition of classes which once knew their proper station. It can no longer count on automatic respect—or automatic anything at all.

Furthermore, our economy has reached a stage of complexity and consolidation where talent is needed and talent is rewarded. The American dream of open opportunity has extended to areas—important areas—never available before to large sections of the population. In an earlier day, as was pointed out, the Wall Street law firm did not suffer if it had something less than the best tax man. Today, however, talent is at a premium in the upper ranks of business and the professions, while sixteen years of full employment have forced employers to abandon many discriminatory bars in order to secure sufficient qualified help in respectable lower rank occupations—which may in turn afford entry to the upper ranks. And so citadels once closed to the child of the immigrant are now opening. It is vital to remind ourselves that it is only since 1940 that banks, investment houses, the diplomatic service, and established industries and universities have opened their positions of power and responsibility to others than those of old American stock. Twenty years ago Americans of Irish, Italian, Slav, and Jewish antecedents were simply not recruited, admitted, or welcomed.

All this is changing. New men, of both immigrant and old stock, are being admitted with greater frequency. Our society and our economy are more complex, more competitive, and more sophisticated. To stand the pace brought on by the complexity of the tasks we must perform, fewer and fewer organizations can afford to keep on those of mediocre competence. In fields ranging from medicine to advertising, from accounting to personnel, from educational administration to the ministry, from the foreign service to journalism—in all of these, skills are required. Even old family firms and partnerships must let in new men (hopefully a son-in-law, but usually not). For without these hands, the ship will will surely founder in highly competitive waters. The new men are energetic. They have to be, and they have had to be. But the expenditure of this energy is at a price. The psychic cost is high. For the man who has had to run, to push, and to fight develops an outlook towards himself and towards society quite at variance from that of the man who has easily had power and responsibility thrust upon him.

The *ancien regime* was a leisure class. To be sure, many of its members toiled mightily in the vineyard. But their upbringing and even their adult years were devoid of the pressures imposed on the new men of today. That leisure enabled them to study—not necessarily in a formal, but often in a disciplined, way—the

responsibilities and obligations which were to be theirs. The lawyer had, of course, to serve his client. But he was able to serve the common law and the Constitution at the same time. The educational administrator took seriously the claims of "useless" scholarship as well as those of useful preparation for life. In short, men of leisure were able to regard their power as an instrument for transmitting traditional values as well as an instrument for performing particular tasks at hand.[11] These values were sustained by a class which could ignore the demands of career-building and organizational competition. For it is plain enough that there is all too frequently a conflict between, let us say, defending the Bill of Rights and earning a dollar or winning a vote. Simple exhortation is not enough to lead a man to strike a blow for the one at the risk of losing the other. He must first be sure that he is in a position to make a short-run sacrifice for the long-term good.

The new men are not cushioned either by status or by private incomes. If we ask the newly arrived man—who, let it be said, is never completely sure that he has arrived—to take a stand on fundamental liberties, we are asking too much of him. One may, with good reason, demand that a Senator from an old Cincinnati family or a Boston lawyer of wealth and standing stake a claim in defense of the First Amendment. But to ask this of a bright young politician from California or an engineer who has risen through the ranks of an automobile company is asking the impossible. The distinction is not one of character or personality. What distinguishes a Taft from a Nixon is what separates the old from the new men. As Shils points out, the new

> American elites in business, politics, publicity and learning tend to come great geographical distances from the places of their birth to the places where they work and achieve. The great size of the country makes the loss of local ties in the leadership of the country a common phenomenon. Moreover, the cultures, the professional and social milieu into which the newly ascended leaders come, do not ordinarily possess powerful traditions which impose themselves firmly on most new-comers. There is no aristocratic or gentry pattern of life to which newcomers can clearly aspire and which they can definitely assimilate. [12]

[11] To be sure, there were free-wheeling entrepreneurs, who lived on the frontiers of our economy in the nineteenth century, and who had no sense of responsibility to society or to posterity in the prescriptive sense. And no one expected them to. But we must not overestimate their numbers (see the references above, note 3); and we must also recall that many of them, like Rockefeller and Harriman, founded family dynasties. Thus a John D. Rockefeller, Jr. was put in a position where he could serve his fellow men in conservationist and philanthropic endeavors. And the five grandsons have carried on the "tradition" from Latin America to Winrock, Arkansas. The family character of nineteenth century and early twentieth century enterprise made it possible for these families to develop responsible second and third generations. Today's men of power have little opportunity to do this for their sons. This means that each successive industrial ruler is, in a real sense, a self-made man. Each one has made the climb himself and in doing this has not had the leisure or security to develop a sense of *noblesse oblige* which, some might wish, would inform his exercise of power. See Daniel Bell, "The Break-Up of Family Capitalism," *Partisan Review*, Vol. 24 (Spring, 1957), pp. 317–20.

[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 79. A number of recent novels juxtapose the new and the old men quite neatly. Louis Auchincloss's *The Great World and Timothy Colt* (Boston, 1956) shows how a

The new men have neither family nor wealth nor geographical ties to support them. They have only their talent. And the talent must be a "marketable" one: it must accommodate itself to the demands of customers, voters, and colleagues. The *ancien regime* did not have to worry about the market. Either the customer-voter would docilely take what was offered; or, if he had the presumption to refuse the offering, he could be ignored with impunity.

The objective needs of the man in the street have not changed over the years. It is doubtful if he is more tolerant of the unusual or unknown than was his grandfather. What has changed is the fact that more and more of our men of power *must* be directed in their actions by these popular demands, whims, and caprices. We are entering a more perfect democracy in that the customer-voter is now, more than ever before, "always right." The new lawyer, for instance, is not so secure that he can ignore the wishes of his clients. Neither is the new broker or corporation president or university professor. And the stark fact is that a larger and larger proportion of market demands, be they economic or social or political, are in conflict with the traditional values of liberal democracy. The law has ceased to be a profession and has become an arm of our corporate economy. The chief reason for this transformation is to be found in the new lawyers, who know full well that they have no personal choice other than to serve their clients. The modern university cannot be expected to hold up the flag of liberal education against the cries of students—and their future employers—for vocational or pre-professional training. The few institutions which hold out for the traditional values can do so because they are so prestigious and so financially cushioned that they can ignore market demands. But to think that the small New England college will set the future standard for the new campuses of state universities being created in the middle and far west is wishful thinking. While many professors at such campuses might like to follow such a lead, their institution cannot afford to. More and more they will be forced to imitate, and with success, the pattern set by a Michigan State University. What the defenders of liberal education fail to concern themselves with are the structural conditions under which such education—and institutions imparting such

Wall Street law firm undergoes this transition in its leading personnel. The senior partner, a venerable figure on the style of Oliver Wendell Holmes, is forced to admit to partnership a Fordham Law School graduate. The latter has not one iota of feeling for the legal profession's prescriptive responsibilities (we can just imagine what *his* response would be if he were asked to defend a Communist under a Smith Act indictment); but he is highly skilled in bringing in the kind of business a large firm needs to survive. When the patrician dies, it is inevitable that the new man will take over complete charge. The firm will be successful; but success will be judged by an entirely different standard. The legal ethic of the old regime will be looked on as a curiosity; perhaps a worthy relic, but hardly attuned to modern needs. On the other side of the street, Cameron Hawley's *Cash McCall* (Boston, 1955) shows just how the new manipulator is capable of meeting problems which are totally incomprehensible to the old-style businessman. It is significant that when the editors of *Business Week* gave this book to several top executives to read and asked them to discuss the "moral problem" raised by the existence of Cash, most of them saw nothing unusual in his activities—but if there was, it could be remedied by changing the current tax laws! No. 1372 (December 17, 1955), pp. 104–114.

education—can flourish. The first condition is internal strength: and power to do the right is hardly bestowed by exhortation. For strength is the strength to ignore the market. Is there not a high positive correlation between size of endowment and whether or not a private institution kept on a professor who pleaded the Fifth Amendment? Today neither the institutions, nor the professors, nor the students, are in a position to tell the consuming public to go to the devil.

America, then, is more democratic than ever before. Careers are open to the talents, and not by virtue of an Horatio Alger-like break. But the new men of power have, in their climb, had no time to develop a sense of responsibility toward what have been our traditional standards—our liberal democratic values. Furthermore, these new men are always personally insecure. They cannot rely on traditional patterns of deference to maintain their power. For they have no family ties or inherited wealth to bolster their careers. But what is more crucial is that deference to the old ruling class has all but ceased to exist in the popular mind. Indeed, just as the new men show small respect for the family connections of those they have joined, so this attitude is spreading throughout society.[12] Despite the fact that we live in a period of prosperity, there is a slackening indulgence of the old rich. Those who are admired are those on their way up. Talent—especially talent in "human relations"—is what is held up as the noteworthy achievement.

But if the new men are admired, they are admired only for the duration of the popular appeal which they evoke for their personal performances. As individuals, the new men cannot be said to command deference in the traditional sense of that word. This means, as will be seen, that they must seek other forms of control. The members of the *ancien regime*, who were habitually deferred to simply because of their class connection, never had to concern themselves with control. They ruled; they were obeyed. Their interest was in administration and the pursuit of the right as they saw it. The new men, on the other hand, have been given the instrument of power without a built-in form of control. It is not guaranteed to them that habitual deference will be accorded by those

[12] That traditional American class relationships have little meaning not only to the man-in-the-street, but also to his wife in the split-level house, is brought out by Elizabeth Janeway in her review of Diana Barrymore's *Too Much, Too Soon* in *The New York Times Book Review*, April 7, 1957. Miss Janeway was commenting on what is wanted in novel-reading today: "Today's mass audience finds fiction hard going. Very few people, I think, really read for escape; most readers are anxious to learn about the world and their place in it. But the old mythology of class and social relationship on which the novel has relied for the last two hundred years is neither interesting nor pertinent to the mass audience, for the mass audience stands outside that crumbling structure. . . . The ordinary members of 'the lonely crowd' need stories which will help them understand and control their lives, they need signposts to behavior and meaning as much as men always have. And a new mythology is consequently being created for them. Like all mythologies in the beginning, it is based on particular events. When the reader asks, 'Did this really happen?' it is able to reply, 'Oh yes, it did. I really knew this Unforgettable Character. This is a direct quote from Marilyn Monroe.' "

over whom they must exercise power. This potentially anarchic situation necessitates the calling forth of a set of political arrangements far different from those found in traditional societies. The theories of John Locke and John Stuart Mill are not of much use here. What must be called forth is the Machiavellian prescription, as old as Thrasymachus and as new as the latest public relations handbook. For the new men are only able to rule because of what they *do*—not because of what they *are*. The new men are not anything as individuals. All they possess is their wits. For this reason they must think constantly of ways in which to achieve not the deference of the man in the street, for that is impossible to acquire in our age, but simply his obedience.

III. FROM DEFERENCE TO MANIPULATION

It is the constant effort at gaining consent which explains the importance of public relations and the use of communications media in modern politics. No longer can a would-be leader or his organization assume continual deference on the part of the public. Control cannot be taken for granted, it must be engineered at every juncture. What we have, then, is the replacement of social control by means of deference with social control by manipulation. Whereas in the past, the man in the street habitually followed those situated above him in the social structure, today, because the barriers of the old structure have crumbled, our men of power must consciously and premeditatedly condition those who fall beneath them.[14]

The rise of professional public relations and the development of sophisticated communication techniques, while fascinating as subjects of study in and for themselves, must be viewed in perspective. The "engineering of consent" is necessary on the part of the new men simply because the obedience of the man in the street cannot be taken for granted, nor even less left to chance. The managers of a great corporation, for example, cannot assume that the public will feel that what is good for the corporation will be good for the country. Instead, the managers will have to work overtime conditioning underlying attitudes so that the community will not bring itself to the point where it might question the mode of operation, or even the very existence, of the company.

[14] See, for example, Stanley Kelley, *Professional Public Relations and Political Power* (Baltimore, 1956) and Vance Packard, *The Hidden Persuaders* (New York, 1957). Both of these studies show that when expert technicians work from a basis of power, persuasion can be effectively engineered on a mass scale. The elements of manufactured obedience are well outlined in Edward Bernays, ed., *The Engineering of Consent* (Norman, Oklahoma, 1955). However, it is a big mistake to overestimate the extent to which people can be influenced from a long distance. Penetration can be deeper, and hence more lasting and effective, if it is conducted on the individual or small-group level. For there the processes of persuasion can be especially tailored to the needs of the individual person who is the object of attack. Certainly, the small-group approach is the basis of the "human relations" techniques in industry and the effectiveness of psychotherapy rests on its person-to-person relationship. For a discussion of the latter, see my "A Political Scientist Looks at Psychotherapy," *The International Journal of Social Psychiatry*, Vol. 2 (Summer, 1956), pp. 23–33.

The same is true of trade, professional, and other powerful organizations. The chief aim of public relations is to throw sand in the public's eyes. Talk about scientific progress rather than profits. Talk about ownership by millions of stockholders rather than the power of a few managers. Talk about the success stories of the fortunate few rather than the thwarted ambitions of those left behind. And, most important, talk of the institution as if the decision of its managers contained no element of power, but rather were the natural and rational outcome of an overriding desire to serve consumers. The principal technique of public relations, then, is never to discuss a case on its own merits. In fact, the highest desideratum is to persuade the public that the organization has no power whatsoever. The body in question is to be viewed purely as a service entity: rather like a national Lion's Club. It should be known by its immediate products—the dashing style of the automobile, the polite voice of the telephone operator—and not by its power as a social institution.

That the public is susceptible to manipulation such as this ought not to be surprising. There is no good reason to suppose that the average American citizen of our time is any more able to withstand such organized powers of persuasion than any other average person in history has been able to exempt himself from the exercise of concerted manipulative power. Nor does the practice of manipulation render this country any less a democracy. Democracy describes a system based on the free consent of the governed. If this consent is engineered, it certainly does not make it any the less consent. And it is doubtful if it is any the less free for its being the product of manipulation. To be sure, there is a difference between liberal democracy and what is coming to be called "mass" democracy. But inasmuch as the former variety is dependent on the unquestioned authority of the old ruling class we have discussed, it ought to be clear that as an ideology it is increasingly anachronistic. What must concern us, therefore, is the consequences to liberal democracy inherent in the coming mass democracy.[15]

First of all, it must be noted that there has not been any widening or deepen-

[15] The changing character of democracy in our century has been the chief concern of such writers as E. H. Carr and C. Wright Mills. Carr is concerned with the shift in ideological underpinning which has accompanied the transition from "individualism" to "mass democracy," *The New Society* (London, 1951), ch. 4; and Mills, in what is certainly the most important chapter of his much misunderstood *The Power Elite* (New York, 1956), discusses the differences between a "public" and a "mass" as the human raw materials for a democratic society. For liberal democracy required, as a citizenry, a "public." But as mass characteristics infuse this public, so a liberal democracy is transformed into a mass democracy. The citizen of the latter society must be managed by his rulers rather than be led by his leaders. Hence there arises the need for a "power elite" which comes into being not because of the lust for power on the part of its individual members, but because such a group is ready to perform certain functions which society requires (ch. 13). Neither Mills nor Carr goes into the dynamics which transform a public into a mass. A good analysis of this process, in economic and psychological terms, is to be found in Erich Fromm's *The Sane Society* (New York, 1955). See, in particular, his discussion of alienation, at pp. 120–52.

ing of the basis of power in America. Rather, power has been transferred from one group to another. That is, with the descent from exclusive power of the old ruling class, and the concomitant necessity of sharing their power with the new elite, it cannot be argued that the public at large has gained anything in the process. All that can be said is that where once, because of ingrained habit and custom, he consented to arrangements by reason of deference, now, because of conscious and premeditated conditioning, he consents to arrangements by reason of manipulation. The factors operating on him are different. But his powerlessness remains constant. The average American of our day gives his consent not to prescription and the works of men long dead, but to a system of power which is controlled by men who are alive and among us. Both deference and manipulation are similar in that they are control. Both permit a few men to rule many men.

The American public, then, is kept content with congenial work, a feeling of participation, a high pattern of consumption, and the general belief that they live in the best of all possible societies. Such a public can be led to a state of satisfaction with its other-directed—non-economic, non-political—existence.[16] This public is composed of those who have neither the talent nor the will to compete for positions of control. They remain where they are, not because they are discriminated against, but because they prefer the easy life. These are, in short, the organization men. And they are not much different from the little men who have populated the streets of a thousand lands since the dawn of history.[17]

Of more concern to us are the exceptions—the new men of power—who rise

[16] The starkest fact—for students of politics—in the spate of sociological essays now appearing, is the acquiescent *powerlessness* of the people who inhabit the emerging middle-class. For the members of the lonely crowd, politics is a spectator sport; for the organization men, patterns of life and work are determined by an amoral institution; for the exurbanite, participation is social or civic, rather than partisan; and for all, the fruits of a surfeit of honey are sufficient exchange for removal from the decision-making process. See David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, 1950); William H. Whyte, Jr., *The Organization Man* (New York, 1956); A. C. Spectorsky, *The Exurbanites* (Philadelphia, 1955); Russell Lynes, *A Surfeit of Honey* (New York, 1957). To be sure, these people have power in the very special sense that they compel decision-makers to frame policies in such a way that they will be acceptable to the "market" (be it economic, political, or social). But the consequence is that decision-makers strive to *anticipate* reactions rather than waiting for the political-economic "customer" to make his wishes known.

[17] If we claim that the average man of our time is content with the amenities of his placid, middle-class existence, we must also go on to insist that he is, in point of fact, soft. He has little in the way of internal strength and he possesses few resources—either material or psychic—of his own. The fact that these people are willing to allow themselves to be carried is made clear in an episode in Sloan Wilson's *The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit* (New York, 1955). Hopkins, the ulcerous network president, finally states an unpleasant fact of life to Tom Rath, the nice young man who wants to take it easy: " 'Somebody has to do the big jobs! This world was built by men like me! To really do a job, you have to live it body and soul! You people who just give half your mind to your work are riding on our backs!' "

above the happy and placid life of the engineered existence. The new men who should command our attention are not the run of the mill organization men.[18] Rather, they are the engineers. The new engineer is not simply a modern Henry Ford, a wizard with an assembly line and a part-time tinkerer with watches. Rather, he applies the principles of his calling—and he probably does not regard them as principles—to the order of human as well as material resources. Ever pragmatic, he is willing to learn and develop new techniques the better to accomplish the job at hand. Human engineering, therefore, becomes his major consideration. Not simply the workers at the bench, but higher managers must be treated like fragile mechanisms: their egos must be pampered lest the workings of the whole machine go awry. The feeling of participation, the feeling of being consulted, the feeling of self-esteem—all of these must be nurtured if the optimum output is to be achieved.[19] The science of committee procedure, the catalyst of modern management, is the skill most demanded of the human engineer. All must be allowed to believe that they are part of the team, be it the informal-turned-formal group on the factory floor, or the board of directors itself. These principles, too, are applied to the areas of community relations and public relations. People must be managed. They are not intractable; but their pliability must not be approached too facilely. Human resources can be controlled. However it is a full-time task and few if any of its aspects can be taken for granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

The new engineers are the focus of power in the emerging American society. They are the ones who have replaced the old ruling class. They are not a class in the old sense, although they are developing into an "Establishment" along a number of significant lines. The new men stand, furthermore, in stark contrast to the tens of thousands of well-rounded, well-adjusted people in middle-management. We know a little about how they differ from their immediate subordinates in terms of personality characteristics. We know a little about how they, rather than others, are recruited for the top echelons. But by and large we must rest content with saying that, as in all ages, they take the leading positions because they are best able to deal with the particular problems at hand. Foxes rather than lions, to use Pareto's distinction, they can meet the imperatives of a time which calls for the sophisticated manipulation of men's attitudes and sensibilities.[20] This minority is the key to American politics and

[18] Standing out like a sore thumb in *The Organization Man* is the chapter called "The Executive: Non-Well-Rounded Man." (ch. 11) Here we are allowed a glimpse of the top three men in the nation's 300 largest corporations. Their lives and personalities present a sharp contrast to those of the middle-management men depicted in the remainder of the book. One wonders if, in fact, the well-adjusted organization men will be recruited into the highest echelon at all.

[19] The classic statement is Russell Davenport, "The Greatest Opportunity on Earth," *Fortune*, Vol. 40 (October, 1949), pp. 65ff. See also Alpheus T. Mason's analysis of this trend, "Business Organized as Power," this REVIEW, Vol. 44 (June, 1950), pp. 323–42.

[20] For an elaboration, see my "Utopia, Inc.," *The Commonweal*, Vol. 65 (February 8, 1957), pp. 479–81.

society. Its members are not so much typical as prototypical of the new men who are found not only in industry, but in politics and the military. They are aware of the need for, and familiar with the ways to achieve, control. Controllers rather than controlled, they find their own satisfactions in their careers and in providing the happiness of others. Unlike David Riesman's egoistic "saving remnant," this group does not flee from responsibility.[21] It dimly understands that its role is the important one. The new men must forfeit their own happiness and serve the happiness of a public which cannot and will not plan its own existence. The new men work overtime at their job; they develop ulcers and nervous tensions; they neglect their families, outside interests, and the pursuit of culture. But they do their task with imagination and vigor. It is no understatement to say that they are carrying the rest of us on their backs.

The new men are our new rulers. They are intelligent, but not cultured. They are tolerant in informal social relations, but they have no compassion for those who are subject to political injustice. The American tradition, for them, probably began in 1945. Values are judged not by their place in the prescriptive scheme of things, but by their current utility. For the new men it would be suicide to regard individuals as ends in themselves: they must always be viewed as resources to be managed. Liberty deals not with freedom of expression or with protection from tyranny by the state: rather it is the complex of conditions under which organizational ends can be pursued and organizational order maintained. And truth becomes an image of the world which ordinary men are capable of comprehending without too much strain on their imaginations.

These definitions obviously appear anomalous. But this is simply because the words are the vocabulary of liberal democracy and their content is not. With the rise of the new men the conditions necessary for liberal democracy have seen their day. This means that we must turn to a new set of prescriptions. The focus must be on control and the controllers.[22] The "Legend of the Grand In-

[21] This is the title of an essay in *Individualism Reconsidered* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1954), pp. 99–120. Riesman tells the would-be autonomous or self-directed man to find his satisfactions in highly personalized activities. Indeed, it is rather difficult to discover the difference between "autonomy," which Riesman thinks good, and "marginal differentiation," which Riesman implies is rather hollow. The solution-via-abdication is illustrated in Ernst Pawel's novel, *The Dark Tower* (New York, 1957), where the hero concludes that he cannot meet the standard of success in his corporation or the standard of good citizenship in his suburb, and hence packs up his family and finds a country-editor job for himself in the Rockies. The point about the new men is that, unlike Pawel's hero, they find their brand of autonomy by attaining the heights where they can exercise power within the framework of the organization. The climb may, in one sense, appear to be morally and intellectually debilitating. But in another it can be viewed as the only road to freedom in today's society.

[22] A fascinating attempt to evolve a new set of prescriptions for a new society and a new citizenry is to be found in the work of B. F. Skinner. The whole of his philosophy is in his Utopian novel, *Walden Two*, (New York, 1948). A briefer statement is his "Freedom and Control of Man" in *The American Scholar*, Vol. 25 (Winter, 1955–56), pp. 47–65. Also of value is a two-man symposium between Skinner and Carl R. Rogers, in which Skinner defends his ideas against a variety of criticisms: "Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human Behavior," *Science*, Vol. 124 (November 30, 1956), pp. 1057–66.

quisitor"—*with* its stress on responsibility—has more meaning in prescriptive terms than the legend of the town meeting. The controllers are not men without souls. They are not philistines by nature. And there is good reason to believe that, in time, they can be civilized. But at this point they are simply busy. And if, in their furious activity, they are unknowingly breaking the idols of liberal democracy, we ought to think twice before we complain. For the new men are the products of equality of opportunity. If we *really* believe that careers ought to be open to the talents, regardless of background or adherence to traditional values, then we must accept the new ascendency with a good grace.

HACKER'S *LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CONTROL:* A CRITIQUE

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The essence of Hacker's construction is the theory of the ruling class. Immediately, one thinks of Marx, Mosca, Michels, Pareto, and several Americans who have espoused, in one form or another, oligarchic doctrines.[1] What most sharply distinguishes Hacker from most theorists of this persuasion is the absence of presuppositions of historical inevitability. Seeking only to describe sequences and relations of the past and present, he makes no claims of omniscience, of knowing what the social process must unfold. Neither is his theory normative.

Yet, apart from details and variations, there is a crucial framework of meaning which discloses Hacker's close affinity with the essence of conventional oligarchic doctrines: the few rule, the many simply obey; the governors, in substance if not in form, are free from compulsion to answer to the governed. Historically, and indeed currently, Hacker asserts, genuine power has been and is the exclusive or, at least, the primary possession of a privileged few. True, the composition and foundation of the governing class have changed, but this change, he continues, did not bring in its wake a widening or deepening of the structure of power in American culture. It merely means the substitution of one set of masters or controllers for another. After all, a monopoly of power is a monopoly, whether its source be deference or manipulation. Both, he avers, "permit a few men to rule many men." Neither system of power allows the personnel and the general policies of government to be the product of voluntary and active consent. In both contexts, the ruled, not the rulers, are the object of *control.* "Both deference and manipulation are similar in that they are control." Such, then, is Hacker's relation to the essence of oligarchic thought. What can be said of the validity of his formulation?

I. THE OLD RULING CLASS AND DEMOCRACY

Hacker's construction contains insights into the historic pattern of power. No amount of sentimentality about egalitarianism can deny or obscure the gulf between the promise and the fulfilment of liberal democracy. At best, the completion of its meanings has been fragmentary and partial; at worst, its values at times have been negated. Nor is it necessary to deny the sociological and ideological anchorage of liberal democracy. But these concessions are not enough to establish Hacker's basic contention.

The validity of his thesis depends upon three central assertions: (1) that a

[1] See in particular David Spitz, *Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought* (New York 1949), chs. 2 and 3. These chapters were of invaluable assistance in the preparation of this paper.

ruling class existed; (2) that that class ruled because of the deferential status accorded it in a stratified society; and (3) that that system of power enabled the "few" to rule the "many," that is, that the rulers were not institutionally accountable to the ruled. Each of these propositions needs examination.

The Old Ruling Class. Identification of the ruling class is the first problem. For if that class cannot be identified, the whole theory of power of which it is the arch is essentially beyond the realm of rational demonstration. At first blush, Hacker's definition seems plausible. Upon reflection, however, it is evident that he neither defines the ruling class with any degree of accuracy nor provides adequate criteria in terms of which the ruling class can be distinguished from others. Indeed, his argument is circular. Instead of first clearly defining the class and then demonstrating that wielders of power belong therein, he defines an alleged oligarchy not in terms of social class but in terms of positions of power. For Hacker, therefore, the ruling class is the class that rules; it rules because of its deferential status and it has deferential status because it is the ruling class. The concept of a ruling group depends on his concept of deference, and *vice versa.*

These observations require a measure of elaboration. Hacker's ruling class is white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, Eastern, and so forth. That members of this group had immense power cannot be gainsaid. But a social class (and *a fortiori*, a political, governing class) is more than a logical grouping of persons of relatively similar backgrounds. Beyond the fact that such a schematic arrangement discloses as much about the preconceptions of the classifier as about the phenomena classified is a more compelling consideration. Inherent in the notion of "class" is a significant degree of class consciousness, allegiance, and common interest.[2] Social origin alone is insufficient to create and sustain the intricate complex of common interests and loyalty that distinguishes one class from others of which the community is composed.[3] "Whatever objective criterion we use," MacIver and Page note, "we do not have a *social* class unless class consciousness is present."[4] Classes have a psychological as well as a social dimension. Accordingly, "a man's class is a part of his ego, *a feeling on his part of belongingness to something;* an *identification* with something larger than himself."[5] What evidence is there to indicate the kind of cohesion and unity which

[2] Cecil C. North, "Class Structure, Class Consciousness, and Party Alignment," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 2, pp. 365–71 (June, 1937), and T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge, 1950), chs. 2 and 3.

[3] R. M. MacIver, *Community* (2nd ed., London, 1920), pp. 110–11 and 123–25, and Pitirim A. Sorokin, "What Is a Social Class?", in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, eds., *Class, Status and Power* (Glencoe, 1953).

[4] R. M. MacIver and C. H. Page, *Society* (New York, 1949), p. 350.

[5] Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes* (Princeton, 1949), p. 27. "Classes," he observes, "are psycho-social groupings, something that is essentially subjective in character, dependent upon class consciousness (i.e., a feeling of group membership). . . . "

Cf. F. L. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1916), pp. 17 and 124–31, and Arthur W. Kornhauser, "Analysis of 'Class' Structure of Contemporary American Society —Psychological Bases of Class Division," in George W. Hartman and Theodore Newcomb, eds., *Industrial Conflict: A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, 1939).

make whites, Protestants, Anglo-Saxons, and so forth one rather than several classes?[6]

Definitions and criteria of social classes are many and varied,[7] but when we emphasize subjective as well as objective qualities, we are arguing, it should be noted, within the terms of Hacker's analysis. For, according to him, the members of the ruling class of the old regime possessed "common objectives and common outlooks." What were they? His remarks on tolerance and dissent suggest the absence of a community of interests, "common objectives and common outlooks." The ruling class itself, we are told, "counted *among its own members* individuals who possessed radical views and who tended to display idiosyncratic behavior." Thus, apparently, the ruling class was divided against itself in terms of sentiments, objectives, and perspectives. *Hacker's conception of the ruling class is at once too broad and too narrow. It is so broad that it ignores vast differences within the oligarchy; it is so narrow that it does not exhaust the centers and sources of power.*

First, the immense diversity within his class is just as significant as the similarities, if not more so. In the broad sweep of American history, consider the depth and scope of competitive forces and opposing organizations, the perennial clashes of personal ambitions, the mutually conflicting group interests and desires resulting in contradictory ideas of public policy, and the perpetual warfare between power-holders and power-seekers, all within Hacker's oligarchy. This suggests that within that oligarchy, as indeed within the total structure of American society, there was a division and ever-changing equilibrium of power.[8]

Again note the phenomenal differences of income, occupation, social status, education, and wealth—inherited and acquired. These objective phenomena must be considered in any effort to determine social, economic, and political attitudes. The case studies of American social stratification by the Lynds,[9] Warner and associates,[10] Davis and the Gardners[11] all take these indexes as decisive in the alignment of classes.[12] If such norms are considered, Hacker's

[6] W. Lloyd Warner, Marchia Meeker, and Kenneth Eells, *Social Class in America* (Chicago, 1949); chs. 1 and 2.

[7] Centers, *op. cit.*, esp. ch. 2; R. M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York, 1947), pp. 115–23, and Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social Mobility* (New York, 1927), esp. ch. 2.

[8] On the historic balance of power in American society, C. Wright Mills comments: "Nineteenth-century America was a middle class society, in which numerous small and relatively equally empowered organizations flourished." *The Power Elite* (New York, 1956), p. 259.

[9] Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown* (New York, 1929), and *Middletown in Transition* (New York, 1937).

[10] W. Lloyd Warner and Wilfrid C. Bailey, *Democracy in Jonesville* (New York, 1949) and the "Yankee City Series" by Warner and associates (New Haven, 1941, 1942, 1945, 1947).

[11] Allison Davis, Burleigh B. and Mary R. Gardner, *Deep South* (Chicago, 1941).

[12] See Talcott Parsons, "Social Strains in America," in Daniel Bell, ed., *The New American Right* (New York, 1955), pp. 120–21, and Gerhard Lenski, "American Social Classes: Statistical Strata or Social Groups," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 58, pp. 139–44 (September, 1952).

oligarchy is composed of several classes, not one. Perhaps, then, many "elites" or "ruling classes" are relevant.[13] The attitudes, allegiances, and interests of this broad group, therefore, are many. The "ruling class," instead of constituting a cohesive and integrated whole, turns out to be a multiplicity of classes with diverse loyalties and contrasting sentiments, shattering the conception of a community of interest and solidarity. "One cannot," asserts Lipset,

> speak of *an* American elite, be it economic, political or cultural. The elites that exist are fractioned regionally, ethnically, and culturally, so that friction and competition constantly arise among these segmented groups: West against East, North against South, new rich versus old rich, Anglo-Saxons against minority ethnics, the graduates of Ivy League schools against others, etc.[14]

Unlike contemporary sociologists who have investigated American social stratification, Hacker follows Mosca and Pareto in an oversimplified division of society according to power relations: elite and masses, ruler and ruled. But even his apparent sage, Pareto, further divided the elite into governing and non-governing groups.

Obviously, not all white Protestants of Anglo-Saxon origin were constituent elements of the oligarchy. For members of the ruling class also had a "tendency to be located on the Eastern seaboard, to be Prep School and Ivy League educated, and to be possessed of inherited wealth." These criteria, while suggestive, are too ambiguous to be convincing. What of those white Protestants of Anglo-Saxon ancestry who neither inhabited the Eastern seaboard nor matriculated at the "right" institutions? What of those who satisfied all the conditions except the one of inherited wealth? Indeed, how much inherited wealth was necessary to place one in the privileged class? Were all persons who fulfilled Hacker's conditions necessarily wielders of sufficient power to be called "rulers" in any meaningful sense? *Who*, in a word, determined the distribution of, and the roads to, power among them?[15] Was the vast interior of the continent *all* ruled by remote control from the seaboard?

Hacker's indeterminate categories cast little light on the dramatic realities of power which are illumined by probing into such power phenomena as locus, forms, levels, and integral relations. Rather, his criteria obscure the complexities and disregard the specific and concrete problems entailed in an adequate analysis of power relations. Social power is too intricate and multifarious to be explained in terms of so simple a formula.[16] While generalizations vivify patterns and similarities, they often neglect differences, subtle interstices, and unique factors in the equations of power.[17]

[13] *Cf.* Harold D. Lasswell *et al.*, *The Comparative Study of Elites* (Stanford, 1952): "There are as many elites as there are values." p. 6.

[14] Seymour M. Lipset, "The Sources of the 'Radical Right,' " in Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

[15] *Cf.* Lasswell, *op. cit.*, pp. 6–13, and Bell, "Interpretations of American Politics," *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[16] Robert Bierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 15, pp. 730–38 (December, 1950), and MacIver, *The Web of Government*, ch. 5.

[17] "The accumulation of political power by any stratum is generally dependent upon some four factors: will and purpose, objective conditions or opportunities, the state of

Moreover, Hacker's ruling class is too exclusive. First, there have been powerful national leaders who were, by his definition, neither members of nor spokesmen for that oligarchy. Consider Jefferson, Jackson, Calhoun, Lincoln, Bryan, La Follette, or even Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson. These men represented social classes and interests distinct from Hacker's governing class.[18] Thus, oddly, here are rulers outside the ruling class. Admittedly, there were also other national figures who were not, strictly speaking, members of Hacker's group but who, conceivably, represented its interests, *e.g.*, Marshall and Clay. But that hardly strengthens the theory. Indeed, it reveals another defect in Hacker's analysis: the easy and direct inference from social origins to propositions of social power and value. For just as men from the "middle" and "lower" strata of society sometimes protect and promote the interests of the privileged few, so men of wealth, eminent family background, and high social position sometimes champion the goals of the underprivileged "many."[19] Social origin, status, and ideology are often intimately wedded, as the sociologists of knowledge tell us. But when this obvious truth is extended into a universal proposition to explain the social process and its ideological and power components, this very truth, as well as the object of inquiry, is misunderstood. Occasionally, men transcend and modify social structures in order to achieve more inclusive objectives.

Second, Hacker obscures the role of groups, such as Catholics, and of regions, like the South and West, in the distribution of power.[20] Perhaps this is due to the identification of power and position, so that the "powerful" are those who occupy the most prominent seats of "power." Every realist knows, however, that positions are often derivative rather than primordial and that he who sits on the throne may be less "powerful" than the king-maker who is responsible for his accession to, and retention of, the position. It is incumbent upon Hacker to demonstrate the proposition that his rulers could have elevated themselves to positions of social control *without* the assistance of non-members of the alleged ruling class.

Third, apart from the ambiguity and indeterminacy of the whole conception of "national power," the underlying assumption cannot be sustained. National power has no magic to create and sustain itself, independently of other levels, forms, and forces. The theory under consideration falsely divorces the structure of national power from its integral relation to regional, state, and local centers

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organization, and the political skill of leaders. Opportunity is limited by the group's structural positions, which is to say, its functional position as a stratum in the institutional structure." Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Character and Social Structure* (New York, 1953), p. 329. On the necessity of group cohesion, self-consciousness, and common objectives, see p. 330.

[18] Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York, 1948), chs. 2–5 and 8–10. Also see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Jackson* (Boston, 1945), and Charles E. Merriam, *Four Party Leaders* (New York, 1926).

[19] *The Power Elite*, p. 280.

[20] See Arthur N. Holcombe, *The Middle Classes in American Politics* (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 85–86 and 182–91; *The New Party Politics* (New York, 1933), pp. 11–35, and *The Political Parties of Today* (New York, 1924), ch. 4.

and manifestations. So restricted a view compels him to disregard the prominent historic role of Catholics and certain ethnic groups in state, local, and occasionally, national schemes of things. His perspective excludes state and local machines,[21] many political bosses of the Catholic faith,[22] and such prominent national figures as Al Smith. National power is not a monolithic and independent reality. The base of "the pyramid of power" is as essential to an understanding of power relations as the apex. Along with the vertical relations of social control are the horizontal ones. The competing centers, clashing interests, and relative equilibrium of power on a national level make Hacker's implicitly monolithic theory of national power a sheer illusion.

Finally, Hacker conceives the ruling class in terms of origin and leadership. But policies, not unlike personnel, are expressive of processes of social control; leadership is not the whole of the distribution of social control and value. Power, to be sure, involves participation in the decision-making process.[23] Nevertheless, it is imperative to explore institutional foundations of power and levels of the hierarchy of decision-making. In particular, a distinction must be made between the broad and primary choices of the electorate concerning the personnel and general policies of government and the concrete and detailed decisions of elected officials.

To concentrate on the social origin of leaders to the exclusion of the structural sources of positions and policies is to miss much of the drama and multifarious character of the realities of social power. As C. Wright Mills, an exponent of the elitist theory, observes: "We cannot infer the direction of policy from the social origins and careers of the policy-holders. The social and economic backgrounds of the men of power do not tell us what we need to know in order to understand the distribution of social power."[24] Ideas and policies are not the automatic and mechanistic product of one's original status in the hierarchy of social stratification. Such an assumption disregards both the complexity of human motivation and the richness of human choice and creativity in modifying the very social structure in which men are born and nurtured.

Deference and the Road to Power. Social power is frequently identified with many qualities—status, wealth, influence, force and deceit, competence, dominance, and so forth.[25] It is, moreover, occasionally equated with prestige. In *Social Control*, E. A. Ross maintains that "the class that has the most prestige will have the most power."[26] Other writers attribute power and privilege to

[21] See, for example, Harold F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics* (Chicago, 1937); J. T. Salter, *Boss Rule* (New York, 1935); V. O. Key and Alexander Heard, *Southern Politics* (New York, 1949), and Twila E. Neely, "The Sources of Political Power," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 33, pp. 769–83 (March, 1928).

[22] Of the twenty political bosses studied by Harold Zink, ten are Catholic: *City Bosses in the United States* (Durham, 1930), p. 30.

[23] H. D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven, 1950), p. 75.

[24] *The Power Elite*, p. 280.

[25] Bierstedt, *op. cit.*, pp. 730–31.

[26] Quoted *ibid.*

honor and prestige.[27] In a not dissimilar manner, Hacker insists that the source of power of the "old ruling class" was deference which, it seems, was rooted in a system of attitudes, prerogatives, and status roles.

Admittedly, deference can be (and occasionally is) a medium of social control. It must also be conceded that the "old-line" families of birth and wealth, of the "tradition of gentlemen," occupied a very special and privileged status in the early American social hierarchy. But when the obviously exalted position in the scale of social evaluation is elaborated into a theory of the ruling class, when their positions are explained in monistic and mechanistic terms, several problems arise. For purposes of analysis, let us assume the existence of Hacker's oligarchy. What are the limitations of the concept of deference?

In the first place, there were in American culture counterclaims of deferential status based on lineage. Southern as well as Eastern regions, and Richmond along with Boston, had "old-line" families of special status roles.[28] Why would proud and aristocratic Southerners defer to a rival lineage's claims to positions of leadership and control?

In the second place, there were, in addition to lineage, competing criteria of social status: national origin, color, religion, and acquired as well as inherited wealth.[29] Since the majority is excluded from Hacker's group, the question left unexplained, is why, in view of conflicting criteria of status and deference, it reserved to a particular minority key positions of social control. This problem is evaded by the mutual dependence of deference *per se* and the ruling class *per se*.

In brief, while Hacker's oligarchy filled many positions of power, there is no compelling evidence that deference was the sole, the primary, or always a basic factor. Additional considerations are relevant to the broad question of social causation and power—wealth, merit, skill, organization and chance. Deference alone cannot explain why some members of this oligarchy held reins of national power while others remained in obscurity. Again comes the question of deference as derivative or causative. Was deference the cause or the consequence, the determinant or the product of positions of power and authority?[30] Of equal standing with the proposition that these men had power because of their deferential status is the proposition that they had deferential status because of their power.[31]

[27] Paul H. Landis, *Social Control* (New York, 1956), p. 136; and Marian B. Beth, "The Elite and the Elites," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 47, pp. 746–55 (March, 1942).

[28] Landis, *op. cit.*, p. 136, and MacIver and Page, *op. cit.*, p. 355.

[29] MacIver and Page, p. 355.

[30] H. A. Mess argues the reverse. In democratic and partly democratic countries, he asserts, "deference is given to those who possess power. . . ." "Valuations in Democratic States," in T. H. Marshall, ed., *Class Conflict and Social Stratification* (Ledbury, 1938), p. 178.

[31] Whether status is derived from power or power from status is an interesting problem. Hacker, of course, assumes that power is the consequence of status. However Gerth and Mills maintain that status, "in due course, follows power," *op. cit.*, p. 335. Because status and power are so intertwined in the nexus of the social process, neither side can be conclusive. The issue is too complex to make either always the ground of the other.

Deference and power are independent variables; they may or may not be conjoined. The Queen of England has much deference but little power; Stalin had enormous power but apparently only a modicum of deference (except that manufactured or coerced).

The radical defect of Hacker's conception of deference is its ambiguity. Like so many key terms in various systems of thought, it is used to explain everything. It is as serviceable in explaining contemporary social processes as it is in accounting for past patterns of power relations. Despite his insistence that America now has a new ruling class and a new system of social control, he still finds it convenient to explain in terms of deference (and oddly enough, not manipulation) Ed Flynn's support of Roosevelt, De Sapio's support of Harriman, and Arvey's support of Stevenson. Multiple factors and the complexities of human motivation, once more, are ignored in order to satisfy the simplicity of a monistic theory of power. As Morris R. Cohen noted, anything that explains everything correctly explains nothing.

The Old Ruling Class and Democracy. The essential inference of Hacker's formulation is that the allocation of power under the old regime permitted the few to rule the many. He builds, it should be noted, on a characteristic of all complex societies: social stratification.[32] His ruling class is identified with a particular stratum of the social order. Admittedly, that tier of social gradation was the source of a great many national leaders and membership within it was clearly advantageous. But the old order, generally speaking, did not prohibit vertical social mobility, and thus no stratum, in terms of the guarantees of the institutional structure, monopolized positions of power and authority.

Democracy, like other systems of order, entails leadership.[33] Leadership involves disproportionate power,[34] a hierarchy of authority,[35] or superior-subordinate relations.[36] In the very nature of social organization, leadership is always in the hands of the few. In a democracy too, as Bryce,[37] Russell,[38] MacIver,[39] and Spitz,[40] among others perceive, the many never rule; the actual process of governance perpetually devolves on a few men. Identification of democracy with the direct rule of the many is a legacy of Greek misconceptions.

The prime significance of democracy is that those who rule are institutionally

[32] Indeed, Sorokin asserts the universality of social stratification; it is, he holds, not only characteristic of every society but also of every organized social group. *Social Mobility* (New York, 1927), ch. 2.

[33] See Albert Salomon, "Leadership in Democracy," in Max Ascoli and Fritz Lehmann, eds., *Political and Economic Democracy* (New York, 1937), esp. pp. 243–44.

[34] Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Self and the Dramas of History* (New York, 1955), pp. 199–209, and Franz Neumann, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State* (Glencoe, 1957), pp. 8–11.

[35] "The need for an acting centre makes even an egalitarian group hierarchical." Paul Tillich, *Love, Power, and Justice* (New York, 1954), p. 45.

[36] Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

[37] *Modern Democracies* (New York, 1921), Vol. 2, pp. 542–51.

[38] *Power: A New Social Analysis* (New York, 1938), pp. 17 and 159.

[39] *The Web of Government*, pp. 197–98.

[40] *Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought*, p. 74.

responsible to the ruled. Consequently, the social origins and the status of leaders as such are irrelevant to democracy. So long as the personnel and broad policies of government are the product of free and active consent of the general community rather than of a particular class, the basic feature of democracy is institutionalized.[41] Introduction of the concept of deference does not alter the matter, for deference can be a function of consent. Indeed, in Hacker's construction, deference is a product of consent: the bulk of the community deferred to his oligarchy. That implies choice.

Even if it could be established that every national leader of the old regime was a member of Hacker's class, that would not be sufficient to validate the proposition that the few always controlled the many, that is, that the few were beyond institutional check. That a given social stratum or social class produced a preponderance of personnel for positions of power and prestige is not equivalent to saying that the few of that class *controlled* the many of other classes. It is a *non sequitur* to argue from the premise of the social composition of leadership to the inference of a ruling class. For leadership, while universally significant, does not exhaust the meaning and structure of power relations, *a fortiori*, if that leadership is conceived in national terms alone.

The structural, as distinct from the biographical, bases of leadership, and the objects and pressures to which that leadership is exposed and accountable, are also relevant. The merit of Hacker's thesis is its emphasis on some important facts about the socio-biographical origins of American leadership and the "climate of opinion" serviceable to it. But his conceptual framework is defective because it denies or obscures essential factors in the structure and distribution of power. In identifying one element with the totality of social power, he is betrayed by his own peculiar "realism." The web of power is too complex to be spun in terms of a neat, monistic category of interpretation.

II. THE NEW RULING CLASS AND DEMOCRACY

Except for vestigial remains, according to Hacker, the old ruling class, like Nietzsche's God, is dead. Its demise, in a sense, produced a "more perfect democracy," yet the few still control the many. Manipulation, as a method of social control, has replaced deference. Hacker, therefore, continues to cling to oligarchic concepts. Social status determinism has yielded to psychological determinism.

In emphasizing manipulation, Hacker is correct. The manipulation of symbols as a method of winning and maintaining consent is a familiar story in American political dynamics.[42] But when this elementary and important truth is expanded into a theory of oligarchy, several issues emerge: the existence of a

[41] "Democracy," Hans Speier notes, "is a form of government in which political life cannot be identified with a politically privileged class; a democracy has no political class." "Social Stratification," in Ascoli and Lehmann, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

[42] Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–8; Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 175; Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, 1922), and J. T. Salter, "The Politician and the Voter," in Edward B. Logan, ed., *The American Political Scene* (rev. ed., New York, 1938).

new ruling class, manipulation and irresponsible power, and manipulation in juxtaposition to the structure and drama of power.

The New Ruling Class. Much is written today on ruling classes and power elites. There is little agreement, however, on the nature, number, and composition of such groups. C. Wright Mills rejects the notion of a ruling class.[43] Instead, he interprets the power elite in terms of the military, economic, and political orders along with the socio-psychological affinities of the men who occupy strategic positions within these hierarchies.

Hacker asserts the existence of a ruling class. If, as he holds, "power has been transferred from one group to another," then the first task of analysis is to identify that group. Who are the members of the new ruling class? What are the criteria by which they can be differentiated from the "public"? To these crucial questions, Hacker provides no helpful answers. We are told why and how they rule without having first been informed of their concrete identity.

If the new men of power constitute the new rulers, that is obviously circular argumentation. If it is the "elite of wits," how, without again begging the question, can it be maintained that all members of the public are witless? Such phrases as "new men of talent," "Paretan Foxes," and "new engineers" do not illumine the problem. If the new rulers are the successful manipulators, circularity is not avoided. If the new rulers are potentially the managers of the "mass," Hacker commits the fallacy of arguing in reverse. Furthermore, there is no suggestion that the new "ruling class" possesses any of the attributes of a social class—class consciousness, cohesion, and a community of interest. Apparently, the only property they have in common is mastery of the art of manipulation. But even here presumably there would be conflicts of policy and a struggle for power—both structural and personal.

The same crucial ambiguities appear in Hacker's definition and delineation of the public which, we are told, "is composed of those who have neither the desire nor the will to compete for positions of control." Apart from the absence of specific criteria by virtue of which the public can be identified, the assumption is made that there are differential psychological qualities that separate the public and the elite.[44] But no evidence is suggested to sustain that proposition. Apparently, the "proof" that the new rulers have the prerequisities (desire, will, and manipulative skill) is the fact that they are our "new rulers"; and, similarly, the "proof" that the public is devoid of these characteristics is the fact that it is the public.

These difficulties are inherent in the approach itself. The polarization of the population—whether in the hands of Michels, Mosca, Pareto, Mills, or Hacker—into elite and mass, ruler and ruled, or the few and the many cannot do justice to the complexities, the multifarious character, and the indeterminateness either of social interaction or of man. It also ultimately destroys both the unity and the individuality of men. There is no evidence of determinate objective

[43] *The Power Elite*, pp. 277–78.

[44] Spitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–81 and Russell, *op. cit.*, chs. 1 and 2.

traits—desire or will to power, intelligence, manipulative skill—of which a particular class has a monopoly.

Manipulation, Social Control, and Democracy. Democracy, as Hacker notes, is a system "based on the free consent of the governed." Yet, curiously, he argues, on the one hand, that consent produced by manipulation is hardly less than free, and, on the other, that the many, because of manipulation, are controlled by the few, and therefore that the public is powerless. The assertion of the co-existence of democracy and a ruling elite institutionally irresponsible is a contradiction in terms.

Ultimately, the difficulty lies in Hacker's conception of democracy. He juxtaposes "liberal" and "mass" democracy, implying that there are several forms of democracy of which "liberal" and "mass" are two. But if the essence of democracy is that those who hold the reins of power are institutionally accountable to the people over whom that power is exercised, then adjectives like "liberal," "conservative," "mass," "public," and "totalitarian" are as irrelevant as they are meaningless. Failure to recognize this leads Hacker to affirm the contradictory proposition that we have "mass" democracy, but the few control the many. If "mass" democracy means that an unchecked minority perpetually controls the majority, then "mass" democracy is no democracy; it negates the very term.

But the conception of "mass" democracy is necessary to give Hacker's theory a semblance of validity. For without postulating inarticulate, servile, and manageable masses, the notion of manipulation as an instrument of social control (and its corollary, irresponsible power) is meaningless.

Manipulation and the Responsibility of Power. Manipulation, if conceived as an ethically neutral term, is, because of the task of engineering and maintaining consent, essential to democracy. The element of truth in Hacker's formulation is that he recognizes the expanding dimensions and forms of manipulation to which men, in a complex industrial and technical culture, are exposed.

What we deny is that the system of manipulation is necessarily a means whereby the few control the many, so that there has been no "widening or deepening of the basis of power" in the American social order. Hacker assumes that our progress toward universal suffrage and the play of other forces (pressure groups, etc.) have been insignificant in affecting the distribution of "real" power. For him, King Demos resides in a world of illusion.

However, the mere fact that aspirants for public office, now more than ever, according to Hacker, find it necessary to manipulate public opinion, to engineer consent, or to condition the electorate, is no small indication of the "widening and deepening" basis of power. Power-seekers waste no time manipulating the powerless. Moreover, the very nature of manipulation suggests that the final choice between contending manipulators is not left to the manipulators themselves. The electorate has the final choice between competing candidates; that very fact exposes candidates for public office, no less than the voters, to the mechanics and processes of manipulation. Politicians are obviously influenced by public opinion. Psychological conditioning is not a unilateral relationship.

Appealing to desires, propaganda, as Russell observes, "is only successful when it is in harmony with something in the patient."[45]

It follows that manipulation does not necessarily annul democracy. On the contrary, it is essential to the fulfilment of democratic values. So long as there are competing manipulators, organizations, and alternatives which make the process of government a function of consent, the essentials of democracy are institutionalized. Under these conditions, the "many," not the "few," are the masters of social destiny, so far as chance, choice and knowledge allow.

Manipulation and the Structure of Power. The most incredible part of Hacker's analysis is its nominalistic presuppositions, conceived in national terms. He sees only individual manipulators. He makes no reference to the institutional bases of power and the multiplicity of power centers, some in conflict, others closely interrelated. Now clearly power in America is of several kinds—economic, military, ecclesiastical, and cultural as well as political;[46] yet Hacker makes no mention of the increasing power of the military, or of the power wielded by corporations, labor unions, religious, ethnic and agricultural groups. It is ironic that another exponent of an elitist theory has written a book on labor leaders, significantly entitled *The New Men of Power.*[47] To exclude the structural and organizational components from the analysis of existing power relations is to miss much of the reality of social control.

Again, Hacker's analysis neglects the various levels of power: regional, state, and local. Since men are profoundly affected by decisions, positions, and processes at these levels, they too must be considered in the analysis. Take two very simple examples. Governors of strategic states not infrequently possess more power, real and potential, than many a United States Senator or Representative or even Vice President. And as for geographical sections, consider the relative advantages of a presidential hopeful from the pivotal East, Middle or Far West in comparison to one from the South or Rocky Mountain or New England regions.

Finally, a comprehensive analysis of power in contemporary American culture entails appreciation of various forms expressed in the machinery of government itself. The powers exercised severally by the President, Congress, the judiciary, the administrative bureaucracy, and the many boards, commissions and government corporations,[48] are all significant links in the chain of social control.

III. CONCLUSION: THE ULTIMATE PROBLEM

Three concluding observations should be made. First, in the realm of conduct, "liberal" democracy has not been without defects; the achievement of democ-

[45] *Power: A New Social Analysis*, p. 141.

[46] See Mills, *op. cit.*, chs. 6–12; Charles E. Merriam, *Political Power* (New York, 1934), chs. 2 and 10; Russell, ch. 3; Gerth and Mills, pp. 328–30, and Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and Political Power," in Bendix and Lipset, *op. cit.*

[47] C. Wright Mills, *The New Men of Power* (New York, 1948).

[48] Spitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 267–68.

racy, as of other systems of ideals, is always largely a matter of degree. But whatever may be said against it, one can hardly deny that it has helped to provide both the rationale and the institutional conditions for a freer and more humane America. Hacker's observation of the expanding range of opportunities testifies to this. Democracy is largely process and, as has been well said, process must always precede product.

Second, "liberal" democracy's irony is that, despite its ideological and sociological origins, the deepest roots of its creed have been universal and humanistic, transcending social class and hierarchical status; the fulfilment of its teachings therefore, entailed the negation of its partial and narrow origins. Third, and most important, there is the issue of the validity of "liberal" democracy itself. Barring the genetic fallacy, in which the essence of the goal is determined by its social origin, it is difficult to agree that the tragedy of "liberal" democracy is that it has no ultimate defense. Actually, on Hacker's own terms, "liberal" democracy is, morally speaking, the "worthiest of political creeds." If that is true, what could be a more ultimate defense?

It is clear that Hacker's reference is to the "home truths set down by such ungentlemanly characters as Thrasymachus, Machiavelli, and Pareto." But the controlling assumptions of these men mean a denial, not a fulfilment of, democracy. Doubtless, we can learn much from these "realists" of the nature, mechanics, and complexities of power. None the less, the problem of social power is not exhausted in terms of descriptive categories which themselves are not free of the the preconceptions of the perceiver: *power for what?* Power is not a self-justifying phenomenon. This simple truth, if power is to fulfill rather than negate objects of value, should never be lost to sight. Excessive zeal to recognize the "realities" of power is a temptation to forget that the normative dimension itself is an integral component of the analysis of power. Without that we are prone to make power an end in itself and to make existing power relations normative. The ethics of power is as crucial as its mechanics and psychology. In this regard, "liberal" democracy is creative and imaginative.

The ultimate issue, therefore, is not only one of imperatives but also of the kind of social order deemed worthy to be brought into existence and preserved. The "realities" of power are not deterministic, static, and closed phenomena; they are, in no small measure, the result of what men conceive to be desirable and necessary ends. Men are not automatons compelled to conform to some absolute and eternal pre-established order called the "realities" or "home truths" of power. Accordingly, the existence of power is one thing; its uses and justification quite another. What wisdom can Thrasymachus, Machiavelli, Michels, Mosca, and Pareto give here?

A POSTSCRIPT TO PROFESSOR DAHL'S "PREFACE"[1]

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An exhilarating breath of fresh air has blown into the musty halls of political theory with the publication of Robert Dahl's Walgreen lectures, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*.[2] We now know that discussion of minority rights and majority rule *can* be carried on with lucidity and serious attention to some of the intriguing intellectual puzzles which arise, as well as with reasonable rigor and a genuinely remarkable economy of expression.

For all his clarity and conciseness, however, Professor Dahl has paid a fourfold philosophical price:

1. His case against "Madisonian" democracy is procedural and perhaps more peripheral than profound.
2. The neo-Spinozistic endeavor to formalize political ideology appears premature.
3. His confessed epistemological perplexity over the ground of "intensity" judgments is peculiar.
4. His refusal to wrestle with ethical issues—a refusal he shares with most "empirically oriented" political scientists—leaves them not only open and unresolved, but even unexplored. Yet, in an important sense, these issues seem to be the central ones.

Following Dahl's example, I shall try to set forth these *caveats* as concisely as possible, leaving aside qualifications and positive theory construction.

I. THE MADISONIAN PROBLEM

What Dahl does. The Madisonian position is boiled down (on p. 32) to four definitions, one "ethical postulate" (p. 10) or axiom, and ten hypotheses. Without claiming to follow the letter of Madison's own writings, his thought is made to appear almost exclusively deductive.

Dahl's first sustained counterargument (pp. 11–15) is directed against the "First Condition" of Madison's "Hypothesis 5":

> *Hypothesis 5:* At least two conditions are necessary for the existence of a non-tyrannical republic:
>
> *First Condition:* The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, must be avoided.[3]

The counterargument seems persuasive, and the point will be conceded. Madison is ambiguous. If his intent was to construct a deductive system, and to argue that a republican form of government is a *necessary* condition of non-tyrannical rule, Madison has indeed failed to make his case.

These "ifs" may however be doubted, and one may especially doubt Professor Dahl's claim (p. 14) to the effect that:

[1] My gratitude goes to Professor H. B. Mayo of the University of British Columbia for his help in criticizing an early draft of this manuscript.

[2] Chicago, 1956.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 11, citing *The Federalist*, No. 47.

. . . the necessity for this condition for a non-tyrannical republic is an article of faith in the American political credo.

—for (*a*) it seems unlikely that Madison failed to realise that the British parliamentary system is non-tyrannical (Dahl's argument, p. 13); and (*b*) it is false that partisans of the American form of government must claim, or have unanimously claimed, the *necessity* of constitutional checks and balances. These have at least on some occasions been defended on purely pragmatic grounds. The founders of our country were intelligent men intent upon working out one practical way (among many possible ones) of insuring against tyranny. It is not altogether certain that Madison was merely a sloppy syllogizer.

Against Madison's "Hypothesis 1":

If unrestrained by external checks, any given individual or group of individuals will tyrannize over others. (p. 17)

Dahl argues (pp. 17–22), in essence, that presently available evidence indicates the importance of "internal checks" to an extent not recognized by Madison, and that Madison must consequently be charged with exaggerating the importance of constitutionally prescribed "external checks." I agree, and pass on to the crucial refutation (pp. 22 ff.).

On Madison's behalf, Dahl defines "tyranny" as "severe deprivation of a natural right," and sets out to prove that this concept is meaningless or useless in Madison's system. Here, I believe, we must use especial care to avoid a widespread and pernicious historical mistake. Dahl recognizes that a definition and analysis of "natural rights" is in order (pp. 22–23) and seeks to sidestep the obligation to furnish us with such an analysis and definition:

We do not need to settle the question whether individuals have natural rights or, if they do, what these may be. All we need to know is whether anything roughly equivalent to the definition of tyranny I have supplied . . . provides a useful concept in Madison's system. . . . It is self-evident that the definition of tyranny would be entirely empty unless natural rights could somehow be defined. It can be shown, I think, that we must specify a process by which specific natural rights can be defined in the context of some political society.

—and already we begin to see the ghost of P. W. Bridgman peering around the corner into the eighteenth century. But before he shows his face we must first demolish two straw men:

If a natural right were defined, rather absurdly, to mean the right of every individual to do what he wishes to do, then every form of government must be tyrannical; for every government restrains at least some individuals from doing what they wish to do.

—and

One possibility is to restrain only those kinds of behavior that every individual (or every adult) in the community believes to be undesirable. But this would require unanimity for government actions and would thereby make government impossible.[4]

Finally we arrive at the heart of the matter:

The typical political situation is one in which individuals in a group or a society disagree as to the desirability of penalizing or rewarding certain kinds of behavior. Government

[4] These three quotations are from p. 23.

processes are then employed to adjudicate the dispute. But when individuals disagree, what rule is to be employed to determine whether the punishing of some specified act would or would not be tyrannical? One possibility is to permit the majority to decide. . . . Yet since this operating rule is precisely what Madison meant to prevent, and moreover would make the concept of majority tyranny meaningless, we must reject it. The only remaining possibility, then, is that some specified group in the community, not defined as the majority, but not necessarily always in opposition to it, would be empowered to decide. But if Hypothesis 1 is correct, then any group in the community with such a power would use it to tyrannize over other individuals in the community. Hence, in practice, no one could have the power to decide this question. Hence this definition of tyranny seems to have no operational meaning in the context of political decision-making. And, of course, it follows further that, if tyranny has no operational meaning, then majority tyranny has no operational meaning. (p. 24)

Dahl's central argument seems to come down to this: Madison's first hypothesis makes non-tyrannical government practically impossible, for some ultimately unrestrained group must determine when restraints are to be applied, and such a group would surely tyrannize. This is a neat and, within its limits, a valid argument. Dahl shows that Madison's natural rights theory, as here reconstructed, does not unambiguously specify political procedures.

I am strongly inclined to go further, and to doubt that *any* purely deductive political theory, based upon self-evident axioms, can ever unambiguously specify political procedures. Even Dahl's own polyarchical postulates (p. 84) do not do this. But I also suspect that this is too strong a demand to make of a theory of this sort. If we can find some theory which is reasonably clear, coherent, comprehensive, relevant and contemporaneously plausible, we ought perhaps to rest content.

What Dahl does not do. Madison was a major figure in an important philosophical and political tradition. As thinker and statesman, he was concerned to understand man in society, and to help men make themselves better. Granting the merely pragmatic effectiveness of Dahl's procedural challenge, and granting the modesty of his book's claims, does it follow that the Madisonian tradition stands refuted? I believe not, and shall try to present my reservations in terms of a brief restatement of the nature of self-evidence (upon which our knowledge of natural rights is said to rest), and of an estimate of the relevance in this context of the concept of "operational meaning."

It was, to Madison and his predecessors, simply self-evident that all men, simply as men, *ought* to live, to be free, to be able to pursue happiness, and the like. I do not defend this doctrine, which seems to me anything but self-evident. But I do ask for a fair hearing on its behalf. And I believe that this notion of "self-evidence" has been widely short-changed these past few years.

"Self-evidence" is not, as it is currently misconceived to be, merely a childish, vulgar kind of unsupported dogmatism. Many of the men who used this expression knew perfectly well what they were talking about. They were not trying to foist their crude prejudices upon an unsuspecting public, and so to escape the responsibility for proof. They were explicitly claiming that some sentences, when fully and clearly understood by the unbiassed eye of the common human

reason, need no further proof. Descartes' *sum* was not "proved" by his *cogito;* it is rather that, having seen by the clear light of reason that I think, I see also that I exist. The latter claim is its own evidence, once it is understood. It is in this sense *self*-evident.

Madisonians can claim that natural rights are self-evident in precisely this way, and that in this same way we sometimes see plainly by the natural light of reason that natural rights are being trespassed. We determine when this happens simply by *looking* at the social situation. Even if a 99 percent majority in the United States Congress believed that Negroes should be disfranchised, this majority would be *mistaken*. Even if 100 percent of the Aryan Germans had thought it morally right to torture innocent Jews, they would have been *wrong*.

How do we decide these things? Why, we simply perceive the situation as honestly as we can. How else? We intuit that rights are being violated, exactly as certainly (and no more so) as we look at grass and see that it is green. No one need claim infallibility. But neither need anyone, because of occasional perceptual error, or because of the alleged possibility of disagreement, relapse into a hopeless, relativistic skepticism.

And what do we do "when individuals disagree" about natural rights? Why, we do the same thing we do in every other case of a clash of intuitions: we sit down together and study the evidence and try to convince each other. If we are honest, and if neither of us is blind, we *must* come to agreement. If you call my suit "blue" and I call it "green," we examine it under different lights, and compare it with sample swatches, and so on. We may even elect to take a closer look with a spectroscope (though of course this in itself does not solve our problem). Assuming normal color vision and a genuinely common language, we may hope to agree. Just so, assuming normal moral "vision," we may hope to agree. If we persist in disagreeing, each calling the other "morally blind," it may be that we simply cannot resolve our problem. This does not mean that there is no moral quality "there" to be discerned, any more than our failure to agree that my suit is green or blue means that my suit is colorless; it means rather (still assuming linguistic consistency) that one of us is, in this situation, blind—or so, at least, a Madisonian might argue.

Yet even such an example as this allows too much. More appropriately, we might consider how disagreements in arithmetic are resolved. If people disagree as to a given sum or product, they may try to work out their disagreement by various arithmetical techniques. Quite strictly, of course, there can be no *ultimate* disagreement in arithmetic, because a sum is what it is and no other thing; opinions about the sum may be correct or incorrect, but the sum itself is explicit, clear, and *in principle available to any sane man*. Exactly so, no *ultimate* disagreement about human rights is possible, in the Madisonian tradition. Men may, in specific cases, dispute morals as they dispute mathematics. There are moral morons, as there are mathematical ones. Nevertheless, in principle any sane man can simply *see* some natural rights, and *see* when they are violated. So-called "moral disagreement" is always a question of perversion or

prejudice or blindness, of not seeing clearly enough what is *there* to be seen.

Dahl would presumably reject this parallel, and claim that moral matters are not as explicit and "objective" as are mathematical matters. Maybe so, maybe not; I incline to agree with Dahl; but this is a complicated philosophical question. To decide it requires a really thoroughgoing philosophical analysis. For Dahl to assume without argument that ultimate and irreconcilable moral disagreement is even possible is for him to come perilously close to begging his central question. It is, I suggest, an inappropriate polemic device to apply a naturalistic-pragmatic yardstick to a supernaturalistic-transcendental moral claim.

Shall we then allow, with Dahl, that "tyranny," in Madison's sense, has no "operational meaning"? Except procedurally, I do not see why we need to allow this at all. Hitlerian Germany (Madison would have said) was a tyranny, in that men were "severely deprived of their natural rights." How do we know that this was the case? Why, simply by looking at the evidence. What else would Dahl have us do? Take a vote, perhaps? Why? If a majority, German or otherwise, disagrees with us, we shall have to consider the majority to be simply wrong. Numbers do not make right, any more than they make wrong.

This meaning is perhaps not "operational" in Dahl's sense. But it would be interesting to have him state explicitly what kind of meaning he would grant as "operational," while rejecting this one. There is at least some sense in maintaining that one *must* personally and ultimately face some evidence somewhere along the line, whether it be a pointer-reading or a social action, and say "yea" or "nay." Our Madisonian forebears honestly faced this point in the moral realm.[5]

In a footnote to the above quotation, Dahl at least isolates the really critical problem, but, alas, he nowhere goes on to explore it:

> It might be said that each individual would decide himself, upon consulting his own value system, whether or not a given act was tyrannical. But this is merely a prescription for individual behavior and provides no rule for collective decision. (p. 24, n. 33)

This is misleading in that a man's "own value system" here appears to be a matter only of individual preference, whereas for the Madisonian every man has essentially the same "value system," and it is God's. Nonetheless, the point is clear, correct, and critical: Madisonians claim that, in the last analysis, every moral decision is made by an individual, on his own responsibility. Governments are not moral agents; men are. Man's problem is to devise some way of living morally with his fellow men. Imperfect though government inescapably is, its procedures should be so designed as to minimize the practical likelihood that men will exploit their fellow men. This, I think, is what Madison is

[5] Nor will it do to make publicity a condition of "operationalism," for the empiricist does not avoid the appeal to the "just plain given" (or "self-evident") by demanding any intersubjective consensus. When my head aches, all the contrary evidence in the world will not convince me that it does not ache. And (a Madisonian might claim) when I see wanton torture, no calculation of votes can convince me that I am mistaken in condemning it.

trying to do. Why didn't Dahl direct his attention to this central question of the relationship between moral man and immoral society, as our Stoic-Christian-Madisonian tradition has conceived it?

What Dahl has done instead is to extract a procedural concept of "operational meaning" from its twentieth-century naturalistic context, and apply it to an eighteenth-century supernaturalistic one. If he had contented himself with some such claim as "Madisonian democratic theory is not consistent with Dewey's instrumentalism," or "Supernaturally grounded natural rights seem implausible, given today's philosophical fashions," he would have been on firmer ground. But to dismiss Madison's tradition as "operationally meaningless" without a thoroughgoing analysis of that tradition in its own terms is to gain altogether too easy an advantage.

The other major attack which Dahl mounts against Madison is based upon Madison's definition of "faction":

> A faction is a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. (p. 25)

Dahl's argument begins this way:

> The difficulty with this definition of a faction is similar to the difficulty encountered with "tyranny." How can one use this concept? We can read it to mean that a faction is any group of citizens bent on invading the natural rights of others.

What we are said to need is

> . . . some way to distinguish a "number of citizens" who make up a "faction" from any other number of citizens. Unless we can make such a distinction, the important subsequent propositions that depend upon the distinction are meaningless. Do factions have recognizable stigmata?
>
> It is easy to see that so long as we do not know either the "rights of other citizens" or the "permanent and aggregate interests of the community," we are helpless. (p. 25)

We must, I think, protest that (except under the qualification mentioned above) this treatment is manifestly unfair. To demand "stigmata" of factions, given Madison's definition, is more effective rhetorically than it is persuasive logically.

Still without endorsing the Madisonian view, it seems easy to give all the "operational meaning" that Dahl has any right to ask of this concept of "faction." The Madisonian answer is, quite simply, that we *do* know at least some of the rights of man, and that we *can* see at least some of the occasions on which these rights are being infringed. "Surely you must agree," Madison might urge Dahl, "that the White Citizens' Councils in the South today are 'numbers of citizens . . . united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of our colored citizens.' Are they not quite strictly, Professor Dahl, examples of my 'factions?' " What would Dahl's answer be?

Natural rights are simply natural, whether anybody recognizes them or not.

A faction may be a faction, even though universally unrecognized. If, through some universal hallucination, five and four were believed to total ten, they would still add up to nine all the same. We know this not by any consensus or majority vote, but simply because we understand it, or because we can deduce it from self-evident axioms.

I have restated the traditional case in its extren e form, because I wish to show that, in its essence, it is untouched (and untouchable) by the strictly procedural considerations which Dahl brings against it. With Dahl, I do not find it a convincing case.

Nor do I wish to underestimate the importance of procedural pragmatics; certainly Madison was a practical man, and he did not do so. Dahl does show a practical difficulty which arises in the application of Madisonian procedures. I do wish to claim that practical difficulties are fatal only to a utilitarian kind of program which claims no higher sanction than mere expediency. Madison's program does claim such a higher sanction. What Dahl does not do—indeed, what he never even seriously attempts—is to show that a Madison-natural rights theory is, as it stands in its own context, in any serious respect defective.

What should Dahl do? Taking "Dahl" here as a symbol for "enlightened political theorist," rather than for the man, I suggest that "Dahl" should, if he is to take thoroughgoing account of a philosophical-political tradition like that of Madison, come directly to grips with it in its own terms. These terms are fundamentally moral and metaphysical, and any adequate account of them must naturally go beyond the bounds of a narrowly conceived "scientific" inquiry.

We waste breath in debating whether political science is "scientific." Thinking about what kind of people we are, and what we really need, and what kind of government we ought to have here and now is not "scientific" in any positivistic sense. But to conclude that such thinking ought therefore not to be done is positively unscientific. We seriously need some men to do some such serious thinking. Who is better qualified for the job than social scientists and men like "Dahl?"

II. THE SPINOZISM

Dahl is to be congratulated upon his forthright attempt to find and to formulate logically coherent principles underlying both "Madisonian" and "populist" democratic theories. He has performed a valuable service in showing the relevance of some economic-theoretical considerations (as in the work of Little and of Arrow) to political discussion. It is less clear that we ought henceforward to employ his quasi-axiomatic system, and even doubtful that we are yet ready to construct formal political logics with the use of symbolism.

One supposition upon which attempts such as this seem to rest is that an ideology (like the theory of democracy) is to be conceived as a neat deductive system, and is therefore testable by formally deductive procedures. Dahl succeeds in demonstrating with almost Russellian rigor that neither a "Madisonian" nor a "populist" defence of democracy is a logical system.

But, one wants to ask, so what? Is it not a bit naive to be surprised that historic "theories" (they are called "theories" only by semantic dispensation, and are not by any stretch of usage to be confused with scientific theories[6]), sedimented as they are from centuries of use and misuse, and overlaid with widely varying interpretations, lack the precision and rigor we demand, say of a theory of numbers, or of mechanics? This is, however, not crucial, and those of us who enjoy rigor will be entertained by discovering the lack of it, even where we never suspected that it might be found. Dahl, by the way, reveals considerable deftness and ingenuity in designing conceptual bridges across argumentative canyons.

The more important question is whether the symbolism introduced in this book, or any other such symbolism, is yet in order in political theory. I believe we must answer that its use is still extremely limited, probably far more limited that it is in theoretical economics. Economists have been able to symbolize their propositions because they have been interested in the development of abstract models of economic activity. As I. M. D. Little has shown,[7] the empirical interpretation of such symbolic systems always alters the nature of the system somewhat. Rigor is also often weakened.

But political scientists in general, and Dahl in particular, want to keep a close grip on specific problems of human interaction in real political situations. This implies the necessity of accounting somehow for a rich texture of incredibly interwoven variables. To symbolize one or two aspects of a complex political situation (as, for example, Dahl does in summating preferences) may be to cast one ray of light on one aspect of one isolated situation. But if it be thought to explain anything of any general theoretical interest, it is as absurd as it would be to try to "explain" the marriage of a man and a woman by the use of the formula "one plus one equals two." Such limited explanations are valuable in physics; they are so because it has become possible conceptually to isolate the relevant functioning variables. In political science we are certainly not yet near that often-promised land.

Dahl does not make any extravagant claims for his symbolism, nor does he often propose any premature "metricization"; on the contrary, he usually

[6] G. C. Field, in his recent *Political Theory* (London, 1956), p. xvii, calls politics "a mere hotch-potch of verbal analysis, historical information, psychological generalisations, and moral judgments."

[7] *A Critique of Welfare Economics* (Oxford, 1950). Kenneth J. Arrow's *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York and London, 1951), is an attempt to achieve the logico-political-economic end with rigor and elegance. But in his discussion, for all its excellence, Arrow must assume (*inter alia*) (*a*) that the social decision process itself is never enjoyable; (b) that everyone always honestly represents his choice (as in vote or purchase), even though it may be to his disadvantage to do so; (c) that the decision process itself never influences anybody's values; and (d) that all men are always "rational." (See Ch. 1, sec. 2. For some philosophical observations, see ch. 7, sec. 3.) All of these assumptions are false, yet Arrow finds it necessary to make them, so that his deductions may be interpretable. This is sensible science, reminiscent of the often outlandish assumptions upon which some physical deductions are made to rest. But it is, at best, empirically dubious and, I think, premature in the social sciences.

thinks and writes with cool, clear, level-headed recognition of the enormous difficulties ahead. It would be a pity if enthusiasts were to adopt his symbolism without also adopting his restraining modesty.

III. ON EPISTEMOLOGY

Perhaps the most valuable analysis in this book is contained in Chapter 4, where Dahl raises the sticky question of "intensity." This question arises when we seek to determine not merely how many people choose an alternative, but also how intensely they feel about their choice. After a masterly dissection of certain aspects of the problem, Dahl comes down to the critical question: How ought we democratically to resolve a situation in which a bare majority mildly prefers one alternative, while a large minority strongly prefers another (mutually exclusive) alternative?

With patent regret, Dahl concludes that neither judicial review nor equal representation of the states in the senate protects the minority in this case, and that "the analysis strongly suggests, although it does not prove, that no solution to the intensity problem through constitutional or procedural rules is attainable" (p. 119).

Let me say at once that I find Dahl's presentation of the problem on the whole excellent, his arguments well contrived, and his conclusion persuasive. The only oddity to which I want to call attention is a typically epistemological one. Dahl repeatedly expresses his bewilderment over the alleged difficulty of discovering the intensity of other people's desires. He introduces the problem with a simplified example:

> Jones himself has no need to know how much he prefers blondes to brunettes; yet the basic fact that we cannot measure the intensity of his preferences raises some interesting and indeed serious problems for democratic theory. For if we cannot measure how much Jones prefers blondes to brunettes, or how much Smith prefers brunettes to blondes, what can we possibly mean when we say that Jones prefers blondes to brunettes more than Smith prefers brunettes to blondes? (p. 91)

Note especially the parallel "If we can not measure . . . what can we possibly mean . . . ?" After showing why he considers this to be an important question, Dahl concludes that:

> If by "intensity" we mean the sensations of another person, then we are defeated at the outset. It is obvious that we can never directly observe the sensations of another person; whatever we experience directly, or whatever we observe by introspection, are always our own sensations. In no conceivable way, then, can we directly observe and compare the sensate intensities of preference of different individuals. . . . We can and do postulate that sensations do exist in others, but we cannot directly observe them. In this sense of measuring intensities of feeling or sensation, it is meaningless to say that A prefers x to y more than B prefers y to x.
>
> Yet most of us will continue to make such statements and to believe that they are meaningful. . . . (pp. 99–100)

Now, is it not odd to find such familiar epistemological perplexities as these in a political-scientific discussion? Why, one wants to know, has so basic a

philosophical consideration (if it must be discussed at all) been delayed to this point? How is it peculiarly relevant here?

Of course, one can revive the metaphysical problem of "other minds" and their sensations; but if such problems are relevant here, they are equally relevant in the analysis of any communication situation. Dahl's desires may (if anybody finds this language appropriate for any purpose) be said to be somehow "inaccessible" to me. But (as is recognized in the text) if this is true of the relative intensity of his desires, it is no less true of his sensations of anger or of redness. Would this concern not seem to be more in order, if at all, at the very outset of any attempt to escape solipsism?

A widespread analytic movement in contemporary philosophy,[8] and one with which Dahl doubtless feels sympathetic, has tried to show that the worry he confesses is utterly without foundation, and arises simply out of an ill-advised linguistic formulation of the question. It is said that concern for the alleged inaccessibility of other people's sensations presupposes that these sensations could in principle, even if not in practice, be made accessible to me (else what could "inaccessible" possibly mean?) Thus, even though I cannot in fact do so, if I could somehow arrange a set of wires from Dahl's brain to mine, I might in principle suppose that I could then feel his toothache. But this is absurd (so it is claimed), because I should then still be feeling not his toothache, but my own sensation, only this sensation of mine would not be traceable to my tooth as a stimulus, but to his. And thus the "mystery" is said to be solved: Dahl's question, "How can I feel somebody else's sensation?" is claimed to be unanswerable simply because it is not meaningfully askable.

As we might expect, Dahl yearns for an "operational" answer: he wishfully proposes the construction of a scale which could in principle be correlated with a set of behavioral events, which could in turn somehow be correlated with varying intensities of desire. "Ethically," he confesses, his eventual proposal is unsatisfactory (though I am not at all sure what "ethically" means here; does it perhaps mean "ideally"?); but then, almost apologetically, he concludes:

> But note that although the scale and the set of events are both observable and related by observations, we have no observations to relate our scale or the set of observable events, with sensate intensity. We merely "agree" that (*a*) sensate intensity exists and (*b*) our scale measures it. Narrowly interpreted, all that we have done, in effect, is to treat sensate intensity as a construct consisting of the outcome of a set of measurements of some observable items. . . .
>
> If our concern is ethical and we are worried about sensate intensities, then (our solution) is unsatisfactory; but all solutions will, I think, be equally so. If our concern is empirical, *e.g.*, if we are concerned with predicting the stability of a social organization, then, (our solution) might be satisfactory, providing we can find a scale for the set of events we wish to predict. (p. 123)

Dahl is here confessing a well-grounded uneasiness in the presence of the

[8] See both early (*Tractatus*) and late (*Philosophical Investigations*) Wittenstein, as well as a good deal of the work of John Wisdom, Gilbert Ryle, A. J. Ayer, as well as the earlier work of Broad, Lewis, Russell, Moore, and many others back at least as far as Hume.

same "operationalism" which he has espoused quite openly in earlier chapters. Once one begins to talk about human experiences of any kind—sensations, needs, emotions, ideas, or any other—a radically "operational" view seems to press toward behaviorism. The "relatively more intense desires" become, for example, intervening variables, to be defined in S-R language.

Briefly, my point is this: there seems to be nothing peculiar about Dahl's intensity problem which makes "operationalism" any less palatable here than elsewhere; or, conversely, if an "operational" language is useful in refuting Madison's system, it could prove equally acceptable here. After all, as Dahl knows, we already have familiar "operational" techniques for determining what is called "intensity of need": we can, for example, count the number of times a hungry rat will cross an electrically charged grid to get food, and postulate that the hungrier the rat is, the more times he will cross the grid. Many Likert scales have internal consistency and high split-half reliability. Economists make somewhat similar postulates in constructing price systems: the more money a man is willing to pay out for a given commodity, the more intensely he is supposed to want it. Dahl is presumably (and justifiably) worried about introducing such simplified models as these into the political situation; we should, for example, certainly hesitate before taking a crude numerical count of letters to Congressmen as simply indicative of the fervor with which a position is held by some minority.

But Dahl ought precisely here to have the courage of his lack of conviction, and dare to ask after the really basic conditions under which the intensity of minority or majority desires *ought* to be relevant to political decisions. He should not uncritically accept (as he does in the above quotation) the currently stylish notion that "ethical" and "empirical" considerations are antithetical, or even radically distinguishable.

IV. THE RELEVANCE OF ETHICS TO POLITICS

In only one place—in Section IV of Chapter 2 (pp. 44–48)—does Dahl undertake any ethical analysis at all. Even here, he claims no thoroughness, and limits himself only to the sketchiest offhand observations about "transcendentalism" and "instrumentalism." Beyond the claim that a divinely grounded natural rights ethics rests upon "assumptions that . . . are difficult (or) . . . impossible to prove to the satisfaction of anyone of positivistic or skeptical predispositions," and the claim that some empirical considerations are relevant to instrumentalism—neither of these claims being even remotely debatable—no analysis is achieved or, for that matter, even attempted. The ethical problem is simply dismissed. No argument is necessary here to show that the entire Stoic-Christian tradition is hardly refuted by pointing to its failure to appeal to positivists. Consider, for example, the inverse of Dahl's claim: "Positivism and skepticism rest upon assumptions which would be difficult or impossible to prove to the satisfaction of anyone of Christian predispositions." No one would deny this, I suppose, but what does it prove? Nor ought anyone to be surprised to learn that one cannot evaluate the consequences of

belief and action unless he has some empirical ground for predicting what these consequences may be.

I do not therefore take issue with what Dahl explicitly says, but I do want to call attention to what he (in company with most other political scientists today) leaves unsaid. I am prepared to argue that once one undertakes to consider the desirability of any form of government, his analysis is inescapably and properly ethical through and through, and that to pretend that such an analysis can be conducted simply on a mechanical-symbolic level of game-theory, or in terms of a purely logical manipulation, is to distort the subject matter before one begins. After all, one can count the consonants in the 117th Psalm, or parse its grammar; but in doing so, one ought not to pretend to be saying anything directly significant about its content.

Indeed, I am willing to go further. A political theory prescribing some form of government always rests upon certain moral assumptions. These assumptions are usually implicit, often vague, and sometimes inconsistent, one with another. Madison assumed that the will of God should be done on earth, as it is in heaven. He interpreted that will as requiring that the natural rights of God's creatures be respected. Hitler assumed that the "German race" was superior to all others morally, physically and culturally, and ought to prevail. So too, with Plato, Aristotle, Locke and probably every other important figure in the history of political thought. They are all serious moralists, with an earnest concern for the good, as they variously conceived it. Comparisons of their theories which ignore their moral concerns or subordinate them to purely logical ones, radically miss the point.

Madisonians may be attacked, for example, in either or both of these ways:

(1) We may try to lay bare the moral and metaphysical commitments, and to undertake a full-scale analysis of their validity. This is, even today, a tolerably ambitious program. But nothing less will fully and fairly refute their claim to be defending democracy.

(2) —or, granting these commitments for the sake of the analysis, we may seek to show that Madison's program was procedurally inadequate to his ends. Dahl shows, for example, that constitutional checks and balances are not practical ways of securing natural rights.

But the procedural question of how to secure natural rights is to be distinguished from the material question of whether there are any such rights to be secured. The practicing politician may be concerned primarily with the former question, but I should suppose that the serious political theorist with an interest in understanding historic defenses of democracy could hardly escape the latter.[9]

Today's attempt to evade the moral questions takes a curious form known as "instrumentalism." I believe that Dahl would be happy to be called an

[9] In *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York, 1953), which Dahl wrote in conjunction with Charles E. Lindblom, he made it plain that he is perfectly conscious of the importance of ethical analysis to political theory. But, just as these authors approach the point there, they back off and turn the question over to the philosophers.

"instrumentalist" (though he would then have to qualify the sharp distinction between the "ethical" and the "empirical," to which attention was called above). Instrumentalism is a possible, though partial, philosophy. It does suggest some ways in which some procedural questions may be approached. But, I am convinced, any political theorist who thinks himself able to avoid his responsibility for ethical analysis by embracing instrumentalism is misled. To smuggle a vague hybrid of hedonistic and self-realizationist ethics into a Dewey-like methodology, even though it be christened "operationalism," is to condemn one's resultant theory to something very like question-begging sterility.

Is there, between the lines of Dahl's acute analysis, an awareness that the really basic issues at stake in democratic theory—such issues as "What is a good man?" and "How ought men to live together?"—are not even touched by technical manipulations of *xPy*'s and sigma-summations? If so, may we hope that, in the larger work to which this book is the *Preface*, he will give us the benefit of his knowledge and wisdom in the area where we need it most?

A REJOINDER

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To discuss all of the points at which we seem to disagree would be an unwarranted imposition upon readers of this REVIEW, many of whom, I fear, will not have read the book in question. Consequently I propose to stick to the central issues so far as possible, for to a considerable extent these transcend the book itself; and therefore some purpose will be served even for those who have not read the book.

I

The heart of the first criticism, that my case against Madison is procedural, turns on certain aspects of the problem of natural rights.

There are, however, a few preliminary issues to be disposed of. Morgan says: " . . . it seems unlikely that Madison failed to realize that the British parliamentary system is non-tyrannical." That is, Madison surely did not think the British parliamentary system was tyrannical, yet he must have understood that it did not provide for separation of powers. But the plain fact is that Madison *did* argue in the Convention, not once but many times, that separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers was necessary to preserve liberty and to avoid tyranny. (For two characteristic examples, see his speeches of July 17 and July 19, where the point is made plainly enough.) However, it was not inconsistent for him to hold this position and yet to believe that when the British constitutional system operated properly it was not inherently tyrannical. For when Madison thought of the "proper" British constitution in 1787, he was not contemplating the British political system of 1950—or even of 1850. He was thinking of the eighteenth century constitutional system in all its classical purity, and often he saw it through the eyes of Montesquieu; but Montesquieu or not, what he perceived, like most of his contemporaries, was the famous check-and-balance system of monarch, Commons, Lords, and judiciary that did actually exist in Madison's time, even if it was then undergoing some changes the radical implications of which were not fully visible until much later.

Morgan says further that "it is false that partisans of the American form of government must claim, or have unanimously claimed, the *necessity* of constitutional checks and balances." I am not aware of having argued so. At this point as at several others there is a certain looseness of fit between the language of the book and the language implied by Morgan's criticisms. Possibly, however, my critic reads too much into my little piece of rhetoric to the effect that the necessity of constitutional checks and balances "is an article of faith in the American political credo. From it Madison, and successors who out-Madisoned Madison, have deduced the necessity for the whole complicated network of constitutional checks and balances . . . " (p. 14). I am satisfied if I have shown,

as I think any careful reading of Madison does show, that *Madison* believed this to be the case. As to the American political credo, I have yet to run across an American student who did not believe—at least prior to contamination by his teachers of political science—in the necessity of constitutional checks and balances. This observation doesn't establish the case, of course, and I suppose neither of us wants to make an extensive empirical investigation of the matter. The point is, in any event, trivial. For to assert that the belief is a part of the American credo or that later "Madisonians" have subscribed to the belief (assertions that are themselves entirely subordinate to the main issues) is surely not to imply that the belief is *unanimously* held or that this is the *only* ground on which the American form of government can be supported. My critic is, in short, attacking a position that is not taken in the book and is not logically deducible from the statements made in the book.

These are points that I should have preferred to ignore had I not thereby seemed to assent to criticisms which, although subordinate, would if they were valid convict me of a species of simple-mindedness on minor issues that might properly be assumed to carry over into the major ones.

Let us then turn to the first major issue, which has to do with the role of natural rights in Madison's thought and my treatment of the problems thereby created. Because what I have to say on the question of natural rights will also apply in large part to the "procedural" problem of defining a "faction," I shall not deal separately with that issue.

I deliberately sought to avoid the problem of the ultimate foundations of natural rights because "we do not need to settle the question whether individuals have natural rights, or, if they do, what these may be" (p. 23). We do not need to settle the question because even if it could be shown that individuals do have natural rights, Madison's theory does not provide us with an internally consistent *constitutional* or *collective* method for arriving at or enforcing these natural rights. There is, then, a critically important distinction that Morgan's criticisms ignore, between an *individual choice* and a *social decision*. The problem is to "specify a process by which specific natural rights can be defined *in the context of some political society*" (p. 23. Emphasis added).

In order to see the bearing of this distinction, let us take it for granted that my critic's interpretation of Madison's concept of natural rights is correct. We now have a prescription as to how individuals should arrive at their opinions about natural rights. But we still lack a prescription as to how a group of individuals should arrive at a collective choice, or social decision, as to natural rights. A social decision would be unnecessary only if separate individual choices were regarded as, by themselves, sufficient to establish and maintain natural rights. But neither Madison—nor, I think, Morgan—believes this to be so. Indeed, Madison was engaged at the Convention and elsewhere in arriving at prescriptions as to methods for making a particularly critical kind of social decision. He was, after all, designing a constitution; and in his view a necessary property of the constitutional processes he sought was that they

should not violate natural rights. Given the central problem Madison was concerned with, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to prescribe how individual choices are to be made. But it *is* necessary to prescribe how social decisions are to be made; more specifically, it is necessary to prescribe how social decisions are to be arrived at through the instrumentalities of government. And in particular, how are governmental decisions to be made on the range and scope of rights?

This is the key question. And if it can be shown that Madison did not answer it satisfactorily, we do not need to concern ourselves with his views on the nature of individual decisions about natural rights.

What is more, it is perfectly clear that Madison, unlike Morgan, did distinguish between individual choices and social decisions. He had to. Anyone who participates in the making of a constitution, or even the rules of a club, has to. It is scarcely necessary to recall that Madison is important to us not as a metaphysician or a moralist but as a constitution-builder.

Once the distinction between individual choices and social decisions is granted, then the procedural question is not peripheral; it is paramount. It is at this point, I argued, that Madison is confronted with a series of dilemmas that he did not satisfactorily resolve. I do not intend to try the patience of readers by restating here the nature of those dilemmas, for it is sufficient to show that the problem of "procedure," or social decision, is central to the whole question of Madison's theory and its validity.

Morgan might object that, given an understanding of Madison's assumptions about the proper process for arriving at individual choices on natural rights, the social process for making collective decisions about natural rights could then be inferred. Let us take the position on individual choices which my critic ascribes to Madison. If it could be assumed that individuals would arrive at a state of unanimity after unlimited discussion, then a kind of Friends' Meeting formula would appear to provide the only appropriate procedure for arriving at decisions. Such a formula might be incorporated into the constitutional system. But Madison never proposed such a solution, nor, so far as I can tell, did he even contemplate it. Yet surely he would have done so if the views Morgan ascribes to Madison on individual choices are correct, and if Madison's views on social decisions were a logical by-product of his views on individual choices.

Possibly my critic is wrong about Madison; or perhaps Madison made the wrong inferences from his assumptions, even though, as Morgan says, "it is not altogether certain that Madison was merely a sloppy syllogizer." But whether or not Madison's conclusions about the proper rules for social decisions were or were not strictly deducible from or consistent with his assumptions about the proper methods for individual choices is not really at issue. Once the difference between these two matters is grasped, and if it is assumed (as I do assume) that Madison is mainly interesting to us for his views on certain kinds of rules for making social decisions, then the central importance of the "procedural" problem is, I think, self-evident. If Madison failed here, he failed.

II

Of course it is naive, as Morgan says, to be surprised when we find that historic theories or ideologies lack precision. I said as much, and more, in justification of Madison (pp. 4–5, 30–31). The problem of a contemporary political scientist, however, is whether he can build on the foundations of some of these historic theories and ideologies, and if so, which ones. In this respect, Madison and "Madisonian theory" are disappointing although very far from irrelevant or useless.

I'm not quite sure of the bearing of Morgan's argument with respect to the use of abstract symbols. Since I employed no symbols in the text except words (which are, surely, symbols), I conclude that his warnings are directed not at me but at "enthusiasts" who might adopt symbolism without "restraining modesty." However, since I did use some notational devices in footnotes and appendices—in most cases in order to symbolize some arguments that were set forth in words in the main text—perhaps I should say a word about the general problem. There are times when a tight control over logical inference from one proposition to another is required; for political science, like any reasoned discourse, rests upon some commonly accepted rules of inference. Sometimes, therefore, it may be useful to seek to control these inferences by employing some form of symbolic logic or even mathematics, a procedure that is not uncommon in disciplines other than our own. One might suggest, incidentally, that political theorists cannot afford to display too much scorn about such attempts to control language and logic, since the writing in our own field has been cluttered for so long with so many giant globs of oily ambiguity like State, Sovereignty, Power, etc.

Naturally there is always a danger that the use of an abstract deductive system will strip the real world of so much of its complexity that the gain in logical clarity is less than compensated for by the loss in realism and relevance. But does anyone argue that judgment, common sense, and understanding can ever be eliminated from political science? Moreover, the danger is very nearly as great with highly abstract words as with abstract "symbols," and highly abstract words have the added disadvantage that they are often excessively ambiguous as well, so that when conclusions are said to follow from certain propositions we remain quite uncertain whether the conclusions do follow or whether we have witnessed a skillful display of verbal sleight-of-hand.

I do not wish to over-state the case. No doubt we shall have our fads with logic and mathematics as with so many other things. But doubtless our discipline will survive these fads as it has others. Meanwhile it would be a pity if political scientists were frightened away from a judicious use of the enormous power of abstract deductive systems like symbolic logic and mathematics out of fear that critics will make the usual ironical remarks.

III

Morgan's third criticism, as I understand it, bears on a rather narrow point. My "perplexity" about determining the intensity of the preferences of different

individuals, he argues in effect, simply reveals the inadequacy of the "operationalist" approach. If, he suggests, I were not an operationalist, then my "perplexity" would be unjustified.

But I am not, strictly speaking, an operationalist; and what is more relevant, the argument of the book does not depend upon operationalist assumptions as to the requirements of a definition. I am inclined to agree with the philosophers of science who argue that it is futile to demand operational definitions of *all* concepts even in a scientific theory. Moreover, the premature or doctrinaire application of operationalist ideas in the more exploratory areas of political science would probably be disastrous.[1]

My critic seems to feel, however, that the book employs a double standard: ruthless skewering of Madison by demands for operational definitions, then a sudden reluctance to make the same demands in dealing with the intensity problem.[2] Strictly speaking, however, my criticism of Madison is entirely independent of the whole question of operationalism; indeed, in my critique of Madison, I did not ever use this term nor did I anywhere insist upon the criteria employed by operationalists. (So far as I know, I only used the term in the introduction where I referred to it as one alternative approach in a series of alternative approaches to the construction of democratic theories.)

The point is simply this: Madison was trying to formulate rules for making collective decisions through instrumentalities of government. Whether or not one prefers operational to non-operational definitions in general, it was incumbent on Madison, as I have tried to show, to indicate a set of procedures that would render collective decisions consistent, so far as possible, with certain basic objectives such as the preservation of natural rights. To demand this of Madison is to make no demand on him that he did not make on himself at the Convention. Although neither he nor the other fifty-four men at the Convention were ever to hear of "operationalism," given the situation that confronted them they had to act as "operationalists" (if one wants to use that language, as I did not). That is, they expected to specify explicitly some procedures that would, in effect, define the term "non-tyrannical republic"; this they expected to do by establishing a constitutional system that would reconcile the supposed facts of human nature with the preservation of certain basic rights and privileges. It is not true, therefore, that I imposed a modern demand for operational definitions on Madison's theory; I simply demanded that his theory do what it professed to do.

Now what of the intensity problem? Few if any of us seem to doubt the existence in other people of psycho-physical states of preference that differ in

[1] On the limitations of operationalism in scientific theory, see C. G. Hempel, *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science* (Chicago, 1952), pp. 23–50. On the dangers of premature application of operationalism in political science, a good statement is in David Easton, *The Political System* (New York, 1953), pp. 314 ff.

[2] The intensity problem is: Can rules for social decisions be constructed that will take into account differences in intensity of preference; as, for example, when a majority only slightly prefers one alternative and a minority passionately prefers another?

intensity. At the same time, it is obvious that one cannot observe or experience these states except in oneself. Presumably this self-experience, together with some assumptions about the measure of basic similarity prevailing among human beings, provides the principal basis for one's conviction that differences in intensity do exist generally. If the problem were simply a matter of establishing to one's satisfaction that differences in intensity of preference do exist generally, there would be no difficulties beyond the traditional epistemological problems that Morgan alludes to and that most of us are prepared to relegate to professional philosophers. But to satisfy oneself as to the existence of differences in intensity is not the problem at hand.

For if intensity of preference is to be taken into account in prescribing or appraising a method for making social decisions—here we are, back to that elementary but critical distinction—then we need to specify some phenomena which we will treat as valid indicators of intensity. One can be as thoroughly satisfied that differences in intensity do exist in other people as that other people exist; and at the same time one can be quite puzzled as to how to prescribe indicators that are valid and reliable enough to build safely into some processes for arriving at collective decisions. Nor is the problem simply an interesting intellectual conundrum; it is a practical problem of rather considerable importance.

At this point, then, we face two alternatives. We may choose to ignore interpersonal differences in intensities of preference in prescribing methods for making social decisions, on the ground that no indicators can be found whose validity can ever be established. Or we may agree to take certain phenomena as indicators, even though we may have nothing like the same confidence in their validity as we have in our initial belief that differences of intensity do exist.

The choice between these alternatives will depend in part upon one's purposes. If one is mainly concerned with gearing social decisions to certain psycho-physical states because one thinks that it is, at least in some cases, ethically desirable to do so, then one may very well prefer to abandon the attempt on the ground that the uncertainities in the relations between inner states and external indicators are too great. If, however, one is mainly concerned with gearing social decisions to certain psycho-physical states for instrumental reasons—*e.g.*, to minimize the probability of acute civil strife—then the second alternative is much more reasonable. For in this case the psycho-physical state is a theoretical construct—an intervening variable, as Morgan points out—which exists merely as a theoretical link between certain kinds of observable behavior (*e.g.*, increase in violent language) and other kinds of observable behavior (*e.g.*, rioting). If one is prepared to entertain this instrumental objective, then one can go to work on the intensity problem.

I have only restated what I said in the book (pp. 99–102). In casting about for possible solutions to the intensity problem I used the same kinds of standards that I used in examining Madison's solution to his problem. In both cases,

the distinction between individual choices and social decisions is critical. In both cases, what I demanded was not criteria for satisfactory individual choices but processes for arriving at social decisions.

It may be that Morgan was searching for a more exhaustive discussion of the grounds for believing in the *existence* of interpersonal differences in intensity of preference, whereas I am prepared to accept the fact on the simple grounds of self-knowledge combined with a belief in the existence of other human beings not unlike myself. To accept the fact so easily would hardly be persuasive to anyone who did not already believe in the existence of interpersonal differences in intensity; to such a person, indeed, the whole problem discussed in the book would be spurious. But since I have never encountered such a person, it seems to me preferable to permit the philosophers to wrestle with basic epistemological questions while political scientists devote their energies to political science.

IV

Morgan's fourth objection is a familiar one, as every reader of this REVIEW must know. The relation of ethics to political theory has provoked endless discussion without notably widening the area of agreement. Because it would be excessively tedious to go over ground that should by now be familiar to every political scientist, I do not propose to do so. Morgan has announced his position. Let me identify my own.

First, any theory, if it is at all complex, is rather like an accordion: it can be extended at both ends. At one end the initial propositions, basic hypotheses, or axioms of Theory A can be regarded as derived propositions in Theory B; and at the other end, the derived propositions of Theory A can be regarded as axioms or basic hypotheses in Theory C. And so on, in what very nearly amounts to an infinite regress of theory. Moreover, a theory can also be expanded laterally: one can make a bigger accordion by increasing the number of new axioms or basic hypotheses. Consequently if one were to enlarge political Theory A in such a way as to satisfy one critic, it would be possible for another critic to show that the new theory could be enlarged still more, and so on. (If Morgan has not found a convenient stopping point short of a total system of human knowledge, I look forward with more than usual interest to the appearance of his next book.)

Second, most of us *are* prepared to stop short of a total system of knowledge (and who, seriously, is not?). We do so by including some propositions as more or less axiomatic *for the purposes of the inquiry* and by excluding a great many others as logically or empirically *independent*.

Third, the extent to which the choice among empirical hypotheses can be regarded as independent of preferences and hence of "ethical" considerations is not a simple question. I find myself singularly unimpressed by all the conventional arguments of political philosophers who insist that ethical and empirical assertions are always inherently interdependent and not "even radically

distinguishable." Ironically, the most interesting arguments for interdependence are perhaps being made in precisely those areas of modern knowledge which are most obnoxious to the conventional political philosopher, namely such disagreeable subjects as the philosophy of science, modern mathematical statistics, and even game theory.[3] Hence even here any progress beyond the stale debates characteristic of this topic might well turn out to be the product of empirically-minded theorists concerned with the grounds of their discipline and receptive to new ideas and modes of analysis.

Fourth, there are, I believe, a tremendous number of important questions in political science the answers to which are patently and unarguably independent of ethical considerations. For example, the truth or falsity of the proposition, "The Supreme Court has not protected intense minorities against apathetic national majorities," is not in any way dependent on whether I regard such protection as good or bad or upon answers to such questions as, "What is a good man?" and, "How ought men to live together?". I do not deny that the last two questions are important. But can anyone sensibly argue that the proposition about the Supreme Court is trivial or even of minor importance?

There are many propositions of a similar kind. For example:

A key hypothesis of Madison's as to the operation of political systems is not supported by evidence drawn from a century of later experience. (p. 13)

Madisonian theory does not specify a set of rules for making collective decisions such that the rules are consistent with the basic assumptions of the theory. (pp. 24, 26)

The theory of populistic or majority-rule democracy ignores differences in intensity of preference. (p. 48)

The Supreme Court has never struck down national legislation designed to curtail the key prerequisites to popular equality and popular sovereignty. (p. 59)

To effectuate the rule: "In choosing among alternatives, the alternative preferred by the greater number is to be selected," would require that all individuals must possess identical information about the alternatives. (p. 70)

The extent of consensus on the basic norms of democracy is a function of the extent of agreement on choices among policy alternatives. (p. 77)

The Senate does not protect all minorities; it only protects some minorities, and it protects some minorities at the expense of other minorities. (pp. 113–118)

Majorities rarely govern on matters of specific policy. (p. 124)

National elections reveal very little as to the preferences of majorities. (pp. 125–127)

In the United States, government decisions are not the result of either "majority rule" or "minority rule" but of *minorities* rule. (p. 133)

American constitutional development has evolved a political system in which all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision. (p. 137 ff.)

[3] Cf. particularly R. B. Braithwaite, *Scientific Explanation* (Cambridge, 1955), Ch. VII, "The Choice Between Statistical Hypotheses," pp. 196–254.

Now these propositions may be true or false. With our present factual knowledge, a decision as to truth or falsity may even have to be held in abeyance. But the critical point is that the truth or falsity of propositions of this kind is independent of my preferences and ethical convictions, just as it is independent of any answer that I or Morgan might give to such questions as "What is a good man?".

Are these propositions important? Or are they only trivial? As to that, I had best let the reader decide.

COMMUNICATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

There is no reason why young men in writing reviews—I am assuming Mr. Riemer is a young man; and I am referring to his note on my *Alexander Hamilton in the American Tradition* in your September, 1957, issue—should be gratuitously vulgar. See his last sentence.

I wish to speak of something else, however; and Mr. Riemer's disregard or lack of understanding of my intention affords me the opportunity.

The burden upon political scientists today is mighty, indeed it is oppressive. Far more so than in the case of the students of the other behavioral sciences, they must know *all* the disciplines in this vast amalgam. They must be familiar not only with political organization and political behavior but as well with the means by which a society seeks to assure freedom, justice, equity, and economic and social stability. Particularly are these touchstones important in trying to comprehend the conduct of new and underdeveloped countries.

To these problems I addressed myself in my essay on Hamilton. I was seeking to show that Hamilton as statesman (read, *Political Scientist*) grasped clearly both ends and means in working for the survival of the new Republic—young, friendless, torn by internecine conflict, and poor.

In the last connection—which your reviewer disregards (except for his applauding James Madison who, he says, did not have to worry about "safeguarding investments")—the matters of fiscal integrity and sound monetary (or credit) policy are central. All one has to do currently is look at, *e.g.* India, Israel and Indonesia (new countries) to see how they are bedeviled by their inability to achieve fiscal and monetary stability (and "safeguard investments") as they grapple with the tasks of social reconstruction. Political scientists, I am saying, dare be cavalier about these problems at their peril.

I was not juxtaposing Hamilton against Jefferson; and I frankly disregarded Madison and Adams—Mr. Riemer's "Messrs In—Between"—because what they said or thought about fiscal and monetary policy was both inconsequential an dhopelessly wrong. Mr. Riemer need not take my word for it; I refer him to Bray Hammond's monumental *Banks and Politics in America* published since my book appeared. Mr. Hammond, concerning himself with the same important questions that I did, but on a much larger scale, is even harsher with Jefferson and the gentlemen "in-between" than I was.

In political terms, I can see no virtue—when things are at sixes and sevens—in lauding those who seek a middle position between right and wrong. Only too often—and this is where the real statesman emerges—there simply is no place for the politician who wants to compromise or temporize.

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TO THE EDITOR:

Dr. Rothbard makes a number of remarks in his comment (September issue, pp. 784–7) from which I must vigorously dissent.

He argues that groups espousing the conservative ideology have been uniformly unsuccessful in achieving their objectives, and he attributes this failure to the poverty of conservatism as an ideology. In the first place, ideology only influences, it does not determine the outcome of conflict between social groups. Other factors—economic, social, military—are of equal or greater importance. Nor, unfortunately, is it true, as he argues, that the more rational a political theory, the more likely it is to succeed. If this appealing variation of the philosophy of progress were valid, Greece and Rome might still be the centers of world civilization. Secondly, Dr. Rothbard's history is wrong in places. To be sure, on the Continent the medieval estates generally went down before the national monarchs and in our Civil War the South went down before the North. But what of the other conservative efforts? Was Hooker's defense against the Puritan dissent a failure? The Church of England is still the established church, and in 1689, after a century of strife between political and religious extremists, England returned to the path which Hooker had counseled. It was Hooker, and neither Hobbes nor Winstanley, whom Locke invoked and whose viewpoint prevailed in the end. Nor was the conservative reaction to the French Revolution a failure. For better or for worse, the ideological, social, and military forces of the Revolution could not crack the existing structure of society in England, Germany, and eastern Europe. The Congress of Vienna shaped the pattern of events on the Continent for a century to come. If Appomattox was a conservative defeat, by the same token Waterloo was a conservative victory.

Dr. Rothbard argues that conservatism is inherently irrational; it is "a blindly tropistic hostility to change" and "on Huntington's own account, conservatism is not a *rational* defense" of existing institutions. Here he defeats himself a few sentences further on, when he quotes my description of conservatism as "the rational defense of being against mind, of order against chaos. . . . " He assumes, but does not demonstrate, that "to oppose reason with reason" it is necessary to adopt "a contrasting radicalism," in short, that only radicalism is rational. He does not define what he means by "reason" and "rational," but any reasonable definition would either invalidate his assumption or force him into a circular argument. Evidently, there can be rational and irrational attacks on existing institutions and rational and irrational defenses of them. Were Hooker and Burke irrational? Has America produced any more rational political thinkers than John Adams and John C. Calhoun? It would take quite an effort to reduce the cold logic of *A Disquisition on Government* to an appeal to "blind instinct." Adherence to the *status quo* may indeed at times be "blind," as Dr. Rothbard suggests, but, at other times, it may stem from the rational decision that in the light of certain ideational values the maintenance of existing institutions is the most desirable of the

feasible social alternatives, and consequently, that conservatism is the most rational ideology to espouse. His argument that conservatism is necessarily irrational because it stresses the irrationality in man equates a theory of irrationalism with irrational theory.

He implies that a conservative who defends one set of existing institutions must defend all existing institutions: one who conserves American institutions must also conserve those in "Soviet Russia, South Africa, and Yemen." But this ignores the basic thesis of the article that conservatism is situational: it is the product of a specific pattern of social forces in a given situation. Though conservatism as a theory is the theoretical rationale of all existing institutions, a conservative as an individual only wishes to defend a specific set of institutions. He only espouses conservatism temporarily, *in that situation*, until the challenge to the institutions is victorious or dissipated. Nor is it a reflection on conservatism that it cannot be used to defend fascism. Fascism, as it existed in Germany and, to a lesser extent, in Italy, was a permanent attack upon stable institutions—radicalism of the most destructive and nihilistic sort.

Finally, Dr. Rothbard argues that liberalism is doomed if liberals today abandon their liberal ideology and espouse conservatism. I have touched above on the weaknesses in the historical analogy by which he attempts to support this conclusion, but another fallacy also exists in this argument. The problem of the United States today in relation to the rest of the world is that we are so absorbed in our own ideals that we find it impossible to believe that other nations cannot be absorbed in them also. However, the noncommitted portion of the world seems to be about as afraid of a crusading American liberalism as of a crusading Russian communism. The way to develop support among the neutrals then is to prove to them that unlike the Soviet Union we have no desire to make them over in our own image. Our problem, as Hartz says, is to transcend our own experience. It is to recognize that the liberal institutions which are appropriate for us have little relevance in Asia, the Mideast, the satellite countries, or even, in many respects, in western Europe; and that our proper aim, as liberals, is to insure that they are maintained here. As Dr. Rothbard recognizes and deplores, American liberals are tending toward conservatism. Such a development, however, is not a sign of doom but of maturity. John Dewey and Henry Wallace were appropriate for the 1930s; Reinhold Niebuhr and George Kennan are required in the 1950s.

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ARTICLE

SELECTED MATERIALS ON IRAQ AND JORDAN: THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL DOCUMENTATION

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The purpose of this paper is twofold: to discuss some essential and illustrative materials on the government, politics, and related topics of the Kingdom of Iraq and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; and to search out and identify certain patterns in the formation and development of these materials. Writings about Arab government and politics are undergoing rapid change, as a result of the transformations occurring in all aspects of the region, and there is reason to believe that new trends in documentation will affect future government itself as well as the study thereof.[1]

After passing four centuries under the recognized, if not always real, authority of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq and Jordan—with Palestine—came under the control and subsequent mandate of Great Britain as a result of World War I. Moving toward full membership in the family of nations by separate routes and according to different timetables, both Iraq and Jordan adopted some of the Western mechanics of government on the national level while retaining much of the Turkish system in local government and in general custom and procedure.[2] The resulting complex is both disturbing and disturbed. Moreover, current world power relationships are hardly conducive to the development of durable structures capable of independent existence in isolation from the consequences of international pressures manifested in the area. The privilege of solving its own problems independently has long been denied the Middle Eastern state and is not now seen on even the most distant horizon.

It should be recognized that most of the political literature on Arab Asian countries has been written by people who were themselves directly involved, whether as mandatory or colonial officials, or as citizens of the countries con-

[1] This study is limited, on the whole, to materials dealing specifically with Iraq and Jordan. Several general books on the Middle East devote separate sections to political development; Harold F. Alderfer cited many of these works in his Near East local government pages in Harold Zink, "Selected Materials for a Comparative Study of Local Government," this REVIEW, Vol. 50, pp. 1107–1133 (December, 1956).

[2] The pattern of Ottoman administration in the Arab provinces is deftly summarized in Ch. IV of Vol. I, "Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century," Part I of H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (Oxford, London, 1950). While this describes provincial administration in the eighteenth century, much of it is pertinent for the subsequent period. Relevant laws for the period of Ottoman administration can be found in the classic work by George Young, *Corps de droit Ottoman; Recueil des codes, lois, règlements, ordonnances et actes les plus importants du droit intérieur, et d'études sur le droit coutumier de l'Empire Ottoman* (7 vols., Oxford, London, 1905–06). See particularly Vol. I, ch. 3 on the Ministry of the Interior, which lists and comments on the laws regarding the administration of the provinces.

cerned. Since most of the modern history of the Arab states, including Iraq and Jordan, has involved some form of dependence upon the West—vehemently opposed by each of them at varying times—the writings have sometimes served more to justify respective political positions than to enlighten the scholarly world. Differences in interpretation result and what the Western writer calls "the granting of statehood," may often become, in the Arab publication, "emancipation."

Only recently have sufficient numbers of trained political scientists, Western or Eastern, turned their attention to the political problems of the area. Much of the literature, therefore, is mainly colorful when descriptive, and seldom statistical when analytical. Indeed, the chief limitation on research on government and politics within the area has been the paucity of pertinent reliable data. For the Western political scientist this has meant either attempting to produce the relevant data himself or using such data as are available with the hope that his conclusion will roughly approximate the truth. Fortunately, the years since World War II have shown a marked change in the Arab world, with governments beginning to feel the need for more adequate and reliable statistics, and with Arab government officials returning in increased numbers from American and European training where they have been exposed to different disciplines in the social sciences. Thus, while explicitness may not yet be championed as a virtue by all governments of the Arab World, it is no longer considered a vice; and if government administrators and political leaders may sometimes lack the perspective as well as the techniques which modern government demands, still the trained personnel are increasing and their influence is expanding in political and governmental thought and action.

IRAQ

Three characteristics have marked Iraq's political development: the close relationship to Great Britain during the formative period, the political and administrative trials of the young state between world wars, and the far-reaching changes in Iraq's body politic which recent and future expending of oil revenues entails. As one studies the country's government and politics, these characteristics appear as central themes in the pertinent literature.

Political Development Following World War I. While the roots of Iraq's government lie in the Ottoman period, much of the existing pattern is the work of British administrators who brought with them concepts of Western government (along lines applied in India) when they came up the Persian Gulf into Basrah, and from there behind the British army into Baghdad.[3] Sir Arnold T.

[3] Some insight into political and administrative conditions during the Turkish period can be obtained from Stephen H. Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq* (Oxford University Press, London, 1925). In 1954 the British Council Institute, Baghdad, exhibited a selection of *British Maps and Books on Iraq* published before 1920. The printed catalogue of books exhibited lists nearly 200 items. In 1956 the institute exhibited *A Selection of Books, Pamphlets, and Reports on Iraq by British Writers from the end of the Ottoman Administration to the Present Day*. The 372 items listed in the printed exhibition catalogue cover a wide range of subjects.

Wilson, deputy to the first Civil Commissioner and later himself Acting Civil Commissioner, writes in detail of the establishment of the new government and administration in his two thick volumes, *Loyalties: Mesopotamia, 1914–1917* (Oxford, London, 1930) and *Mesopotamia 1917–1920: A Clash of Loyalties* (Oxford, London, 1931). An account of Iraq's early organization that stands as a model of administrative reporting is Gertrude Bell's *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia* (Command 1061, HMSO, London, 1920); while the color and drama of the period as witnessed and narrated by Miss Bell, who was Oriental Secretary under Commissioners Cox, Wilson, and Dobbs, is contained in her letters edited by Florence, Lady Bell, *The Letters of Gertrude Lowthian Bell* (2 vols., Benn, London, 1927). Volume Two of the *Letters* contains articles by both Sir Percy Cox and his successor Sir Henry Dobbs discussing some of the problems each faced as High Commissioner. An extensive account of Cox's experience in Iraq is part of his biography by Philip Graves, *The Life of Sir Percy Cox* (Hutchinson, London, 1942). Other biographies and memoirs exist of military and civil officials of the time, many of which are listed in the British Council catalogue mentioned in footnote three.

Through the efforts of these early British officials, originally operating under the India Office, the framework of government was established and a system of published laws and decrees was organized. The *Official Gazette* which began publication in 1920 and its later Arabic counterpart, *Al-waqā'i' al-'Irāqiyyah* [Iraqi Chronicle], faithfully recorded all laws, ordinances, decrees, and *iradas* of the Government.[4] Even earlier, British officials produced the *Compilation of Proclamations, Notices, etc., still in Force or of Public Interest Relating to the Civil Administration and Inhabitants of Mesopotamia issued by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief from October 31st, 1914, to August 31st, 1919* (Government Press, Baghdad, 1919.) A succeeding volume, under a slightly different title, covered the period September 1, 1919, to September 30, 1920 (1920). The Ministry of Justice of the Iraq Government subsequently continued the publication in English as *Compilation of Proclamations, Laws and Regulations;* the first volume covered the period October 1, 1920, to December 31, 1923 (Government Press, Baghdad, 1924). Thereafter it continued on an annual, although delayed, basis until 1949 when it was discontinued.[5] Even before, however, the Ministry of Justice had initiated the publication in Arabic, *Majmū'at al-qawānīn wa'l-'anẓimah* [Collection of Laws and Regulations] (Government Press, Baghdad, 1921–), and this continues to be released regularly.

The Ministry of Finance in 1921 began preparing an annual public budget,

[4] Both these publications are currently released by the Publications Department of the Ministry of the Interior (Government Press, Baghdad). The English version has for some years been an official translation of the Arabic and is now about five years behind schedule. While the serial number of recent issues is for 1954, the laws appearing there were issued in the Arabic numbers for 1952.

[5] In 1934 another publication in English was the *Index of the Laws, Regulations, Proclamations, etc., relating to Iraq, October 31, 1914–December 31, 1933* (Government Press, Baghdad), but this also has not been continued in an English version. See below under "Legal and Political Documentation" for an account of current legal codification.

which is currently published for each fiscal year by the Ministry, after it has been approved by Parliament, as *Mizāniyyat ad-dawlah al-Irāqiyyah* [Budget of the State of Iraq] (Government Press, Baghdad). Once the pattern was set, publications were in most cases continuously forthcoming. On the other hand, a number of reports in English were issued during the early days of the military and civil administration by British political officers and departmental advisers. These reports fell off sharply in the late 1920's.

The [Proceedings] for both houses of Parliament have been recorded since these bodies first sat and are published by the Government Press. They are *Ad-dawrāt al-intikhābiyyah* for the Chamber of Deputies and *Maḥādir al-ijtimā' al-'ādī* for the Senate. Current issues are available, as are other reports on legislative action. Chief among those to be mentioned are the annual [Reports on the Actions of the Permanent Committees in Ordinary and Extra-ordinary Sessions] of the Senate, *Taqrīr 'an a'māl al-lijān ad-dā'imah fī'l-ijtimā' al-'i'tiyādī wa ghayr al-'i'tiyādī;* and of the Chamber of Deputies through its Director General, *Taqrīr al-mudīr al-'ām 'an a'mal al-lijān ad-dā'imah fī'l-ijtimā' al-'i'tiyādī wa ghayr al-'i'tiyādī* (Government Press, Baghdad). Additional separate reports are also published from time to time, particularly by the Chamber of Deputies, concerning fiscal matters.

Detailed information on the decade of direct British influence can be found in documents prepared separately by the mandatory power, such as the Colonial Office's annual *Report by His Majesty's Government . . . to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq* (10 vols., HMSO, London, 1922–33; titles vary slightly), covering the period from October, 1920, to October, 1932; the *Special Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Progress of Iraq during the period 1920–31* (HMSO, London, 1931); and the regular statements of the British representative to the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Tenth Session, 1926* through *Minutes of the Twenty-Second Session, 1932* (League of Nations Publications VI.A, Geneva).

Documents published by a mandatory power may not give all versions of the relationship between the two governments and of the sometimes painful process of attempting to apply Western political techniques in an Eastern milieu. One step in that process becomes vivid in the foreword by Sir Edwin M. Drower to C. A. Hooper's detailed and comprehensive, although now outdated, analysis of *The Constitutional Law of Iraq* (Mackenzie, Baghdad, 1928). Sir Edwin, who was then the Adviser to the Ministry of Justice (and co-author with Major H. W. Young of the Colonial Office of the first draft of the Organic Law), describes how

> the Iraq Constitution was drafted in English in 1922, translated into Arabic and submitted to a committee of Iraqi lawyers. From that time, until it was passed in July, 1924, the draft was submitted to a continual process of what is locally known as "improving the expressions." The result is that the authentic Arabic text is a shining example of that subordination of coherence to elegant language which is characteristic of the Arabic scholar.[6]

[6] Hooper, *op. cit.*, p. v.

The Ministry of Interior's *Majmū'at mudhakkirāt al-majlis at-ta'sīsī al-'Irāqi li-sanat 1924* [Collection, the Discussions of the Constituent Assembly of Iraq of the Year 1924] (2 vols., Dār as-Salām Press, Baghdad, 1925) gives the full account of the tense debate over ratification of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, as well as a somewhat apathetic discussion of the organic law.[7]

Despite the newness of such accessories of Western-type government as a two-house legislature and a cabinet-type executive, the Iraqis made political gains. Within a few years Quincy Wright in "The Government of Iraq," this REVIEW, Vol. 20, pp. 743–69 (November, 1926), could state that "the people have advanced further out of tutelage toward self-government than in any other mandated community."[8] Similarly, a prominent Iraqi military and political leader, Ja'far al-'Askari, related the achievements of his state in "Five Years' Progress in Iraq," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, Vol. 14, pp. 62–72 (January, 1927). The League of Nations' concern with constitutional and treaty guarantees to minorities, among other things, however, held off the admission of Iraq to membership as a sovereign state until 1932, when the mandatory power herself vouched for Iraq's readiness for self-government. The late Walter H. Ritsher, a professor at the American University of Beirut, discussed this development fully in "What Constitutes Readiness for Independence?" this REVIEW, Vol. 26, pp. 112–22 (March, 1932), as did Luther H. Evans, "The Emancipation of Iraq from the Mandate System," this REVIEW, Vol. 26, pp. 1024–49 (December, 1932).

Independence. The five years following Iraq's acceptance into the League produced a number of extensive political studies by Western writers. Almost immediately the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs produced a *Memorandum on Termination of the Mandatory Regime in 'Iraq* (The Institute, London, 1932). A few years later three somewhat more detailed, somewhat more analytical works appeared to provide exhaustive case treatment of Iraq up to independence. Ernest Main included much material on internal and political conditions in his *Iraq: From Mandate to Independence*

[7] The Constitution appears today in Arabic in the regular collections of Iraqi laws and in the League of Arab States, Institute of Arab Higher Studies, *Dasātīr al-Bilād al-'Arabiyyah* [Constitutions of the Arab Countries] (Institute of Arab Higher Studies, Arab League, Cairo, 1955), pp. 220–261. Helen Miller Davis (ed.), *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East* (rev. ed., Duke University Press, Durham, 1953), pp. 151–75, contains the regular English version of the Iraqi Constitution. Both the Arabic and English sources cited include the amendments of 1925 and 1943. The Davis collection also carries the Electoral Law of 1946 (superseded by the new law of 1952, see below), the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, and Iraq's Declaration on the Occasion of the Termination of the Mandate in 1932. More recent bilateral agreements involving Iraq—including the Military Assistance Agreement between the United States and Iraq of 1954, the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq of 1955 (Baghdad Pact), and the Special Agreement between Britain and Iraq of 1955—are contained in Vol. II of the collection of documents ed. J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (2 vols., Van Nostrand, New York, 1956).

[8] Wright, *Mandates Under the League of Nations* (U. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1930) describes the League system, as well as the organization for each mandate and its development.

(Allen and Unwin, London, 1935). Henry A. Foster wrote a careful appraisal of *The Making of Modern Iraq, a Product of World Forces* (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1935) in which chapters nine, ten, and eleven describe governmental, administrative, and political tutelage in terms meaningful to students of comparative Middle Eastern government. Philip W. Ireland wrote the last and perhaps definitive study in the trilogy. Like the other two books, Ireland's *Iraq: A Study in Political Development* (Jonathan Cape, London, 1937) examines the new state's advancement through the decisions of 1932, but his study is more sharply focussed on problems of government and administration. In addition the book's appendices and comprehensive bibliography provide one of the best collections of sources—particularly for the early official reports of the period.

Unfortunately the newly independent country had only a few years grace before a period of political instability ensued, which lasted well into the Second World War. Nevertheless, a few studies bore upon its varied problems. M. Fadhil Jamali, then Director-General of the Ministry of Education, published an advanced study in education, *The New Iraq: Its Problem of Bedouin Education* (Columbia U. Press, New York, 1934). His description of Iraqi tribes is unique and his bibliography is thorough. Some attempt, too, was made to attack the problem of land tenure. The resulting report, published in 1932 by Sir Ernest Dowson, is discussed more fully in the section on economic development below. Most of the other western-language writings of the time, however, reflect political turbulence. Some description of the uneasy internal condition of the country is given by a British official, Alan D. MacDonald, in his *Euphrates Exile* (Bell, London, 1936); while MacDonald's article, "The Political Developments in Iraq Leading up to the Rising in the Spring of 1935," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, Vol. 23, pp. 27–44 (January, 1936), is an incisive case report on the continuing power of the tribes. The alliance of the army with the left-wing Ahali group and their successful bid for power are described by Majid Khadduri in "The Coup d'Etat of 1936: A Study in Iraqi Politics," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 2, pp. 270–92 (July, 1948). An eye-witness account of the short-lived pro-Axis Rashid ʿĀli regime of 1941 is found in Part Four of Freya Stark, *The Arab Island: The Middle East, 1939–1943* (Knopf, New York, 1946); and the ʿĀli regime was also the subject of Laura Veccia Vaglieri, "Retroscana della politica estera ed interna dell' 'Iraq," *Oriente moderno*, Vol. 21, pp. 153–61 (April, 1941).

Transition Years. In terms of Arabic scholarship, the years preceding and during World War II were significant. On one side stand the works of more traditional writers such as the Lebanese, Amin Rihani, who wrote several works about Iraq in the course of a productive career. Rihani's biography, *Fayṣal al-Awwal* [King Faisal I] (Ṣādir Press, Beirut, 1934), and his literary study of Iraqi culture, *Qalb al-ʿIrāq* [The Heart of Iraq] (Ṣādir Press, Beirut, 1935), represent Arab political observation in a long-accepted style and exemplify an aspect of Arab culture and thought that the student of politics should not over-

look. But in addition to these traditional writings, the works of young, primarily Western-trained authors, such as Fadhil Jamali and Majid Khadduri, began to appear.

Professor Khadduri exemplifies the transition in writings on Iraq which began during the thirties: he follows Western patterns and methods of research, yet comprehends and is capable of describing domestic political attitudes and activities. One of his early works in Arabic, *Taḥarrur al-'Irāq min al-'Intidāb* [Emancipation of Iraq from the Mandate] (Al-'Ahd Press, Baghdad, 1935), illustrates the point. The same ligature is evident, also, in the writings of the young, Western-trained lawyers in Baghdad who began contributing to the lawyers' journal *Al-Qaḍa'* (founded originally by the Iraqi Bar Association as *Al-Ḥuqūq*), currently in its fourteenth year. Somewhat later, Professor Khadduri published a pamphlet in English on *The Government of Iraq* (New Publishers Iraq, Baghdad, 1944) and a study in Arabic containing similar information, *Niẓām al-Ḥukm fīl-'Irāq* [The System of Government in Iraq] (Ma'arif Press, Baghdad, 1946). In these he treats the constitution, the machinery of government, "government in action," and finally the constitutional amendment of 1943, which is also the subject of his article, "Has the Iraqi Constitution Become Less or More Rigid After the Second Amendment?" *The Judicial Review*, Vol. 4, pp. 46–55 (May, 1945).

Post-War Political Studies in Western Languages. The long concern of Khadduri with the political and constitutional problems of Iraq during the preceding period was preparatory to the completion of his major work, *Independent Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1932* (Oxford, London, 1951). When read together with Stephen H. Longrigg's *Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social and Economic History* (Oxford, London, 1953), the political scientist finds the modern history of Iraq treated in a manner unmatched in English for other countries of Arab Asia.

As recognized by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, which published both works, they are complementary in many respects. Khadduri, writing as a Western-trained political scientist, and Longrigg, writing historically from his long experience in the country first as an official (adviser) in the Government and later with the Iraq Petroleum Company, together provide most of the introductory information which the student of government requires. While Khadduri starts with 1932 and stresses political groups and their movements since independence, Longrigg goes into detail about the role of the British in tutoring the new government. Where Khadduri is more descriptive and analytical of present governmental institutions, Longrigg is more encyclopedic in treating contemporary developments. Both books contain work of caliber and provide, some fifteen years later, a partial link with the work of the 1930's. None the less, the field is not exhausted and an analysis of Iraq's political and administrative development in the 1950's, along the lines of Ireland's study twenty years earlier, remains to be done.

The educational process which has already produced Iraqi social scientists,

competent in both Arabic and Western languages, should contribute others in increasing numbers as university education expands in the country and as graduates seek further training abroad. Young doctoral candidates applying new techniques in the social sciences to their country's political questions can make some worthwhile contributions to the literature. Two recent publications can be cited. Mohamed Aziz, *An-nizām as-siyāsī fī'l-'Irāq* [The Political Regime in Iraq] (Al-Ma'arif Press, Baghdad, 1954) is a doctoral dissertation originally written in French for the Faculté de Droit of the University of Montpellier in 1949; while Fadl Hussein, *Mushkilah al-Mūṣul: Dirāsah fī'd-diblūmasiyyah al-'Irāqiyyah-al-Inkiliziyyah-at-Turkiyyah wa fī'r-ra'ī al-'ām* [The Mosul Problem: A Study in Iraqi-English-Turkish Diplomacy and in Public Opinion] (Ar-Rābiṭah Press, Baghdad, 1955) was originally written in English as a doctoral dissertation in history at the University of Indiana.

For the most part, recent journal publications are primarily commentaries upon events or chronicles of happenings with some attempt at analysis. "Aperçu sur l'évolution politique de l'Iraq," *Documentation française, Notes et études documentaires*, Nos. 1499–1502 (July, 1951), represents such chronicling and documentation. Commentary upon specific events and their significance appears in the form of informative articles like Henry S. Atyeo, "Reform through Riot," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Vol. 4, pp. 90–95 (March, 1953), a description of the 1953 election riots in Iraq; Amadeo Giannini, "L'accordo anglo-iracheno del 1955," *Oriente moderno*, Vol. 35, pp. 425–34 (October, 1955); and S. Yin'am, "Iraqi Politics—1948–1952," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Vol. 3, pp. 349–59 (December, 1952), a survey of Iraqi parties and factions and their political efforts. Finally, mention should be made of Pierre Rondot, an authority on political institutions in the Levant, who analyzed British administrative methods in "L'expérience britannique en Iraq, 1920–1955," *L'Afrique et l'Asie* (2e trimestre, 1955), pp. 2–26.

Post-War Political Studies in Arabic. Despite the publications of Khadduri and others, pertinent Arabic writings were scarce in the turbulent period from 1936 until the end of World War II. As political conditions became more stable after 1948 and as higher education expanded, Arabic publications increased in Iraq. The professors of the Baghdad College of Law, e.g., published an increasing number of their lectures in law and related subjects. Likewise, other Iraqi educators published materials which, taken together, form a "textbook core" of information about Iraq's immediate political history. Professor Zaki Saleh of the Higher Teachers' Training College in Baghdad emphasized constitutional development in *Muqaddimah fī dirāsat al-'Irāq al-mu'āṣir* [Introduction to the Study of Contemporary Iraq] (Ar-Rābiṭah Press, Baghdad, 1953). In his first section, Professor Saleh relates Iraq's political history chronologically from the British occupation to 1953; other sections deal with geography and with official records and research. Chapter six includes a brief description of the principal departments in each of the twelve Iraqi ministries.

At the request of the Division of Historical Studies of the Institute of Higher

Arab Studies of the League of Arab States, 'Abd ar-Raḥmān al-Bazzāz, then Dean of the Baghdad Law College, gave a series of lectures, *Muḥāḍarāt 'an al-'Irāq min al-Iḥtilāl ḥattā al-Istiqlāl* [Lectures on Iraq from Occupation to Independence], which the Institute subsequently published under that title (Dār Miṣr li't-Ṭibā'ah, Cairo, 1954).

One of the most prolific recorders of Iraqi political events is 'Abd ar-Razzaq al-Ḥasanī, who has seen much of the country's politics and administration through his service in the Cabinet secretariat. From among his several Arabic works, the political scientist may find two to be of particular value: *Tārīkh al-'Irāq as-siyāsī al-ḥadīth* [Political History of Modern Iraq] (3 vols., 'Irfan Press, Sidon, Lebanon, 1948) and *Tārīkh al-wizārāt al-'Irāqiyyah* [History of the Cabinets of Iraq] (8 vols., 'Irfan Press, Sidon, Lebanon, 1953–55). This latter publication gives promise of further volumes as cabinets change in Baghdad. Both works give a detailed and favorable account of the successive ministries and an account of events of political and economic importance. Al-Ḥasanī's recording of events is perhaps more valuable than his analysis.

Legal and Political Documentation Since World War II. In the field of legal codification, the *Official Gazette* and the annual collection of laws have been supplemented by another Ministry of Justice publication, *Al-majmū'ah addā'imah li'l-qawānīn wa'l-'anẓimah al-'Irāqiyyah al-muwaḥḥadah* [Cumulative Collection of the Unified Laws and Regulations of Iraq] (various presses, Baghdad, 1948–). As codified by Kāmil aṣ-Ṣāmarrā'ī, the laws and citations of laws appear under subject headings kept in alphabetical order. In 1946 the Ministry of Justice recognized the need for recording judicial precedents and established a Committee for the Publication of Court Decisions. For two years, 1946–48, the committee published a quarterly journal, *Al-majmū'ah ar-rasmiyyah li-muqarrarāt al-maḥākim* [Official Collection of Court Decisions] (Government Press, Baghdad). The publication ceased when the Ministry dissolved the committee.

Following the practice in most Arab countries, important laws and regulations are published by the Iraqi government under separate cover if demand is anticipated or realized. As examples, the current electoral law, *Marsūm intikhāb an-nuwwāb* [Decree for the Election of Deputies], Number 7 of 1952 (Government Press, Baghdad, 1952), appeared separately, as did *Majmū'at qawānīn al-khidmah al-jadīdah* [The Collection of New Civil Service Laws], Number 55 of 1956 (Dār al-Ma'rifah, Baghdad, 1956). The *Income Tax Law No. 85 of 1956* (Al-Aswāq at-tijāriyyah Press, Baghdad, 1957) appears separately in English. Collections of laws pertaining to a particular subject may sometimes be gathered into one volume. This is the case for the government service compendium prepared by Mr. aṣ-Ṣāmarrā'ī, *Qawānīn al-khidmah wa'l-milāk wa't-taqā'ud* (Laws of Service, Classification and Retirement] (2nd ed., Al-Ma'ārif Press, Baghdad, 1953). Other collections of kindred laws and regulations have been published in Baghdad. The study there of administrative law according to the French pattern, as well as the British, has prompted close adherence to the

legal text; thus authoritative Iraqi works on administration may also be termed works in administrative law. The accepted book by Husayn ar-Raḥḥāl and 'Abd al-Majīd Kammūnah, *Al-idārah al-markaziyyah wa'l-idārah al-maḥalliyyah fi'l-'Irāq* [Central Administration and Local Administration in Iraq] ('Abd al-Karīm Zāhid Press, Baghdad, 1953), is essentially a treatment of administrative law as a basis for administrative action and procedure. A distinction between administrative operations and administrative law is not easily conceived in Iraqi theory or practice.

The study of Iraq's administration and government organization may be supplemented by two non-government publications. Ahmed Sousa, *Atlas of Iraq Showing Administrative Boundaries, Areas and Population* (Surveys Press, Baghdad, 1953) contains detailed maps of each of the provinces as well as maps of the administrative divisions of Baghdad City. Of a different nature, *Iraqi Year Book, 1953*, ed. Memdouh Zeki (The Times Press, Baghdad, 1953), contains a wealth of political as well as economic information, particularly for the previous year. The yearbook has not appeared since 1953, unfortunately, but occasional supplements to the English-language daily, *Iraq Times*, afford similar economic information.

Social and Economic Affairs. While they are tangential, in some respects, to the study of Iraq's government and politics, publications focussing on economic and social development cannot be overlooked by the political scientist, even as materials on governmental planning and administration must be considered by writers concerned primarily with Iraq's development. As in most underdeveloped countries, the problems are closely intertwined and there can be no clear and arbitrary separation of the materials to fit Western academic disciplines. Likewise, since so much of Iraq's energy and endeavor go into her economic and social improvement programs, government and those interested in government must devote much attention to these objectives and to plans for their achievement.

The Question of Minorities. One of the first major crises of the newly independent state resulted from the military action taken by Iraqi troops against the Assyrians, a Nestorian Christian community, in northern Iraq in 1933. Much has been written about this unfortunate affair, which brought a sharp reduction in the international prestige of the young government. Perhaps one of the most objective accounts of the affair and the events leading up to it is R. S. Stafford, *The Tragedy of the Assyrians* (Allen and Unwin, London, 1935).

Since World War II the issue of minority groups such as the Assyrians and their role in Iraqi as well as international politics has impelled a number of writings. Albert H. Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World* (Oxford University Press, London, 1947) contains a chapter on Iraq, noting that minorities form about a quarter of Iraq's population and that the largest number of these differ more in race and language than in religion. The estimated 800,000 or more Kurds in Iraq loom large as such a group, which is Arabic neither in language nor custom but adheres to the tenets of Islam. The 3,000,000 or so Kurdish

people, some of whom live in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Russia, have aspired to their own national independence from time to time and constitute a special type of problem for their host states. Colonel W. G. Elphinston in "The Kurdish Question," *International Affairs*, Vol. 22, pp. 91–103 (January, 1946), holds that a centralized Kurdish autonomy is hardly practicable but that assimilation is improbable and Kurdish traditions must be respected. He has written further on the subject in "Kurds and the Kurdish Question," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, Vol. 35, pp. 38–50 (January, 1948). Other careful treatments of the Kurdish question include Pierre Rondot, "Les revendications nationales kurdes (1943–1949)," *Cahiers de l'orient contemporain*, Vol. 18, pp. 65–71 (1949), and Basile Nikitine, *Les kurdes: étude sociologique et historique* (Librarie Klinksieck, Paris, 1956). The latter is extensive and includes a large bibliography, citing works in both Western and Oriental languages. One appended item of some interest is a map prepared by the Kurdish nationalists for the San Francisco United Nations Conference in 1945. Another recent and extensive study is Fredrik Barth, *Principles of Social Organization in Southern Kurdistan* (Brødrene Jorgensen Boktrykkeri, Oslo, 1953), which deals with the tribal organization of the two tribes in the Iraqi liwas of Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya. Other recent articles are W.L.E. [*sic*], "Iraqi Kurdistan, a Little-Known Region," *The World Today*, Vol. 12, pp. 417–32 (October, 1956) and C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds of Iraq," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 11, pp. 52–62 (Winter, 1957). On his last page Mr. Edmonds states, "Whatever the mistakes and shortcomings of the past, Iraq is the one country where the existence of the Kurds as such has come to be officially recognized." Indeed, Kurdish officials and administrators have played no small role in recent Iraqi development.

Economics in Government and Politics. Among early approaches to specific economic and legal problems, Sir Ernest Dowson, *An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions* (Garden City Press, Letchworth, England, 1932) was unique. The specific question here was who owned what land; and this British official's report led to the establishment of a Settlement Department in Iraq's Ministry of Finance, and an attempt to determine boundaries and titles. Early public fiscal matters came under the scrutiny of Kurt Grunewald, *The Government Finances of the Mandated Territories in the Near East* (Palestine Economic Society, Tel Aviv, 1932), pp. 34–46; he noted at that time the increasing yield of oil revenue and forecast Iraq's economic independence. A later economic study, Sa'id Himadeh, *An-Niẓām al-Iqtiṣādī fī'l-'Irāq* [The Economic Organization of Iraq] (American Press, Beirut, 1938), offers some political analysis as well and stands as a contribution in Arabic to the study of Iraq before World War II.

There is a considerable difference between the economy of those earlier years and that of the years after 1949. In that year oil revenue became a dominant factor in the government income of Iraq, and today's returns as well as current estimates show that her oil revenue is far greater than her receipts from all other

sources. As post-war politics differs markedly from that of earlier years, so the later economics is built upon a new base.

Despite a disagreement on the beneficence of companies extracting oil from the region, Stephen H. Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development* (Oxford, London, 1954) and Benjamin Shwadran, *Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers* (Praeger, New York, 1955) contain the basic information necessary to understanding the national and international oil development and politics of the Middle East. Oil operations in Iraq are treated in these general works. The operations, together with their economic and political by-products, are the subject of a special study by Shwadran, "The Oil of Iraq," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Vol. 3, pp. 360–80 (December, 1952). The oil operations are important, of course, because they provide the means for long-term economic development. By a 1952 agreement, the Western-owned and British-managed Iraq Petroleum Company and its subsidiaries pump the oil from Iraq and share equally with her in the profits. By law Iraq sets aside seventy per cent of her returns for use in development of the country and places responsibility for planning and executing that development in the Development Board and the Ministry of Development.

Since the first years of British occupation, independent or semi-independent economic agencies have been part of Iraq's governmental organization. The Development Board dwarfs all of them in importance, size, and significance, although in 1953 the Board's functions were limited when the newly-established Ministry of Development incorporated the Board's administrative responsibility. While most of the publications put out by the Board and the Ministry are in Arabic, many are in English. The official *Compilation of Laws Concerning the Development Board, revised* (Government Press, Baghdad, 1952) gives the framework of the organization, while the Board's *Annual Reports* (Government Press, Baghdad, 1952–) tell of developments in each financial year. Special reports such as *Major Irrigation Projects, 1955* (Al-'Ani Press, Baghdad, 1955) can be expected from time to time.

A critical article by Stanley John Habermann, "The Iraq Development Board: Administration and Program," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 9, pp. 179–86 (Spring, 1955), discusses the need for administrative reform. A less critical account in Arabic is given by a former Minister of Finance, Abdul-Karim al-Uzri, "Majlis al-i'mār—a'māluhu wa mashru'ātuhu" [The Development Board, Its Activities and Its Projects] *Al-abḥāth*, Vol. 8, pp. 26–29 (March, 1955). The most extensive evaluation yet to appear in either language is Lord Salter, *The Development of Iraq: A Plan of Action* (Iraq Development Board, 1955). This report, prepared on behalf of the Board by Britain's distinguished economist and adviser to the Ministry of Development, is designed to give advice on the

> . . . timing and balance of the different projects of the Development Board; their coordination both with each other and with the action of other authorities; the impact of each upon the others and upon the general economy of Iraq; and such modification in the

administrative machinery both of the Board and the Departments of the Government as is needed to insure their successful execution.[9]

Whether or not Lord Salter accomplishes all of these things in his 248 pages remains to be seen, but the report deserves careful reading as the most thorough account of the Board's objectives and administrative problems to date.

Individual experts or teams of scholars from outside organizations offering economic and technical assistance have made many reports. The Department of Economic Affairs of the United Nations prepared its *Public Finance Information Papers: Iraq* (United Nations, New York, 1951) as a summary of the government's financial history from 1938, with an evaluation of the impact of World War II inflation on Baghdad's fiscal administration. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development sponsored a survey committee, whose study, *The Economic Development of Iraq* (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1952), provides one of the more concise collections of data and recommendations, now slightly outdated. A more recent analysis of one aspect of financial policy is Carl Iversen, *Monetary Policy in Iraq* (Published for the National Bank of Iraq by Ejnar Munksgaard Publishers, Copenhagen, 1954). An even later study of Iraq's budget appears in United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, *Quarterly Bulletin of Economic Development Number 13: Government Budgets of Middle East Countries* (mimeo., UNRWA, Beirut, April, 1956), pp. 45–98.

Under the auspices of the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, Arnljot Engh completed a considerable analysis of *Municipal Administration and Taxation and Finance in Iraq* (United Nations, New York, 1956); many of his recommendations have been adopted. Another UNTAA analyst, François Ferreol, studied *The Administration of the Post Office in Iraq* (New York, United Nations, 1956).

In the course of their activities in Iraq the technical assistants and advisers brought in by the United States International Cooperation Administration have prepared reports and recommendations for segments of government and administration. Among these reports are Richard W. Bonnevalle, *Report and Recommendations Relating to the Budgetary and Accounting Systems of the Government of Iraq* (mimeo., United States Operations Mission to Iraq, Baghdad, 1954), Orba F. Traylor, *Income Tax Revision in Iraq—1955* (mimeo., United States Operations Mission to Iraq, Baghdad, 1955), and William Brownrigg, *The Requirements for an Effective Civil Service for the Government of Iraq* (mimeo., United States Operations Mission to Iraq, Baghdad, 1954). As a member of the United States Information Service, Howard E. Stingle completed *A Survey of the Official Printing Office of the Government of Iraq* (United States Information Service Regional Service Center, Beirut, 1957). Inasmuch as the government press is the source of most Iraqi documentation, the descriptive passages of the report are of interest to the political scientist.

[9] Salter, *op. cit.*, preface.

The number of the reports and the similarity of their subject matter may result in failure to consider the carefully prepared recommendations and may also cause duplication of effort by uncoordinated experts. Lord Salter criticizes the lack of adequate registry or records systems which could prevent misplacement or duplication.[10] In search of consensus where it exists, Joseph R. Starr, Public Administration Adviser in the United States Operations Mission, Baghdad, is preparing an article on "Administrative Problems in Iraq as Seen by Foreign Observers."

On its own behalf the Government of Iraq is developing and maintaining valuable accumulations of statistical data. Extensive population data appear in the *Census of Iraq, 1947* (3 vols., Government Press, Baghdad, 1954), compiled in both Arabic and English, by the Directorate General of Census in the Ministry of Social Affairs. The census results were treated by Doris G. Adams in "Current Population Trends in Iraq," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 10, pp. 151–65 (Spring, 1956). M. S. Hasan is now completing a study of the growth of Iraq's population in recent decades, scheduled to appear soon in the new British periodical *Universities and Left Review*. Another census is now under way. Early information about it may be forthcoming in the *Monthly Statistical Bulletin*, which the Directorate General of Census has published in Arabic since 1955.

Economic data appear in the *Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics* and in the *Annual Statistical Abstract*, both published by the Principal Bureau of Statistics in the Ministry of Economics.[11] Compiled, like the census, in both Arabic and English, these publications contain information on population, public health, agriculture, economics, finance, and transportation.

It is indeed apparent that for Iraq the statistics, like the economics, are considerable and that the fundamental need in pertinent literature seems to be for interpretative studies which evaluate the effect of recent economic and demographic changes upon the political structure of this once isolated country. Doreen Warriner's new *Land Reform and Development in the Middle East, A Study of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1957) sets a pattern for such exposition. Pages 113–83 evaluate the effect of "Money in Iraq" as a cause of social and political development. However, Western scholars have not yet made full use of available materials, which would support more intensive analyses than those that appear in general works or as monographs on Middle Eastern subjects. Nor have writings by Arab scholars yet filled the breach, although there are indications as noted that the Arab writers are moving quickly to meet the need.

JORDAN

A few Arab and British officials created the administrative and governmental structure which became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The parallel pur-

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

[11] On duplication of statistical functions see John Murray, *A Report on Statistical Organisation in the Government of the Kingdom of Iraq: Including a Scheme for a Centralised Statistical Bureau* (Government Press, Baghdad, 1948).

poses of Abdullah, who wanted a kingdom, and Great Britain, who wanted an administration for the area east of the Jordan River, led to the establishment under British mandate of the small non-viable state in 1923, in an area which had little previous experience with law and order, much less with government.

Assisted by British advisers and British financial aid, the administration centering in Amman gradually brought order to the country and succeeded in creating some of the forms, at least, of Western government. Thus, legislative councils, electoral systems, and a constitutional monarchy came into formal existence in this region, where illiteracy remained the rule and public opinion was unsullied by modern means of communication.

Through World War II, the task of government lay largely in establishing a central government for the inhabitants and in obtaining the reluctant support and participation of a wary and suspicious citizenry. With the outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities in 1948, the role of the government altered drastically, as did the number, nature, and interest of its citizens. Not only were many square miles of formerly Palestinian territory subsequently brought under Jordanian control, but the population more than trebled. Moreover the newly acquired Palestinian citizens, although often destitute, had previously been accustomed to a more developed, more responsive administrative apparatus than that currently in use in Amman. Hence, within a few years Jordan changed from a state in which law and order were primordial into a state with a considerable welfare problem and with a population demanding governmental services never before required nor expected from Amman. The government and politics of Jordan after 1948 break sharply with the past, and the literature shows equal contrasts.

Except for the field of law, scholarly discussion and comment on government and politics within Jordan today have been limited, as might be expected in a young country which has neither a national university nor a previous deep tradition of scholarship. Documented work by Arab writers is more apt to be found in books about Arab Asia generally than in writings about a country which many of them feel never should have existed separately.[12] At the present time the ultimate fate of Jordan hangs in the balance. Whether the state can long exist independently remains to be seen.

Literature on Government and Politics prior to 1948. As in Iraq, the British advisers to the Amirate of Transjordan early began to establish records and procedures. In 1924 the government first published *Al-jarīdah ar-rasmiyyah li-'imārat Sharq al-Urdun* [The Official Gazette of the Amirate of Transjordan]. The journal has appeared steadily since that time, although its title changed in the period of Jordanian development after 1946.[13] In English and therefore more easily used by Western researchers is the collection of laws

[12] A recent book by a Jordanian civil servant, Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh, *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism* (Cornell U. Press, Ithaca, 1956), may serve as an example of a scholarly work on a general Arab topic, containing some brief references to constitutional development within the Jordanian state.

[13] In April 1946 the Amirate was proclaimed the "Kingdom" of Transjordan; while following the Palestine conflict the state became "The Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan" and was internationally accepted as such in 1949.

assembled by Claud Ramsey Wilmot Seton (together with Tawfiq Bey Sinnū, then President of the Court of Appeal) *Legislation of Transjordan, 1918–1939* (7 vols., William Clowes and Sons, London, 1931–39). This compendium includes laws, regulations, and public notices, as well as such significant items as the Organic Law of 1928.

Conforming to League of Nations requests, the Colonial Office submitted to the Permanent Mandates Commission *His Britannic Majesty's Report of the Administration under Mandate of Palestine and Transjordan for the Year 1924* (League of Nations, Geneva, 1925) and thereafter submitted annual reports until 1938 under the same title. Except in the first report, the administrations of Palestine and Transjordan are treated separately. These documents afford material for a careful study of the state's early governmental and administrative operation.

Following the Treaty of 1928 with Great Britain (*Parliamentary Papers, 1930*, Treaty Series No. 7, Command 3488), the Organic Law of the same year was promulgated.[14] Commentaries on the creation of governmental forms in Transjordan and on the application of concepts of rights and constitutional limitations appeared in Hans Kohn, "Die Staats- und Verfassungsrechtliche Entwicklung des Emirats Transjordanien," *Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts*, Vol. 16, pp. 238–67 (1929); and in Amadeo Giannini, "La costituzione della Transgiordania," *Oriente moderno*, Vol. 11, pp. 117–31 (March, 1931). While some scholarly attention was given to Jordanian constitutional development by Europeans, within the area itself there was too little political consciousness on the one hand and too much preoccupation with the immediate tasks of governing on the other to produce works of equal reflection and analysis.

More typical of literature on Jordan in this period were the memoirs and biographies of some of the leading figures in the new state. Among these, particularly, were King Abdullah, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick G. Peake, and his successor in the Arab Legion, General (later Sir) John Bagot Glubb.

From 1922 until his assassination in 1951 Abdullah Ibn al-Hussein ruled Jordan to the apparent satisfaction of the British and Bedouin alike, although his plans for an enlarged kingdom were viewed with suspicion and alarm in neighboring countries. King Abdullah left two books, *Mudhakkarātī* [My Memoirs] (Bayt al-maqdis Press, Jerusalem, 1945) and *At-takmilah* [The Completion] (At-tijārah Press, Jerusalem, 1951). The first appeared in translation, edited and expurgated by Philip R. Graves, as *Memoirs of King Abdullah* (Jonathan Cape, London, 1950) and the second in a faithful translation by Harold W. Glidden entitled *My Memoirs Completed* (American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, 1954). Chapters seventeen through twenty of the *Memoirs* contain descriptions of incidents and royal reactions related to government in early Jordan; while *The Completion* throws even more light on Abdullah's rela-

[14] The Organic Law of 1928 appears, along with the Anglo-Jordanian treaties of 1928 and 1946, in the Transjordan section of Helen Miller Davis, *op. cit.*, 1947 ed.; while the Constitution of 1946 and the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948 appear in the revised ed. (1953) of the Davis collection.

tionships with the Arab League and with his neighbors during the period of the Palestine conflict.

The strength of Abdullah's regime and the source of law and order in early Jordan was the Arab Legion, supported and trained by the British and commanded from its inception until 1956 by two able men, the "last of the Pashas."[15] At the end of his service with T. E. Lawrence and the Arab Army, Frederick G. Peake was assigned to Jordan where he formed the Legion and eventually succeeded in preventing raids between the tribes and against the settled areas and in bringing peace along the Transjordanian frontiers. Possessing some facility in the Arab language, Peake Pasha wrote *Tarīkh Sharqī al-Urdun wa qabā'iluhā* [A History of Transjordan and Its Tribes] (2 vols., Dār al-'Aytām al-Islāmiyyah aṣ-Ṣinā'iyyah Press, Jerusalem, 1935). The first volume sketches the history of the area occupied by Transjordan through World War I and the formation of the Amirate, while volume two is a history and genealogy of Jordanian tribes, as well as of the Circassians, Shishans, and Turkomans in the area. Unfortunately Peake's book has never been translated, although his collaborator, Baha' ud-din Touqan, rewrote much of the material into *A Short History of Transjordan* (Luzac, London, 1945). Peake Pasha's reminiscences about the area, interspersed with a few observations on government and political change, were the basis of his lecture on "Transjordan" published in the *Royal Central Asian Journal*, Vol. 26, pp. 375–96 (July, 1939). In writing Peake's biography, *Arab Command: The Biography of Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Peake Pasha* (Hutchinson, London, 1942), Major Claude S. Jarvis, himself a former administrator in the neighboring Sinai, perforce describes, with insight and no little humor, Transjordan's formative years from 1918 to 1939.

General Sir John Bagot Glubb, successor to Peake as commander of the Arab Legion, wrote *The Story of the Arab Legion* (Hodder, London, 1948), describing his successful methods of changing the raiding habits of the desert tribes, the frontier difficulties with the French in Syria and with the Saudi Arabians, and the dramatic military exploit of the Legion when it guided British forces in their march on Iraq in 1941. Glubb's interest in the way of life of the Bedouin is seen in his earlier article, "The Economic Situation of the Trans-Jordan Tribes," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, Vol. 25, pp. 448–59 (July, 1938), an answer to Eliahu Epstein's pessimistic "The Bedouin of Transjordan: Their Social and Economic Problems," *ibid.*, Vol. 25, pp. 228–36 (April, 1938). Glubb's later article, "Transjordan and the War," *ibid.*, Vol. 32, pp. 24–33 (January, 1945), praised the country's political advancement under Abdullah without offering major criticisms. The story of Glubb Pasha's dismissal by young King Hussein in 1956 is included in Godfrey Lias's recent *Glubb's Legion* (Evans Brothers, London, 1956).

Finally, Sir Alex Seath Kirkbride, for thirty years a British official in Jordan —British Resident from 1939–46 and Minister from 1946–51—recounts a number of his experiences and observations, during much of this period, in a

[15] See the short account of the institution in Gerald de Gaury, "The End of Pashadom," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, Vol. 43, pp. 243–47 (July–October, 1956).

recently published book, *A Crackle of Thorns* (Murray, London, 1956). By design this is a light book, full of interest and color, but there is reason to believe that Kirkbride has more to tell.

Two publications of the 1930's by British officials give some information on the administration of Transjordan, as well as on that of Palestine. Sir Harry Luke and Edward Keith-Roach edited *The Handbook of Palestine and Transjordan* (3rd ed., Macmillan, London, 1934), part-way between a guide book and a yearbook. Part Two is devoted to Transjordan, and the editors note that the materials which pertain to Jordanian government were revised by Kirkbride. In Norman Bentwich, *England in Palestine* (Kegan Paul, London, 1932), chapter seven covers "The Autonomy of Transjordan, 1921–1925."

On the whole, comparing the materials cited above with literature on Iraq of a similar or earlier period reveals the relative dearth of political accounts about Jordan. There is no careful, detailed study to compare with the works of Foster, Main, and Ireland, for example. This lack may well reflect the absence of general Western concern for the smaller, dependent Amirate of Transjordan, while in contrast the drama of Iraq's admission to statehood and to the League of Nations (the only Arab state to free itself of mandate status in the interwar period) afforded an interesting case-study.

Nevertheless, two articles written by I. Chizik on political parties in the area in the early thirties, while simple in their analysis of emerging political forces, mark the beginning of a more precise political literature: "The Political Parties in Palestine," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, Vol. 21, pp. 94–128 (January, 1934), treats separately the Jewish and Arab Palestinian parties, of which the latter provided the basis for some of the current parties in Jordan; "The Political Parties in Trans-Jordania," *ibid.*, Vol. 22, pp. 96–99 (April, 1935), describes the Arab Independence factions and related groups across the Jordan.

Later Developments in Jordanian Literature. Since World War II, three interrelated factors have broken up the old pattern of the state: the achievement of Jordanian independence, together with a greater measure of responsible constitutional government; the worsening of a dire economic situation; and the annexation of part of Jerusalem and surrounding territory, with the incorporation of a large Palestinian Arab population, much of it refugee and politically sensitive. A summary of the changes brought about in the critical transitional years is given by Esmond Wright, "Abdullah's Jordan: 1947–1951," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 5, pp. 439–60 (Autumn, 1951).

Two treaties and two constitutions in rapid succession mark the altering of Jordan's political status and structure following World War II. The short-lived Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1946 (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1946, Treaty Series No. 32, Command 6916) officially recognized Transjordan as an independent state and gave Britain a twenty-five year preferential alliance. The Constitution of that same year provided the framework and the limitations essential to a parliamentary government under a strong monarch. The 1946 treaty was replaced two years later in line with a modified British policy in other Arab states

and was signed in Amman in 1948 (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1948, Treaty Series No. 26, Command 7404).[16]

The fourth document, the Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, promulgated in 1952, makes the cabinet responsible to the elected lower house of parliament (rather than to the King alone as had been the case since 1939), specifies individual rights, and limits the powers of the King. It appears in Arabic in *Al-jarīdah ar-rasmiyyah* [The Official Gazette], No. 1093, pp. 3–15 (January 8, 1952), and has been published as a separate document in Arabic as well as in English translation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jordan. Another English translation appeared in *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 6, pp. 228–38 (Spring, 1952). The Constitution was amended in 1954 and again in 1955. The amendments appear in *Al-jarīdah ar-rasmiyyah*, No. 1179 (1954) and No. 1243 (1955). Mimeographed copies of the Constitution and amendments in English translation are available from the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut.

Commentary on the new constitution is offered in two publications by Amadeo Giannini: "Nuove costituzioni di stati arabi (Siria, Libia, Giordania)," *Oriente moderno*, Vol. 32, pp. 273–84 (November–December, 1952), and *Nuove costituzioni di stati del vicino oriente e dell' Africa* (A. Giuffre, Milan, 1954). Another article is that written by E. Theodore Mogannam, former legal adviser to the Jordanian Ministry of Justice, "Developments in the Legal System of Jordan," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 6, pp. 194–206 (Spring, 1952). Mogannam discusses changes brought about by the 1952 Constitution. However his article centers mainly on the operation of the laws and courts and on the legal coordination made necessary by the inclusion of the former Palestinian territory, which had been operating under different codes from those followed in Jordan.

As it appears today, *Al-jarīdah ar-rasmiyyah* includes laws and decisions, deliberations of the Chamber of Deputies, the Council of Notables, and the General Assembly (both houses assembled together), and commercial regulations. Jordan's annual budget appears in the Gazette and also as a separate publication. The first number of the Gazette for 1956 contains a history of Jordanian parliamentary development and short biographies of the members. Parliamentary proceedings have been kept (in Arabic only) since 1928, but these early records are scarce. According to N. R. Rafie, Secretary of the General Assembly, only the original, in longhand, exists for the first session. It is found in the General Assembly library.

Extending the compilation of C. R. W. Seton, three Jordanian officials in the Ministry of Justice and the Cabinet Secretariat systematized and assembled *Majmū'at al-qawānīn wa'l-'anẓimah* [Collection of Laws and Regulations] (3 vols., Al-istiqlāl al-'Arabi Press, Amman, 1946). This collection covered laws and regulations published from 1918 through 1946. The Lawyers' Association

[16] The 1948 treaty was abrogated following British-Jordanian talks in Amman in March, 1957.

of Jordan is currently sponsoring the preparation of a collection of laws and regulations, which includes those effective in 1956. Volume One is now available from the Association under the title, *Majmū'at al-qawānīn wa'l-'anẓimah; aṣ-ṣādirah wa'n-nāfidah al-maf'ūl [bihā] li ghāyat sanat 1956 fi al-Mamlakah al-Urduniyyah al-Hāshimiyyah.* [Collection of Laws and Regulations, Published and Effective, in force until the end of 1956] (Lawyers' Association, Amman, 1957.) An index to the codes and cases has been begun by Ḥannā Dawūd aṣ-Ṣa', *Dalīl al-qawānīn wa's-sawābiq al-qaḍā'iyyah al-Urduniyyah* [Guide to the Laws and Judicial Precedents of Jordan] (Dār al-'Aytām al-Islāmiyyah aṣ-Ṣinā'iyyah Press, Jerusalem, 1953); only the first volume has appeared. The Lawyers' Association is also responsible for publishing the monthly journal, *Niqābat al-muḥāmīn* [The Lawyers' Association], 1953– . The journal summarizes legal matters, including high court cases, but is apparently devoid of articles and commentary such as appear in the Iraqi law journal.

Two recent articles in Arabic on Jordanian administration may mark new trends of thought and interest in problems of government other than those primarily legal. Mohammad Adeeb al-Amary, head of the newly-created civil service bureau, describes the strong merit system now effective in Jordan in "Nushu' dīwān al-muwazzafīn fī'l-Urdan wa 'amāluhu" [Evolution of the Jordanian Civil Service Bureau and Its Achievements], scheduled to appear in *Al-Abḥāth*, Vol. 10 (June, 1957). Mūsa Nāsir, former minister of finance, wrote previously on another problem common through much of the region: in "Mashākil al-idārah wa't-tadrīb fī'l-manāṭiq ar-rīfiyyah" [Problems of Administration and Training in the Settled Rural Zones], *ibid.*, Vol. 4, pp. 167–86 (June, 1951), he traced the development of a high degree of centralization in government in formerly Turkish-held territory and particularly in Palestine and Jordan. He suggested decentralization through local councils with local budgets supported by lightly restricted grants from central government.

While Western attention has been focussed mainly upon the pressing economic and social problems facing the Jordanian state—and more recently upon its position in international affairs—some scholarly efforts have been directed toward political and administrative questions as well. One attempt to assess the factors contributing to the political growth of the state is Edwin R. Van Deusen, "The Development of Democratic Institutions in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," (Unpub. M.A. Thesis, American University of Beirut, 1955). There have been few recent works on Jordanian parties *per se* except for Walter Z. Laqueur (W.Z.L.), "Communism in Jordan," *The World Today*, Vol. 12, pp. 109–19 (March, 1956), a careful tracing of the threads of left-wing developments since 1935. Finally, as one of the first volumes of its Country Survey Series, the Human Relations Area Files has recently published a volume on *Jordan*, ed. Raphael Patai, containing contributions from a number of specialists on the area (Human Relations Area Files, New Haven, 1957). The volume contains several chapters relating specifically to problems of government and political behavior. Also listed to appear in 1957 is an annotated bibliography of Syria-Jordan-Lebanon, prepared by Human Relations Area Files.

Population Problems Since 1950. The formal annexation of Palestinian territory on April 24, 1950, increased the magnitude of Jordan's government difficulties without providing an equivalent means of solving them. In particular there was little economic means of coping with the Arab refugees, several hundred thousand of whom became Jordanian residents if not Jordanian subjects. At this point the "problem of Palestine" acquired a permanent predominance in Jordanian governmental and political activity, which it retains today, because more than half of the Kingdom's people reside west of the Jordan River, and most of these are refugees.

Miss Sybilla G. Thicknesse wrote *Arab Refugees: A Survey of Resettlement Possibilities* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1949) as an early examination of the Arab Palestinian's plight, particularly in the Jordan-held lands. Her later reactions appeared in "The Arab Refugees: Their Position Today," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, Vol. 38, pp. 29–30 (January, 1951). At that time, the status of the refugees began to be reported officially in the *Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East* (United Nations, General Assembly, New York, 1952–). The first report covered the period 1 July, 1951, to 30 June, 1952; reports have appeared annually thereafter. The number of articles sympathetic to the refugees includes Winifred A. Coate, "The Condition of Arab Refugees in Jordan," *International Affairs*, Vol. 29, pp. 449–56 (October, 1953), and Elizabeth Monroe, "The Arab-Israel Frontier," *International Affairs*, Vol. 29, pp. 439–48 (October, 1953). Most interesting to social scientists is Fred C. Bruhns's investigation, "A Study of Arab Refugee Attitudes," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 9, pp. 130–38 (Spring, 1955), which documents unanimous refugee condemnation of the West for their plight. Perhaps the latest official report in the United States is the short report of the Special Study mission to the Near East, *The Arab Refugees and Other Problems in the Near East: Report Pursuant to House Resolution 113, February 25, 1954* (83rd Congress, 2nd Session, House Report No. 1250, 1954).

While these are but a few of the materials available on various facets of the current question of the status and future of Palestinian Arabs, of whom the greater number are in Jordan, a perusal of the writings reveals dire economic and social distress confronting the Kingdom. Indeed, the weight of the problem has contributed in great part to the increased publication in Jordan of studies devoted to economics, population, and statistics.

Economic data related to Jordanian politics. James Baster in "The Economic Problems of Jordan," *International Affairs*, Vol. 31, pp. 26–35 (January, 1955), describes how the economic problems of Jordan intensified with the Palestinian annexation. Now, unless major changes are made, there is reason for concluding, as does Paul G. Phillips in *The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Prolegomena to a Technical Assistance Program* (University of Chicago, Department of Geography Research Paper No. 34, Chicago, 1954), that Jordan's economy cannot rise above the subsistence level. Nor could earlier studies such as that by A. Konikoff, *Transjordan: An Economic Survey* (2nd ed., Economic Research

Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Jerusalem, 1946), come to much more optimistic conclusions. In fact, as early as the 1930's it was apparent, as stated by Kurt Grunewald in *The Government Finances of the Mandates Territories in the Near East*, cited above (p. 1077), that "the dominant feature of Transjordan finances is the inadequacy of Internal Revenue making impossible the balancing of the budget except with outside help."[17] The short chapter on Jordan in the Grunewald study covers the period 1924–31 and includes yearly tables of government expenditures in the new state.

That Jordanians recognize the need for making the best use of available means is shown in the emphasis now placed upon government statistics and upon economic development by public and semi-public Jordanian agencies. It also appears in the number of economic surveys and analyses produced by international and other agencies from outside the Kingdom.

Jordan's current population estimates are based on the *1952 Census of Housing, Statistics for Districts, Subdistricts, Nahiyas, and Principal Towns* (Amman, 1953), a joint census project of the United States Technical Cooperation Service for Jordan and Jordan's Principal Office of Statistics, which is now under the Ministry of Economy. This office also produces an annual *Statistical Yearbook* (various presses, Amman), which began in 1950 and whose sixth number covers the year 1955. The yearbook divides into a demographic, an agricultural, and an economic section. Data cover the settled areas of the present Kingdom and serve as bases for current economic planning, as do the annual statistical reports by the Ministry of Health and by other government agencies. Such reports are seldom printed for distribution.

Hamad Farhan, former Permanent Undersecretary of Economy, encompassed current economic planning in "Mashrū'āt al-inmā' fī'l-Urdun" [Development Projects in Jordan], *Al-Abḥāth*, Vol. 8, pp. 363–88 (September, 1955), emphasizing the political and economic repercussions arising from the pressing problem of housing. Further development projects involving irrigation and potash production are also treated. A broader study of the development of Jordan's economy was prepared for the Arab League by Ali Dajani as *Muḥāḍarāt fī iqtiṣādiyyāt al-Urdun* [Lectures on the Economics of Jordan] (Arab League, Institute of Higher Studies, Cairo, 1954). The treatment here is historical as well as current.

In Western languages, perhaps the most recent intensive report is that by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, *Quarterly Bulletin of Economic Development No. 14: Special Reports on Jordan* (mimeo., UNRWA, Beirut, July, 1956). The three reports therein cover "The Jordan Valley Land Tenure Survey, December 1955," "Comparison of Recent Plans to Utilize Waters of the Jordan River and Its Tributaries," and "Economic Development Programs and Projects of Jordan." These articles serve well as supplements to the section on Jordan, pp. 143–205, in UNRWA's *Quarterly Bulletin*

[17] P. 60.

of Economic Development No. 13: Government Budgets of Middle East Countries (mimeo., UNRWA, Beirut, April, 1956).

With the exception of such older descriptions as G. F. Walpole's "Land Problems in Transjordan," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, Vol. 35, pp. 52–65 (January, 1948), Western periodical literature on Jordanian economic plans has tended to relate specifically to Jordan River development projects, which of course have international as well as domestic complications. H. A. Smith, "The Waters of the Jordan: A Problem of International Water Control," *International Affairs*, Vol. 25, pp. 415–25 (October, 1949), considers the politico-legal aspects of executing irrigation and power projects in this locality; Abraham M. Hirsch, "Utilization of International Rivers in the Middle East: A Study of Conventional International Law," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 50, pp. 81–100 (January, 1956), touches upon the Jordan-Yarmuk Basin dispute in treating historically disputed rivers in the area; Georgianna G. Stevens covers the background, the proposals, and the obstacles to effecting them in "The Jordan River Valley," *International Conciliation*, No. 506, pp. 225–83 (January, 1956). Other articles include: M. G. Ionides, "The Jordan Valley," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, Vol. 38, pp. 217–25 (October, 1951); Ionides, "The Disputed Waters of the Jordan," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 7, pp. 153–64 (Spring, 1953); Dana Adams Schmidt, "Prospects for a Solution of the Jordan River Valley Dispute," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Vol. 6, pp. 1–12 (January, 1955); Don Peretz, "Development of the Jordan Valley Waters," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 9, pp. 397–412 (Autumn, 1955); and Adnan Mahhuk, "Al-mashārī' al-muqtaraḥah li-inmā' ḥawd al-Urdun" [The Proposed Projects for the Development of the Jordan Valley], *Al-Abḥāth*, Vol. 9, pp. 337–57 (September, 1956).

Reliable data on all aspects of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan have been scarce during the thirty-five years of the country's tenuous existence; but now, because of efforts to probe and to solve her economic and social difficulties, and also Jordan's increased international significance, more government materials are printed and more commentary appears. It does not necessarily follow, however, that increased commentary is based upon increased or improved research efforts.

OBSERVATIONS

Patterns in the Development of Iraqi and Jordanian Materials. In both Iraq and Jordan, the years of Turkish rule followed by the period of British administration are reflected in the fundamental similarity of the governmental structures. As might be expected, then, the formal documentation and laws of Iraq and Jordan are also analogous, but at this point comparability seems to cease. The differing economic conditions and social problems in Iraq and Jordan are borne out in the literature. Since the sudden affluence of her neighbor in the East, Jordan has been left even further behind in economic development, educational expansion, and publications. Likewise politics in Iraq is not the same as

politics in Jordan; but on this topic current literature affords little in the way of research reports and monographic material. For both countries there is a dearth of grounded analysis of political movements and their related parties and groups.

It may be that Iraq's earlier development as a state and her achievement of national consciousness as a political entity have prompted both Iraqis and Westerners, particularly British scholars, to produce more material about her. On the other hand, the lack of secondary Jordanian writing points to the youth and instability of the country, to its lack of capable writers and recorders particularly following the emigration of educated Jordanians after 1948, and perhaps as well to the lack of national tradition which might spur Jordanians to be concerned, to investigate, and to write. Nor have recent years brought a great increase in secondary Arabic publication on Jordan. Western output on the Hashemite Kingdom has increased proportionately more than has Arab literature, but the reader senses circumlocution in much of the Western product.

In the case of both Iraq and Jordan, increased government documentation, improved collections of laws and legal records, and the new availability of census and other economic and social data have multiplied the feasibility of research and the prospects for worthwhile results. Despite the general increase in materials in both governments, however, documentation in English is decreasing. This is notably so in legal publications, although not so apparent in the newer economic and social fields. With this trend comes a related increase in the importance of Arabic as a necessary working language. This means that increased documentation exclusively in Arabic further burdens the Western political scientist who uses it carefully. A study that requires both breadth and depth of research becomes extremely time-consuming. The resulting tendency for Western political scientists, then, may be toward less publication per person and toward a narrowing of scope and therefore of material examined. The linguistic advantage of the Arab scholar in these matters must be conceded, and it may soon be that the writing of compendiums on government and administration in Iraq and Jordan and other Arab countries will be left primarily to such writers because of their linguistic talents as well as their increasing research capabilities, and equally because of Western default.

BOOK REVIEWS

Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy. By John W. Masland and Laurance I. Radway. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957. Pp. xx, 530. $7.50.)

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. By Samuel P. Huntington. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1957. Pp. xiii, 534. $7.50.)

It is by now a commonplace that the modes and structure of the international relations of our time will be set by the transformation of military strategy arising from nuclear weapons and that anyone who would understand the pace and direction of events today must study both the soldier and his art. Both these books focus on the first of these problems, on the military themselves and on their relationship to society, and they are valuable contributions in what one hopes is to be a growing literature. It should also be said, however—and immediately—that the two books profoundly disagree.

In *Soldiers and Scholars*, Masland and Radway have set out to examine higher education in the American armed services, with emphasis, as they say, on "the preparation of career officers for positions involving participation in the formulation of national policy." They examine the genesis, growth, and present curricula of West Point, Annapolis, and the ROTC program; of the intermediate level Command and General Staff schools of the three services; and of the senior institutions—the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the three service War Colleges, and the National War College. Of equal interest is their study, based on interviews and responses to a written questionnaire, of the nature of the responsibilities placed on officers in planning and policy positions and of the extent of their need for more than a purely military education.

This book has much good advice for the Services, but it is perhaps even more valuable for the outsider, the student of the soldier and his art. For the student, the value is in what the book reveals of the kind of person the American military officer is and of the role the military see themselves playing in the making of our national policy. In general, this role is seen as an important one, and the response in higher military education is toward giving the officer a broader knowledge of political and economic affairs. Masland and Radway not only approve of this response but suggest that it be carried still further.

It is precisely on this question of the role the military is to play in the making of national policy that the Huntington book differs so sharply. Huntington feels that there are only two possible forms for ensuring civilian control of the military. One is what he calls "subjective" civilian control: that is, control achieved by maximizing the power of civilian groups in relation to the military, which in practice has permitted one particular group to use the power of the military for their own purposes. The other, made possible by the rise of a professional officer corps, is "objective" civilian control. This is to be achieved by letting the military's own professionalism confine them to a purely "military" function.

In a time of sustained external threat, however, Huntington sees a dilemma arising between the demands of security and America's traditional liberalism. In a time of threat the military must be given power, yet the anti-military bias of liberalism either resists this or forces the military to become "political," that is, liberal, and so to abandon their professionalism. Huntington argues that the requisite for survival is therefore a shift in basic American values from liberalism to conservatism. "Only an environment which is sympathetically conservative," he writes, "will permit American military leaders to combine the political power which society thrusts upon them with the military professionalism without which society cannot endure" (p. 464). In an arresting analogy, Huntington compares the sprawling hodge-podge of Highland Falls, the typical main-street town just outside the gates of West Point, with the neat barracks, the clipped lawns, the disciplined, ordered "serenity" of the Army post inside. The garish individualism of Main Street, he identifies with liberalism; the disciplined order of West Point, with conservatism. And his conclusion is that America today has more need of, and more to learn from, the second than the first.

This conclusion has aroused much criticism. And in some ways the critics are right; the book is indeed a strange one, difficult to review. It is heavily laden with generalizations, and many chapters are noisy with the sounds of sawing and stretching as the facts are forced into the bed that has been prepared for them. So perverse are some of these generalizations that at times one wonders whether the author is striving more for originality, which is achieved principally by being different, than for a sound judgment of where the truth may lie. On the other hand, the book contains many insights about both America and its soldiers, and the thought behind many of its conclusions is hard and clean. With a particularly good critical analysis of the "garrison state" hypothesis, it also disposes of a number of the prejudices about the military that still clog the policy process. One's final judgment may be mixed, in sum, but no one could deny that here is a book to make one think.

One of the most useful of Huntington's theses is that of the "professionalization" of the American officer corps. It helps to explain a number of things that observers have remarked upon in the American military, including a respect for constitutional processes that seems to remove any danger that they might follow a man on horseback. But any concept can be pushed too far, and one cannot help being uneasy at some of the corollaries that Huntington draws from this one. He assumes that the attributes of the "military mind" can be derived as elements of a professional ethic. "The military mind in this sense," he writes, "consists of the values, attitudes, and perspectives which inhere in the performance of the professional military function and which are deducible from the nature of that function" (p. 61). From this, he concludes that the "military mind" is conservative, believing in the weakness of man and the supremacy of society; that it is power-oriented, believing in the inevitability of war; that it is nationalistic yet pacifist, believing in preparedness and the limitation of foreign commitments. An analysis of American military periodicals of

the period following the Civil War confirms that the Americans have become "professional" and also serves as a test of his model. Yet as methods for establishing the nature of the "military mind" these are long leaps. The first takes a logical definition of the military mind as proof that it exists. The second demonstrates well enough that the people whose writings were studied had the characteristics described, but it does not necessarily follow that it was the military life that developed those characteristics. The American officer corps is recruited principally from the lower middle class, and it, too, seems to have these same characteristics. If there is something called the "military mind" other than the kind of preoccupation with the power aspects of policy problems that would come automatically to anyone who is given responsibility for a nation's security, one would think it would be in the very concrete standards of behavior for officers set out in training procedures. An analysis of this ideal image that is put before the young officer might be rather enlightening. But whether there is any utility in the idea that practicing the military art makes people more sympathetic to one basic political philosophy than to another is somewhat doubtful. Aristocracies, monarchies, bourgeois democracies, fascist and communist dictatorships have all produced successful armies. One would therefore assume that the military are not a thing apart, but are a reflection of the society from which they spring. It was Marx and Engels, after all, who long ago discovered that there is no reason that a socialist state cannot have a socialist army—that there is no reason, indeed, that an army cannot be made an instrument of revolution.

If the military are a reflection of the society from which they spring, and if the political, sociological, and psychological forms of that society, including the professionalization of the military, ensure that the Army will not be used in the service of one political faction against the others, what role should the military play in the making of national policy? Masland and Radway, with at least those among the military who make educational policy, feel that officers will inevitably participate in policy-making at every level and that their training should include a broad knowledge of political and economic affairs. Huntington, on the other hand, would restrict the military to purely "professional" activities. And some, at least, of the military themselves would support him. As one officer interviewed by Masland and Radway put it, "If we make our professional officers part time statesmen, they can no longer perform their primary role of protecting the country, and so automatically lose the stature they might have in the secondary role of the performance of 'civilian' duties" (p.ix). Against this point and the related civilian fear that giving officers a more sophisticated knowledge will undermine civilian supremacy, Masland and Radway have two arguments. The first is that no amount of replacing military men with Assistant Secretaries will eliminate the interdependence of military and foreign policies or the need to have military officers participate in joint decisions. The second argument is that the purpose is to equip the officer not to make political judgments, but to understand the context in which his "military" advice must be judged and so to be more effective in adapting military means to the political

necessities laid down by higher authority. It is the sophisticated officer, with a full understanding that there are many considerations other than military that bear on policy, who is least likely of all to usurp civilian authority.

One cannot help wondering, finally, whether there is not a point here about the role of the student of military affairs as well as the role of the military themselves. As the revolution in strategy increases in tempo, so will the demands for advice on its implications for foreign affairs. The military will inevitably have a part in this, as indeed they should. But what kind of part they play, whether it is creative and flexible in adapting military means to foreign policy goals or rigidly insistent on the dominance of means, will depend not only on what the soldiers learn of political and economic matters, but also on what the civilians learn of logistics and strategy. It seems likely, in other words, that the civil-military relations of our day will be determined not by a conscious effort to follow a theoretical ideal, but in the market place of debate on substantive issues of strategy and policy. Presumably it was on the basis of this line of reasoning that the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Civil-Military Relations Research recently changed its name to the Committee on National Security Policy Research. One ought never to suppose that thinking about civil-military relations as such is without utility, but in terms at least of emphasis the rest of us might be well advised to follow suit.

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Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India. BY J. S. FURNIVALL. (New York: New York University Press. 1956. Pp. xii, 568. $7.50.)

Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning. BY LUCIAN W. PYE. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1956. Pp. xvi, 369. $6.00.)

Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change. BY W. F. WERTHEIM. (The Hague, Bandung: W. Van Hoeve, Ltd.; New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1956. Pp. xiv, 360. $5.00.)

Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia. EDITED BY PHILIP W. THAYER WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF WILLIAM T. PHILLIPS. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1956. Pp. xvi, 394. $5.75.)

Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions: A Documentary History, 1945–55. EDITED BY ALLAN B. COLE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF PETER W. LANDE, DENNIS H. KUX, W. BRYCE HARLAND, AND LARRY H. WENDELL. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1956. Pp. xxix, 265. $5.00.)

Since the war, particularly in the past five years, Southeast Asia has become the subject of an increasing number of significant studies by able scholars, whose work is claiming the attention of an expanding audience. One of the earliest of such studies, whose high quality was remarked by Lennox A. Mills in his review in the October 1948 issue of this REVIEW (p. 1019), was John S. Fur-

nivall's *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India*. First published in England in 1948, out of print and much sought after for several years, it has now been reprinted, without change, in the United States. In no important sense is this a dated work; its brilliant and deeply-probing investigation of the pre-war colonial orders is valuable to an understanding of post-war developments as well as of the colonial period. It will undoubtedly continue to serve as an important guide and point of departure for younger scholars; and much of Furnivall's analysis is unlikely to be surpassed.

Lucian Pye's ground-breaking study, *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya*, may well generate a demand as great as that for Furnivall's book, and one by no means restricted to readers primarily interested in Asia. It represents a high level of scholarly research and keen analysis leading to profound insights and important conclusions. It will probably be considered a contribution as much to the general field of political behavior as to our knowledge of an important political phenomenon in a particular country. In the major piece of research upon which it is based, the methodological approach is one previously little utilized in studies of Communism in underdeveloped countries: essentially, an imaginative adaptation of the interview technique used with such rewarding results by Gabriel A. Almond in *The Appeals of Communism*—an indebtedness which Pye fully acknowledges.

Pye's study is based on field work in Malaya: in particular, on intensive interviews with sixty Malayan Chinese who joined the Malayan Communist movement and subsequently left it. He is concerned with their personal experiences: why they were attracted to Communism, how they came to understand politics in general and Communism in particular, how they sought to adjust to the party's demands, and why they broke with it. In trying to establish some common denominators on the basis of these interviews, he advances the thesis that they are members of a generation in transition, wherein many people are losing their sense of identity with their traditional way of life and are seeking to realize a modern way; the Communists are distinguished from those who do not turn to Communism in that they have become isolated from their traditional cultures, often even hostile towards them, and generally less fortunate or less able to discover some means of becoming effective participants in the new way of life. Pye supplements the numerous significant conclusions drawn from his interviews with an excellent analysis of important aspects of contemporary Malayan society and politics, which will be particularly meaningful to readers already somewhat familiar with their basic characteristics. The book might have been useful to a wider audience if he had supplied a brief historical introduction to provide the essentials of the evolution of the contemporary socio-economic setting and political system. His scant attention to the broader aspects of the environment conditioning the Malayan Communist movement will make it difficult for some readers to appreciate fully several of his important conclusions.

This omission will also pose difficulties for readers who seek to evaluate some of his broader generalizations: in particular, those relating to Communism in

underdeveloped areas as a whole. The socio-political context of Communism in Malaya is decidedly different from that in the surrounding Southeast Asian countries and probably from that in any other underdeveloped country in the world. Malaya has a virtually unique ethnic pattern—with its Chinese element approximately balanced in numbers with its Malay element—and has experienced a rather unusual pattern of indirect colonial rule; both factors have had a decided influence upon the character of its nationalism. Aside from the basic fact that underdeveloped countries are quite as heterogeneous in character as the developed countries of the world, Malaya may well be a case apart. Thus, in his final chapter, "The Process of Disaffection," Pye appears to this reviewer to overextend himself and undertake generalizations which are sometimes too broad for the base of his case study to support.

A good many informed readers will probably find themselves in at least qualified agreement with Pye's thesis that "the real basis of the Communist appeal in underdeveloped countries is the sense of rootlessness of people separated from their traditional ways and unable to realize their ambitions according to new ones." And very likely many will concur in his judgment that "the problem of countering Communism in Asia is thus essentially a matter of political development," of discovering "more appropriate ways of relating their [the Asians'] activities to their real and immediate needs" and thereby making it possible for them to "find that a fundamental characteristic of political action is to make the gap between reality and aspirations less frustrating and more constructive." Some of his other generalizations may meet less acceptance. For instance, with regard to the establishment of political processes in the underdeveloped societies, he states that the most coherent political theories and philosophies are those which are imported and that "it is almost inevitable that those which appear the most explicit, the most formal, and the most embracing will be chosen—a fact which, at this stage in the history of Western political thought, means the ideas of the political left rather than the eclectic and possibly more subtle ideas of the political center." Here Pye seems to be generalizing far too much from his experience with the Malayan Chinese—one of the most socially uprooted elements in Asia. His conclusions may be far more difficult to sustain with respect to those underdeveloped areas where significant residues of the indigenous cultures can be and are being wedded, in widely ranging patterns of eclectic union, with Western political concepts. And such generalizations are perhaps even more friable when applied to those countries where progressive and pragmatic currents are assuming major importance within a dominant religion. Moreover, in a number of the underdeveloped countries the potentials of indigenous forms of authoritarianism appear to be at least as strong as the Communist potential, their orientation often being more rightist than leftist.

These last observations are not meant as suggesting any serious defect. For the book is primarily a case study, and as such it is excellent. It is only where some of the author's generalizations transcend Malaya that their base seems inadequate. Until more case studies of similar high quality have appeared,

others also might do well to keep their generalizations in closer proportion to the substructure of their substantive research.

In his *Indonesian Society in Transition*, W. F. Wertheim of the University of Amsterdam discusses the important changes that have taken place within Indonesian society during and since the period of colonial rule. His incisive analysis probes deeply into this complex history, isolating key factors. He centers his discussion in seven chapters: "Shifts in the Economic System," "The Changing Status System," "Urban Development," "Religious Reform," "The Changing Pattern of Labour Relations," "Cultural Dynamics," and "Nationalism and After." The first four chapters provide an excellent historical introduction to the post-revolutionary scene and, in spite of Wertheim's modest disclaimer, have merit in themselves. It is, however, in the chapters that describe and analyze the still uncompleted transition from a colonial to a modern society that he makes his most important contribution. Each of these sections constitutes a self-contained essay, historical in approach, and for the most part well documented. Of particular value are the chapters on changes in the economic system, the status system, and labor relations (especially that part dealing with the pre-war period). Though Wertheim states that in the past few years the earlier rapid rate of transition has been slowed, he is not pessimistic about Indonesia's long-range prospects. He envisages the emergence of a new pattern of pluralistic organization, the components having "collectivist tendencies" and allowing the individual to enjoy a fuller and more active part than at present. With the masses playing a larger role and superseding in influence the present elite (which he fears is becoming increasingly "bourgeois"), he expects that after a period of increasing instability and social and political unrest there will emerge a strong government based upon mass support and endowed with the capacity to carry out far-reaching reforms efficiently.

If Wertheim's book has any serious general weakness, it derives from his adherence to an overly rigid system of modified Weberian social analysis and a reliance upon Western political concepts not always well suited to a description of Indonesian conditions. Unless applied to the Indonesian milieu with great discrimination and substantial qualification, systems and concepts grounded primarily in Western experience can all too easily lead to a set of findings which may seem to have an inner logic but which do not give a completely accurate or, at least, a fully balanced picture. In the reviewer's opinion, Wertheim is not always sufficiently discriminating in this respect; in some parts of his book, primarily those dealing with the post-revolutionary period, this has led to a distortion of the actual picture. To employ so freely, with little or no qualification, such terms as "feudal," "bourgeois," "reactionary," "individualism," "left," "right," and "class struggle" is to court misunderstanding.

More specifically, it is highly misleading to suggest that Indonesia's Islamic parties represent only conservative political forces; this is true in terms neither of socio-economic platform nor nationalist orientation. It does violence to reality to characterize the principal Islamic party, the Masjumi, as "rather conservative with regard to economic matters," with "feudal forces" attempting

"to make use of this movement for their own reactionary ends." Certainly Wertheim fails to marshal sufficient evidence for his assertion that there is a tendency for "the new aristocratic and bourgeois ruling elite to ally themselves with foreign capitalists for support against the radical elements." And most students of Indonesian affairs will probably find it difficult to agree with his conclusions that "the greatest dangers for national unity arise from foreign sources" and that "capitalism is prone to play upon regionalism and provincialism, as it has done already for centuries." (If one is primarily concerned with foreign sources, the current calculated exploitation of regional sentiment by the Communist party in India is a case in point.) Finally, his conclusion that "the two branches of the nationalist movement, the bourgeois branch and the left-wing radical branch, now threaten to enter upon a struggle to the death" is likely to lead to a serious misinterpretation of the broad sweep of Indonesian political development. These criticisms do not mean that the book is not of real value. Much of Wertheim's analysis is excellent and helps greatly to clarify the profound changes in Indonesian society.

Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia contains thirty-seven essays and commentaries relating to post-war South and Southeast Asia. Chester Bowles points out, in his brief introduction, that, while this part of Asia shares common problems, it is an area of tremendous cultural variation; and this fact is illustrated by the wide range of topics covered by the papers. The principal *foci* are American and European relations with South and Southeast Asia, the character of post-war nationalism in the countries of this area, the development of their political institutions, problems of political integration, racial minorities, problems of economic development, and communism. These contributions were collected from two conferences sponsored in 1955 by the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies: in Washington, D. C., and Rangoon, Burma. The omission of several important papers from the Rangoon Conference is regrettable—and particularly unfortunate in view of the importance of this conference (whose success was largely the result of the able and self-effacing leadership of William T. Phillips), a unique and notable assemblage of some of the ablest Asian and Western scholars. Of the twenty-one papers and sixteen commentaries selected by the editor, twenty-seven are from the Washington Conference and ten from that held in Rangoon. Most of the Washington contributions are by established and competent scholars or knowledgeable persons from other walks of private life; these are almost all significant and valuable. Most of the eight contributions by foreign diplomats and State Department officials are thin and superficial, a superfluity of polite remarks and emasculated statements; they provide much too heavy a dose of "public relations." (However, Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson's contribution has the virtue of providing Robert Blum with an occasion for a first-rate critical commentary.) It is a pity that the editor could not have left out some of the contributions by government officials in favor of a few of those omitted from the Rangoon Conference.

Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions is a very useful com-

pilation of most of the key documents relating to the outstanding developments in and concerning Indochina in the critical decade 1945–55. This compendium of some hundred selections comprises what the editor, Allan B. Cole, and his associates regard as the most important of a much larger collection which they obtained from a wide range of private and official sources in Washington, Saigon, and Paris. While the editor's sectional introductions place these documents in meaningful context, he makes clear that the collection is intended primarily as a reference to be used together with some of the existing interpretative treatments. Thus, this is primarily a book for specialists or seriously interested students.

An indication of its scope is provided by the five section heads: "Negotiations and Developments to the Outbreak of Hostilities (March 1945–May 1947)," "Deepening Conflict and Formation of a Rival Vietnam (May 1947–December 1949)," "Spreading International Dimensions of the Conflict (January 1950–December 1952)," "International Crisis and the Geneva Agreements (January 1953–November 1954)," "Developments Following the Geneva Agreements (December 1954–July 1955)." The documents illustrating each of these phases have been organized under the following headings: "French Policies," "Democratic Republic of Vietnam—Political, Constitutional Matters and General Policies," "Franco-D. R. Vietnam Agreements," "Documents Relating to the State of Vietnam," "United States Policies," "Policies of Non-Communist States (other than the U. S.)," "Policies of Communist States," "Cambodia," and "Laos."

As Professor Cole notes, it is difficult for a documentary history to be fully comprehensive. This difficulty is, of course, increased where access to important items is impeded by lack of communication with a key repository (e.g., North Vietnam). Thus it was probably inevitable that this collection could be neither completely comprehensive nor fully balanced. Among the few deficiences noted by this reviewer are: the omission of Ho Chi Minh's rationalization concerning his concessions to the French in early 1946, lack of a sufficient account of the important role of China at the Geneva Conference, and a weighting of the selections a bit too heavily in favor of diplomatic exchanges at the expense of those descriptive of internal political developments. But these are minor criticisms. Professor Cole and his associates should be commended for having performed an important service to scholars and students concerned with Asian government and politics or with international relations.

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Moscow and the Communist Party of India: A Study in the Postwar Evolution of International Communist Stategy. By JOHN H. KAUTSKY. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology; New York: John Wiley and Sons. 1956. Pp. xii, 220, $6.00.)

The new, popularly elected communist ministry in the south Indian state of Kerala is the first communist ministry to have single-handedly assumed office in

an Indian state. The brief history of Kerala's communist administration so far has shown a reluctant respect for parliamentary traditions, but how long this policy can be rationalized with familiar communist strategy, designed for revolution-minded parties, remains to be seen. The recently announced "one-hundred flowers" principle of Mao Tse-tung, allowing for more varied doctrinal interpretations, may make such rationalization easier.

In the light of these recent developments, Mr. Kautsky's thorough and carefully documented study of the direct connection between Moscow and the Communist Party of India (CPI) during the period 1945–54 takes on added importance. To prove this connection, he traces the effect upon the CPI of the vacillations of international communist strategy, first between the familiar "right" and "left" interpretations, and later between this dichotomy and its subsequent refinement by Peking. The "right" strategy, based on cooperation with bourgeois nationalist parties or the formation of a united front "from above," features imperialism and indigenous feudalism as its principal targets; "left" strategy, assuming the communist party's "going-it-alone" and relying solely on a united front "from below," specifies capitalism and the native bourgeoisie as its chief enemies. Neo-Maoism combines both policies by directing its attack against imperialism and feudalism but also seeking to form a united front "from below." Thus the communist party can claim to represent both the exploited classes and the bourgeoisie. This has been particularly useful in uniting Asian nationalists in a broad anti-American front since the advent of the cold war.

No Asian communist party in the postwar period has had more difficulty in accomodating itself to these rapid alterations of strategy than the CPI. It has had to switch policy to conform to Moscow's dictates; it has also had to live down the unsavory reputation achieved by its wartime collaboration with the British. The frequent shuttling from "left" to "right" which has characterized CPI strategy from the party's inception in 1933 until 1950 has caused indecision and bewilderment among its following. On occasion, adherence to a particular strategy has lasted only a few months, as in 1946 when the CPI shifted from "right" to "left" and back to "right" within the year. But an uncritical acceptance of Moscow directives has been tempered by local opportunism in determining the actions of the party. Such events as the Cabinet Mission of 1946, the mutiny of the Indian navy, and later the Mountbatten Plan for accelerating the granting of independence had their effect on the position of the CPI.

A further factor in moderating Moscow's influence on the CPI has been the existence of factions within the party. Mr. Kautsky vividly portrays the determined insistence of B. T. Ranadive on "left" strategy accompanied by violence, which culminated in the abortive Telengana revolt of 1948–49, despite the resistance of the vitally concerned Andhra communists, who favored neo-Maoism, in vogue elsewhere. In 1950, the Andhra faction triumphed when Ranadive was replaced as CPI General Secretary by Rajeswar Rao.

Since 1951, when the CPI entered the field of parliamentary activity, con-

testing elections and spearheading the opposition of Congress in the Lok Sabha, greater emphasis has been placed on cooperation with other left-wing parties, even to the extent of entering electoral alliances with socialists. Even neo-Maoism has been reoriented for the Indian scene by forming the united front from "above," but stopping short of the "right" strategy of cooperation with Congress. Yet in Kerala, the CPI triumphed without the support of other parties, although its continuation in office depends on five members of the legislature who stood as Independents. Whether this success will affect subsequent efforts at united fronts from "above" remains to be seen.

Nevertheless, Mr. Kautsky amply demonstrates that for all its local deviationism, the CPI, in the final analysis, has depended on the Cominform and ultimately on Moscow for direction, particularly in settling its internal dislocations. Large portions of the volume are devoted to the evolution of strategy at its source in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the author emphasizes, the introduction of the Chinese refinements has not as yet tended to take the initiative from Moscow, since the wide acceptance of neo-Maoism has been blessed by the Russians themselves.

Although this book is not intended to be a history of the CPI, perhaps greater attention to the context of important events in India would have given it more perspective. The Cabinet Mission of 1946 and the Mountbatten Plan of 1947 are mentioned only as they activated responses in the communist press and alterations in CPI tactics. Their importance for India's future is not brought out. Mr. Kautsky isolates the CPI from Indian history and thus makes his book understandable only to those with intimate knowledge of recent Indian events. Nevertheless, the book is an invaluable guide to the relationship of international communism and national communist parties, particularly in the noncommunist nations of Asia.

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Order and History. Vol. I, Israel and Revelation. By ERIC VOEGELIN. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1956. Pp. xxv, 533. $7.50.)

This work is a vigorously presented speculation on the meaning of history as seen from the vantage point of Christian faith. At the outset the author asserts his belief that the succession of societal orders does not form "a senseless series of failures," for societies are "intelligibly connected with one another as advances toward, or recessions from, an adequate symbolization of truth concerning the order of being. . . ." This volume traces man's gradual approach toward this truth through the civilizations of the ancient Near East down to the political collapse of the kingdom of Israel. In the prophecies of the exilic prophet, the Second Isaiah, the movement is completed: "The order of being has revealed its mystery of redemption as the flower of suffering. This does not mean, however, that the vision of the mystery is the reality of redemption in history: the participation of man in divine suffering has yet to encounter

the participation of God in human suffering." In other words, the fulness of meaning is only revealed in the Fulness of Time.

In setting forth his motivations to so large an undertaking (the present volume being the first of a projected six), the author states that "metastatic faith"—later defined as faith in "the vision of a world that will change its nature without ceasing to be the world in which we live concretely"—"is one of the great sources of disorder, if not the principal one, in the contemporary world; and it is a matter of life and death for all of us to understand the phenomenon and to find remedies against it before it destroys us." Israelite-Judahite religion is the womb of the malady: "Metastatic faith . . . though it became articulate in the prophets, did not originate with them but was inherent, from the very beginnings of the Mosaic foundation, in the conception of the theopolity as the Kingdom of God incarnate in a concrete people and its institutions." The history of Israelite faith is the history of a great idea, "the discovery of transcendent being as the source of order in man and society," which was "derailed." Israel failed to see that Canaan "can be reached only by moving through history, but it cannot be conquered within history. The Kingdom of God lives in men who live in the world, but it is not of this world." Hence Israel undertook the spiritually fatal task of creating on earth the ideal society. To this end it foisted on Moses the mythical role of legislator, who laid down the constitution of that society in the Law, the Torah. The Torah is "the symbolic end of Israel's life . . . the contraction of the universal potentialities of the Sinaitic revelation into the law of an ethnic-religious community." Law and Prophets both sought to transform reality "by perverting faith into an instrument of pragmatic action." It was Christianity that released society from the sphere of divine commands "so that the order of the world regained its autonomy."

These citations will suggest the viewpoint from which the author evaluates ancient Near Eastern and Israelite thought. But they do not begin to suggest the labor, the erudition, and the thorough grounding in American and European literature in the field that have gone into his work. His treatment of Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilization is imaginative. He terms them "cosmological," meaning that they conceived of society as part of and analogous to the divine-cosmic order. Men participated in the life of the gods; the gods were the world itself of which mankind was a part. Here there could be no history, but only a recurring cycle of existence. History was created by Israel; it was, in its broadest terms, the recognition by man of his existence under God and the evaluation of man's acts as conforming to or defecting from the divine will. This conception is the source of meaning in history for Biblical historians, and for Professor Voegelin as well.

The bulk of the work analyzes the history of Israelite ideas. Since the theme is Israel's failure to realize the true implications of its "leap into being," it is understandable that the author finds support in Christian sources: "From Christ a ray of light falls back over the past to illuminate Moses." Accordingly, his work offers valuable insights for a religious appreciation of Scripture. More-

over, he justifiably takes Biblical scholars repeatedly to task for their philosophic innocence and their lack of adequate self-criticism.

These observations are embedded among speculations which are often themselves based on the merest conjecture. The author has a tendency to seize upon atypical, isolated cases as a basis for broad generalization. Genesis XIV, for example, an historically obscure chapter in which, moreover, Abraham appears atypically as a warrior, is the basis of a discussion of the political and religious situation of the Patriarchal age. There are present throughout, in unsettling juxtaposition, penetrating insights and remote conjectures, exegetical sensitivity and opaqueness.

This highly suggestive work cannot, then, be read uncritically. Indeed few who are not at home in the terminology of modern theology and Biblical criticism will be able to follow the argument with any ease. Animated by the conviction that the criterion of the true meaning of history is available, this work will be found most illuminating by those who share the author's conviction, yet, like him, do not permit it to stand in the way of free speculation.

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Philosophy, Politics and Society. EDITED BY PETER LASLETT. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1956. Pp. xv, 184. $3.00.)

"For the moment, anyway, political philosophy is dead." A great tradition maintained for more than three hundred years by English philosophers from Hobbes to Bosanquet has been broken. So states Mr. Peter Laslett, the editor of this collection of essays on political themes by contemporary British philosophers. And he leaves us in no doubt about the identity of the assassin—or perhaps we should say, the liberator. The "Logical Positivists"—writers like Russell, Wittgenstein, Ayer, and Ryle—have converted philosophers from metaphysical and ethical system-building to close linguistic and logical analysis and thereby subverted the foundations of political philosophy written in the grand manner of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, or Hegel.

A measure of truth can hardly be denied to this verdict. Since most English philosophers of the past generation have shunned systematic construction and preoccupied themselves with problems of logic and syntax, it is not surprising to find almost all the contributors to this volume devoting their energies to logical analysis and to clarification of the meanings of important terms in our political vocabulary. In the long run, however, it may be of even greater significance that many of the analytic philosophers are modifying the earlier, more rigorous view that ethical, political, or aesthetic discourse is literally "nonsense." As evidence of this trend we may note the titles of such recent works as Mr. Hare's *The Language of Morals* and Mr. Weldon's *The Vocabulary of Politics*, as well as the argument—advanced by Professor H. L. A. Hart among others—that legal and political discussions have a meaningful and analyzable logic of their own, even though it differs from the strict logic of scientific dis-

course. The themes of several of the essays in the present collection—natural rights, sovereignty, the general will—lend further support to the conclusion that it has now become philosophically respectable to discuss topics that the pioneers of logical positivism would have anathematized as "metaphysical nonsense." In fact, the founders might be scandalized to find their followers attempting to salvage elements of the theory of sovereignty (W. J. Rees), to resolve the antinomy between the retributive and the utilitarian theories of punishment (A. M. Quinton), and, worst of all, to rehabilitate the theory of the general will (Bernard Mayo).

After reading these essays, one wonders whether political philosophy in England is indeed dead or, rather, just beginning to rouse itself from a period of hibernation. For the moment we can only note the cautious movement in the direction of traditional problems, coupled with a continuing commitment to a definition of the philosophic enterprise that many readers will regard as too narrowly circumscribed. Mr. Weldon, for example, in his essay on "Political Principles" insists that philosophical problems are "entirely second order problems": problems, that is, "which are generated by the language in which facts are described and explained by those whose function it is to construct and defend scientific, historical and other types of theory" (p. 22). Underlying this confinement of the philosopher, and in particular the political philosopher, to "second order problems," to talk about talk, is the neat but ultimately self-defeating dichotomy between the experts on politics, who deal with the facts of political life and construct theories to explain those facts, and the political philosophers, who are specialists in identifying and tidying up the linguistic and logical muddles and confusions perpetrated by the political analysts. If philosophers confine themselves to sharpening the tools of inquiry and never try them out by cutting into the hard stuff of politics, political philosophy is likely to degenerate into an "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories," equalled in futility only by unremitting concentration on scientific "methodology."

In this connection it may be pertinent to note that the most rewarding essay in this collection is Michael Oakeshott's well known inaugural lecture on "Political Education." Mr. Oakeshott, not being of the company of the analytic philosophers, is not encumbered by their self-denying ordinance, and so his conceptual distinctions gain relevance and vitality by being used to illuminate actual problems involved in maintaining and continuing a political tradition.

HERBERT A. DEANE.

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Rousseau—Totalitarian or Liberal? BY JOHN W. CHAPMAN. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1956. Pp. vii, 154. $3.25.)

This study is far more interesting and valuable than the title would suggest. Rousseau is so original and unsystematic a figure that any attempt to fit him into conventional categories is dangerously Procrustean. The danger is particularly acute when the categories themselves, like "liberal" and above all "totalitarian," are the product of specifically twentieth-century experience

and thus have little relevance to the problems of eighteenth-century thought. In the present work the author tries, in opposition to Talmon and other hostile critics, to show that Rousseau is not fundamentally totalitarian, but rather that his main significance is as a forerunner of modern liberalism. The Procrustean dangers implicit in such an undertaking are not entirely avoided. The author is by no means unaware, however, of the illiberal aspects of Rousseau's thought, and his analysis is for the most part uncommonly perceptive and well-balanced. His work thus goes well beyond the limits of the rather sterile "liberal versus totalitarian" controversy and stands as a substantial contribution to the understanding of one of the most baffling and difficult figures in the history of political thought.

The author believes that Rousseau's basic preoccupation, and greatest strength, lies in the field of ethics, and that his more strictly political theory can be understood only in the light of that preoccupation. He therefore begins with a careful analysis of Rousseau's ideas regarding the moral and psychological nature of man. This is no easy task, for these ideas are expressed in terms, such as "the state of nature," which are often misleadingly unclear or ambiguous. By a judicious comparison of the relevant passages the author is able to show, however, that Rousseau's principal concern is with the problem of moral autonomy. Although man is born without reason or conscience, he is endowed with innate potentialities which, under favoring circumstances, can lead to the growth of these desirable characteristics. When this takes place, moral autonomy becomes possible. This, in the Aristotelian sense, is the natural goal or telos of human existence. But the attainment of human perfection, though natural in that all men are potentially capable of it, is by no means inevitable. Man's growth is largely determined by his environment, which includes the society in which he lives, and this may well encourage the development of moral and psychological traits, such as indolence or selfishness, which are incompatible with the attainment of moral autonomy. To show how this danger can be avoided by creating a social environment favorable to the realization of the best potentialities of human nature is the basic purpose of Rousseau's political thought. This is the thesis, briefly but capably argued, that is put forward in Part I of the present study.

Having clarified the problem that Rousseau set himself, we then proceed, in Part II, to a consideration of his proposed solution. Although the author is clearly sympathetic to Rousseau, his sympathy is not undiscriminating, and the resulting analysis of Rousseau's political theory is not only fair but also rather devastating. "When set beside the complexity of his psychological theory, Rousseau's political theory is almost incongruously crude" (p. 139). This stems not only from the fact that his "capacity for political invention was clearly limited" (p. 140), but also, and more significantly, from the fact that his moral and psychological theories were mutually incompatible. He believed, on the one hand, that moral autonomy was the proper end of man, and that this called for the highest possible development of the individual's reason and conscience; on the other hand, his sense of the individual's dependence on his

social environment was so absolute that he was constantly tempted to advocate the strengthening of society by manipulative and irrational means which were hopelessly at variance with the development of the individual as a rational and conscientious creature. "There is an unresolved tension in Rousseau's thought between radical Christian emphasis on moral creativity and Platonic willingness to impose order and value on human life at the expense of moral liberty and dignity" (p. 73). While the author rightly rejects the thesis that this led Rousseau to adopt, in any meaningful and consistent way, a totalitarian position, he also clearly shows how this prevented him from bringing the liberal potentialities of his ethical doctrine to political realization.

In spite of this, the author concludes that Rousseau is significant primarily as a forerunner of modern liberalism. This is the thesis developed in Part III. The argument is that, for all his weakness as a strictly political thinker, Rousseau's ideal of moral autonomy and his conception of human nature are essentially at one with the moral goals and psychological assumptions of the modern deliberative state. Bentham and other early liberals, with their optimistic rationalism and their faith in the inevitable perfectibility of man, were poles apart from Rousseau. From the time of J. S. Mill onward, however, the supporters of human freedom have been forced to take a more realistic view of human nature. Without losing faith in responsible self-government as the form of politics best qualified to realize the moral potentialities of mankind, they have come to recognize that the achievement is far from easy. "Perfectibility is not immanent in history but rather a possibility, the realization of which depends on rational insight and moral effort" (p. 107). The malleability of human nature and the importance of social and other environmental factors have also gained increasing recognition. Because of his early preoccupation with these moral and psychological problems, Rousseau deserves a prominent place in the history of modern liberal thought.

In general the reviewer finds the thesis well argued and convincing. It is true that the case for Rousseau's liberalism may be occasionally overstated. The basic difficulty is that the modern deliberative state depends on the existence of a pluralistic society, with political parties and other private associations playing a major role in the formation and mobilization of public opinion, whereas Rousseau conceives of all private or group interests as being intrinsically in opposition to the general will. In his attempt to emphasize the liberal side of Rousseau, the author of the present study tries to minimize this fact. He even goes so far, without introducing anything very cogent in the way of supporting evidence, as to say that "he did not entirely disregard all the partial focusing of public opinion which the modern liberal sees taking place in private associations" (p. 139). This is hard to reconcile with the famous passage in the *Social Contract*, a passage which is here used, curiously enough, as the epigraph to Part III, in which Rousseau states that people, while deliberating on public matters, ought not even to communicate with one another. But this is, at most, a minor flaw, since the author immediately goes on to admit that the locus of Rousseau's general will "is the state, not society, where the modern liberal

tends to place it." Altogether, this is an uncommonly able and perceptive piece of work, which manages within a rather brief compass to throw light on many important problems. It deserves the attention of all those who are interested in political theory or the history of political thought.

FREDERICK M. WATKINS.

Yale University.

Government under Law: A Conference Held at Harvard Law School on the Occasion of the Bi-centennial of John Marshall, Chief Justice of the United States, 1801–1835. EDITED BY ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1956. Pp. xi. 587. $7.50.)

With support from the Rockefeller Foundation, Harvard Law School gathered together a distinguished group of professors, judges, lawyers, and theologians for a three-day conference in September, 1955. Four principal themes were chosen: Government as Protector of the People against the Government; Government under Law in Time of Crisis; The Meaning of Due Process; and The Value of Constitutionalism Today. Papers by a distinguished French scholar, Professor André Tunc, and by Professor Joseph M. Snee, S. J., Mr. Francis Shackelford, Professor Charles Fairman, Judge William H. Hastie, Dean McGeorge Bundy, Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, and Mr. John Lord O'Brian were printed and distributed four months in advance of the conference to those scheduled to attend. They have now been reprinted for public distribution, together with the comments from the floor, the opening address of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, addresses by the (English) Master of the Rolls and the Chief Justices of Australia, Canada, and South Africa, and the shorter remarks of the Chief Justices of the United States and of Massachusetts, Dean Griswold, and President Pusey.

Needless to say, the papers and addresses are uneven in quality and the total volume is somewhat lacking in continuity. Professor Henry M. Hart protested the "note of negativism" that he found running throughout the formal papers (p. 142), such as Father Snee's assertion (p. 105) that "the story of political theory is that of a quest for effective means of limiting the exercise of governmental power and for philosophical justifications of such limitation." In their remarks from the floor the authors attempted, rather unsuccessfully, to meet this attack. Nevertheless these papers raised a good many fundamental issues. The addresses by the guests from abroad brought into even sharper focus the fact that the recognition of basic rights and the acceptance of legislative supremacy are not necessarily antithetical.

In his Foreword, Dean Griswold states (p. v) that "Marshall has come to symbolize for all Americans the doctrine that a written Constitution, interpreted by a Supreme Court, is the supreme law of the land." Nowhere in the entire volume are we reminded of the fact that it was John Marshall, before he ascended the bench, who presented one of the strongest arguments against the right of the Supreme or any other court to question the validity even of a state

statute alleged to violate a national treaty—see the Reporter's summary of his argument and that of the court in *Ware v Hylton*, 3 U. S. (3 Dall.) 199, 211, 235 (1796). Perhaps it was an awareness of this change in position that Mr. Justice Frankfurter had in mind when he referred (p. 8) to "the courage of *Marbury* v. *Madison*"; for it hardly took great courage to assert a power expressly recognized by Congress in Article 25 of the Judiciary Act and frequently accepted by the then President, Thomas Jefferson, in letters to his friends. Again, perhaps the Justice had in mind the numerous issues rather fully discussed by the opinion in that case that were not at all necessary to its decision, for he reminds us (p. 8) that the "radiating potencies" of Marshall's opinions "go far beyond the actual holdings of the decisions." He adds—and with sound reason—that "to slight these phases of his opinions as dicta, though such they were on a technical view, is to disregard significant aspects of his labors and the ways in which constitutitional law develops" (p. 11).

The clash between those who seek definiteness in the judicially enforceable rules of constitutional law and those who prefer that they remain flexible came fully to light. Mr. Justice Frankfurter developed the thesis that due process, "once we go beyond its strictly procedural aspect," and equal protection, being "precisely defined neither by history nor in terms," are of "dubious . . . appropriateness for judicial enforcement" (p. 20). After listening to this and other comments, Professor Freund remarked, "Almost every justice of the Supreme Court, over the generations, has had occasion to lament the fact that so brave and delicate a responsibility was intrusted to so incompetent a group as his colleagues. This unanimity of judgment is, I submit, the most impressive argument against the practice of judicial review in due process cases. And if the judges made a botch of things in the twenties when they were censors on the right, how can he expect them to do any better as censors on the left?" (p. 356). On the other hand, Judge Hastie attempted to prove that the tests of due process "lend themselves, perhaps more than is generally acknowledged, to intelligible exposition" (p. 336); but two pages later his final conclusion was on a different plane: "It may be more desirable that the state officer realize that the whole adventure into impropriety is risky than that he be confident that he can proceed unchecked for an indicated distance on his aberrant course." Although most speakers praised the courts for the restraint they had shown in the exercise of their powers under these "ambulant, adaptable" clauses, Mr. Thurgood Marshall of the N.A.A.C.P. quite understandably pleaded (p. 351) for "less self-restraint than has been used."

Even more fundamental differences in approach appeared between the views of the American and the foreign participants. Professor Tunc, explaining the French system of remedies against administrative action, insisted that "there is no real need for control of legislative action. We consider that civil liberties are much more endangered in daily life by executive or administrative action than by that of the legislature" (pp. 73–4). Father Snee, citing Madison, countered (p. 116) with the assertion that the limitations of a bill of rights are "not so necessary upon the executive" since this is "the weakest branch of the government." If American history has borne out Madison's conclusion, it cer-

tainly has not sustained his reason. Of course the English and Commonwealth visitors spoke for legislative supremacy and parliamentary government; but all agreed that an independent judiciary was a *sine qua non* of "government under law."

There are many errors of fact in the book. *Fletcher v. Peck* and the *Dartmouth College Case* are not "the only two Marshallian constitutional opinions that concern individual rights as such" (p. 17). Surely *United States v. Saline Bank*, 26 U. S. (1 Pet.) 100 (1828), holding that a witness in a federal court need not answer questions when to do so might incriminate him of state offenses, must be added. Nor is the vesting of federal jurisdiction in state courts "peculiar to" Australia (p. 319). And of course the Chief Justice of Australia was in error in assuming (p. 322) that we, like they, never permit national and state laws to overlap. If this were true, the *Lanza* rule of successive prosecutions could never have been born. But on the whole, the guest speakers showed a more thorough knowledge of the nature and operation of our political institutions than our judges and practitioners normally show of theirs. The only speaker to point out that a good many Marshallisms no longer are good law was the Chief Justice of Canada.

Undoubtedly there were times when these guests from abroad were not impressed by the logic used to combat legislative supremacy. Witness the following (p. 119—footnotes omitted): "In a representative form of government . . . the state is supposed to reflect and execute the will of the people; but . . . the voting majority cannot be identified with the people. . . . If the whole people, by the 'solemn and authoritative act' of establishing a constitution as fundamental law, have determined that certain matters are not to be subject to the will of the majority, however good or desirable may be the object of that will, then the majority have no authority to make rules and regulations in the prohibited area." This may be. But if Congress and the state legislatures are not chosen by "the whole people"—and I do not contend that they are—how does one arrive at the conclusion that "the whole people" adopted the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment, which were adopted by Congress and state legislatures?

The book contains valuable information and ideas. Professor Cushman gives as neat a summary of the broad lines of development of substantive due process as I have seen in concentrated form. Professor McCloskey explains why the ancient convention that "the courts are unconcerned with a law's wisdom" must go if modern due process tests are to remain. Professor Fairman makes a strong and reasoned appeal for *planned* civil defense lest martial law prove necessary to fill the vacuum in case of an atomic war. The Chief Justice of Canada explains some of the advantages of the Canadian advisory opinion, and the Chief Justice of South Africa explains why jury trials are becoming even less frequent there than in England. These may have little or nothing to do with Marshall; but perhaps the anniversary of his birth served as an excuse for the conference rather than its basis.

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Judicial Review in the English-Speaking World. By Edward McWhinney. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1956. Pp. xiv, 201. $8.50.)

The author of this compact comparative work on judicial review in the principal English-speaking countries is unusually well prepared by study and experience in the field. He is a lawyer, a student of jurisprudence, and a political scientist. He has lived, studied, and taught in Australia, the United States, Canada, and France. He is now Associate Professor of Law at the University of Toronto.

The work begins with three chapters on constitutional law in Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries, parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law in the United Kingdom, and The Privy Council as final appellate tribunal for the overseas empire. Then follow four chapters on judicial review in Commonwealth countries: Canada, Australia, and South Africa (one chapter each), and India, Ceylon, and Pakistan (in one); and two on non-Commonwealth countries: "Catholic Ireland" and the United States. A concluding chapter (10) summarizes the general argument of the book and suggests some guiding principles of judicial review for the Supreme Court of Canada, now the final appellate tribunal for that country. As a whole the book is succinct, well reasoned, and thoroughly documented. It reveals a scholar who is completely at home in the jurisprudence of the Commonwealth of Nations and a master of the problems of judicial review in those countries. A better brief introduction to judicial review in the Commonwealth countries would be difficult to picture.

Inasmuch as five of the countries dealt with have federal or pseudo-federal systems of government—Australia, Canada, India, Pakistan, and the United States—the book has value also to students of the problems of judicial review under federal constitutions.

The work as a whole is more in the nature of an extended essay than a comprehensive treatise on judicial review in the countries concerned. Many topics are not dealt with—and who could expect anything else in a work of such brevity? The historical developments in particular are underemphasized, while the theoretical and analytical approach is given priority.

A major purpose of the author is to examine the philosophies of supreme court justices concerning the functions of a supreme court *vis-à-vis* the legislative and executive branches of government. Should the court participate actively in the determination of public policy? Should the judges look to present and probable future conditions and so interpret the written constitution as to find therein the flexibility needed to permit the "political branches" to provide for changing public needs? What if this calls for overruling past decisions? Or overriding provincial in favor of central authority? Or, alternatively, should the court treat the written constitution as a statute, as has been done by the Privy Council and several Commonwealth supreme courts, and interpret it strictly or "harshly" against the government in doubtful cases? Should it pay any attention whatever to those parts of briefs ("Brandeis briefs") and arguments presented to it that purport to show prevailing social and economic conditions and public needs as bases for decisions on constitutional powers?

The author identifies two opposing positions as "activist" and "positivist." These are not necessarily the same as "liberal" and "strict" construction, or liberal and conservative economic views, but there certainly are rather close parallels among these variously-termed dichotomies.

It seems to this reviewer that much can be gained, as this book shows, by centering a discussion of judicial review around such a pair of opposing terms as activist and positivist, but also that much is lost thereby. To use this method greatly oversimplifies the problems involved. It sets up a single dichotomy to do work that calls for a number of scales of values. It overlooks the fact that every justice is a different individual, full of complexities, and that no two would fit exactly any given definition of an activist or a positivist.

Furthermore, although the author finds strong activist tendencies in the United States Supreme Court since 1937 and holds that court before the reader as more or less the exemplar of the activist position which he in general favors, that court never admits that it is making policy. Its approach to policy making is almost as covert as was that of the "positivist" Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In short, the actual differences among individual justices, and among courts, are numerous and complex; they are different in degree more than in kind; and the differences can be measured only by using a number of different attitude scales such as are suggested by such terms as "justiciable question," "standing of parties," avoidance of constitutional questions, respect for other branches of government, respect for the powers of the states, "preferred position" of civil liberties, and so on.

This reviewer wonders how many recent Supreme Court justices have seriously thought of themselves as being "activists" in the author's sense of that term. Are there not various kinds and degrees of activism among the justices, and not a little mixture of positivism, too? And, in practice, is not a justice's positivism or activism conditioned by various other motivations, ideas, and traits of personality? Nevertheless, the reviewer is forced to agree with the author that the Privy Council and the High Court of Australia, for example, have shown tendencies considerably different from those evident in the recent Supreme Court of the United States.

The author is certainly right that it would be better if high court justices had a clearer understanding of their responsibilities in the process of democratic government, but for them to get clear only on the issue of judicial positivism or activism, as he uses these terms, surely is not enough.

WILLIAM ANDERSON.

University of Minnesota.

Four-Power Control in Germany and Austria, 1945–1946. I. Germany. By MICHAEL BALFOUR. *II. Austria.* By JOHN MAIR. (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. ix, 390. $7.70.)

In this valuable book, which deals with most of the early phases of the occupation of Germany and Austria, the authors, both of whom participated in the occupation of these two countries, carry forward the excellent war-time

series of the Survey of International Affairs. More than two-thirds of the volume is quite properly devoted to the German as the larger and more important of the two occupations, and something is gained by placing these two experiences side by side. One is able to discern, from the thorough researches and clear presentations of both authors, not only the plans but also the actual operation of both of these great ventures in international administration.

It becomes very clear in the perspective of this study how the execution of policy is quite different from determining it, and one not only sees the magnitude and importance of the problems involved, but also is brought to understand where differences and disagreements among the erstwhile Allies developed. The basic difficulty was lack of Allied agreement in actually organizing and manipulating any agreed plan. It is indeed a miracle that the occupation did not bog down completely. Had it not been for British cooperation and American energy, initiative, and resources, the western zones would have become a quagmire of failures, and the Germans would have starved to death.

Perhaps the basic failure in all the planning of the Allies was the inability of the planners to have any realistic conception of the total situation after the war, of Germany's chaotic condition, and of Soviet intransigence and perfidy. And there is much to be said for the conclusion of the two authors that the doctrine of "unconditional surrender" and the failure to advance northeast through Jugoslavia were elemental mistakes of the western planners, particularly Roosevelt. In various places the wisdom of Churchill and the doubtful proposals of Roosevelt are emphasized.

Aside from General Clay's indispensable and well documented book, which deals largely with the American zone, we have lacked comparative treatments of the various zones and of the variety of ways in which the different powers proceeded to carry out their responsibilities. The authors, and particularly Mr. Balfour, vividly present, with the utmost fairness and objectivity, the programs and actions of all four occupying powers. Among other things there is presented one of the best pictures of the condition of Germany at the time of surrender; of the organization and work of both the Control Council in Germany and the counterpart in Austria; of the attitudes of both the Germans and the Austrians; and of the problems of denazification and property control. All the essential elements are in this book to enable one to understand "why things happened as they did" and what was done to the Germans in the different zones.

Obviously one can differ with the authors in certain evaluations and point out certain aspects which deserve more emphasis. For instance, the brief discussion of administration (pp. 184–203) fails to convey the significance of the *Länderrat* in the American zone as the instrument for activating the whole administrative process in the states and localities of the American zone, and of the value of holding early elections in rebuilding and resuscitating the whole structure of government in the American zone. True, Mr. Balfour points out that "the Americans moved faster than the British in handing responsibility back to the Germans" and that this "proved successful." But he does not quite

put his finger on some of the real reasons for this success: for instance, General Clay's masterful leadership and the zonal device which he utilized to solve many of the early problems.

In all essentials, however, this is a very level-headed, fair, and complete account of the critical first two years of the occupation in two different settings. No student of this field can neglect these painstaking researches, even though the authors insist that they have "not had access to official papers."

JAMES K. POLLOCK.

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La querelle de la C.E.D.: essais d'analyse sociologique. By JACQUES FAUVET, ALFRED GROSSER, STANLEY HOFFMAN, J. J. MARCHAND, JEAN STOETZEL, JACQUES VERNANT. EDITED BY RAYMOND ARON AND DANIEL LERNER. (Paris: Libraire Armand Colin. 1956. Pp. xvi, 216.)

Professors Aron and Lerner have put together a highly illuminating set of essays on the defeat of the European Defense Community Treaty in the French Assembly in 1954. An English translation is now available: *France Defeats EDC* (New York, Praeger, 1957, $5.00).

The leading essay, by M. Aron, summarizes the main facts with admirable lucidity. After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the Pleven government proposed E.D.C. in September 1950 as a compromise between German armament, demanded by the United States, and French hostility against a resurgence of the German *Wehrmacht* in any form. The United States government accepted this compromise as the best way of gaining French parliamentary consent to a German armed force, and because "the combination between the rearmament of the German Federal Republic and European unity was apt to please American opinion" (p. 5). The E.D.C. treaty was defeated in the French National Assembly partly for domestic reasons: two major parties supporting it, the M.R.P. and the Socialists, weakened by the 1951 elections, had left the governing coalition, while non-Communist opponents of the E.D.C., particularly a strengthened Gaullist faction, formed by 1954 an important part of the government's majority.

There were other reasons, too. While E.D.C. offered to Germany what she lacked, an armed force up to division level, it proposed to take from France something she had: a unified national army and general staff, with French-appointed generals, subject to French policy decisions. When M. Mendès-France's compromise proposals were rejected in August 1954 at Brussels by Germany and the Benelux countries, E.D.C.'s defeat in the French Assembly was inevitable, M. Aron believes, regardless of anything Mendès-France could have done. Contributory factors were French preoccupation with Indochina and Algiers, and the "coexistence" mood of 1954, but more fundamental was the gradual shift among the friends of E.D.C. from hailing it as a positive good to defending it as a lesser evil. The popularity of European integration was spent, outweighed by the unpopularity of German armament. The French parliament, including the Left, rejected the European solution proposed by a

French government and supported by the State Department; and it accepted the alternative of national German armament, proposed from the outset by the United States military in the Pentagon.

Other essays offer facinating details. Jacques Fauvet traces shifts in parliament. E.D.C. was already dead, he finds, in April 1954 under the Laniel government; putting military integration ahead of economic and cultural ties was "to put the cart before the ox"; domestic alignments triumphed over weaker European loyalties. Stanley Hoffman incisively traces the subsequent breakup of the pro- and anti-E.D.C. coalitions. He distinguishes "ultra-Europeans" favoring integration from above; "European *ralliés*" favoring functional arrangements; and "Atlantic *ralliés*" favoring whatever might strengthen the West. With the anti-E.D.C. coalition likewise divided, both camps soon gave way to new alignments. Jean Stoetzel finds that public opinion polls showed consistently the unpopularity of E.D.C. and the greater popularity of economic and cultural approaches to European unity; a seven-page appendix of poll data buttresses his points. Alfred Grosser analyzes the search for a French-German policy; J. Vernant documents with cost statistics the fears of French industry of losing annually $200–300 million in defense orders to cheaper E.D.C. suppliers; and J. J. Marchand's survey of the press suggests that French employers' organizations covertly opposed E.D.C.

Daniel Lerner's concluding essay utilized a quantity of high-level interview data for a remarkable piece of analysis. He explodes the geographical interpretations of the anti-E.D.C. vote in a manner that should make these pages required reading in any discussion of geography and politics. His shrewd comments on psychological overtones (E.D.C. seemed to diminish for many Frenchmen the image they held of France) and on the gradual changes in the French military situation (once nuclear parity reduces the effectiveness of American protection) are worth pondering.

Raymond Aron's postscript of 1956 differs markedly in tone and temper from his opening statement. He concludes that European integration died for our generation with the defeat of E.D.C. It is a measure of the merit of this book that it could serve as a mine of data to support the opposite thesis: that E.D.C. was far less popular than other steps toward European integration would have been, and that many of these alternative approaches are not yet closed.

Altogether, these essays are suggestive first interpretations of a very rich material. They sometimes contradict each other, in ways that deserve further inquiry. Time and further analysis of the data may clear up many of these points. In the meantime, the authors have made a contribution in thorough and imaginative research that puts the profession in their debt.

KARL W. DEUTSCH.

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Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost: Text, Background, and Meaning of Khrushchev's Secret Report to the Twentieth Congress on the Night of February 24–25, 1956.

By Bertram D. Wolfe. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1956. Pp. 322. $3.95.)

The "off-the-record" address delivered by N. S. Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union served to culminate the campaign of "de-Stalinization" which had commenced by innuendo in 1953. This fantastic document, with its many revelations and posthumous "rehabilitations" of thousands, has provided confirmation of much that specialists on the Soviet Union have been saying and writing over the years. It is also the most damning indictment of Communism ever to come from the lips of a professed Communist. Its publication between hard covers is a welcome addition to the constantly growing bibliography of basic works on the Soviet regime.

However, the principal value of this volume, in addition to the improvement of the original translation of the address released by the Department of State, lies in the forceful commentary provided by Bertram Wolfe, whose tremendous knowledge of Soviet Communism was gained largely through first-hand experience. Wolfe's commentary is hardly detached and dispassionate, and it was not intended to be such. Khrushchev had delivered a tendentious speech, and Wolfe, a master of the written word, had little choice but to write an open exposé of Khrushchev's many contradictions, omissions, and deliberate falsifications. Although Wolfe refers contemptuously to Stalin's heirs as "pygmies," "dwarfs," "epigones," and "smallish men"—in contrasting them with their mentor—his commentary possesses unquestionable validity and Khrushchev's speech should not be read without it.

Wolfe asks whether Stalin's crimes can be attributed to Stalin alone or did not, instead, result from the Soviet system itself: "these exorcists are the disciples, accomplices and heirs of the huge and monstrous spirit they are trying to exorcise" (pp. 76 f.); "can the cult of Stalin's person be so fraught with evil and the cult of Lenin's person, which Khrushchev celebrates, be free of it?" (p. 89). Another major criticism is that Khrushchev praised all that Stalin did prior to 1934 and, in distinguishing between Stalin's "great achievements" and his crimes, apparently approved of the failure of the "Old Bolsheviks" to obey Lenin's Testament by removing Stalin from the Party Secretaryship. Khrushchev approved of the ways in which Stalin dealt with "Trotskyites," "Bukharinites," and Ukrainian and Georgian Communists accused of "bourgeois nationalism." Wolfe notes that "it is curious to watch Khrushchev's game of hide-and-seek with the date when Lenin's 'wise characterization of Stalin' finally became 'correct' " (p. 125).

Among the many inconsistencies observed by Wolfe, the following merit mention: crimes committed against non-Communists were not crimes in Khrushchev's lexicon; while denouncing the cult of Stalin, Khrushchev admitted that the confused *protégés* had begged Stalin to return to the helm when he took to sulking during the dark days of the war; Beria was blamed by Khrushchev for executions of Communists which occurred in 1938 under Yezhov; Khrushchev blamed Beria for the January 1953 "Doctors' Case," although, in fact, it was the latter who had actually rehabilitated and released the unfortunate medics;

Khrushchev denounced the decree of December 1, 1934, while at the same time he relied upon it as a "legal" basis for purging the "Beria gang"; Khrushchev condemned the use of "confessions" by Stalin but employed the same practice against Beria, who was denied a public trial but was said to have "confessed." Yet it was such inconsistencies that prompted a Soviet citizen to refer to Khrushchev as a "wily peasant" in the course of a recent conversation with the present writer.

A series of appendices includes documentation of the Leninist norms of Party life, and in this way Wolfe delivers a mortal blow to the illusion that Stalin departed radically from Leninism. Also included are the formerly suppressed Lenin documents, published in the Soviet Union following the Twentieth Congress, as well as Bukharin's "Notes of an Economist," which are of importance since the "sin" of Bukharinism is still conjured up in Khrushchev's Soviet Union.

Certain critical observations are in order. Since Wolfe's commentary on the right-hand pages does not usually coincide with the content of Khrushchev's text on the opposite page, both items should probably be read separately. All quotations employed by Wolfe are not documented, and the index, so important in a volume of this type, is incomplete. One may also question Wolfe's assertions that Ignatiev, the former minister of state security, was a "Khrushchev-man" (pp. 13, 195) long ago. However, these are relatively minor drawbacks in an important and rewarding volume.

The repercussions of Khrushchev's address and the decision to go all out in the apparent "de-Stalinization" campaign were to make themselves felt more than a year later, in June of 1957, with the expulsion of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich from the Central Committee and its Presidium. As the "collective leadership" has become less collective one can only recall that the essential element of Leninism and Stalinism—the monopoly of omniscience and the excommunication of "factions" and heretics—remains with the Soviet system.

JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.

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Albania. EDITED BY STAVRO SKENDI WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF MEHMET BEQIRAJ, GEORGE BOSSY, FRED PISKY, AND QEMAL VOKOPOLA. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1956. Pp. xiv, 389. $7.50.)

The present volume of Dr. Skendi and his associates has two distinguished merits: it is a detailed study of Communist rule in Albania and, at the same time, the first comprehensive survey of that country. It contains systematic accounts of the political, economic, cultural, and social life; in addition, there are introductory chapters devoted to the historical background, the land, and the people.

The part of the book dealing with the political systems can be read with interest not only by those who are in search of more information about Albania, but also by those who are involved in studies of Southeastern Europe and of the Soviet camp in general. A brief and pointed presentation of Albania's political life since 1878, of the governmental organization and constitutional develop-

ment, of the formation of the armed forces, police, and propaganda apparatus, and of the country's involvement in Balkan affairs and Italian encroachments is followed by a full account of the Communist ascendancy during World War II and the subsequent Communist rule. The role of Tito's Yugoslavia in organizing the Communist Party, in guiding the resistance movement, and in setting up the new governmental structure in Albania is clearly and objectively described. Various phases of the postwar development are also minutely traced: the Yugoslav influence through 1947, and the shifts in Albania's policies, with the ensuing purges of the ranking Party leaders after Tito's break with Moscow.

The efforts to give a rounded picture of each field, in addition to the introductory general survey, unavoidably lead to repetitions. This may be annoying to some readers; however, it may come in handy to those who would confine their interest only to a specific field. The difficulties the authors faced in finding information account for unevenness in the value of various chapters. Thus, while the chapters dealing with the political, cultural, and social life contain a wealth of important and reliable data, which would lend themselves to further analytical and comparative studies, the chapters on the economic field leave much to be desired before they could be considered of equal usefulness. Albania's economy has been the field least treated in the past, and it is in this sphere that the Communist sources are very scanty and, for the most part, unreliable.

Concentrating on the present period, when everything is in flux, it was rather difficult for the writers to be judicious in selecting data and in devoting attention to the elements of lasting importance at the expense of those of passing value. It also seems that they have deliberately refrained from attempts to analyze or interpret their data, limiting themselves to evaluation when it was deemed necessary. Thus they have stressed the informative side of their work; they have been highly successful in reducing ignorance about Albania, which had acquired the reputation of being the least known country in the Soviet orbit.

This work bears witness that no matter how small a nation may be, there are values to be discovered and appreciated and problems which merit our attention and await solution. Finally, Albania is a part of a wider area—a part of the troubled Southeastern Europe and of the threatening Soviet bloc. All efforts to enhance our understanding of these areas should command our wholehearted support. As in this case, so in many others, native scholars of various interests, in cooperation with American scholars, may fill many gaps in our knowledge of the world and achieve results of lasting value.

JOSEPH STRMECKI.

University of Pittsburgh.

Transnational Law. By PHILIP C. JESSUP. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1956. Pp. 113. $3.00.)

Morals, Law, and Power in International Relations. By PERCY E. CORBETT.

(Los Angeles: The John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation. 1956. Pp. 51. $1.50.)

The reader who approaches these volumes with the object less of learning than of being stimulated to think will find himself richly rewarded.

Professor Jessup is in good humor and good form. He is not overwhelmed by world crisis or obsessed with the problem of survival. He has the wisdom to recognize that life must go on, and is going on, even when the issue of life or death seems unprecedentedly immediate. Hence, he deals broadly with the complex problems of what he calls *transnational* relations: situations which may involve (in varying combinations) individuals, corporations, states, international organizations, or other groups, and which are not confined by national boundaries.

While Jessup's devotion to detail may sometimes offend the non-lawyer, he exhibits the great virtue of unfailing skepticism concerning the validity and adequacy of old definitions and categories. *International* is too narrow a term for the diverse relationships that criss-cross the world; *transnational* is offered as a more adequate adjective. The standard dichotomy between domestic and international problems is too absolute; Jessup suggests that all problems of human relations, from that of the divorce-seeking wife to that of the independence-seeking colony, fall along a continuum. He declines to draw deductions from the hoary concept of *sovereignty*, insisting rather that decisions regarding jurisdiction over, and legal rules applicable to, problems arising transnationally should derive from sensible appreciation of realities. He finds—in existence, in growth, and in prospect—rules governing many aspects of transnational relations, and he is not intimidated by the popularity of definitions of *law* too small to contain them. Jessup throws off the fetters of old concepts and provides powerful stimulus to fresh thinking.

Professor Corbett makes an exceptionally clear-headed and judicious contribution to the contemporary debate over the actual and desirable roles of power and morality in international relations. He insists upon a realism which recognizes that the actors upon the international stage are not "disembodied essences without conscience or feeling" (p. 11), but men who cannot escape the moral quality characteristic of their species, and that national objectives are influenced, necessarily and properly, by considerations of moral purpose as well as by calculations of power advantage. He contributes further to balanced thinking by pricking at the myth, now decidedly over-inflated, of the effectiveness of balance-of-power mechanisms.

In some respects, Corbett's thinking seems less emancipated than Jessup's from standard rigidities. Having defined law as a coercive order, he is unable to find international law, although he does discern "a movement towards law in this domain" (p. 21). In fact, it appears that he really means to restrict his allegation of lawlessness to the highest political zones of international affairs, for he credits law—or "rules of a legal type"—with useful operation in zones of lesser significance (pp. 24, 26). His primary concern is with the Big Problem

of war and peace; his conclusion is that the scheme of world federalism, unattainable for the foreseeable future, holds the answer to that problem. One might ask whether the theoretical validity of the world federalist solution has not become an axiom in restraint of thought, properly subject to the kind of critical gaze that Jessup turns upon established concepts and doctrines.

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.

University of Michigan.

The Representation of the United States Abroad. (New York: The American Assembly, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University. 1956. Pp. 217. $1.00.)

The conferences of the American Assembly, held since 1951 under the auspices of Columbia University, have provided high caliber discussions of several major questions confronting the United States. The publication reviewed here contains the background papers and final report of the Ninth American Assembly which met in May, 1956, and which considered the problem of the representation of the United States abroad.

The burden of the discussions at this Assembly concerned the tremendous expansion in America's world responsibilities since World War II and the need for strengthening the organization both in Washington and overseas for carrying out these responsibilities. A close look at the growth in this overseas representation since 1939 provides dramatic evidence of the "revolution" in American foreign policy in the past two decades (4,600 civilian employees abroad in 1939, and over 29,000 in 1955—exclusive of military personnel). Much of this growth has been due to the undertaking of such programs as foreign economic aid, mutual security, technical assistance, information and cultural relations, and participation in numerous international organizations like the United Nations, NATO, SEATO, and the Organization of American States.

The various background papers used by the Assembly dealt with the special problems of economic representation overseas, information and cultural representation overseas, military representation abroad, and United States representation to international and multilateral organizations. A special paper was also presented on one of the major problems of overseas representation: the coordination of the many policies and programs of the various agencies of government involved in foreign affairs. Lincoln Gordon, John Lindeman, Howland H. Sargent, William T. R. Fox, and Ben T. Moore prepared the various papers. Each has had extensive field experience in his respective specialty and has succeeded in communicating to the reader a sense of first-hand knowledge about the operations and problems of the particular program being discussed.

The Assembly concluded that while the objectives of American foreign policy have been remarkably constant, the organization of our government to carry out these objectives has in recent years been "characterized by successive improvisations." The main requirement for a sounder and more stable organization of our overseas activities is a "strengthened and broadened career service,

enjoying public confidence and such official support as will render it invulnerable to irresponsible attack."

A major recommendation of the Assembly, which merits careful consideration, is the suggestion that the United States Information Agency and the International Cooperation Administration be manned primarily by career officers. Behind this recommendation lies the difficulty experienced by these agencies in recruiting sufficient personnel for temporary assignments who not only were qualified specialists in the desired field, but who could easily adjust to living and working in the different and often unusual cultures of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. A career service for the USIA and ICA should be operated on the same general principles as the regular career Foreign Service, with no discrimination in opportunities for rotation of personnel or advancement to the position of Chief of Mission.

The Assembly also emphasized the importance of expanded training for all overseas personnel, especially in language and area studies. The Department of State has begun to move ahead in line with this suggestion, but unfortunately has encountered strong Congressional opposition to appropriating the necessary additional funds for enlarging the existing training program.

Several recommendations are made to improve the coordination of foreign policies and operations. In Washington, the State Department should be the chief agency responsible for the over-all coordination of foreign policy, and it should be prepared to absorb specialized agencies whose primary functions are in the foreign field. Abroad, the ambassadors should be given wider discretion, within a more clearly defined framework of policy in Washington, to secure the unified development and execution of both policy and operations. Periodic regional conferences of ambassadors and functional officers should also be held to achieve better coordination of the increasing number of problems that are regional in character (mutual defense, economic development).

Those who are interested in the administration of American foreign affairs will find this publication extremely informative and thought-provoking. One can only regret that the record of the Assembly discussions that took place could not also be made available.

ELTON ATWATER.

The Pennsylvania State University.

Der Stand der Menschenrechte im Völkerrecht. By HEINZ GURADZE. (Göttingen: Verlag Otto Schwartz. 1956. Pp. xiv, 236.)

In the growing literature relating to human rights, Dr. Guradze's book is noteworthy on two counts: first, it provides an analysis of the European Convention on Human Rights signed at Rome on November 4, 1950, by thirteen members of the Council of Europe; and secondly, it is concerned in some detail with the impact of this Convention on the municipal law of a particular country: namely, the German Federal Republic, which is a party to the Convention. This analysis is preceded by a discussion of the position of individuals as subjects of international law, of the function of the domestic jurisdiction res-

ervation in the law and practice of the United Nations, of the articles of the Charter devoted to human rights, the Universal Declaration of 1948, and the draft covenants on Human Rights.

Proceeding methodogically, the author affirms that individuals are, in principle, subjects of international law. Regarding the relation between the latter and municipal law, he accepts the construction of moderate monism. He also argues, persuasively, that human rights are a matter of international concern and that in practice Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter has not seriously interfered with the handling of complaints about violations of such rights by organs of the United Nations. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights is considered to be unrealistic and to contain meaningless (Articles 14, 15, 28) as well as utopian provisions concerning economic and social rights (Article 21 in conjunction with Article 2). On the other hand, the draft covenants fail to establish the rights of property, asylum, and citizenship. The author deplores particularly the absence of a recognition of the freedom of science, research, and teaching.

The European Covenant has entered into force and become binding on a majority of the fifteen signatories including Germany. Applying the monistic construction, the author contends that the Covenant supercedes incompatible provisions of the Bonn Constitution as well as of the constitutions of the *Länder* and that it cannot be modified by later statutory legislation. The author does not go so far as to claim that German law in conflict with the European Covenant is *ipso facto* invalid, but he does argue that the constitutional, judicial, and administrative organs of the Republic and the *Länder* will be bound by the judgments of the European Tribunal. This Tribunal will come into being when adhered to by eight contracting States. So far, that is, by January 1955, only Ireland, Denmark, and the Netherlands have adhered.

Comparing and contrasting the European Covenant and the Bonn Constitution, the author concludes that the former goes beyond the latter in several points. For instance, the Covenant establishes conditions for a fair trial, particularly in favor of aliens, which are not found in the Constitution. The Covenant, in Article 6, paragraph 2, establishes the principle that the defendant shall be presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The author believes this principle to be implicit in German law, but he admits that it is disregarded in practice. He trusts that henceforth German judges will refrain from admonishing the defendant to confess humbly his misdeeds or from inflicting a stiffer penalty upon the defendant for "persistent denial" of the charges brought against him by the prosecutor. The prohibition against retroactive penal laws is more explicit in the Covenant than in the Constitution. On the other hand, the German Government made a reservation to Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Covenant which excludes from this prohibition punishment for acts which at the time of commission were punishable according to general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. The author points out that the effectiveness of the reservation is moot, inasmuch as such principles have become part of, and shall take precedence over, federal law in virtue of Article 25 of the Bonn

Constitution. The Covenant, however, permits capital punishment, which is abolished by Article 102 of the Constitution, in this respect the more progressive. The Covenant provides for freedom of thought, religion, and opinion, whereas the Constitution does not mention the first but specifically secures freedom of teaching and research. The right to marry is not included in the Constitution but is broadly established by the Covenant. The effect of this will be a liberalization of German law. A Protocol to the European Covenant, not yet ratified by Germany, deals with the right of property, education, and free, secret, and periodic elections. These matters are amply covered by the Constitution, although the right to an education is not specifically mentioned. The effect of the Protocol will be to prohibit the introduction of a *numerus clauzus* in public schools and universities. It would also provide effective protection of the property of foreign corporations. The Constitution contains several fundamental rights which have been omitted from the Covenant: e.g., freedom of movement, the right of asylum, the prohibition of denationalization, and various measures devoted to the protection of mothers and illegitimate children.

The analysis of the Constitution and Covenant is based on the writings of a large number of German jurists and account is taken of the jurisprudence of courts. However, this analysis suffers from excessive brevity and consequent lack of clarity. Reproduction of the full text of the Covenant would have made the analysis more comprehensible. In conclusion, the author expresses the hope that the theory of the subjects of international law will throw off the conceptual framework inherited from the period of the Thirty Years War and that the coming generation of statesmen will confer upon the individual the necessary procedural rights without which the substantive rights created by the European Covenant cannot be fully effective. The right of petition is merely the first reluctant step in the right direction.

LEO GROSS.

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Wilson: The New Freedom. By ARTHUR S. LINK. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1956. Pp. ix, 504. $7.50.)

Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study. By ALEXANDER L. GEORGE AND JULIETTE L. GEORGE. (New York: The John Day Company. 1956. Pp. xvii, 362. $6.00.)

Political biography tantalizes historians, journalists, psychologists, poets, and occasionally political scientists who wander into the labyrinthine coves of personality. The two volumes under review represent the different methods of the historian and the political scientist, one genetic and chronological, the other analytical and developmental. Arthur Link has established himself as the foremost Wilson historian of this period. The Georges have applied the Freudian techniques principally developed in the United States by Harold Lasswell and Nathan Leites. Link's *The New Freedom* is the second in his projected multivolumed "definitive" biography of political science's favorite son. Carefully and chronologically, Link covers the period from Wilson's inauguration until

the outbreak of World War I, the most fruitful legislative two years in American history outside 1933–35.

The meticulous treatment of detail is sometimes tedious, especially in dealing with the complexities of Wilson's Mexican diplomacy. The biographer seems to delight in revealing Wilson's "mistakes," now crystal clear by the brilliant light of hindsight. One Wilson admirer has privately charged that Link hates Wilson. This reviewer does not accept this interpretation. Probably Link is influenced by the desire to counterbalance the somewhat idolatrous treatment by Ray Stannard Baker and is anxious to live up to high standards of objectivity. He wishes to present "both" or "all" sides of the controversial issues raised by Wilson's behavior. This is creditable but the total effect is somewhat dubious. To one who cut his political teeth in reading about Wilson the picture conveyed by the two studies under review is something of a rehash of the Republican campaign literature from 1913–1921. The reviewer read this propaganda when his boyish party sensibilities were intensely Republican. It comes as a shock to find the voice of scholarship forty years later confirming in detail the Republican charges of egotism against Wilson.

The Georges undertake to penetrate the inner being of Wilson—a task usually left to the confessional or to St. Peter. A common-law judge concluded four centuries ago that the "Devil Himself knoweth not the motives of man." His satanic majesty, by reputation, is an eminently learned personage. Perhaps he did not have the advantages of psychoanalysis. To begin with, the data about Wilson are few. His medical records were destroyed a quarter-century ago. Accordingly, the Georges, in *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, employ the minimum of evidence to draw the maximum of inferences. From the fact that Wilson's father was a caustic and sarcastic critic of young Wilson, who was a rather poor student in his early days, the writers infer that a gross sense of personal inadequacy grew in Wilson but that he magnificently sublimated it into an overt, profound admiration and affection for his father. A smoldering hatred was submerged, which produced inner contradictions. Wilson needed to dominate, to be aggressive in order to prove his adequacy before the image of the father censor. This inner urge to power gave Wilson, reared in a rigorous Calvinism, a sense of guilt. His personal conflicts produced a psychosomatic consequence that led to several near nervous-breakdowns, followed eventually by a physical collapse accompanied by a desire for martyrdom. Why the Freudian death wish was not applied here is not clear.

The net result of the George study of *Wilson and House* is to show that the latter could nurse Wilson's ego by flattery and exercise great power but that when he became critical Wilson shut him off. The climax was reached at Paris and in the League of Nations fight. Wilson's inability to compromise with Lodge produced the death of his treaty. The authors do not spare Lodge, though they do not make him the Devil that ardent Wilsonians usually do. Perhaps their skilled minds can now be turned to an analysis of Lodge in order to balance up the score. Undoubtedly, factors of temperament were present but they were minor as compared with the social and economic forces involved.

Wilson represented, though belatedly, a challenge to the social order which grew out of the post-Civil-War period. If Wilson could make the Democratic party into an effective majority liberal party, the whole course of American society might be changed. Lodge symbolized the apogee of the Hamiltonian ideal of the well-born and well-to-do. Wilson was the respectable front to Bryanistic populism but a cultural and temperamental conservative. Wilson developed but did not perfect a means of overcoming the political obstructions set up in the United States Constitution. If the Georges are correct that Wilson had aggressive impulses which were gratified by the exhilaration of power, perhaps this is a necessary ingredient of successful political leadership in the United States. Similar accusations have been made against all strong political leaders who wished to establish vigorous parties with definite sets of values.

Jackson, Clay, Lincoln, both Roosevelts, and Truman, as well as Wilson, have been characterized a "imperious," "domineering," "egotistical," and "stubborn." Is it possible that fathers of future presidents should be encouraged to frustrate their sons so they will be effective political leaders? Can we say that mild-mannered, pacific, ineffective fathers are responsible for the Buchanans, Fillmores, Hardings, and Eisenhowers? That Wilson had peculiarities of temperament he acknowledged. He liked a fight and he didn't like to lose, and this was a limiting factor in his tragic defeat on the League, but it is only a part of the story. To reduce politics to a struggle of personal power seekers is to oversimplify, though personal loyalties, hates, ambitions, and frustrations are a part of the political process. The books under review are both competent studies. No *post mortem* is ever totally satisfactory, for the posthumous diagnosis explains why the patient died but never fully accounts for his living.

Wilson's torment by inner doubts may have resulted as much from his theology as from the conflict of his *id* and *ego*. Calvinism posits total depravity. All human beings are suspect. Any earthly salvation is a contradiction. Wilson, a convinced Calvinist, trusted neither his followers nor himself. Wilson still merits further study before a final verdict.

J. B. SHANNON.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

TVA: The First Twenty Years. EDITED BY ROSCOE MARTIN. (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press; Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 1956. Pp. xiii, 282. $4.50.)

Recently there has been a spate of books about the already much-written-about TVA (see this REVIEW, XLIX, 1163-5, December, 1955, and L, 885–6, September, 1956). This one is an official story. There are sixteen chapters from as many members of the Board and staff, selected from lectures delivered in 1953 at Florida State University. These are supplemented by a final chapter by the editor.

The staff story does well what could be expected. It tells what TVA has done and how. It records the staff view of the agency's accomplishments and also of some of its problems and crucial decisions. It reflects the now familiar "belief system" of the agency and the extent to which the thought patterns on administration—regional resource development, decentralization, cooperative administration, collaborative approach, shared responsibility—permeate the staff thinking. It reasserts old claims: TVA is a "twenty-year demonstration in the democratic administration of the resources of a region" (p. 15); it "stands alone as a regional resource organization in the United States" (p. 244); the corporate form of organization is recognition by Congress "that such an agency needs more freedom in its operations than the regular government agencies" (p. 26); "It is wholly likely that, in the long run, the social engineering processes which brought the TVA program into the aspirations of the people of the Valley will prove more important than the physical engineering structures . . ." (p. 11). All of this is done in compact, forthright, and dignified narrative. The result is a useful addition to earlier accounts. The chapters on the meaning of TVA, administrative foundations, personnel administration, financial administration, and relations to state and local government should be of special value to teachers of public administration seeking convenient summaries for student use.

Yet the staff story is primarily exposition, contains little new information or analysis of criticisms, and projects few issues for the future. Quite different is the thoughtful chapter by the editor. Martin justifiably concludes with respect to the preceding discussion: "TVA emerges from these essays both as an accomplishment in concrete and as a way of governance" (p. 257). But he moves further. He sets forth, after noting the part played by chance, the important decisions that have made TVA and its program what they are. Then he presents the "choices yet to be made." Some relate to program definition: Shall power production dominate other goals? Shall resources development be emphasized? What shall be the future of the fertilizer program? Will further progress be made in upstream control of water? Some relate to other things, including among others the possible extension of partnership with private business, the place of TVA in our governmental system, and the series of problems arising "from the maturation of the TVA as an administrative agency."

Several years ago Martin and others explored the need and the feasibility of a commission of study on TVA. His statement of choices for the future evidences that, as Gordon Clapp says, TVA is "an illuminator of issues" (p. 11). It still deserves study because of the significance of its own future to an area and to the nation and of its models on resource development and governance.—EMMETTE S. REDFORD, *University of Texas.*

Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations. BY WILLIAM ANDERSON, ASSISTED BY WAITE D. DURFEE, JR. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1956. Pp. vii, 131. $3.00.)

The forty-eight states of the United States are focal points of intergovernmental relations. Each has relationships with its own local units, with other American commonwealths, and with the Federal Government. However, prior to the (federal) Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1953–1955), there were only a few states, Minnesota among them, in which over-all studies of the subject had been undertaken.

Pioneer monographs in this field are those edited by William Anderson and Edward W. Weidner under the title, "Intergovernmental Relations as Observed in Minnesota." Professor Anderson has had a leading part in de-

veloping research on intergovernmental relations in this country and was an active member of the Kestnbaum Commission. The Minnesota project called for ten monographs, some dealing with particular functions such as highways, education, and public health; others, like the one here reviewed, being of a more general character. Eight of the ten have been published (1950–1956). *Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations* is the eighth in the series.

Dr. Anderson begins with a discussion of the financial problems of a federal system, in which he raises ten questions for consideration in the light of Minnesota's experience. When examining Minnesota's place and rank in the Union, he observes that "the attempt to rank the states upon the basis of their state and local tax levels, by per capitas, or otherwise, is so difficult, involves so many variables and questions of judgment, and results in such ambiguous and misleading conclusions that it is hardly worth the effort" (p. 16).

Six chapters are devoted to Minnesota-federal financial relations, the first two being historical in character. To those who object to tax overlapping, the author says, "As long as the productivity and resources of the nation can be maintained, the overlapping of state and national taxes is a minor irritant" (p. 66). It must be weighed against the whole picture of the "national-state fiscal balance" which takes account not only of grants-in-aid, but also of federal expenditures within Minnesota. Anderson's tentative conclusion is that "Minnesota is faring relatively well in the balance of payments between the national government and the state" (p. 95).

The last two chapters examine state-local financial relations. Here there is more to criticize. Minnesota has more local government units than any other state in the Union. If they are to be used for the performance of major public functions, "they will not only need to have a considerable measure of local self-government and of policy-making power, but also to be of adequate and appropriate size and to have substantial sources of revenue under their own control. Unfortunately they do not all have equal economic resources or even proportionate resources to devote to the public services. Since it is the state as a single unit of government that is ultimately responsible for the entire range of services outlined above, I see no objection to the state's sharing important tax revenues with the local units and providing financial aid in other ways to equalize the burden of local support of services of statewide concern; nor can I see anything wrong in the state's trying to equalize the quality and quantity of the essential services throughout the state" (p. 125).

If ten scholarly monographs are required to analyze the situation in one state, it is obvious that much more research is needed on intergovernmental relations on a state-by-state basis. The Anderson-Weidner series establishes a pattern for such research.—ROGER H. WELLS, *Bryn Mawr College.*

Opponents of War, 1917–1918. By H. C. PETERSON AND GILBERT C. FITE. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1957. Pp. xiii, 399. $6.00.)

Most opponents of war are like those lukewarm vegetarians who stoutly oppose carnivorous habits between meals but temporarily suspend their opposition to meat during the meals themselves. When the United States entered World War I, the overwhelming majority of those who had opposed American entry into the struggle began to support what they had hitherto denounced. But surprisingly large numbers refused to retract their pre-war position, and it was their adamant stand that so sorely tried the ideological and legal framework of American institutions.

Peterson and Fite study these consistent opponents of war and in graphic fashion examine the reaction of the American State and of public opinion. The opponents themselves included Socialists, members of the I.W.W., religious and political conscientious objectors, and sundry intellectuals. While in World War II individual conscientious objectors constituted the main challenge to the bellicose State, in the conflict of 1917–1918 there was substantial organized political opposition. The government, for its part, was new to the business of global war-making and often tended to take crude and hasty action against opponents whose strength it sometimes exaggerated.

The scene was thus set for the well-known repressive acts both of government and of public opinion. Political leaders often forgot counsels of moderation and molders of opinion apologized for mobs. The instruments of repression included not only such legislation as the Espionage Act and public agencies like the police and FBI, but also a multitude of privately organized and publicly blessed organizations with such impressive names as the American Defense Society, the Knights

of Liberty, the American Anti-Anarchy Association, the Boy Spies of America, and the Sedition Slammers. Peterson and Fite maintain that the "most omnipresent" of the private, quasi-public organizations was the American Protective League. Sponsored by the Department of Justice, this organization included among its many activities the illegal tampering with private correspondence; and even after President Wilson protested against some of its acts, the Attorney General continued his active sponsorship.

The authors show how public authorities strained procedural due process in prosecuting alleged opponents of the war. There are good chapters on the treatment of aliens and conscientious objectors, on censorship of press and cinema, and on the trials of such widely known figures as "Big Bill" Haywood and Eugene V. Debs. Mob actions against Negroes and Germans are vividly described. Thirteen cartoons and photographs heighten the interest of the reader and dramatize the many attacks on civil liberties and on the very idea of tolerance.

One of the startling facts emerging from the study is the degree to which political and intellectual leaders succumbed to the seeming hysteria of the times. Thus Assistant Attorney General John Lord O'Brian was loath to act against a mob which abducted and whipped a pacifist minister; Dean Vance of the University of Minnesota Law School frankly avowed in effect that "wartime was no time to quibble about constitutional rights and guarantees"; and Vice President Marshall recommended legislation which would annul the citizenship and confiscate the property of every American not "heartily in support of the Government in this crisis." And the familiar story of Wilson's repeated refusal to release Debs is retold in some detail.

While many of the episodes related in this volume are already well known to students of American law and politics, the authors have rendered a real service by telling the story so effectively and suggesting its importance for the perennial problem of freedom. We might also note that while in our day the American State treats its war objectors more leniently than in World War I, its leniency may in large part be due to the fact that it is no longer challenged by politically organized opponents of war. For ours is the era in which conscription is accepted with scarcely a murmur and the "garrison State" blends nicely with the "welfare State."—MULFORD Q. SIBLEY, *University of Minnesota.*

Citadel: The Story of the U. S. Senate. By WILLIAM S. WHITE. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1956. Pp. xi, 274. $3.75.)

In this book Mr. White, chief congressional correspondent for the *New York Times*, does a profile of the U. S. Senate. Using an impressionistic approach, he endeavors mainly to portray its corporateness. Throughout he stresses the thesis that the Senate is an institutionalization of the principle enunciated in Calhoun's doctrine of the concurrent majority.

White writes in an expository fashion admirably suited to the subject. There is much that is commendable in the substance as well as the style of this work. White explains the crucial importance of negotiation and compromise in the legislative process. He describes very well the basically nonpartisian nature of most of the Senate's business. He appraises accurately the relative influence on a Senator's decision of constituents, pressure groups, political parties, news analysts, and other molders of public opinion. He re-emphasizes the vital truism that the standing committees are the real locus of power in the Senate and touches upon the potent role played by their chairmen. He ably defends the seniority system. He gives an excellent summary of the historical controversy between the executive branch and Congress regarding the disclosure of information. And his discussion of the complex issues involved in Senate investigations is unsurpassed for clarity and succinctness.

The only major shortcoming of this study is its superficiality in several important respects. Aside from a brief consideration—largely concerned with personal attributes—of the majority and minority leaders, White does not have much to say about the internal power structures of the Senate. And a knowledge of their diffuseness, diversity, and changeability is essential to an adequate understanding of how the Senate operates. For example, White ignores even the factional groupings within the Senate.

As a result of such omissions, White exaggerates somewhat the extent to which the Senate functions as a collective entity. Similarly, he creates a rather misleading impression of the executive branch as a homogeneous body which universally adheres to a presidential line. This notion conflicts with common knowledge that the executive branch com-

prises many agencies with disparate views on policy, which often indulge in open strife and, in the case of agencies with strong congressional backing, sometimes defy the President.

Continuing this tendency toward overpersonification, White depicts the Senate and the executive branch as two monolithic structures engaged in an almost incessant struggle for power. Admittedly, institutional rivalry exerts a marginal influence on executive-legislative relations. In reality, however, the main contests are not between the entire Senate and the whole executive branch but are between coalitions consisting of subgroups from each, allied with comparable aggregations of organized interests. Here as elsewhere, White focuses on the Senate as an institution rather than on the underlying dynamics of the political process. He never really considers why Senators exert or respond to particular pressures. He pays little attention to why the President and the Senate give expression to different clusters of interests.

However, this rather grave conceptual deficiency does not vitiate his primary thesis that the Senate embodies the principle of the concurrent majority. On the contrary, a more penetrating analysis substantiates it even better. And the good points of this work greatly outweigh its shortcomings. All in all, *Citadel* provides an urbane introduction to that most fascinating subject: the United States Senate. —KENNETH KOFMEHL, *Purdue University.*

The Politics of Distribution. By JOSEPH CORNWALL PALAMOUNTAIN, JR. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1955. Pp. 270. $4.75.)

This volume is an able analysis of the relationships between economic and political conflict in distribution during the 1930's. Primarily it is a study of the struggles "between large-scale organization and small, between new methods of marketing and old" and of the manner in which the economic realities of distribution gave rise to political conflicts and to attempts at public settlement of the basic economic struggles. More specifically, the author's purpose is twofold: first, to demonstrate the extent to which competition among distributors provided the basis for political grouping and the exercise of power for the achievement of group objectives; second, to show that public policy regarding distribution was more than a simple reflection of the interests and strengths of competing economic groups. This purpose is accomplished through analysis of the nature of competition in distribution generally and in the grocery, drug, and automobile trades specifically, and through descriptions of the political struggles culminating in the Robinson-Patman Act, chain-store taxation, and fair-trade legislation. Brief attention is also given to the economic consequences of such political conflict. For political scientists especially, the volume is a valuable study of the policy-making process and particularly of the adequacy of the group-process method of analyzing the formation of public policy.

In Professor Palamountain's view, the group-process approach, when used alone, is a partial, and therefore a generally inadequate, analytical method. The very nature of competition among some distributors in the 1930's made grouping difficult and therefore makes group-process analysis of little value. Such was the case, for example, in the competition among independent retailers, where rivalry was among members of the same group rather than between different groups. And even in those types of competition where strong bases exist for identifying group interests and thus for the application of group-process analysis, as for example in the conflict between mass food distributors and independent grocers or between automobile manufacturers and their retail dealers, the group-process approach has its limitations. Some limitations arise from the nature of groups themselves: geographical dispersion of group members, ineffective leadership, "imperfect mobilization" of members behind group goals, economic dependence of one group upon still other groups with resulting weakening of motivation and drive. But the most significant limiting factors, in the author's opinion, were "the general legal and political framework and the elemental dynamism of the economy," which permitted innovations and generally encouraged efficiency and vigorous competition in distribution. As a result, with a possible exception in the case of fair-trade laws, demands of the more narrow, particularistic groups in distribution were substantially blunted or transformed, and competitive criteria more consonant with a broad public interest were enabled to govern the formation of public policy and the conduct of marketing functions.

Professor Palamountain rightly disclaims any novelty for such conclusions. The merit of

his volume therefore rests on other grounds: upon a generally successful blending of the analytical tools of both politics and economics to provide excellent descriptions of the policy-making process and better understanding of the nature of public policy in one important area of American economic life.—HUGH M. HALL, *Duke University*.

A Citizen Looks at Congress. By DEAN ACHESON. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1957. Pp. 124. $2.50.)

This short volume by former Secretary of State Acheson is an extremely well written and valuable addition to the literature on American government. The author starts with an analysis of the changes which have taken place since Woodrow Wilson's *Congressional Government* was written in 1884. He traces the change in the role of Congress and the rise of the power of the Presidency with the result that "today—and even more tomorrow—it is the President who initiates and proposes policy; it is the Congress which approves, modifies, or vetoes." The problem, as he sees it, "is whether the checking and balancing prescribed by the constitution is so conducted as to permit a continuity of policy, involving over a period of years the maintenance of distasteful measures." He is concerned with methods by which "the Congress and the Presidency can both be strengthened to do the pressing work that falls to each to do, and to both to do together."

Mr. Acheson rejects Wilson's suggestions that we adopt parliamentary and party government. Our system is too set and too well adapted to our large, heterogeneous country to make such changes desirable or possible. And he puts no faith in such half-way measures as a question period or centralization of party control of Congress. He calls for a greater degree of humility and disinterest on the part of the leaders of Congress and the Administration. Every now and then a highly constructive relationship develops between members of both branches and they can accomplish together "what neither could have accomplished separately." The administrator needs an original mind, a willingness to stay out of the limelight, and the full backing of the Administration. The member of the House or Senate needs an ability to bring suggestions within the realm of the possible and the respect of the leaders of both parties of Congress. Such an ideal relationship existed between Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett and Senator Vandenberg during the 80th Congress, and it resulted in the Vandenberg Resolution, the precursor of the North Atlantic Treaty. Mr. Acheson is not overly sanguine about the willingness of members of Congress to follow his prescription—to discipline themselves to do their own job and not that of the President, to take more time to inform themselves and to think about the important issues which they face. He is fully aware that personal ambition and the interests of constituency and party tend to make self-restraint difficult.

The value of this book does not lie in the originality of its analysis of legislative-executive relations, but in the imaginative examples used to illustrate the problems, especially in the field of foreign affairs, and in the fact that this able public administrator, who received more than his share of irresponsible criticism from Congress, should reach such fundamentally conservative conclusions. It is tantalizing to the political scientist that so little attention should be paid to organizational and procedural reform. There is no mention, for example, of the problems raised by the seniority system for choosing committee chairmen. The solution proposed is to get the right people in the right places at the right times, but little is said about how to do it.—GEORGE GOODWIN, JR., *University of Massachusetts*.

Service and Procedure in Bureaucracy: A Case Study. By ROY G. FRANCIS AND ROBERT C. STONE. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1956. Pp. vi, 201. $4.00.)

This is an interesting case study by two sociologists to test two propositions drawn from the "classical theory of bureaucracy" (Weber-Merton): 1) bureaucratic behavior is dominantly "procedure oriented": rule-following supersedes purpose and service; 2) bureaucracy implies predominantly impersonal employee relationships. The detailed field investigation covered a local urban office of the Louisiana Division of Employment Security with about a hundred employees.

Those who have experienced the internal life of American government bureaucracies are unlikely to be surprised by the findings: bureaucrats behave like most human beings. Neither hypothesis could be validated. Bureaucracy is characterized by competing and conflicting patterns of behavior rather than one

dominant pattern. "Employees' attitudes and acts are strongly influenced by a 'work ethic' which is directed toward the goal of service to the client." The bonds of organization were impersonal, but considerable personal relationships characterized employee interaction.

In an excellent final chapter and in the preface, the authors review an impressive list of other studies which have also revealed the invalidity of the original hypotheses. The question remains whether the weight of empirical evidence will detach many sociologists from devotion to their classical model of "ideal-type" bureaucracy. It is to be hoped that they will go on to direct their ample research skills and resources to the examination of propositions derived from their own empirical findings on the American scene.

Although their methods have been challenged by some colleagues, the authors have done a painstaking and careful job. The book contains many revealing pieces of by-product information, which students of public administration will find helpful. It is well written throughout.—HERMAN M. SOMERS, *Haverford College.*

Public Works and Employment: From the Local Government Point of View. By EUGENE C. MCKEAN AND HAROLD C. TAYLOR. (Chicago: Public Administration Service. 1955. Pp. xiii, 274.)

Unemployment and Relief: From the Local Government Point of View. By SAMUEL V. BENNETT. (Chicago: Public Administration Service. 1955. Pp. xiv, 273.)

The authors of *Public Works and Employment* take a rather modest Keynesian approach to the contribution of public works in a depression. The book then emphasizes the serious limitations of any significant dependence on state and local financed public works. Direct employment through local public works is bought at a much higher tax cost than aid to unemployed families through work relief or general relief. Public attitudes would probably prevent either local taxes or local borrowing for a building program in a period of sharp depression (public opposition would not extend to Federal government activities). Finally, although the authors set forth a case for a stabilized plan of local public building, they also caution that stabilization of all state and local financed public building in the two decades of the 1920's and 1930's would have changed the gross national product by less than one per cent in the average year. Moreover, the change would have been in the wrong direction in the first three years of the depression. The fact that local optimism for public building grows more slowly than improvement in the economy and then overlaps a period of economic lag may have aided in preventing the worsening of several mild recessions.

The second book, *Unemployment and Relief,* reviews the work relief and general relief programs of the 1930's and appraises the lessons. The author assumes that at best state and local governments can only meet initial stages of a depression. Most of these governments in the 1930's made strenuous efforts (in fact in constant dollar terms, state and local governments by 1934 had only decreased total expenditures by eight per cent over 1929 and thereafter steadily increased outgo) and failed in the task. But local governments especially should have plans ready both for community efforts and for cooperation with the Federal government in its direct assistance or joint programs.

The authors intend these companion volumes for local officials, lay leaders, and public administrators and other consultants to local officials. Both in content and in their selected bibliographies, the books should serve this purpose well. For the more specialized reader, some questions occur. As a matter of economic theory, the multiplier effect of public works and work relief seems somewhat underplayed and the concept of the balanced budget multiplier is ignored.

This reviewer thought the authors excessively summarized their material. A beginning chapter of conclusions does not offend. But by writing paragraphs to summarize chapter sections and sections to summarize chapters, the authors show little confidence in the ability of readers to follow the discussion unaided.—CLARA PENNIMAN, *University of Wisconsin.*

Essays in Constitutional Law. EDITED BY ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1957. Pp. 429. $4.75.)

This is an excellent collection of fourteen essays in American constitutional law, only one of which is a court opinion (Judge Learned Hand's in the *Dennis* case). On judicial review there are essays by Beard, Thayer, Powell, and Lerner. The editor reprints Stern on the commerce clause, Corwin on federalism and the presidency, Sutherland on treaties, Meiklejohn and Nathanson on freedom of speech, Murray on separation of church and state,

Hyman on racial equality, and Green on criminal procedures. One of the best essays in the volume is the editor's introduction, and the introductory notes are substantial and well-done. This is a welcome addition to the materials available for the teaching of American constitutional law courses.

The Creative Role of the Supreme Court of the United States. By R. Ramaswamy. (London: Oxford University Press; Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1956. Pp. xiii, 138. $3.00.)

This book consists of three lectures given at Stanford in 1953 by a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court of India. The lectures deal with the role of the U. S. Supreme Court in connection with the general interpretation of the Constitution, the federal system, and civil liberties. They focus largely on the analysis of well-known cases, thus ignoring altogether the impact of executive and legislative policy upon constitutional interpretation. While the author demonstrates an understanding of the teaching of the leading decisions, no fresh insights are suggested, though he does draw some analogies with Indian law.

Extraterritorial Powers of Municipalities in the United States. By Russel Webber Maddox. (Corvallis: Oregon State College Press. 1955. Pp. 114. $1.00.)

After canvassing his subject by way of the pertinent literature, statutes, court-cases, and correspondence with responsible officials in all United States cities with populations over 5000, Professor Maddox concludes that the exercise of extraterritorial powers is so widespread a practice that it is necessary to revise "the classic view of a municipality exercising its powers solely within its corporate limits." Mr. Maddox further finds that it is *corporate* power (as distinguished from *governmental* power) that is generally exercised extraterritorially and that the concerns of this power must generally involve water and sewage, municipally-owned utilities, roads and airports, and the sale of certain perishable commodities, especially meat and milk.

The Metropolitan Transportation Problem. By Wilfred Owen. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 1956. Pp. x, 301. $4.50.)

Especially to be commended in this book is its conscientious canvass of the great range of factors that are significant to the metropolitan transportation problem: from the concerns of the social critics for the effects of conurbation upon the "good life," to such things as the role of consumer attitudes in the use (and non-use) of public transportation. The data upon which the book is built are carefully and effectively presented, and the canvass is given a dimension of concreteness and practicality by reference to the attempts of various cities to solve different phases of their transportation problems. The final recommendations of the author rely upon no single "magical" formula but would involve the creation of governmental bodies capable of using the findings of the economist, sociologist, engineer, and city planner and endowed with *adequate* authority for making a total attack upon the transportation problem.

Old Bullion Benton: Senator from the New West. By William Nisbet Chambers. (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company. 1956. Pp. xv, 517. $6.00.)

Although nineteenth-century Missourians joined with Tom Sawyer in judging Thomas Hart Benton the "greatest man in the world," the agrarian Senator's contemporary stature has not until now prompted a biography worthy of him. In this significant volume, Chambers has contributed a well-documented appraisal of Benton as champion of western interests in hard money, cheap lands, westward expansion, and nationalism. The loss of Benton's papers by fire in 1855 complicated the biographer's task, but Chambers has succeeded in drawing together the necessary information from many scattered manuscript collections. Although tolerant of Benton's annoying personality characteristics and seemingly sympathetic toward his general point of view, Chambers nevertheless faithfully protrays Benton "wart and all." The result befits the man Philip Hone once described as "the fiercest tiger in the den" of democracy.

The National Civic Federation and the American Labor Movement, 1900–1925. By Marguerite Green. (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press. 1956. Pp. xii, 537. $5.50.)

The National Civic Federation grew out of a unique attempt in the populist-progressive era to prove to labor leader and capitalist alike that theirs was a community of interest. Dominated by its founder, Ralph M. Easley, it had the distinction of being able to bring together for this purpose key figures from

both sides of the fence, men like Samuel Gompers, John Mitchell, Mark Hanna, August Belmont, and Seth Low. In a period marked by savage industrial conflict and governmental aloofness, members of this group labored tirelessly to raise the level of industrial relations by serving as mediators, attempting to substitute welfare measures for the former personal relationship between employer and employed, and advocating legislative changes to solve the larger questions of the age. This thoroughly documented dissertation is confined to an evaluation of the impact of the Federation on American trade unionism. As such it is a chronicle of personalities, pressures, successes, and failures.

Bibliography of New Guides and Aides to Public Documents Use, 1953–1956. COMPILED BY JEROME K. WILCOX. (New York: Special Libraries Association. 1957. Pp. 16. SLA Bibliography no. 2. $1.50.)

This continues a series published in *Special Libraries*, 1949–1954. It is arranged systematically, has useful annotations, and will be helpful wherever public documents are used to any appreciable extent.—J.B.C.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
University of Maryland

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

The Founding of the French Socialist Party (1893–1905). By Aaron Noland. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1956. Pp. vii, 233. $4.50.)

There has been of late a renewed interest of American scholars in the pre-World War I history of European socialism. Earlier views seemed to agree that solid social-democratic parties had been shaken by the outbreak of the war and that the reasons for the schism of the continental labor movement date from 1914. Carl Schorske, in his remarkable book on German Social Democracy, and now Aaron Noland, in his not less distinguished study of the French Socialist Party, have bared the deeper roots for the congenital weakness of democratic socialism. In discussing the historical record of intra-party developments, Professor Noland is bound to analyze, as did Schorske before him, the many dilemmas socialism had to face when it was no longer content with being a movement of doctrine but engaged in political action. The at times kaleidoscopic changes of positions which groups, factions, and personalities underwent occurred generally in answer to historical challenges such as the Dreyfus Affair, the participation of the socialist Millerand in a bourgeois cabinet, the bloody suppression of strikes, the noble resolutions of the International. And yet always the same problem led to the bitter feuds, the recriminations and schisms: What was the role of socialist parties in a middle-class democracy? How should the defense of immediate working class interests be reconciled with the exigencies of the *lutte finale*?

The most interesting parts of the book are those that present succinctly but colorfully enough the debates between Guesde and Jaurès and between the lesser apostles of the various socialist chapels. High level and incisive though these debates were at times, their intellectual content appears now fuzzy and quixotic, their verbosity painful. If they remain, at least under the skillful pen of the author, historically interesting and quite moving, this must be due to the seriousness (not always matched by sincerity) with which these men discussed possible solutions of political and human problems. In the meantime, it is true, these problems have proven generally insoluble.

To the student of party developments the book offers invaluable materials: the controversies about desirable forms of organization, opposing the advocates of centralism to those who hoped for a "flowering" of varied philosophies through a loose federal organization; the uneasy relationship between the party militants and the parliamentary organization; the powers of the International over the national parties. The French socialist movement avoided the excessive bureaucratization of the German social democracy only to be

plagued by another problem: how to make the class conscious proletariat trust a party in which intellectuals and other middle-class elements have always played a predominant role. It becomes quite clear how early difficulties have contributed to the present strength of French communism.

One may regret that Professor Noland neither discusses nor even highlights any of the problems which his material suggests. Following Ranke's precepts, he merely presents the historical record, leaving it to the reader to muse over it. Such self-restraint fails in the end to provide an explicit explanation of the final unification of the socialist movements, which just prior to 1905 were still so badly split. How much was the confluence due to a desire to play a role in the Second International, then dominated by the German socialists? Or was unification mostly caused by the personal involvement of Jaurès, whose greatest talent was that of a conciliator? In the last excellent pages of his book the author at least hints at the elements in Jaurès's legacy that were bound to weaken the French socialist movement till our days.—HENRY W. EHRMANN, *University of Colorado.*

Wähler und Gewählte: Eine Untersuchung der Bundestagswahlen 1953. By WOLFGANG HIRSCH-WEBER AND KLAUS SCHÜTZ. (Berlin: Verlag Franz Vahlen. 1957. Pp. xxii, 462.)

This is one of the most complete and exhaustive treatments of a national democratic election which has appeared up to this time in any language. It is encouraging and significant for political science that the co-authors are German and that the publication results from researches conducted by the Institut für Politische Wissenschaft in Berlin. Utilizing not only the extensive German data but also demonstrating familiarity with the important literature in other countries dealing with elections, this book adds luster to an already commendable series of recent publications emanating from the Berlin Institute.

After a brief discussion of an election campaign as a problem for political science, the book, which is divided into five fairly equal parts, deals with the influence of groups, of propaganda, and of the occupying powers. It analyzes the party and election developments since 1945 and then devotes major attention to an intensive analysis of the results of the 1953 Bundestag election, utilizing the official election statistics, public opinion polls, newspapers, and party literature. Age, sex, religion, profession, and population groups are related to party voting, and the differing patterns of voting behavior in the various *Länder* are described. The impact of the electoral system is evaluated and the parties and elected members resulting from the election are intensively analyzed. One hundred thirty-two valuable tables, six charts, two helpful appendixes, and two summary tables are included.

This very impressive example of cooperative research in a difficult and diffuse area of political investigation deserves the highest commendation. The collection and presentation of the vast data alone are sufficient to mark the authors as tireless scholars and indefatigable investigators. But the high quality of the scholarly analysis, which is also exhibited, distinguishes this book throughout. The absence of extensive field investigation and the strong reliance on newspaper materials results in a certain lack of the feeling of pulsating political life. But the few instances where lack of perspective and maturity and absence of field data are to be detected do not detract too much from this over-all judgment of the book's high value and merit. May German political science of this commendable variety continue to flourish and to illuminate such basically important areas as elections and political parties!—JAMES K. POLLOCK, *University of Michigan.*

Italy and the Allies. By NORMAN KOGAN. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1956. Pp. viii, 246. $4.25.)

Italy, through the *risorgimento* of the nineteenth century, had been hoping for the fulfillment of the original aim to become a modern nation as to national unity, constitutional liberalism, and general progress. Instead, as the result of World War I, the country became finally the victim of Fascism, after dreams of a glorious phase following a grandiose peace had not come true. All political opposition was destroyed and Mussolini, after having gained final and complete domestic control and peace through the Lateran Accords of 1929, seemed to be beyond any challenge. It was then that some of his actions in the field of foreign affairs, and particularly Italy's entry into World War II, estranged the regime from the masses of the nation. Yet, no doubt, "it was the failure of Mussolini's foreign policy, not the strength of the anti-fascist opposition, which brought down the regime. The Duce had not altered the structure of Italian society. He had bol-

stered the upper classes who were so frightened by the revolutionary movement of 1919–21. His government existed at the pleasure of these groups, and when the war was lost they got rid of him."

This study concerns itself with the endeavor of the Italians to do away with the impact of Fascism and to find new ways of leadership and government. This complex situation, which was caused by the outburst of feelings arrested for so many years, in the midst of a war on the soil of Italy and dividing the country, made it obviously impossible for the Allies to find, at all times, a common policy as to the future of the country and to bring it back to the Western fold. How otherwise can one understand that it was possible to treat Italy as an enemy and yet have her at the same time assume the position of a co-belligerent power? It makes one wonder in retrospect how a treaty of peace was finally feasible, particularly since there had been so much "disregard for the Italian viewpoint which the victors exhibited." With little regard for anti-Fascists, in fact "underestimating the strength of anti-Fascism," the foreign powers were finally drawn into concern for matters such as the question of the monarchy. With all our interest in the country, the balance still today is doubtful; in fact, "until its internal problems can be solved, until its people can be given a stake in their country, Italy can make little contribution to the peace of the world."

Professor Kogan's well-written short book is quite a contribution to students of modern Italy. It is composed of rather short chapters, of which some are amazingly good, such as an introductory one on "the fascist period," which for all its brevity (12 pages), shows great insight into and understanding of the major causes of Fascism and its ideas. While probably some experts might desire more detailed coverage and thus find reason to detect factual omissions and doubtful interpretations, this reviewer feels that this is a good book done with great care and written in a clear way. Well-documented, this study includes also a good bibliographical survey that should be most helpful to any reader.—MANFRED C. VERNON, *University of Alabama.*

Tito: Moscow's Trojan Horse. By SLOBODAN M. DRASHKOVICH. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1957. Pp. xiv, 357. $5.00.)

Basically, *Tito: Moscow's Trojan Horse* is not about Tito or about Yugoslavia. Rather, it is an effort to analyze the concept of Titoism, particularly as it is related to the ostensible aim of the West to combat Communism. The early chapters contain a detailed examination of the nature of Communism, Tito's rise to power, and his regime's break with Moscow. Following these, there is a survey of Yugoslavia's relations with the West and with the Soviet Union, together with some commentary on Yugoslav internal developments. The final chapters deal with Tito's mission in Asia, his reconciliation with Moscow, and the impact of Titoism upon the USSR and upon the West. The last chapter is in the nature of an epilogue, concerning the "Titoist experiment" in Poland and Hungary.

In this penetrating and closely reasoned book, Drashkovich has developed the thesis that Tito serves the cause of international Communism and not democracy. In his view, Tito's break with Moscow was real enough, but it resulted from internal political tensions in the Communist world rather than from any differences over ideology. Tito wants a Communist world just as much as Moscow does, and he has been working toward this goal at home and abroad. In his trips to various countries, he has been a more effective spokesman for Communism than any one of the Russian leaders. Moreover, by arguing in India, Burma, and elsewhere that the Soviet Union has really changed, Tito has paved the way for Stalin's successors to regain lost ground.

By aiding Tito, the West has been and is contributing to the goal of international Communism. It has done so in two ways. First, the West has made it easier for him to build a Communist society in Yugoslavia: i.e., to fight the Communist battle on his front. Secondly, the West has helped to make Communism respectable: i.e., to further the impression that there is a "good" type of Communism. This was a shot in the arm for international Communism at the very moment it needed it most, when Soviet Communism, and therefore Communism in general, was being discredited in many quarters. By helping Tito to promote Communism, the West is, in effect, assisting world Communism.

What makes the situation so tragic, says Dr. Drashkovich, is that there is little appreciation of these truths among Western policy makers. By believing that Titoism is undermining Communism, they are succeeding only in disarming the West. Drashkovich does not omit the arguments of countless American publicists, newspaper correspondents, columnists, and editorial writers who have defended

Western aid to Tito. For the most part, he lets them speak for themselves, and often. One could go through this book and make a veritable catalog of nonsensical observations of some of our leading columnists and feature writers to the effect that Yugoslavia was moving toward genuine freedom for the people.

Moscow's reconciliation with Yugoslavia, Drashkovich believes, came about largely as the result of the realization by Stalin's successors that Tito was loyal to international Communism. Tito's criticism of Stalin helped them to correct Stalin's various mistakes and thus to improve the standing of the Communist world movement. Drashkovich does not exclude the possibility of future tensions in the Communist camp of the order which produced the Moscow-Belgrade break, but does not view this as a probability.

Drashkovich's book is strong medicine, but the realities of world politics may yet force us to swallow it. Certainly, his thesis cannot be dismissed out of hand. This book should be required reading for all policy makers in the West.—ALEX N. DRAGNICH, *Vanderbilt University.*

The Soviet System of Government. By JOHN N. HAZARD. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1957. Pp. xi, 256. $4.00.)

The search for the "perfect text" is a perennial one in all fields of instruction, but the teacher of Soviet government may be said to have an edge in frustration over his colleagues in other disciplines. Until Stalin's death the problem was not quite so urgent—or so it looked: what struggle went on within the walls of the Kremlin was a matter of speculation rather than of safe documentation. All this has changed since 1953 and teaching Soviet government has again become an exciting experience, making the utmost demands upon the alertness of the instructor trying to keep up with the fast-changing events. He can no longer rely on any textbook, for every single one is obsolete as soon as it appears in print. But that is only one aspect of the predicament. There was, in the past, no lack of excellent studies of the Soviet regime but, somehow, none of them seemed quite to meet all the needs of upperclass undergraduate instruction. Merle Fainsod's outstanding *How Russia is Ruled* (1953) would seem to be too exhaustive for one semester's workout; Harper and Thompson (*The Government of the Soviet Union*, 1949) or Florinsky (*Toward an Understanding of the U.S.S.R.*, 2nd ed., 1951), on the other hand, would strike some as compressing the subject matter too severely for purposes of advanced course work. The same may be said of Professor Huszar's recent symposium (*Soviet Power and Policy*, 1955), which tries to cover rather too much ground to satisfy needs of intensive treatment. Towster's *Political Power in the U.S.S.R.* (1948) is a superb account of the political structure and process but completely disregards Soviet economics, a subject which in all but a few colleges must be taught as an integral part of the Soviet government course or courses offered. Another source of frustration is the question of method: ought we to trace the evolution of Soviet institutions historically, or should we, starting from present data with occasional flashbacks, treat things functionally? Either approach has its advantages and disadvantages, which need not be gone into here. Whoever prefers the second method will be very happy with Professor Hazard's magistral study just published. The author is justly renowned for his pioneer work in the field of Soviet law; in addition, he has long been fascinated by the intricacies of Soviet administration; his many publications in that field have been a boon to quite a few of us. These and many other qualifications make his new text authoritative as well as the one most likely to meet the sundry demands outlined before, except the one of being completely "up to date"—not even Professor Hazard could possibly anticipate Khrushchev's administrative revolution of this year, not even by way of speculation. Whoever has had the pleasure of watching the author discuss Soviet developments with some of the more daring "inside-dopesters" knows that he is the soul of soberness, not addicted to prophecy. But one wishes he could somehow persuade his publisher to produce, at a small charge, periodical addenda in brochure or leaflet form, so as to protect *The Soviet System of Government* from joining its predecessors on the "scrap heap of history." The work certainly deserves a better fate.—J. H. MEISEL, *University of Michigan.*

Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918–1927: Papers Seized in the 1927 Peking Raid. EDITED BY C. MARTIN WILBUR AND JULIE LIEN-YING HOW. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1956. Pp. xviii, 617. $8.75.)

Communist China Today: Domestic and Foreign Policies. By PETER S. H. TANG. (New York:

Frederick A. Praeger. 1957. Pp. xvi, 536. $10.00.)

The volume of *Documents* (with introductions by the editors) throws light on the most obscure period of the history of the Chinese Communist Party. The circumstances which made these documents available made necessary a careful examination to determine the authenticity upon which their historical value depends. The problem of authenticity is carefully examined by the editors, and their conclusions are set forth as the essential preliminary to the presentation of the fifty documents selected for publication. As the editors state (p. 3), the Documents "have a rather peculiar interest for most of them are 'action' documents written on the spot by participants in the revolution. Among them are instructions, reports, minutes, letters, and resolutions drawn up by men planning and carrying out the revolutionary program." On the Nationalist side, they give the Communist side of relationships with Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Thus the materials presented make available in English translation valuable Communist party data on this early phase of development of the Chinese Communist movement.

This early period of Chinese Communist Party history is summarized, both ideologically and historically, by Dr. Tang in his valuable study of Communist China today as essential background for an understanding of the nature and purposes of the new regime. Chapter III, "The Character of the Leadership," goes beyond the title into questions of personal relationships as they affect internal party solidarity. In this connection Dr. Tang also takes a brief look at relations of some of the leaders with Moscow.

About half of *Communist China Today* is devoted to a careful and detailed examination of the organization of power in Communist China under the headings: the Party Machine; the State Machine; the Economic Machine; the Social Machine; the Military Machine; and the Propaganda Machine. This part of the study has particular value for the student of comparative government. The conclusion that emerges from the analysis is that China under the Communists is stronger than at any time in the last century and that Communist Party control is not now seriously threatened either from within or without. This conclusion is reënforced, from the international standpoint, in the analysis of The Moscow-Peking Axis and of Communist China's relations with the Soviet Satellites, Southeast Asia, the West, and the United States. These chapters have especial value for the student of international relations and of Far Eastern politics.

Dr. Tang correctly portrays Communist China as a firm ally of the Soviet Union rather than as a Soviet satellite. There is some overstatement in his conclusion that "Communist China and the Soviet Union are certain to remain firmly allied as the directing core of strength in the Communist world" (p. 504). Thus he sees no reason to anticipate the development of Titoism on the part of Communist China. "On the basis of the considerations advanced here," he writes, "Chinese Titoism would seem impossible because it would mean the self-destruction of the so-called Socialist camp of peace and democracy now jointly headed by the Soviet Union and Communist China. It is likewise unnecessary because Communist China has her own outlets for power and influence as the junior partner and co-leader of the Communist camp. . . . On the other hand, the Soviet Union entertains no special designs on China's border regions while they are under the control of loyal Communist brethren. For the present, the entire Chinese domain is open to Soviet or to joint activities, and the Chinese rulers are not only more than ready to accept Soviet advice and the lessons of advanced Soviet experience, but are prepared to make sacrifices for the sake of world communism under the leadership of the Soviet Union" (p. 411). The evidence supports this conclusion as of today. Changes, presently unpredictable, in the balance of internal forces in either the U.S.S.R. or Communist China or in the non-Communist world might readily invalidate it for the future.—HAROLD M. VINACKE, *University of Cincinnatti.*

Burma in the Family of Nations. By MAUNG MAUNG. (Amsterdam: Djambatan, Ltd.; New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1956. Pp. xi, 236. $4.50.)

This book is primarily a diplomatic and legal history of Burma, with a sprinkling of politics. It was written as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Utrecht (Netherlands). The author is a Burmese lawyer, who, if he ever was a tense nationalist, is now relaxed. He writes with great good nature and with a quiet humor, as often at the expense of his fellow-countrymen as at that of his former alien rulers. The style is simple, direct, and unadorned; not a word is wasted. However, the writing is by no means colorless.

Dr. Maung believes that if Burma had held fast to its independence to the end of the nineteenth century, it might have won admission into the family of nations, as did Siam, without experiencing a century of colonial status. Internal and external factors were unfavorable to its survival. Disunity, the inefficiency of its government, and the British conquest of neighboring India sealed Burma's doom as an independent state. The British were unable to establish satisfactory relations with Burma. They tried to obtain treaties of friendship and commerce and to establish permanent diplomatic missions in Rangoon, but to no avail. "The Burmese at the pinnacle of power," comments Maung, "were proud and blissfully ignorant of world affairs." The Burmese attitude toward the outside world was very similar to that of the Chinese and the results were even more disastrous. After three wars all of Burma was annexed by Britain in 1885.

Maung judges British rule dispassionately. Under the kings there was too little government, under the British too much. The British brought law and order and a centralized government. The alien rule discouraged the growth of democracy in the village, but it also imported "the rule of law which struck ready roots in Burmese soil and flourished. . . . The spirit that was breathed into the new legal system was doughty and deathless." Maung has kind words for the Government of Burma Act of 1935, which gave the Burmese dyarchy, and he describes realistically the Burmese response to it. It provided the young nationalists with a political school of which they took full advantage. He states that "the frequent censure motions provided an opportunity for the members to learn, and they learned quickly. There was much learned talk in the Legislature and much lip-service paid to political ideologies, but basically all parties were nationalist and their primary aim was to secure more prize jobs for Burmans. 'Burmanization' of the services was therefore the slogan, and many of the top appointments were thrown open to young Burmans; if the fortunate young people happened to come mainly from the families of the Ministers or their friends and supporters, that was perhaps accidental. The experiment of parliamentary government worked well, and some reforming zeal was shown in the making of laws—when members were not busy making and breaking governments."

The political history of Burma points up the difficulties of the transition from dependent status to full self-government. Once the foreign ruler has granted a substantial measure of autonomy and popular participation in government, it should be prepared to end its control in short order or face a sea of trouble. In this connection Lord Mountbatten emerges from these pages, as he has from so many others, as a man of character, ability, vision, and great wisdom.

Dr. Maung gives an outline of the Constitution and the government set up under it, but the treatment is too brief and too legal to be of much help in understanding present-day Burmese politics.

This book demonstrates (it has been proved before, but too infrequently) that doctoral dissertations need not be arid. Its weakness is that it attempts too much, and that too hurriedly. Nevertheless, it is an important contribution to the history of Burma.

In a long appendix (one-third of the book) are collected sixteen of the most important documents of the diplomatic and constitutional history of Burma. Since many of these documents are not easily available, these appendices constitute a very valuable feature of this publication. There is no index.—AMRY VANDENBOSCH, *University of Kentucky*.

Reports on the Indian General Elections, 1951–52. EDITED BY S. V. KOGEKAR AND RICHARD L. PARK. (Bombay: Popular Book Depot; New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1956. Pp. xvii, 322. Rs. 12/8.)

The Indian Experience with Democratic Elections. BY MARGARET W. FISHER AND JOAN V. BONDURANT. (Berkeley: University of California, Indian Press Digests. 1956. Pp. 200.)

Both books deal with Indian elections. The first studies the general elections of 1951–52 in considerable detail. The second describes in a more generalizing manner elections, including state and by-elections, between 1951 and 1956. The Fisher and Bondurant study begins with a brief summary of the varied experiences of the Indian public with the first general elections. It then devotes considerable space to the successful and unsuccessful features of the election machinery and to legislative and judicial attempts at improving it. Brief mention is made of the election trends and their interpretation by the Indian press. A large part of the book is devoted to a great variety of tables and statistics showing the results of

the elections for the various parties in the different states. Since the book aims primarily at a description of the more technical aspects and the objectively measurable results of the elections, it forgoes any interpretation or analysis of the nature of Indian parties, their functioning, their programs, or the motivations of their supporters. It is therefore essentially a collection of data and, within its self-imposed limits, very useful as such.

The book edited by Kogekar and Park, while restricted to the first general elections, is much more ambitious in scope. It contains reports from every state by Indian political scientists and the American editor on the pre-election activities of the parties and the results of the elections. Each report covers the same ground: the parties and party alliances; the selection of candidates; the issues and the campaigning; the role of the press; the voting process; the results; and a concluding interpretation and evaluation. The reports are somewhat uneven in quality and emphasis. In several instances, details given as facts appear more correctly to be assertions. This is especially true in regard to the basis upon which the voter determined his choice. It is always difficult to discover this basis and more so in the Indian case, where, in comparison with other democracies, additional complicating factors seem to be effective. Some of the conclusions in these reports might therefore have been more convincing had there been more information about the manner in which they were arrived at. To some extent, this weakness was due to the project's shortness of time and money. Considering this handicap, the total result is most laudable. For, although the editors refrain from introducing any generalizing summary, several instructive features applicable to all India emerge from the valuable case studies. Caste, class, religion, and language were vital considerations to which all parties paid careful attention in all their activities. Ignorance of the purpose and meaning of the elections was widespread, even though in many cases the least informed voters were the most enthusiastic. The candidates came mostly from the educated middle and upper classes. The issues were usually national in scope. In some instances factionalism within the Congress party made of it in fact two parties: the battle of the candidates was fought during their selection rather than their election. Nevertheless, the overwhelming victory of the Congress party appeared in part explainable by the absence of any major opposition party, the existence of many local splinter parties and independent candidates, the single-member district method of election, the well established organization of the party—not to mention its traditional prestige and the personal magnetism of its major leader, Nehru.—WERNER LEVI, *University of Minnesota.*

Essays on the Constitution of Pakistan: Including the Draft and Final Constitutions of Pakistan with Comments. By K. J. NEWMAN. (Dacca: Pakistan Co-operative Book Society, Ltd. 1956. Pp. lvi, 395. Rs. 12/8/0.)

Constitutional Problems in Pakistan. By SIR IVOR JENNINGS. (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1957. Pp. xvi, 378. $7.50.)

The two volumes under review, which contain useful materials on selected aspects of constitutional developments and problems in Pakistan, are particularly welcome, for objective studies of the government and politics of Pakistan are surprisingly few. Doubtless the reason is to be found in the instability of the political situation in the first decade of Pakistan's independence. The country did not even receive a constitution until 1956, and the first national elections are yet to be held. Thus all studies must be tentative ones, for the future of Pakistan is by no means clear.

While the Constitution was being drafted, Professor K. J. Newman, a European scholar who is Head of the Department of Political Science at Dacca University, expressed his views on some of the major issues involved, and after the Draft Constitution was published in January, 1956, he wrote a series of articles on the document for the Dacca *Morning News.* These articles, in revised and expanded form, form the heart of his *Essays on the Constitution of Pakistan.* In the volume he has also included a brief historical introduction to constitution-making in Pakistan and the texts of the Draft Constitution and the Final Constitution, with brief comments on the major changes which were made before the document was finalized.

Clearly most of the provisions of the Constitution of Pakistan were modelled after the Government of India Act of 1935, the Indian Independence Act of 1947, and the Indian Constitution of 1950, with necessary adaptations: the introduction of Islamic principles, a different kind of Central Parliament, and the incorporation of certain features of the presidential system of democratic government in a

structure which is basically patterned after the British parliamentary system. Professor Newman describes it as "an experiment with mixed institutions, a unique case of a Federation consisting of only two units with equal representation." He finds the Constitution deficient in several respects and is particularly disturbed over the lack of clarity regarding the powers of the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the Parliament. He believes that "the Constitution makers have succeeded in finding a via media between the tenets of Islam and modern parliamentary Democracy," and he hopes that the unique experiment of a federation "based upon a dualism" will solve the problem of holding together the two units of the country.

On October 24, 1954, the Governor-General of Pakistan proclaimed a state of emergency throughout the country, called upon the Prime Minister to reform the Cabinet, and dissolved the Constituent Assembly on the ground that it "has lost the confidence of the people." This action, unprecedented in modern times in the history of governments patterned after the British system, raised fundamental questions of law and politics and led to prolonged litigation. The President of the Constituent Assembly filed a petition with the Chief Court of Sind, alleging that the Governor-General's proclamation was *ultra vires* and void. The Chief Court of Sind upheld his claim, but the Federal Court of Pakistan, to which the case was appealed, in *Federation of Pakistan v. Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan*, while avoiding the issue of the legality of the Governor-General's dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, held that acts of the Constituent Assembly were illegal unless they received the assent of the Governor-General. The effect of this decision was a virtual breakdown of the constitutional machinery of the state. This impossible situation was gradually clarified, with the Federal Court in a prominent role, chiefly through two additional decisions, *Usif Patel v. The Crown* and *Federation of Pakistan v. Ali Ahmad Hussain Shah*, and an advisory opinion, *Special Reference No. 1 of 1955*. Professor Newman summarizes these important decisions. In a separate volume, Sir Ivor Jennings, a leading authority on modern constitutions who served for a time as a constitutional adviser to the Government of Pakistan, discusses the legal aspects of these four cases in a lengthy introduction and presents the major parts of the judgment of the Federal Court in each case. The back flap of the jacket contains a statement that "both Tamizuddin Khan's case and the Reference will have to be included in future standard works on constitutional law." The Federal Court's decision in the first case seemed to bring Pakistan to the verge of constitutional chaos, but in the end, as Professor Newman points out, "by its wise and learned decision it built the 'legal bridge' which brought the Nation back to constitutional government." —NORMAN D. PALMER, *University of Pennsylvania.*

Constitutions of Nations. By AMOS J. PEASLEE. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; New York: Justice House. 2nd ed., 1956. 3 vols. Pp. xxvii, 896; xii, 881; xii, 919. $22.50.)

A new edition of a valuable reference work, which is apparently still the only-up-to-date and reasonably complete compilation in English of the constitutions of the world. As in the first edition (Concord, N. H., The Rumford Press, 1950), now out of print, the text of each constitution is preceded by a short historical introduction and a summary; the texts themselves are well annotated and are followed by extensive bibliographies of sources and commentators. Thus it serves the purposes of experts, students, and laymen. According to the editor, a former American ambassador to Australia and secretary general of the International Bar Association, major changes have occurred in the text and status of the constitutions of thirty-five of the eighty-nine nations since the publication of the first edition. The new edition also includes improvements in translations and summaries, additions to the bibliographies, and revisions in the sixty-odd pages of comparative tables which conclude the third volume. Completely new are the chapters dealing with the constitutions of five new states: Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Libya, and Viet Nam. Although the book is invaluable for reference libraries and extremely useful (particularly in regard to the less accessible constitutions) for the scholar, the summaries, the annotations, and, particularly, the bibliographies could be improved. As the texts of only the present constitutions are given, it seems somewhat paradoxical that the bibliographies list mostly commentators on constitutions no longer valid, while showing serious inadequacies in regard to recent works.

The Approach to Self-Government. By SIR IVOR JENNINGS. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1956. Pp. viii, 204. $3.00.)

Sir Ivor Jennings has become one of the two or three leading constitutional analysts in the world and is clearly without a peer as a student of the constitutional problems of nascent British dominions. In this volume, which is an elaboration of several talks on the B.B.C., he examines a profoundly significant question: namely, what sort of constitution should be adopted by (or given to) a country venturing upon its first efforts at self-government? His wide experience has been primarily in Asia and his book reflects this interest; but his observations and suggestions have a far broader application. He is properly cautious with his conclusions and most reluctant to describe them as having any general validity; he is keenly aware of the unique needs and problems of each country. But the problem he faces is a practical one and he is aware, too, that an answer must be found, however imperfect. This is a bold and exciting little book and a contribution of real substance to the understanding of constitutional principles and of their application and development in newborn nations.

British Constitutional History since 1832. By Robert Livingston Schuyler and Corinne Comstock Weston. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company. Pp. 191. $1.25.)

Another issue in the excellent Anvil paperback series, this time by one of America's leading students of the British constitution and its development. Like other volumes in the series, this one comprises about a hundred pages of text followed by a variety of readings on the topic. The text is clear and well written, a most useful summary of a complex period in British constitutional history; the thirty-five short readings vary widely in content and range in time from Charles I to Sir Winston Churchill. A useful companion for students of British political institutions.

British Broadcasting: Radio and Television in the United Kingdom. By Burton Paulu. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1956. Pp. xii, 457, $6.00.)

Here is a competent, scholarly study of British experience and experiments in radio and television. It is intended primarily for an American audience and has a special utility in its many comparisons with American and continental broadcasting. The author, who is manager of the University of Minnesota radio station, deals not only with political questions, such as the controversy over public *versus* private (commercial) broadcasting, but also with many technical affairs concerning management, financing, programming, audience composition, and the like.

Local Government in New Zealand. Edited by R. J. Polaschek. (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Public Administration; London: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. 122. 16s.)

This volume comprises a series of papers delivered by half a dozen experts, mainly public officials, at the 1956 convention of the New Zealand Institute of Public Administration. They have now been edited and tied together by Professor Polaschek of Victoria University College. Little has been written heretofore, and not much done, about local government in New Zealand and most commentators have been content merely to call attention to its failings and inadequacies. These writers, while conceding the failures (the opening paper is subtitled "a history of defeat"), go well beyond mere lamentation and look toward the prospect of improvement. The book is animated by a lively spirit of reform and the reader is left with the hope and expectation that local government, in such hands as these, may yet become a vital part of New Zealand's governmental system.

The Ministry of Works. By Sir Harold Emmerson. (London: Allen and Unwin; New York: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. 171. 15s.)

Sir Harold, permanent secretary of the Ministry of Works from 1946 to 1956, endeavors "to convey the sense of a living, changing and virile organisation" to the Agency Services of the Ministry dealing with works, buildings, historic preservation, and relations with the building industry.—J.B.C.

Australian Colonial Policy: A Survey of Native Administration and European Development in Papua. By J. D. Legge. (Sydney, London, Melbourne, Wellington: Angus and Robertson; New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1956. Pp. ix, 245. $3.50.)

The fact that several of the British dominions are themselves colonial powers of importance is often ignored; here is an able volume that will fill a gap in the literature on the subject. Mr. Legge has written a scholarly and readable history of the Australian administration of Papua and eastern New

Guinea, which are the principal parts of the Australian colonial empire. The volume begins with the original British protectorate and annexation and brings the story down to the new trend in policies and techniques that followed the Second World War. Largely chronological, the book nevertheless concentrates attention on certain significant themes, such as native welfare and economic development.

Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example. By Hans Kohn. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1956. Pp. 133. $3.25.)

An essay that will be incorporated in a forthcoming larger study, *The Age of Nationalism*, presumably a continuation of the author's renowned *The Idea of Nationalism*. It is the thesis of this lively and original essay that, unlike most nations in continental Europe, Switzerland adopted a democratic system after the English and American models particularly as a result of her successful liberal revolution of 1848. It is contended that the Swiss experience still has its lessons in two respects: "the compatibility of nationalism and liberty and the peaceful and productive coexistence of various ethnic groups in one common state."

Los Principios de la Nueva Ley de Expropiacion Forzosa: Potestad Expropiatoria—Garantia Patrimonial Responsabiliadad Civil de la Administracion. By Eduardo Garcia De Enterria. (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos. 1956. Pp. 321. 125 Pesetas.)

This volume represents a contribution to the available legal literature on Spain. It is a highly technical book and will interest only those scholars and lawyers who have an interest in foreign expropriation principles. Essentially a commentary on the controversial expropriation law enacted by the Franco government in 1954, it expounds the law article by article. The author deals with the theory of expropriation and with the administrative problems and responsibilities in connection with the execution of the law. An appendix contains the texts of the law and of a clarifying decree of December 1955.

The East German Rising, 17th June 1953. By Stefan Brant. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1957. Pp. 202. $3.95.)

On June 17, 1953, the people of the Soviet Zone of Germany rebelled against their occupiers in a dramatic and spontaneous uprising, the first real sign of the mass unpopularity and vulnerability of Russia's satellite empire. The story of the revolt of unarmed workers and peasants, as well as of the far-flung repercussions it had on both Soviet and Western policy, is now told by an eye-witness to the proceedings, writing under a pseudonym. The reporting lacks journalistic vitality and one senses that the author has not made the most of the opportunities his fifty-yard-line seat afforded. But as a brief history of an important day in contemporary Eastern Europe the work is extremely valuable.

Current Soviet Policies. Volume II, The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and Its Aftermath. Edited by Leo Gruliow. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1957. Pp. 247. $6.00.)

This important collection of documents follows an earlier volume which covered the Nineteenth Party Congress and the period of Stalin's death (*Current Soviet Policies*, I, 1953). It has been compiled under the guidance of Leo Gruliow by the staff of the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council. It provides an ample but necessarily incomplete selection from the record of the Twentieth Party Congress. For completer coverage, the editor points to the files of the *Current Digest* and the two volumes published by Columbia University: *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* and *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe*. It also includes documents on "The Stalin Cult, 1949," the directives of the Sixth Five-Year Plan, and a selection of documents showing the repercussions of the Twentieth Congress in the Soviet Union and abroad.

National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe: A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary, February-November, 1956. Edited by Paul E. Zinner. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1956. Pp. xx, 563.)

A useful selection of documents showing the evolution in Moscow, Poland, and Hungary that led to the uprisings in October and November, 1956. Because of the very early date of publication (the foreword is dated December 14, 1956), it is necessarily weak on documentation of the intellectual ferment in Poland and Hungary, without which these

events cannot be fully understood. The volume appeared under the sponsorship of the Program on East Central Europe at Columbia University and should be regarded as a sequel to the earlier collection, *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism.*

Belorussia: The Making of a Nation. By Nicholas P. Vakar. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1956. Pp. xii, 297. $6.50.)

The author, a native of Russia now at Wheaton College, has with this very learned work "put on the map" one of the least-known of the fifteen Soviet Republics. Not too much light is thrown on the present condition of Belorussia, but the past of that submerged nation situated between Poland and Russia proper is treated with much detail and documented with an abundance of evidence. If Khrushchev's program of economic decentralization should lead to restoring the individual character of the Soviet nations (as Mr. Isaac Deutscher assumes that it might), Professor Vakar's study would become even more important as a fount of relevant information.

The Anatomy of Terror: Khrushchev's Revelations about Stalin's Regime. Introduction by Nathaniel Weyl. (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1956. Pp. 73. $1.00.)

This is a paperback publication of the text of the secret speech delivered by N. S. Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The introduction deals primarily with the more obvious implications of the speech and contains many quotations from a variety of sources. There is no critical textual analysis of the kind to be found in Bertram Wolfe's *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost.*

Heritage of the Desert: The Arabs and the Middle East. By Harry B. Ellis. (New York: The Ronald Press Company. 1956. Pp. vii, 311. $5.00.)

The author, a newspaper reporter, spent three years in the Middle East as correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor.* The book represents the fruit of his travel, experience, and thinking during that period. It is written in a free, easy, journalistic style and makes very good reading. It is packed with information about each of the Middle Eastern countries: their historical development, the basis of their present societies, and the nature of their animosities and disagreements. A particularly good chapter deals with the search for unity among the Arab states. The impact of westernization and of Communism on the region is the subject of two more chapters. The book is essentially a volume for the interested layman, but scholars may also read it with profit.

Selected Works. Volume IV, 1941–1945. By Mao Tse-Tung. (New York: International Publishers. 1956. Pp. 348. $3.00.)

The present volume of the selected writings of Mao Tse-Tung is the fourth of a projected series of five volumes. It deals with the thought of the Chinese Communists leader during the last years of the struggle with Japan, 1941–1945. The contents of the book are drawn from the public speeches of Mao Tse-Tung, from his numerous editorials, party directives, reports, and resolutions. A Notes section at the end of the book helps to clarify such matters as the historical setting of the speeches and identifies persons and places referred to in the writings contained in this and preceeding volumes.

The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia. By Donald E. Willmott. (Ithaca: Cornell University, Department of Far Eastern Studies. 1956. Pp. vi, 88.)

Mr. Willmott's study appears in the "interim" reports series of the Modern Indonesia Project at Cornell, but despite its tentative character it throws important light on the complex legal problems of the Chinese community in Indonesia. The author traces the status of the Chinese in Indonesia during the past century, as successively modified in the legislation of the former colonial regime and of the present Indonesian Government. Mr. Willmott summarizes the negotiations between Indonesia and the Chinese People's Republic, which culminated in the Agreement on Dual Nationality concluded at Bandung on April 22, 1955, by the respective foreign ministers, Sunario and Chou En-lai. This and other post-1946 legal texts are included in the appendix.

Living Conditions of Plantation Workers and Peasants on Java in 1939–1940. Final Report of the Coolie Budget Commission. Translated by Robert Van Niel. (Ithaca: Cornell University, Department of Far Eastern Studies. 1956. Pp. 131. $1.50.)

The Coolie Budget Commission was established by the Netherlands East Indian Gov-

ernment in 1938 to investigate the standards of living of Javanese plantation workers in the light of prevailing and comparative wage practices. The report was completed after the outbreak of war with Japan on December 8, 1941, but for obvious reasons the conclusions of the Commission could not thereafter be employed as a basis for policy. Nevertheless, as a finding of the facts with respect to the social life of the pre-war Javanese plantation worker, the Report of the Coolie Budget Commission is a document of extraordinary social and political value, and all students of the subject will be indebted to the Modern Indonesia Project at Cornell for the present full translation.

Development for Free Asia. By MAURICE ZINKIN. (Fair Lawn, N. J.: Essential Books. 1956. Pp. viii, 263. $4.50.)

The author of *Asia and the West*, a former member of the Indian Civil Service, here offers a brilliant synopsis of the intellectual, economic, political, and social requirements of development in the several non-Communist countries of Asia. "The great requirement for development is change"—and from this initial sentence, Mr. Zinkin constructs highly suggestive analyses of the different aspects of modernization in Asia. The twenty-two chapters are brief, to-the-point, and unmistakably clear. A relatively long chapter on "population control" answers the typical question of uninformed Westerners; and the concluding chapter on "Indian Planning" pleads for understanding of the scope and difficulties of the problems confronting that vast country.

Constitutional Developments in India. By CHARLES HENRY ALEXANDROWICZ. (Bombay: Oxford University Press. 1957. Pp. 255. Rs. 12.)

The author, who is professor of international and constitutional law at the University of Madras, examines the way in which the Constitution of India has been interpreted in the Courts since 1950, particularly with regard to intent as expressed in the debates of the Constituent Assembly.—J.B.C.

De Staatkundige Ontwikkeling der Nederlandse Antillen. By ANNEMARIE KASTEEL. ('s-Gravenhage: W. van Hoeve. 1956. Pp. xi, 361. Fl. 14.75.)

This publication on the development of government in the Netherlands Antilles to 1955 was presented originally as a doctoral dissertation at Leiden University by the author, who is a daughter of the former governor of that jurisdiction. It has a five-page summary in English.—J.B.C.

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Washington, D. C.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

The Yearbook of World Affairs, 1956. EDITED BY GEORGE W. KEETON, GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, AND L. C. GREEN. (London: Stevens and Sons. 1956. Pp. xii, 420. 42 s.)

It seems unavoidable that a collection of papers on rather diverse subjects, discussed from different aspects, should produce a rather uneven series. Even the excellent editors who prepared this *Yearbook* for the London Institute of World Affairs could not quite escape the Scylla of leaving out certain important events or the Charybdis of including a few mediocre papers merely to provide more complete coverage. More durable results would seem to be produced by gathering articles which either discuss one important problem or survey several years of continuous development, rather than by evaluating "the outstanding event of the year."

Thus, for instance, Frank Tannenbaum travels far in time and space in his brilliant analysis of the typical Latin American body politic "in continuing ferment." W. Friedmann contributes an incisive statement on the

"Limits of Functionalism in International Organization," analyzing the record of the European Coal and Steel Community, the agency that in his view approaches most clearly the ideal of international government; he concludes that in spite of its undoubted achievements, the ECSC must ultimately "progress or perish." F. Parkinson's article on "Bandung and the Underdeveloped Countries" and C. E. Toussaint's careful analysis of "The Colonial Controversy in the United Nations" complement each other well. The latter shows the reasons and nature of the shifting tactics of the anti-colonial nations in the UN; the former points out that the sooner the underdeveloped nations reach the limits of their capacity to use parliamentary means within the UN, the faster they will be "compelled to resort to extra-parliamentary" diplomacy. J. D. B. Miller usefully reviews the Commonwealth Conferences between 1945 and 1955, showing that while pre-war meetings "took place within a framework of an assumed Empire 'interest'," these post-war conferences moved "essentially within the framework of separate national interests which coincide sufficiently for the time being to make an appearance of unanimity a worthwhile policy for each country concerned." The future of the meetings—and, one may perhaps add, of the Commonwealth itself—depends, he asserts, on the extent to which the "ramifying national interests of the members continue to coincide." Geoffrey L. Goodwin's lucid sketch of the achievements, difficulties, and limitations of GATT and the hopes raised by plans for an Organization for Trade Co-operation also deserves reading, as does C. H. Alexandrowicz's concise survey of the precarious and, in some respects, obscure situations produced by "India's Himalayan Dependencies."

On the other hand, Lord Lindsay's rather perfunctory analysis of the Geneva Meetings (surely the outstanding event of 1955), Susan Strange's realistic and crisp paper on "Strains in NATO," and J. Frankel's sound contribution on "The Middle East in Turmoil" seem, a year after publication, out of date. J. G. Starke's discussion of ANZUS is of little interest; I. Paenson's paper on East-West trade is disappointing in its analysis and unconvincing in its conclusions.

The *Yearbook's* most valuable part, occupying a third of the present volume, is, perhaps, its book-review section, divided into "reports" on economic, educational and psychological, geographic, institutional, legal, and sociological aspects of world affairs. Bibliographical articles have much merit, but functional division into categories and sub-categories resulted here in including in "Power Politics in Disguise," a sub-section of "Sociological Aspects," Kirk's and Hoskins's books on the Middle East, Truman's and Lord Templewood's well-known memoirs and the alleged memoirs of Litvinov, Pipes's historical treatise on *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, Nasser's *Egypt's Liberation*, the Chatham House *Surveys*, and Dorothy Pickles's *The Fourth Republic*, together with fifty-odd equally diversified titles.
—GEORGE A. LANYI, *Oberlin College*.

The Second International, 1889–1914. By JAMES JOLL (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1956. Pp. 213. $3.50.)

The Socialist International had no history of its own apart from that of the parties composing it, for, unlike the Third (Communist) International, the Second was never directed from a single center, nor was it the tool of one of its member parties or of any government. Though James Joll, a lecturer in modern history at Oxford University, is wise not to attempt to write a history of socialist parties in this small volume, he presents us with far more than a discussion of the congresses and resolutions of the Second International. His work is primarily a study of the German and French Socialist parties and their relation to each other, though he also gives us interesting glimpses of the British, Russian, Italian, Austrian, and Belgian parties. The author concentrates on the three chief issues that confronted the International in its twenty-five year history—those having to do with the respective roles of political and "direct" action in socialist tactics, the participation of socialist leaders in bourgeois governments, and the problem of how best to prevent war. He shows how the attitude of each party toward these issues was determined by its own history and by economic and political conditions in its own country.

Joll rightly stresses the great influence wielded in the International by its German member party as a result of its outstanding organizational strength and electoral successes. In his Introduction, he goes so far as to assert that "one of the main themes of the history of the Second International is the imposition by . . . the German Social Democratic Party of doctrines and tactics on other parties, notably the French, with, it may be thought, disastrous consequences to the whole subsequent

development of French social and political life." Fortunately, however, Joll's book is not built around this at best greatly exaggerated case. On the contrary, it contributes to an understanding of the fact that the divisions which have all along seriously incapacitated the French socialist movement, as compared to the British and German, have been ultimately due to the numerical and organizational weakness of French labor, which has in turn been an inevitable consequence of the relative backwardness of the French economy. Here, rather than in anything the International or the German Socialists did or did not do, was to be found the source of strength of such tendencies as Blanquism, Anarchism, and Syndicalism—and of their present-day heir, Communism—in the French labor movement and of the corresponding failure of orthodox Marxism to make much headway in France. As Joll himself says, "the International itself was unable to do much to influence the course of development followed by its member parties." The major exception he cites to this generalization reflects, in fact, not the International's weakening effect on the French Socialists but its success in uniting them into the present SFIO.

The Second International is extremely well and even entertainingly written and is a very successful attempt to compress a vast subject into little space without sacrificing scholarship. It is a well-documented work and has a useful select bibliography and a good index. Particularly noteworthy are the excellent sketches Mr. Joll draws of some of the outstanding personalities of the Second International, above all of Jean Jaurès, for whom he shows somewhat more sympathy and understanding than for Marxists, especially those in Germany.—JOHN H. KAUTSKY, *Washington University, St. Louis.*

Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power. By HOWARD K. BEALE. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1956. Pp. xxi, 600. $6.00.)

Political scientists concerned with discovering and testing theoretical insights into political phenomena frequently find historians too preoccupied with mere narrative and description at the expense of systematic interpretation within coherent conceptual frameworks. Yet these same political scientists, especially if they study international relations, may have learned more from a few "traditional" historical works than from scores of studies in their own discipline, if only because the painstaking record of institutions and events is the indispensable raw material for all the social sciences, in the absence of which the most ingenious generalizations are tenuous and shallow.

For the student of American foreign policy and, above all, for the student of diplomacy, Howard K. Beale's scholarly volume, a product of unusually extensive and intensive examination of primary documents, is exceedingly fruitful. However, it is fruitful because it is such a thorough, objective, and skillful account of the statecraft of a seminal figure in the evolution of American foreign policy, not because this account bears any logical relation to the author's general conceptions about imperialism, the balance of power, or the role of men and "forces" in international relations—conceptions which he states but does not argue, and which he states systematically only in the concluding six pages.

As a man deeply concerned about war and peace, Professor Beale begins his book by acknowledging its origin in a desire to answer some very large questions, such as why "for three decades the United States and other great powers have been pursuing policies that have not led to the better world for which men and nations have hoped." But as a historian, he comes to grips only with much narrower problems of interpretation. Essentially, he has chosen some central components of Roosevelt's foreign policy—imperialism, America's plunge into world power, the Anglo-American entente, China policy, and the balance of power in the Far East and Europe—and described selected episodes that illustrate Roosevelt's conduct and conception of diplomacy.

From Beale's meticulous investigation, President Roosevelt emerges as a statesman of extraordinary comprehension, foresight, and finesse. As a diplomat he exploited extensive personal channels of communication with notable success. His estimates of individuals were shrewd, his dealings with them were discreet, tactful, and patient, yet forthright. But his competence in the technique of diplomacy was a natural concomitant of his whole conception of diplomacy.

Roosevelt comprehended, as did few other Presidents, the nature and importance of power and the specific configurations as they bore upon American interests. Accordingly, he made his decisions with clear-sighted deliberation, weighing all the consequences of action and scrupulously distinguishing substance

from appearance. Decades ahead of most Americans, he perceived the growing interdependence of the world and America's intricate involvement in its affairs. Above all, he understood the relationship between force and diplomacy. He knew how to combine the threat of force with persuasion, so that even his *ultimata* achieved their objectives quietly, cementing rather than disturbing friendly relations. While ever solicitous of America's prestige, he never involved the prestige of others at the expense of accommodations of interest. He was unalterably opposed to bluster and bluffing and to assuming positions beyond America's military capacity to sustain. It was his rule to speak courteously but firmly; and because he stood prepared to back words with deeds, words sufficed.

Throughout his subtle and complex diplomatic dealings Roosevelt kept his eye on two central purposes: the maintenance of a balance of power in Eurasia and the prevention of general war. This steadiness of purpose, combined with firmness of principle, was the condition of his success as a flexible tactician; for it was the consistency and reliability of his diplomacy, as much as the skill of his technique, that won for him and his country the respect and trust without which his personal diplomacy would have been a liability.

Moreover, Roosevelt was not only a successful practitioner of *Realpolitik* but an able politician as well, with a keen appreciation of the role of public and Congressional opinion in foreign affairs. Nevertheless, his sensitivity to opinion did not prevent him from leading the nation into paths far in advance of the existing consensus.

Substantially all of these qualities Professor Beale grants and amply documents. Yet in the final six pages he concludes that Roosevelt failed because his policies led to America's time of troubles, marked by two disastrous world wars, nationalist uprisings among colonial peoples, and communism in strife-torn China. Beale the philosopher finds in this verdict an answer to the question with which he began his book: imperialism and power politics were to blame. But since the many assumptions that underlie this judgment are left implicit, this reviewer is content to register the great debt of political scientists to Beale the historian for the abundant lessons of statecraft he has revealed in the diplomacy of a man to whom he concedes almost every virtue but omnipotence.—ROBERT E. OSGOOD, *University of Chicago.*

The United States in World Affairs, 1956. By RICHARD P. STEBBINS. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1957. Pp. xii, 426. $6.00.)

The new volume of this standard annual presented difficult problems to the editor: the outstanding challenges to American foreign policy in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe occurred in the last quarter of the calendar year, at the end of which it was by no means clear how the United States would deal with them. Nevertheless, the recapitulation of essential facts in the form of a coherent story is useful and makes, as usual, interesting reading for expert and layman alike. The last chapter, "Facing 1957," is particularly characterized by masterful balance and good judgment, and the experienced author cannot be blamed for the fact that events have changed the perspective by mid-1957.

Inter-American Juridical Yearbook, 1952–1954. (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union. 1955. Pp. vii, 357. $3.00.)

The present volume of this useful *Yearbook* covers the three year period 1952–1954. It is divided into five principal sections. Part I contains four studies in the field of international law and organization. Part II considers current inter-American developments, devoting considerable space to the juridical results of the Tenth Inter-American Conference. Part III emphasizes the activities of the United Nations in so far as these activities have a bearing on the development of inter-American law and organization. Part IV is a bibliography of books and articles which treat of the inter-American system generally or discuss specific problems and areas in this hemisphere. At least half of the book is to be found in Part V, Documents. Here one may read the official reports of the various inter-American bodies, as well as the texts of proposed conventions, such as that of the Convention on Territorial Asylum. Four languages are employed in the book: English, Spanish, French, and Portuguese.

Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade. By RICHARD N. GARDNER. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1956. Pp. xxii, 423.)

The central theme of this well-written study is neither economic theory as applied in the international area, nor the statistical course of the balance of payments problem; rather, it is a portrayal of the workings and an evalua-

tion of the results of what the author calls "international economic diplomacy." Multilateralism is the dominant concept, and joint Anglo-American planning for it occupies stage center in the narrative. Born of these often awkward and snarled negotiations were such institutions as the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the ill-fated ITO, and GATT. Possibly rooted too exclusively in the postwar period, the author's analysis emphasizes the national dogmas and human strains that hamstrung many of these efforts. Figures such as John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and Will Clayton dominate the scene, and their private papers have been liberally tapped to give the account a definitive and zesty flavor. Their handiwork emerges as admirable in many respects, but much of it is seen as doomed to failure because of a combination of economic provincialism and serious miscalculations about the nature of the postwar world.

Russia and America: Dangers and Prospects. By Henry L. Roberts. (New York: Mentor Books. 1956. Pp. xxix, 251. $.50.)

This book is the result of two years discussion by a group of scholars, scientists, businessmen, and government officials brought together by the Council of Foreign Relations. As such, its style and some of its punch are weakened by the need to portray committee consensus and respect differing viewpoints. Nevertheless, it presents a lucid and penetrating account of the basic problems affecting Soviet-American relations, focussing on both the level of long-term strengths and vulnerabilities and the level of more immediate areas of conflict—Germany, the East European satellites, and Communist China. This paperback edition is not indexed.

International Communication and Political Opinion. By Bruce Lannes Smith and Chitra M. Smith. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1956. Pp. 325. $6.00.)

This continuation of earlier bibliographies on public opinion and propaganda is more specialized in period (1943–55) and subject and even more useful to the student of international relations. Communication is a crucial aspect of international politics, as well as of policy formation and decision-making; and a formidable body of research on political opinion and attitudes has grown up in recent years. By now, survey questions have become highly relevant, and research has developed to the point where many data can be checked against one another. Any student of recent world politics would ignore these resources at his peril. The authors offer an excellent guide to over 2600 items, including not only books and articles, but also important surveys and poll data that may be obtained from governmental agencies. Excellent printing and indexing further enhance the usefulness of what clearly is a book to own.

Jugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1948–1956: An Analysis with Documents. By R. Barry Farrell. (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press. 1956. Pp. 220. $5.00.)

A brief (66 pages of text plus documents) effort to analyze Yugoslav-Soviet relations since the Cominform Resolution. Unfortunately, as a purportedly scholarly work it has serious shortcomings. A number of important assertions of "fact" are either not so or highly questionable. Interpretations are often misleading or not justified by the evidence. The documents are almost entirely made up of speeches and reports of Yugoslav leaders, sometimes only in the form of excerpts. There are no Russian documents except for the Cominform Resolution and Khrushchev's brief speech at the Belgrade airport in May 1955. And to dignify an unofficial translation from a monitored radio broadcast by the word "document" is to hit a new low in the name of scholarship. To make things worse, the book contains errors and inconsistencies in the spelling of place names, evidence of bad or inadequate editing and carelessness in proofreading.

The Suez Canal: A Selection of Documents Relating to the International Status of the Suez Canal and the Position of the Suez Canal Company, November 30, 1854–July 26, 1956. (London: Stevens and Sons; New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1956. Pp. vi, 76, $2.50.)

This selection, published first as a Special Supplement to *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 1956, in London, includes the classic Suez documents as well as a compilation of later treaties, agreements, and judgments which in some way or other affected the Suez Canal or the Suez Canal Company. It also gives a good bibliography. Though it includes the Nationalization Law of July 26, 1956, the compilation was unfortunately closed before the dramatic repercussions to that act got under way.

Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China: An Historical and Integrated Analysis through 1948. By Yu-Kwei Cheng. (Washington, D. C.: The University Press of Washington, D. C. 1956. Pp. xi, 278. $7.00.)

Mr. Cheng's study represents four years of research at the Brookings Institution, following previous studies at the Academia Sinica and Chinese National Resources Commission —with which he was associated for some twenty years. The work contains 85 tables, 15 charts, and 8 statistical appendices and incorporates a substantial amount of technical data and analysis on trade and industrial development under the Kuomintang regime, prior to its collapse. As the subtitle suggests, however, the work is largely historical in context and covers the pre-1948 period in which the author had personal association with the questions studied. The book is written as though Communist China had no existence and thus yields such absurdities as: "The existing pattern of [China's] export trade will remain unchanged at least for the immediate future" (p. 250)! For the present tense, wherever used, read past tense.

The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1955. Vol. IV. (Madras: University of Madras. 1955. Pp. viii, 429, Rs. 10.)

The *Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1955*, edited by C. H. Alexandrowicz for the Indian Study Group of International Affairs at the University of Madras, contains ten articles on international affairs, eight articles on international and comparative law, and a section on judicial decisions (pp. 331–398) which draws heavily from decisions of Indian courts in 1954. The articles range widely in scope—from studies of history and theory, such as "Inter-State Relations in Ancient India and Kautalya's *Artashastra*," to studies of contemporary political and constitutional questions, such as "Peaceful Co-Existence as a Doctrine of Current International Affairs" and "The Constitutional Crisis in Pakistan, 1954–1955." The *Year Book* is an authoritative guide to opinions and research of Indian scholars, although it also includes several articles by foreign scholars.

The Meaning of Bandung. By Carlos P. Romulo. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1956. Pp. vii, 102. $2.50.)

The noted Philippine general, author, and diplomat has, in this slim volume, given us his impressions of the significance of the Bandung Conference of 1955. He was the chief delegate of the Philippine Republic to this first major conference of underdeveloped and formerly colonial countries of Asia and Africa and took a leading role in its deliberations. The book is divided into two parts: "The Spiritual Offensive" and "Asian Criticisms of America." In the first, Romulo dicusses the ideological conflicts centering on the issues of colonialism and political freedom, racial equality, and peaceful economic growth. He also makes some penetrating observations about two important figures who attended the Conference: Nehru and Chou En-Lai. In the second part of the book, he sets forth the main criticisms of America that emerged from the conference. An appendix gives, in addition to several statements of Romulo, the text of the Communique of the Conference.

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1938. Volume V. By Department of State. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office. 1956. Pp. v, 995. $4.25.)

This volume deals exclusively with the American republics. The first part is concerned with the Eighth Conference of American States in Lima and other minor multilateral matters. The remainder deals with bilateral relations of the United States with individual American republics, arranged country by country. The subject given most attention is trade.

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1939. Volume II, General—The British Commonwealth and Europe. By Department of State. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1956. Pp. vii, 911. $4.00.)

This volume will be of considerable interest to students of the diplomatic history of the Second World War. Relations with the Soviet Union are omitted, since these were already covered in the volume on *The Soviet Union, 1933–1939*. The coming of the war was primarily treated in Volume I of the 1939 *Diplomatic Papers*, but Volume II includes topics such as Italy's seizure of Albania, the repercussions of the *Anschluss*, the termination of the Spanish Civil War, Roosevelt's approaches to Mussolini, and the appointment of the President's representative to the Vatican. Among the wartime topics treated are the sinking of the *S. S. Athenia* and other matters

involving relations between neutral America and belligerent Britain.

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941. Volume IV, The Far East. By Department of State. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office. 1956. Pp. 1044. $4.50.)

This volume (which will be followed by Volume V on the same subject) deals chiefly with the events that culminated in the attack on Pearl Harbor. More than two-thirds is concerned with discussions of a peaceful settlement by the United States and Japan, supplementing material contained in the two volumes of *Foreign Relations . . . : Japan, 1931–1941*, published in 1943. The remainder of this volume deals, among other matters, with wartime cooperation among the United States, Britain, China, and the Netherlands in the Far East, the decision of the Soviet Union to remain neutral in the Pacific war, and relations of Japan with the Axis Powers and the Soviet Union.

Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March 1918. By John W. Wheeler-Bennett. (London: Macmillan and Company; New York: St. Martin's Press. 1956. Pp. xx, 478. $8.00.)

An unchanged reprint of this well-known and excellent monograph, which has been out of print for some time.

World Politics in Transition. By Lennox A. Mills and Charles H. McLaughlin. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1956. Pp. x, 757. $6.50.)

This book is exactly what it purports to be: an introductory text to the subject matter of international relations. The contents are well organized and are easily assimilable. After acquainting the student with the basic facts of international politics, such as the existence and nature of the sovereign state, and with various physical and psychological power factors that shape and influence international relations, the authors deal with the attempts that have been made to make states more responsible to the world community. The foreign policies of seven powers are examined under the heading, "The Defense of Freedom." Those of the Soviet Union and Red China are analyzed under the heading, "The Growth of Communism." The text ends appropriately enough on the problems facing nations in their dealings with one another.

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WILLIAM H. ROBERTS
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POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

Against the Tyrant: the Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide. By Oscar Jászi and John D. Lewis. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press and The Falcon's Wing Press. 1957. Pp. xii, 288. $5.00.)

The rise of modern totalitarian dictatorships has forced many of our contemporaries to face the realities of political oppression. This has led in recent decades to a number of actual or attempted assassinations, the most notable of which was the great conspiracy against the life of Hitler. Is it possible that the older theories of political resistance, and more particularly of tyrannicide, have acquired new relevance under the conditions of contemporary life? This is the question that has inspired the present book.

In the division of labor adopted by the authors, the task of tracing the historical development of these theories has fallen mainly to Professor Lewis. The first part of the work, which appears under his signature, consists of a brief but comprehensive survey of the doctrine of tyrannicide from classical antiquity down to the 17th century, together with a more summary treatment of the related but broader problem of the theory of resistance to tyrannical rule.

In the second part of the book, Professor Jászi carries the story forward from the period of the American and French revolutions down to the present day. The burden of the tale is that the theory of tyrannicide, at least until very recent times, was never widely influential. True, the age of revolutions did lend currency to the idea of tyranny, and produced a marked revival in the art of assassination. But the interest was largely rhetorical, and the assassinations rarely met the requirements of true tyrannicide.

According to Professor Jászi, the killing of a ruler cannot be justified within the terms of the classical doctrine unless it is essentially conservative in purpose. A tyrant is one who outrages the moral sense of the community, or at least of the right-thinking portion thereof, by violating previously accepted standards of natural and customary law. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, however, the cry of tyranny was raised for the most part by revolutionaries, mainly of the utilitarian, nationalist, or Marxist persuasion, who rejected the traditional moral and political standards of the Western world, and advocated resistance to the constituted authorities on the basis not of established expectations but rather of future hopes. This led, in his opinion, to a progressive distortion of the idea of tyrannicide which found its ultimate expression in the meaningless and indiscriminate terrorism of the Russian Nihilists. Although a few thinkers, most notably Mazzini, maintained the doctrine of tyrannicide in a purer and more acceptable form, the general result of these developments was to place the whole idea under a burden of discredit from which it is only now beginning to emerge.

The turning point came with the rise of the modern totalitarian dictatorships. Hitler, Stalin and other totalitarian rulers are tyrants in the full sense of the word. Coming to power in lands where humanistic and Christian con-

ceptions of the worth of the individual have long been recognized, and where the responsibilities of public authority have long been guaranteed, at least in many cases, by effective constitutional restraints, they have used their position in a systematic and dangerously successful effort to corrupt the standards of public life and degrade the individual. Since the resources of the modern police state are such as to prevent any sort of organized resistance on the part of the community, conscientious individuals have been forced once again to face the responsibilities of individual resistance. The German resistance movement against Hitler, though unsuccessful in its immediate object of overthrowing the Nazi regime, was a striking demonstration of the fact that tyrannicide must once again be taken into account as one of the living issues of contemporary politics.—FREDERICK M. WATKINS, *Yale University.*

Loyalty in America. By JOHN H. SCHAAR. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1957. Pp. vii, 217. $3.50.)

This book is a threefold inquiry into the problem of political loyalty in contemporary America. Historically, Mr. Schaar argues, the problem emerges out of a dual tradition in which loyalty has been identified both as devotion to freedom and as obedience to the will of the majority. Sociologically, it is the product of the tensions and insecurities, the collapse of values, and the deepening sense of alienation that have overcome modern man and that urge him to seek the bonds of community. Philosophically, it is the conflict between the historical conception of loyalty (itself a dual conception) and the new or emergent conceptions of loyalty: *i.e.*, the idea of potential loyalty and disloyalty, of loyalty and disloyalty by association, and of the superior claim of loyalty as conformity. From these elements Mr. Schaar draws two conclusions: a personal preference for loyalty as freedom and a conviction that the problem admits of no final answer. "Each age," he writes, "must make its own resolution."

Within each level of his inquiry, Mr. Schaar contributes a creditable and at times (as in his evaluation of the contemporary loyalty program) an excellent bit of analysis. This makes all the more regrettable his failure to provide a unifying thread, a principle that would vindicate his own preference and that would carry us beyond a conclusion that leaves open the question whether, and on what terms, a particular resolution is the "right" resolution.

For, if I read Mr. Schaar correctly, history cannot decide this question, since history is both schizophrenic and (on Mr. Schaar's own terms) both normative and non-normative. Sociology cannot decide; for sociology enables us to understand how and why a particular practice came to be, not whether that practice is, by some standard, "right." Philosophy cannot decide; for the conflict is less between ancient principle and current practice than it is between two opposing and (if loyalty is, as Mr. Schaar insists, Janus-faced) equally valid traditional principles, with no appeal to a superior principle—*e.g.*, majority rule or freedom—outside them. Not majority rule: for while Mr. Schaar in certain parts of his book takes the extreme position that the majority has a right to do whatever it may please, he elsewhere insists that individuals and minorities have certain rights and must be protected in their exercise of them. Not freedom: for freedom, Mr. Schaar believes, can degenerate into licentious irresponsibility; if it is to be genuine freedom, "it must be a freedom within freely accepted but clearly defined limits." This, of course, comes very close to Rousseau's notion of a general will; but Mr. Schaar rejects this as constituting a theory of orthodoxy; and what is needed, he says, is a recovery of our faith in freedom. We must, he argues, "be loyal to loyalty," and this means devotion to freedom. But both freedom and loyalty, as Mr. Schaar defines these terms, require a commitment to and a love of conformity. Then each age must decide for itself. But if there is neither a final solution nor an enduring principle in terms of which we can seek and judge a particular solution, how can any age decide "wrongly"?

The merits of Mr. Schaar's study are thus to be found in the development of his discrete essays and not in the "philosophic and synthetic" sphere which he affirmed to be central to his enterprise.—DAVID SPITZ, *Ohio State University.*

The Moral Basis of Burke's Political Thought. By CHARLES PARKIN. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1956. Pp. viii, 145. $2.50.)

Mr. Parkin's monograph must be read by any teacher or student concerned conscientiously to understand Burke's political theory. Scholarly, concentrated, copiously documented, written with painstaking self-effacement, it outlines a complete and consistent

ethical-political philosophy that bears comparison with the more self-conscious systems of Plato, Hobbes, or Hegel. Taking the corpus of Burke's work as a unified creative effort, Mr. Parkin first examines his views on the political contract, the social rights of men, and the harmony of human nature within an ordered hierarchy of moral laws, then explains "the Natural Relation of Society and Government," emphasizing the state as a "moral essence" or "network of moral relations" and the government's responsibility for distinguishing "between the real and the apparent desires of the people." An impressive elaboration follows of Burke's concept of the natural social, moral, and religious order as contrasted with erroneous theories of "abstract natural rights," popular sovereignty, "abstract idealism" (i.e., Utopianism), "abstract reason," "simple forms of government," and atheism.

Because the work is of considerable value, an important question must be raised. The treatment of Burke's writings as a totally consistent body of thought seems ill-advised. No doubt the partisan supporter of Rockingham was the same person as the authoritative exponent of European Conservatism; no doubt the moral convictions of the latter were immanent in the petulant strictures of the former; but the emphases and wisdoms of the two differed widely. Sentences such as the following are *not* merely different ways of saying the same thing: "Everybody is satisfied, that a conservation and secure enjoyment of our natural rights is the great and ultimate purpose of civil society" (*Tracts on the Popery Laws*, c. 1765–70); "How can any man claim, under the conventions of civil society, rights which do not so much as suppose its existence? . . . Men cannot enjoy the rights of an uncivil and of a civil state together" (*Reflections on the Revolution in France*, 1790). Similar heavy changes of emphasis may be found between Burke's earlier and later views on "the people," the crown, and even on human nature and, perhaps, religion. It is no reflection on Burke to recognize that his views expanded with experience and increased in objectivity as his private ambitions receded. That Mr. Parkin was partly aware of this is shown by the fact that well over two-thirds of his references are to works written under the shadow of 1789: *i.e.*, to four of the sixteen volumes of Burke's works. The result of the effort to make Burke entirely self-consistent is actually to take the edge off Burke's final considered views: he appears too complacent; his religious beliefs are left too vague; and the central crux of relativism and historicism *versus* religious and moral absolutism is imperfectly worked out. The Whig politician has blurred the outlines of the Conservative philosopher.—RAYMOND ENGLISH, *Kenyon College.*

Some Potentialities of Experimental Jurisprudence as a New Branch of Social Science. By FREDERICK K. BEUTEL. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1957. Pp. xvi, 440. $6.00.)

Brooks Adams once remarked that the speed of social change is to be measured by the "activity of the scientific mind which makes mechanical discoveries" and that the mind of the social scientist must be equally active if an effective adjustment is to be made to such change. The writer of this book, who is a Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska, is of the opinion that the social scientist has not been sufficiently active in this respect and that no practical social changes "have been made that are comparable to those made in the physical sciences and engineering." Disturbed by this "disproportion between man's power over himself and the elements about him," he raises the question as to whether the techniques developed in the physical sciences can be transferred "to the field of social control." Answering this question in the affirmative, he works out a new approach to the social sciences which he calls "Experimental Jurisprudence." Since he believes that "the line between the social sciences is little more than a 'quibble,'" he holds that it is not important whether "Experimental Jurisprudence" be considered a branch of sociology, or whether any of the other social sciences be included within its scope. To him the nature of the subject matter and the methods of studying it are the important factors. His chief concern is with the rigorous application of the scientific method to the functioning of law in society. To this end he formulates a method of study for "Experimental Jurisprudence" based as far as possible on the techniques and procedures of the physical sciences. When the thorny problem of "value" and "interest" arises, he thinks the question should be: "value for the solution of what social problem?" If the problem is "carefully identified, its factual basis studied, and the scientific and jural laws surrounding its phenomena developed," he bravely asserts that "the question of value as a philosophical speculation or political issue will usually be found to have vanished." Since

he considers scientific jurisprudence to be essentially a problem-solving device, he devotes the second and larger portion of his book to illustrations of the experimental methods he has formulated in various studies in Nebraska and to an analysis of methods employed in studies made by the Johns Hopkins University Institute of Law, the Hoover Commission, and similar bodies. His Nebraska pilot studies point up the methods and techniques which he hopes to develop. He warns us that his suggested procedures must be recognized as tentative, and that his "Experimental Jurisprudence" must be taken for what it is, "just a primitive beginning." With his manifest zeal for improving the tools of the social sciences, he will undoubtedly try to carry his work beyond this point. If he is unable to effect the results he hopes for, it will not be due to lack of faith in the efficacy of the scientific technique. An index and appendices are included.—FRANCIS R. AUMANN, *Ohio State University.*

The Values of Veblen: A Critical Appraisal. BY BERNARD ROSENBERG. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1956. Pp. vii, 127. $2.50.)

This book is not in any apparent sense a study of Veblen's values. It is a comprehensive examination of Veblen's major works, drawing on a broad erudition in the social sciences.

Rosenberg argues that the key to Veblen is in his status as "stranger," an outsider to the society in which he lived. Although the proposition has been well explored by Dorfman, it is further developed here by relating it to the analyses of Simmel, Benda, Mannheim, and others. For all this power of disenchanted objectivity, the author concedes inconsistency and even contradiction in Veblen's work. This is explained in terms of dichotomies within Veblen—notably by a tension between the optimistic system builder and the pessimistic, critical temper of Veblen as "synoptic" social scientist. This latter is represented as Veblen at his best and in his clearest contrast to Marx or to the mechanistic optimism of conservative Social Darwinism.

Rosenberg uses an abundance of example and comparison from philosophy and the sciences to appraise Veblen's methodology and his use of psychology and anthropology. The latter, and particularly his romanticizing of primitive society, Rosenberg criticizes as faulty and outmoded. The methodology he praises highly, contrasting Veblen's dynamic outlook, his emphasis on social change, and his modern understanding of scientific "laws" with the static, taxonomic, natural-law doctrines of many of his contemporaries.

Thus, in spite of similarities, Veblen is far from Marx. He rejects teleology in history (with some wavering), rejects classical economics, and tempers rationalism with what seems, as Rosenberg describes it, like a kind of Niebuhrian dualism of reason and unreason.

This book is at its best when it is discussing the general character of Veblen's thought in a broad context that marshals a rich array of learning. It is less successful in the chapters that deal with specific Veblen texts. Here it bogs down in summarizing the detail of familiar material with comparatively little that is new in interpretation or evaluation.

Rosenberg singles out *The Higher Learning in America* as crucial to the understanding of Veblen and devotes an early chapter to it. Yet he belabors Elton Mayo and Logan Wilson more than he illuminates Veblen, and the point of the chapter remains obscure.

This is a book rewarding in its parts but disappointing in the whole. Its argument is hard to dig out and its pace is impeded by numerous digressive passages on collateral figures and ideas, most of which should have been left out or reduced to footnotes. Too, the style leaves something and the editing almost everything to be desired. There are mechanical errors and misspelled words on almost every page. More serious, the prose is heavy, polysyllabic, and opaque. It abounds in isms: "debiologizes and sociologizes," "Benthamizes," "medievalizes" are just samples. "Homogenization" replaces "homogeneity." Such terms as "consecution," "compenetrate," and "scientistic ultimacy" stud the text and, in my case at least, use up energy that could be better spent in mastering the difficult and meaty ideas that lie behind them. There is no index.—WILLIAM H. BRUBECK, *Washington, D.C.*

Politics and the Novel. BY IRVING HOWE. (New York: Horizon Press. 1957. Pp. 251. $3.50.)

This stimulating collection of essays in literary criticism can be read with profit by those interested either in politics or in the novel. Running through them is a theme which might be called "the discerning disenchanted." Of Dostoevsky, Mr. Howe observes (p. 86) that "precisely because he does not accept the status quo . . . the reactionary enjoys a keener scent for political realities than the conserva-

tive," who must endow the present with attributes it seldom possesses. In accounting for a writer's perception, however, "reaction" implies more than simply a political category. Dostoevsky's extreme political reaction against the radicalism of his youth never obliterated a revolutionary temperament. It left an inner tension which he transferred brilliantly to his works ("The greatest of all political novels [is] *The Possessed*"—p. 22). On the other hand, the tension which Conrad felt as a revolutionary's son in revolt against revolution did not pass into his writing as real political drama. Although Conrad was to some extent drawn to the characters he rejected politically ("Conservatism is the anarchism of the fortunate"—p. 84), his anarchists remain strawmen who weaken his novels.

Literary insight may also be the product of reaction to the decay of a political ideal by a writer still devoted to it, or attracted by it. A chapter not without current relevance examines Stendhal's picture of nineteenth-century liberalism crumbling under the weight of success, disintegrating in the face of no enemy. Stendhal's heart was with the Enlightenment, but its watch-words had been reduced to cant, its forms to farce. Out of the struggle of intelligence to survive in such an age by the ruse of apparent conformity, and its struggle to live with the farces to which it had to conform to survive, Stendhal made his novels.

American writers included are Hawthorne (*The Blithedale Romance*), Henry Adams (*Democracy*), and Henry James (*The Bostonians* and *The Princess Casamassima*). All three had doubts about the American dream, and all were in reaction not so much from a particular politics as from politics generally. They not only were withdrawn; they had never really known commitment. The very coolness of their observation, says Mr. Howe, means that they could not capture the essence of politics. By contrast, the significant political novelists of the twentieth century have been reacting against Marxism after a commitment to it. As ex-insiders they sometimes lack balance, but they create vital impressions of the conflicts of our time. Malraux seeks out the thrust of individual wills in revolutionary movements. Silone ponders the dilemma that organization means bureaucracy but refusal to organize means martyrdom or acquiescence. Koestler shows the triumphant Party devouring itself. Orwell paints the nightmare of the psychology and politics of "one more step" (p. 241).

Referring to a work on the "radical novel," Mr. Howe has remarked elsewhere: "It is not easy to watch quietly as the passions of one generation become the dissertations of the next" (*New Republic*, Oct. 29, 1956, p. 21). Similarly, those whose vocation is politics may not always find comfortable the combined penetration and skepticism of the novelist (or his factual ellipses). As this excellent book points out, however, the criterion for a political novel is the same as for any other: "How much of our life does it illuminate?" (p. 24). Apart from the entire pattern of life, which a great novel does illuminate, neither the study nor the practice of politics mean very much.—JAMES F. DAVIDSON, *The University of Tennessee.*

The Bisocial Nature of Man. By ASHLEY MONTAGU. (New York: Grove Press. 1956. Pp. 123. $1.00.)

This short essay is concerned with the nature of human nature. Its brief compass permits the statement and analysis of only two basic questions: How far does the biological enter into the shaping of human nature? How much of the social experience of the individual enters into the process? The reader is taken at a fast trot through a summary of the available facts and some representative theories about the "biosocial" character of man. He is served up brief, non-technical statements of the Christian, Darwinian, Freudian, racist, and modern anthropological and social-psychological views on the subject. Montagu emphasizes the failure of all attempts to establish an integral relationship between physical and behavioral traits and concludes that educability is far and away man's most important species trait. A suggestive, if occasionally superficial, essay.

Understanding Minority Groups. EDITED BY JOSEPH B. GITTLER. (New York: John Wiley and Sons. 1956. Pp. xii, 139. $3.25.)

This small volume is a compilation of the papers read and discussed during an eight-week institute on Minority Groups held in 1955 at the University of Rochester. The papers, each of which is a chapter in the book, deal essentially with the problem of toleration in our present society. Specific minorities are considered in each chapter: the American Catholic, the American Indian, the American Negro, the American Jew, the Japanese American, and the Puerto Rican in the United States. The tone of the book is set in Wayne A. R.

Ley's inquiry into the "Philosophical and Ethical Aspects of Group Relations." The editor of the volume has written a good concluding chapter entitled "Understanding Minority Groups."

An Essay on the Impact of Marxism. By JOSEPH MACEK. (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press. 1955. Pp. x, 147. $5.00.)

The emphasis in this by no means dispassionate study by a Czech refugee scholar is on Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist action rather than doctrine, but enough incidental information about the latter is provided to make the work interesting and useful to the general reader looking for basic information about Marxist theory.

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Smith College

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A COORDINATING COURSE IN THE POLITICAL SCIENCE MAJOR[1]

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Most political scientists are teachers, engaged in higher education, as well as contributing scholars. Indeed, it might be an intriguing question to ask how much the discipline, even in its research and basic theory, is influenced by its student clientele. Such an exploration into the sociology of knowledge cannot concern us here. It is worth noting, however, that the introductory course tends to take its goals from the need to make "better citizens," since it is here that teachers of government reach out most widely into the student body. An unavoidable dilemma thus besets a course which must somehow satisfy the "terminal" needs of the general undergraduate and, at the same time, serve as the prerequisite introduction to advanced courses in the government major. There is a strong tendency to resolve the dilemma in favor of the needs of terminal students. For example, Francis Wilcox has urged:

> The introductory course, in the first instance, should be designed to meet the needs of the great mass of students on the campus who may soon become responsible citizens. This paramount objective should not be compromised in order to cater to the particular needs of potential political science majors.[2]

Whatever disagreement there may be with this view of the introductory work, once the departments of political science have acquitted themselves of this broad responsibility, presumably, they may steer a clear course in terms of their discipline in the construction of their advanced offerings and their programs for student majors. Yet, from the literature, it would appear that the really difficult teaching problems involve the introductory course. Even there, the profession has not devoted much of its energies to articulating teaching problems. Still less attention appears to have been paid to the adequacy of our undergraduate curriculum as a field of concentration in political science.[3]

Yet, as every teacher knows, there are many difficulties in organizing a satisfactory major. Students in the typical undergraduate program experience the major as simply a number of political science courses from which they select perhaps eight or nine. Do these add up to a major in political science? Assuming that there should necessarily be a relationship which links them as units within a single discipline, how can these often disparate selections achieve coherence? In many institutions a comprehensive examination in the major subject field is required of all graduating seniors. How well do such examinations succeed in overcoming the fragmentation of individual courses?

At Dartmouth our department was stimulated by a college-wide report to consider these questions and seek satisfactory answers. A committee on the integration of the government major, after exploration and consultation, proposed a new coordinating course which is required of all senior majors in their final semester. We are emboldened to share with our professional colleagues the results of two years' experience, in the spirit of Wilcox's plea that " . . . after years of hit-and-miss methods, it would seem high time for the members of the American Political Science Association to adopt more effective methods of exchanging ideas about teaching problems. . . . "[4]

Purposes and Context of the Coordinating Course. The terms in which we justify the political science major in the liberal arts curriculum are the same as those for any specialization. General educational needs are importantly satisfied by the introduction of undergraduates to the basic problems, concepts and methods of particular disciplines. Liberal arts purposes are furthered when stu-

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[1] We wish to acknowledge our debt to Professors Arthur M. Wilson and Richard W. Sterling who participated with us in the course herein described. Responsibility for the views presented, however, is shared only by the authors and should not necessariiy be attributed to the Department of Government at Dartmouth College.

[2] Francis O. Wilcox, "The Introductory Course in Government," this REVIEW, Vol. 41 (June, 1947), pp. 491-92.

[3] The largest venture was the APSA report of the Committee for the Advancement of Teaching, *Goals for Political Science* (New York, 1951). See also Landon G. Rockwell, "Toward A More Integrated Political Science Curriculum," this REVIEW, Vol. 41 (April, 1947), pp. 314 ff., and the symposium on "Undergraduate Instruction in Political Science," *ibid.*, (June, 1947), pp. 489 ff. But Dwight Waldo in his recent "Trend Report" concluded: " . . . the figures indicate very little self-conscious concern either with the techniques or the philosophy of teaching. . . . " *Political Science in the United States of America* (Paris: UNESCO, 1956), p. 47.

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 490.

dents gain competence to analyse critically and evaluate the literature of a field. Within a concentrated area, greater intellectual rigor is possible than when students spread themselves all over the curriculum in cafeteria style. This much is a necessary premise to justify the selection of a major as an educational requirement; if student interest in particular areas were the only reason for concentration the free elective system would suffice. The value of the requirement that students choose a major is the intellectual discipline involved in coming to know a field in its systematic approach to an area of knowledge.

Political science, as a major discipline, shares this *raison d'être* with other subject-matter specialties within the liberal arts framework. It also shares the feeling that the major programs are not measuring up to their purposes. Little has changed since Harvey Mansfield asked: "How can a student 'concentrate' on this array of specialties? . . . Plainly, no single pattern of choice among the available permutations emerges to define automatically the content of the major."[6] It is clear that the course selections by students within the major have not added up to a political science concentration in any systematic sense. The underlying weakness is the failure of departments of political science to construct their courses and provide guidance to their students in terms of an adequate conception of the larger contours of their discipline. Left to their own devices, by and large, students have fallen back upon the usual variety of campus criteria in choosing courses: the time a class meets, reputed easiness and other corridor-talk information about courses and instructors. On such a basis there is little ground on which to justify a major requirement. The validity of the major depends upon conveying a sense of the interdependence of courses.

If this is agreed to, and many writers have expressed such a view,[6] why have so few departments managed to overcome this deficiency? The answer stems partly from a lack of agreement on the nature of the discipline; partly it is a matter of vested interests in particular courses and approaches. Some efforts have been made to recognize and correct this by capping off the major program with some sort of umbrella under which the otherwise disparate courses may be brought together. The comprehensive examination covering the work of the major is a means to this end. In many institutions it is combined with the requirement of a senior thesis. The presumption is that the thesis can be sufficiently broad in the concepts applied and the processes examined to constitute an integrating experience. Mansfield has discussed the value of these devices in his consideration of the need to bring the major into sharper focus.[7]

The Dartmouth department applied both these techniques for several years, but still had the feeling of inadequacy that led to the establishment of our committee. The thesis course, valuable as it was in providing an opportunity for individual student research, did not successfully bring the whole major into view. Indeed, it contributed to narrowness in practice as the advisor, quite naturally, was assigned on the basis of specialization. Unquestionably, for superior students, the thesis can be genuinely broadening and can bring much of the total major to bear on even a specialized topic. Opportunities for tutorial-type work are highly advantageous in the form of thesis and reading courses, as well as small seminars, and they remain an important part of our instructional apparatus. However, they have not provided the solution to the problem of integrating the major for most students.

Comprehensive examinations are more successful unifying instruments. At the least, they cover the entire work as experienced within a department's courses. But that is the source of the inadequacy of many comprehensive examinations. When they are geared to particular courses students must be offered sufficient latitude to find questions for which they have had course preparation. Quite logically, the instructor grading a particular answer is a specialist in the area of the question. The comprehensive examination consequently tends, in practice, not to be truly comprehensive. Conceivably, where the curriculum of a department has been fully rationalized in terms of a systematic conception of the discipline, this need not be the case. But, for the reasons mentioned, few departments have so overcome the divisiveness of approach and course suzerainty as to provide majors with an integrated image of political science.

What can be done short of a thorough revi-

[6] "The Major in Political Science," this REVIEW, Vol. 41 (June, 1947), p. 501.

[6] See "Goals for Political Science: A Discussion," by James W. Fesler, *et al.*, this REVIEW, Vol. 45 (December, 1951), pp. 996 ff. Also, Rockwell, *op. cit.*

[7] *Op. cit.*, pp. 506–507.

sion of the character of our courses? This was the question our committee faced as the practical limitation on what we might propose. The result was a special course designed to provide a common and integrating experience for all senior majors.

The Design of the Coordinating Course. The Coordinating Course is required of all government majors, and is taken in the last semester of the senior year. This now joins two introductory courses as required components of the major.[8] Top caliber students are encouraged to write a thesis also, but this, for reasons explained above, is no longer required of all majors.

The first question in working up the coordinating course was this: what precisely is it that we are trying to coordinate? The discipline of political science can be conceived of as analogous to a wheel with five spokes, each representing a principal field within the discipline. In our simile the "hub" is political theory[9] which contributes the underlying frame of reference of the subject matter and systematizes its specialized fields. The course aims at a continuous interchange of information and concepts between the "spokes" and the theoretical "hub." Without implying any order of importance, the spokes represent the following fields: comparative politics; party, group and opinion processes; public administration; international relations; and public law. This idea of the wheel with its hub and five spokes constitutes the framework for the coordinating course at Dartmouth.

The course is divided into two main parts: a series of general sessions attended by all the students; and a series of relatively small discussion sections.

The discussion sections are set up to analyze critically, by means of a relatively informal give-and-take exchange of ideas, a set of six books chosen to represent each part of the "wheel." No special attempt is made to include the classics of political science in this list, but rather to choose provocative and, if possible, recent works which will serve to illustrate the problems and the possibilities of scholarly work in the particular field under scrutiny. We further limited our selection to works which displayed some theoretical sophistication in the treatment of the subject matter. A list of the books used in the course in 1957 follows. (1) Political Theory: Walter Lippmann, *The Public Philosophy;* (2) Comparative Politics: Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution;* (3) Parties, Groups, and Opinion Processes: E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government;* (4) Public Administration: Paul Appleby, *Big Democracy;* (5) International Relations: H. M. Wriston, *Diplomacy in a Democracy;* and (6) Public Law: Fred V. Cahill, *Judicial Legislation.*

A writing requirement was built into this part of the course in the form of critiques written on each of the books. These ran from five to ten pages in length, and were designed to train the student to isolate the thesis of the book, analyze it critically with respect to the methods and approaches employed, the evidence used, the validity of the conclusions reached, and the importance of the work to an understanding of political phenomena. To ensure that the discussion sessions would be lively and informed, the students were required to submit their papers at the time of class meetings. Two sessions of approximately one and one-half hours each were devoted to analysis of each of the six books. While there was rarely enough time to discuss every point in great detail, this allowed adequate opportunity to get the author's major ideas out on the table.

It was not feasible to assign each of the discussion groups to a specialist in the field of the work. Instead the books were parceled out among the staff assigned to the course, which proved to be a coordinating experience for staff as well as for students.

The general sessions comprise the second major part of the course, running simultaneously with the discussion sections. The weekly schedule includes a meeting of each type. Two books are required for this part of the course. Dwight Waldo's *Political Science in the United States of America: A Trend Report,* a monograph written for UNESCO, primarily for readers outside the United States, has, for our purposes, the great advantage of presenting in brief compass the major trends, tendencies and preoccupations of the discipline as it has developed in the United States in recent years. Moreover, the organization of the material in the book corresponds quite satisfactorily to our idea of the "hub" and "spokes." This book is assigned as background reading for the lectures which make up a major part of the general sessions. A lecture and discussion of approximately one and one-

[8] These are Government 1, "Present-Day Government in the United States," and Government 2, "An Introduction to Contemporary World Politics."

[9] *Cf* APSA Committee for Advancement of Teaching, *op. cit.*, pp. 126 ff.

half hours is devoted to a delineation of each of the six areas. For these lectures we have called upon members of the department whose specialties correspond to the particular areas under review. This has two advantages: it draws widely on the talent of members of the department other than the staff of the course; and the assignment forces them periodically to take a hard look at theoretical developments within their own specialty and to relate these to the main currents of political science.

The second required book serves as a capstone for the course, and is analyzed critically in several concluding general sessions. For this assignment we have chosen David Easton's *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science*.[10] Emphasizing our symbolic hub of the wheel, this book possesses the signal merit of stating the case for the development of general or systematic theory in political science. Certain aspects of Easton's argument are controversial, and the book as a whole, while lucidly written, is not easy going for the average senior. These two points, far from constituting disadvantages, were to us rather important considerations in its favor.

One further aspect of the work in the course deserves special mention. All senior majors are strongly urged to enrol as student members of the American Political Science Association, and to read this REVIEW. In addition, those who can do so are encouraged to attend the annual meetings of the Association and to visit panels of special interest to them. Frequent reference is made throughout the course to articles in the REVIEW specially relevant to the topic under consideration, and students are expected to bring ideas gleaned from this and other sources to bear in class discussion and in their book critiques. Finally a question is included on the comprehensive examination which provides students with an opportunity to show their acquaintance with the kinds of material contained in the REVIEW.

A determination to make the comprehensive examination a significant educational experience was a guiding consideration in establishing the coordinating course. The relation of the course to the comprehensive examination is in some respects mechanical, but we trust that it is much more than this. The comprehensives at Dartmouth have traditionally been two-day affairs, with three-hour sessions each day. Also traditionally, students have been tested by means of what our department has regretfully called "course-type" questions, *i.e.*, questions that have no place in a comprehensive examination since they tend to segmentation rather than integration of the student's knowledge of political science.

In an attempt to avoid this pitfall, the department has set aside the first day of the comprehensives for the sole purpose of examination of materials used in the coordinating course. This, along with the marks on the book critiques, provides the basis for grading students in the coordinating course. In the second day's examination, an effort has been made to extend the scope of the questions.

Evaluation and Conclusions. Whatever success attends our efforts to bring to political science majors a conception of the unity of our discipline, rests largely upon the coordinating course itself. We have no core of courses which all majors must elect. They must consult with a member of the staff in working out their programs of courses, and secure his approval; this semi-formal advisory system gives student concentration programs a fair degree of balance. Yet, except for the unusually gifted and highly motivated student, a properly diversified program of course work does not of itself lead to an adequate awareness of the discipline as a unified whole. Thus, even if a core-type program were to be adopted as part of the major, we would still urge the desirability of a coordinating course.

How well, then, has the course realized its objectives? Its conception of the scope of the discipline may well be challenged. Why have such widely recognized areas as State and Local Government or Government and Business been neglected? We answer pragmatically that a line must be drawn somewhere. Like any classification scheme, the reduction of categories dividing an area does not necessarily eliminate material. The six fields we have presented are convenient, in the absence of a well-grounded theoretical conception of the limits of political science. In effect, though the total number is smaller, each category is broadened. The fields we have selected for inclusion seem, at any rate, to provide a fair representation of the discipline.

We hold no particular brief for the books used, although we have found most of them highly satisfactory. Whatever books are selected, should not only serve to represent the literature of the specialized fields, but should also be intrinsically significant, and related to the discipline as a whole.

Since there are no accepted dogmas in

[10] New York: Knopf. 1953.

political science—no single approach which is *the* correct one—a coordinating course must bring to the attention of the students a diversity of viewpoints. What are the controversies which political scientists are excited about? Ideally, the general sessions ought to give students some feeling for competing views of the best approach to an understanding of the political system. In practice this varies considerably with the extent to which the lecturer is prepared to articulate and defend his own point of view.

We have little doubt that the comprehensive examination has been significantly improved by the inclusion of material from the coordinating course. More attention could profitably be given to the kinds of questions asked on the second day, yet even here, the narrow "course-type" question has given way, thanks to the impact of the coordinating course, to questions which encourage the student to "aim at the integration of knowledge, the perception of relationships, and the cultivation of mental powers beyond memory."[11]

No coordinating course can by itself accomplish the objective of somehow combining otherwise disparate courses into a meaningful and coherent major. The solutions of the dilemmas of the introductory course and of the integration of the social sciences as a whole are crucially related to it. Indeed, it may seem odd to emphasize a course which comes after all other difficulties are encountered and resolved for better or worse. Yet, if the other problems have been handled well there is surely a need to consider the culminating work of the major, and if they continue to remain unresolved there is a danger that for want of agreement on how to tackle them a department may never get to the business of coordination. Pragmatically, we have found the construction and teaching of this course a valuable stimulant to a renewed attack on these remaining problems.

[11] Mansfield, *op. cit.*, p. 502.

THE FOREIGN-BORN IN CONGRESS, 1789–1949: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY*

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During the first century and a half of its existence, 9,618 different men and women saw service in the Congress of the United States; 374 of them were foreign-born.[1] The following tables furnish some statistical data about these

TABLE I. NUMBER OF FOREIGN-BORN CONGRESSMEN, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: 1789–1949

Country of Origin	Total	House	Senate	House & Senate
Austria	3	3	—	—
Canada	49	40	7	2
Czechoslovakia	3	3	—	—
Denmark	6[1]	5	1	—
England	55[2]	40	10	5
Finland	1	1	—	—
France	8[3]	6	2	—
Germany	41	38	3	—
Greece	1	1	—	—
Hungary	3	3	—	—
Ireland	122	107	13	2
Italy	3	3	—	—
Luxembourg	1	1	—	—
Mexico	1	—	1	—
Netherlands	2	2	—	—
Norway	10	8	1	1
Poland	6	6	—	—
Portugal[4]	1	1	—	—
Russia	3	3	—	—
Scotland	40	36	2	2
Sweden	5	4	—	1
Switzerland	1	—	—	1
Wales	9	7	2	—
	374	318	42	14

[1] Includes one born in the Danish West Indies.
[2] Includes four born in the British West Indies.
[3] Includes one born in Corsica and one in the French West Indies.
[4] Actually the Azores.

* This note is a by-product of a monograph study on American-Canadian relations, made possible in part by a grant-in-aid from the American Philosophical Society.

[1] These totals were derived from a page-to-page count of the entries in the official *Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774–1949* (Washington, 1950). They do not include Territorial Delegates, Resident Commissioners, and Congressmen who were elected but not sworn in and seated. Similarly, Congressmen born abroad of American parents or born in the overseas territorial possessions of the United States were not regarded as foreign-born for present purposes.

TABLE II. NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN-BORN CONGRESSMEN, BY CONGRESS: 1789–1949

Congress	Senate No.	House No.	Total No.	Total %[1]	Congress	Senate No.	House No.	Total No.	Total %[1]
1	4	5	9	9.5	41	2	13	15	4.5
2	3	5	8	7.9	42	2	9	11	3.4
3	4	7	11	7.6	43	3	11	14	3.7
4	2	5	7	4.4	44	2	9	11	2.8
5	1	6	7	4.3	45	5	14	19	5.1
6	1	3	4	2.6	46	3	12	15	3.9
7	2	2	4	2.6	47	5	21	26	6.7
8	1	8	9	4.6	48	5	23	28	6.7
9	1	8	9	4.8	49	5	24	29	7.0
10	1	6	7	3.7	50	3	28	31	7.7
11	0	6	6	3.0	51	4	19	23	5.2
12	1	7	8	4.3	52	4	24	28	6.6
13	2	6	8	3.3	53	6	27	33	7.0
14	2	6	8	3.3	54	7	25	32	7.0
15	2	4	6	2.4	55	7	20	27	5.8
16	1	4	5	2.0	56	8	16	24	5.2
17	1	4	5	2.0	57	8	17	25	5.4
18	1	7	8	2.9	58	5	17	22	5.1
19	1	3	4	1.4	59	4	17	21	4.2
20	1	4	5	1.8	60	3	20	23	4.6
21	1	8	9	3.2	61	5	21	26	5.1
22	0	7	7	2.6	62	5	16	21	4.1
23	1	7	8	2.5	63	5	19	24	4.3
24	1	3	4	1.3	64	5	16	21	3.9
25	0	5	5	1.6	65	3	16	19	3.4
26	0	5	5	1.6	66	2	18	20	3.6
27	0	4	4	1.3	67	4	22	26	4.7
28	0	3	3	1.0	68	3	18	21	3.9
29	2	4	6	2.0	69	2	17	19	3.5
30	1	3	4	1.3	70	3	17	20	3.7
31	3	2	5	1.6	71	5	16	21	3.7
32	3	4	7	2.2	72	4	16	20	3.6
33	5	4	9	2.9	73	5	24	29	5.3
34	3	0	3	1.0	74	4	23	27	5.0
35	4	1	5	1.6	75	3	23	26	4.7
36	4	1	5	1.6	76	3	16	19	3.4
37	1	4	5	1.8	77	3	19	22	3.9
38	1	5	6	2.5	78	4	14	18	3.2
39	1	5	6	2.3	79	4	16	20	3.6
40	1	8	9	3.0	80	3	8	11	2.0

[1] Based on the total number who actually served during the life of the respective Congress, which in most instances exceeded the authorized membership at any one time.

foreign-born congressmen under such headings as country of origin, age at emigration, profession at time of entering Congress, frequency of appearance in Congress, political affiliation and distribution by states.

TABLE III. NUMBER OF CONGRESSES IN WHICH FOREIGN-BORN SERVED, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: 1789–1949

Country of Origin	Total	First	Last[1]
Austria	7	62nd	75th[2]
Canada	45	33rd	80th[3]
Czechoslovakia	22	59th	80th
Denmark	11	33rd	75th[4]
England	65	1st	77th[5]
Finland	2	67th	68th
France	13	8th	75th[6]
Germany	42	37th	80th[7]
Greece	1	52nd	52nd
Hungary	5	49th	77th[8]
Ireland	76	1st	79th[9]
Italy	8	70th	78th[10]
Luxembourg	5	45th	56th[11]
Mexico	1	70th	70th
Netherlands	4	38th	65th[12]
Norway	33	48th	80th
Poland	13	66th	80th[13]
Portugal	1	57th	57th
Russia	13	64th	79th[14]
Scotland	64	1st	80th[15]
Sweden	18	50th	79th[16]
Switzerland	4	3rd	6th
Wales	19	18th	80th[17]

[1] Data in this table do not go beyond the 80th Congress.

[2] Not represented in the 63rd to 67th, 71st and 72nd congresses.

[3] Not represented in the 34th, 37th and 46th congresses.

[4] Represented in the 33rd to 36th, 54th, 63rd, 65th to 67th, 74th and 75th congresses.

[5] Not represented in the 11th, 14th to 18th, 24th, 25th, 27th, 28th, 38th and 42nd congresses.

[6] Represented in the 8th, 9th, 13th to 15th, 29th to 33rd, 40th, 57th and 75th congresses.

[7] Not represented in the 40th and 78th congresses.

[8] Represented in the 49th, 53rd, 54th, 76th and 77th congresses.

[9] Not represented in the 34th, 36th and 69th congresses.

[10] Not represented in the 76th congress.

[11] Not represented in the 47th and 50th to 55th congresses.

[12] Represented in the 38th and 63rd to 65th congresses.

[13] Not represented in the 70th and 71st congresses.

[14] Not represented in the 66th Congress.

[15] Not represented in the 5th to 7th, 19th to 22nd, 25th, 26th, 30th to 32nd, 34th to 36th and 67th congresses.

[16] Not represented in the 53rd to 57th, 59th, 65th to 67th and 69th to 71st congresses.

[17] Not represented in the 19th to 41st, 43rd to 52nd, 56th, 57th and 62nd to 70th congresses.

The major findings which emerge from these tables may be summarized as follows:

The foreign-born congressmen during these first 160 years were exclusively

TABLE IV. PARTY AFFILIATION OF FOREIGN-BORN IN CONGRESS: BY NATIONALITY, 1789–1949

Country of Origin	Democrat[1]	Republican[2]	Other	Unknown
Austria	2	—	1[3]	—
Canada	10	38	1[4]	—
Czechoslovakia	—	3	—	—
Denmark	1	4	1[5]	—
England	22	28	1[6]	4
Finland	—	1	—	—
France	4	2	1[7]	1
Germany	16	23	2[8]	—
Greece	1	—	—	—
Hungary	2	1	—	—
Ireland	80	29	4[9]	9
Italy	2	1	—	—
Luxembourg	1	—	—	—
Mexico	—	1	—	—
Netherlands	1	1	—	—
Norway	2	5	3[10]	—
Poland	5	1	—	—
Portugal	—	1	—	—
Russia	2	—	1[11]	—
Scotland	16	22	—	2
Sweden	—	3	2[12]	—
Switzerland	1	—	—	—
Wales	1	7	—	1
Totals	169	171	17	17

[1] Includes Anti-Federalists and Democratic-Republicans, as well as members of the current Democratic Party.

[2] Includes Federalists, National Republicans, Whigs and Unionists, as well as members of the current Republican Party.

[3] Socialist.

[4] Populist.

[5] Southern Whig-Democrat.

[6] Greenbacker.

[7] Farmer-Laborite.

[8] One Farmer-Laborite and one Progressive.

[9] One Independent, one Populist, one Democrat-Whig and one Democrat-Unionist.

[10] One Farmer-Alliance, one Farmer-Laborite and one People's Party.

[11] Socialist.

[12] One Farmer-Laborite and one Republican-Democrat.

white and (with just one exception) of European or Canadian origin. While a total of 23 different nationalities were represented, only five—the Irish, the English, the Canadians, the Germans and the Scottish—were statistically important, accounting among them for five-sixths of all the foreign-born congressmen.

Foreign-born congressmen sat in each of the first 80 congresses. Statistically,

TABLE V. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN-BORN CONGRESSMEN, BY STATE, 1789–1949

State	Number	State	Number
Alabama	1	Nevada	3
Arizona	0	New Hampshire	3
Arkansas	1	New Jersey	15
California	8	New Mexico	1
Colorado	3	New York	70
Connecticut	2	North Carolina	4
Delaware	0	North Dakota	3
Florida	4	Ohio	24
Georgia	6	Oklahoma	0
Idaho	2	Oregon	4
Illinois	26	Pennsylvania	46
Indiana	11	Rhode Island	4
Iowa	6	South Carolina	6
Kansas	3	South Dakota	1
Kentucky	5	Tennessee	4
Louisiana	10	Texas	2
Maine	0	Utah	3
Maryland	4	Vermont	3
Massachusetts	9	Virginia	6
Michigan	12	Washington	2
Minnesota	19	West Virginia	2
Mississippi	0	Wisconsin	17
Missouri	13	Wyoming	2
Montana	3		
Nebraska	5	Total	378[1]

[1] Actually there were only 374 foreign-born congressmen. Three of them represented more than one state during their political careers, which results in a slightly higher geographical total.

however, they were relatively unimportant, comprising between 1.0 percent and 9.5 percent of the total serving membership in any single Congress. In only 19 congresses did they account for as much as 5.0 percent of the total membership—a reflection in part of the fact that two-fifths of them saw service in just one Congress apiece and another fifth in just two.

Although all but five states were, at one time or another, represented by foreign-born congressmen, only eleven states contributed as many as ten foreign-born congressmen each during the entire period. New York was, as might be expected, easily in first place, followed by Pennsylvania in second place, and Illinois and Ohio, sharing third place. Between them these four states accounted for almost half of the foreign-born representation in Congress.

Politically, the foreign-born congressmen were about equally divided between Democrats and Republicans.[2] However, if the Irish (who comprised

[2] As used here, the adjectives "Democratic" and "Republican" embrace not only the two contemporary parties bearing these labels but all of their lineal predecessors as well.

TABLE VI. DISTRIBUTION OF LENGTH OF SERVICE OF FOREIGN-BORN CONGRESSMEN: 1789–1949[1]

Number of Congresses	Number of Congressmen	% of Total
1	153	40.9
2	73	19.5
3	59	15.8
4	27	7.2
5	15	4.0
6	10	2.7
7	14	3.7
8	6	1.6
9	2	0.5
10	2	0.5
11	3	0.8
12	4	1.1
**[2]	**[2]	**[2]
15	1	0.3
16	3	0.8
17	1	0.3
**[2]	**[2]	**[2]
21	1	0.3
Totals	374	100.0

[1] Terms of service not necessarily continuous.
[2] No cases fall in these intervals.

TABLE VII. AGE OF FOREIGN-BORN CONGRESSMEN AT TIME OF IMMIGRATION: 1789–1949

Age	Number	Percent
1– 5	93	24.9
6–10	61	16.3
11–15	57	15.2
1–15	29	7.8
16–20	63	16.8
1–20	20	5.3
21–	40	10.7
Unknown	11	3.0
	374	100.0

almost one-third of all the foreign-born congressmen and who exhibited an almost three-to-one preference for the Democratic Party) are excluded, the remaining foreign-born congressmen favored the Republican Party over the Democratic Party in a ratio of three-to-two.[3]

[3] This analysis may call for re-examination of the late Professor Sait's observation that "voters of foreign extraction . . . aside from the Irish, who are mostly Democrats, and the Germans and the Scandinavians, who are mostly Republicans, do not generally favor one party more than another." Howard R. Penniman, ed., *Sait's American Parties and Elections* (4th ed., New York, 1948), p. 165.

TABLE VIII. PROFESSIONS OF FOREIGN-BORN CONGRESSMEN ON ENTERING CONGRESS: 1789–1949

Profession	Number	Percent
Law	145	38.8
Business	138	36.9
Medicine	19	5.1
Journalism	18	4.8
Agriculture	14	3.7
Miscellaneous	17	4.5
Unknown	23	6.2
	374	100.0

About two-thirds of the foreign-born congressmen were no more than 15 years old at the time of their arrival in the United States—only one in eleven was an adult. Professionally, three-quarters of them were either lawyers or businessmen when they first entered Congress, with the former holding a slight edge over the latter. Medicine, journalism and agriculture, in the order named, were the next most important professions.

NEWS AND NOTES

NOMINATIONS

The Association's Committee on Nominations invites all members to propose candidates for the elective offices of the Association, to wit: President-Elect, three Vice-Presidents, Secretary, Treasurer, and eight members for two-year terms on the Council. Suggestions and supporting statements may be sent to any member of the Committee: Alexander Heard, University of North Carolina, chairman; Victoria Schuck, Mt. Holyoke College; Homer Durham, University of Utah; George Galloway, Library of Congress; Herman Pritchett, University of Chicago; Kenneth W. Thompson, Rockefeller Foundation. The sooner suggestions are received, the better; to be considered at all they must arrive by March 1, 1958.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

Fifty-Third Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association: Minutes of the Council Meeting

The Council of the American Political Science Association met at 9:30 A.M., September 4, 1957 at the Henry Hudson Hotel, New York City, with President E. E. Schattschneider presiding. The following officers and members of the Council were present: President-Elect V. O. Key, Treasurer Max M. Kampelman, Vice-Presidents Carl Brent Swisher and Wilfred E. Binkley, Secretary Gladys M. Kammerer, Managing Editor of the *Review* Harvey C. Mansfield, Executive Director Evron M. Kirkpatrick, and Weldon Cooper, Paul T. David, Thomas Eliot, William T. R. Fox, Claude E. Hawley, Alexander Heard, Thomas P. Jenkin, Avery Leiserson, John D. Lewis, Louise Overacker, Austin Ranney, Charles B. Robson, Ruth Weintraub, and York Willbern. Also present at the Council meeting were the new nominees for the Council and offices of the Association; and Pendleton Herring, Ralph Bunche, and William Anderson, past Presidents of the Association.

Chairman Austin Ranney, reporting for the 1957 Program Committee, pointed to the Final Program for the meeting as the bulk of his report. He stressed also that the meeting of the Committee, instituted as a new practice last year, was extremely valuable; that the major problem of the committee was securing adherence to deadlines, not only in planning and making up the program but in the receipt and duplication of papers at headquarters; and that the reproduction and sale of papers was an important innovation of the last few years which had tended to raise the intellectual level of the meetings and the discussion. He said the general policies and procedures now being followed worked well, but would be improved by the still earlier appointment of a program committee as planned for next year. The Council accepted the report and unanimously adopted a resolution thanking the Chairman and Committee for their excellent work on the 1957 program.

President Schattschneider announced that for the first time the Program Committee for the following year (1958) had been selected in the spring and would meet at the close of the Annual Meeting to begin planning for the 1958 Annual Meeting. This will be the earliest start ever made in program planning. The new Program Committee for the 1958 Meeting was announced as follows: Marver H. Bernstein, chairman, Robert A. Dahl, political theory; Leon Epstein, comparative government; William Goodman, political parties; Daniel R. Grant, local government; Edgar Furniss, Jr., international relations; Richard Neustadt, national government; Jack W. Peltason, public law; Richard C. Snyder, political behavior; and Frederick N. Cleaveland, public administration.

President Schattschneider, agreeing with Austin Ranney about the value of the reproduction and sale of the panel papers, asked the

Executive Director about their costs to the Association. Mr. Kirkpatrick reported that the deficit resulting from the sale of papers in 1956 had been between $500.00 and $600.00; he expected it to be somewhat larger in 1957, because of two factors: (1) the cost of reproduction of a number of the papers for the 1957 meeting exceeded the flat 50-cent selling price; one paper cost $1.12 per copy, another $0.97. Approximately half the papers cost more per copy than the selling price, in spite of the use of the central services of The American Council on Education at favorable rates. (2) All papers are reproduced in the same fixed number; the supply of some is completely exhausted, while very few of others are sold. With no way of estimating the demand accurately in advance, the fairly substantial cost of unsold papers to the Association is never recovered. After some discussion, it was agreed to retain the practice of reproduction and sale but the Program and Executive Committees for the coming year were instructed to try to devise a procedure that will reduce the Association deficit.

The Chairman of the Nominating Committee, David B. Truman, was not present but submitted a written report that was circulated in advance to Council members. The nominations were reported in the June issue of this REVIEW. Mr. Truman, in his report, strongly endorsed the holding of a face-to-face meeting of the nominating Committee, as was initiated in 1956. "Discussion in the meeting produced a genuine consensus in almost all cases rather than merely a preponderant vote, and we feel that this is a most important feature of the work of the nominating Committee under the constitutional arrangements of this Association." He also strongly urged that a request for suggestions to the nominating Committee be published in the REVIEW no later than the December issue. "We do not think that a large number of suggestions from the membership is necessary to the performance of the Committee's work but we do feel strongly that every opportunity should be given to all members of the Association to make their preferences known to members of the Committee." He further urged that the officers of the regional societies keep the Washington Office of the Association informed of changes in the lists of their officers, and that the Nominating Committee make an effort to secure recommendations from officers of the regional societies. The following nominees were unanimously agreed upon as officers and Council members of the Association for 1957–58: President-Elect Taylor Cole (Duke University); Vice-Presidents, Francis O. Wilcox (Department of State), Earl Latham (Amherst College), and Cortez A. M. Ewing (University of Oklahoma); Secretary Ruth C. Silva (Pennsylvania State College); Treasurer Max M. Kampelman (Washington, D. C.); Members of the Council for two years, Marian D. Irish (Florida State University), Arthur Dugan (University of the South), John Davis (City College of New York), John Masland (Dartmouth College), H. Arthur Steiner (University of California, Los Angeles), Milton R. Merrill (Utah State Agricultural College), Ralph K. Huitt (University of Wisconsin), and J. Austin Ranney (University of Illinois).

The Treasurer, Max M. Kampelman, briefly discussed the Auditor's Report, the Treasurer's Report, and the proposed budget for the fiscal year ending July 31, 1958, all of which documents were in the hands of members of the Council. He pointed out that the 1957 budget, approved by the Council and Business Meeting in 1956, called for an estimated deficit of $3,670 and that this had been cut considerably; the actual deficit was only a little over $1000. He reminded the Council that in the fiscal year beginning August 1, 1954 a changeover had been made to an accrual basis accounting; the liabilities in this adjustment were $26,934, which amount was reduced, by adjustments to record assets to $14,554.12 as of October 31, 1954. This was further reduced to $9,448.95 at the end of the fiscal year, July 31, 1955, by a surplus of $5,105.17 of income over expenditures in that fiscal year. In the fiscal year ending July 31, 1956, the deficit was reduced still further by a surplus of income over expenditures of $3,635.37. At the beginning of the fiscal year just passed, therefore, the accumulated deficit was $5,866.93. The operating deficit of the current year has increased that figure by approximately $1,000.00. It is important, he said, that the Association make an effort to wipe out this deficit entirely in the coming years and create a surplus that might go into endowment funds. The proposed budget for the coming fiscal year is approximately in balance: Income, $83,444.00; Expenses, $83,569.00.

Mr. Kampelman reported on income from grants in the past year. These included $211,250 from the Ford Foundation for five years for the Congressional Fellowship Program, contingent on matching funds from other sources; $12,500 from the Ford Founda-

tion for awards to young journalists for excellent reporting of state and local public affairs; $9,000 from the Carnegie Corporation for official representation at international meetings; $15,000 from Senator William Benton for the Congressional Distinguished Service Awards; $1,000 from the Woodrow Wilson Foundation for the Woodrow Wilson Book Award; $571 from various donors for the James Kimbrough Owen Memorial Award Fund; $1,275.15 from various donors for the Birkhead Award; $250 from the *Courier Journal* and Louisville *Times* and $1,800 from the Poynter Fund for the Congressional Fellowship Program; and $8,000 from the Woodrow Wilson Foundation for the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Volume. He mentioned a number of additional grants being considered by various foundations and individuals.

Mr. Kampelman noted that while, on the basis of this report, the Association seems to be in good financial shape, it is essential to keep in mind that the Association is faced with rising operating costs that will continue in the future and that make it essential for the Association continuously to seek new programs on terms that will make it possible to continue the kind of public services it has provided. The cost of office space rose from $2,800 in 1956 to $3,559.45 in 1957 and will increase to $4,332 in 1958. This represents no increase in space but the greater cost for exactly the same space. The cost of the REVIEW was $31,140.70 in 1957 and will increase to an estimated $34,500 in 1958. This increase is due in part to a 12 to 15 per cent increase in printing costs under the new contract just negotiated, and in part to increased salaries for the Editor and his staff. Likewise salaries in the National Office, office supplies and equipment, travel, mimeographing, printing and other necessary costs have risen. Our situation, Mr. Kampelman reported, is like that of other professional associations. The Treasurer of The American Economic Association reported in 1956: "Expenses show a steady increase. Both administrative and printing costs are rising: *e.g.* office salaries and other administrative expenses, and editorial and clerical salaries are now about $10,000 higher than they were five years ago, and *American Economic Review* and *Papers and Proceedings* printing costs are about $4,500 higher. The explanation is apparent: We have found it necessary to employ more assistants and office help has become more expensive and good help has become more difficult to get and to hold; printing costs have risen an average of 50 per cent since 1949. . . . " Exactly the same thing can be said about The American Political Science Association in 1957.

Mr. Kampelman concluded by saying that he mentioned these things in order to emphasize the necessity to expand membership in the Association constantly and to develop new and significant programs which will enable the Association not only to continue what it is doing but also to enable it to be of even greater service to its members and to the whole of American society.

The Council voted unanimously to accept the report of the Treasurer and to thank him for his services to the Association both as Treasurer and as Counsel.

Mr. Schattschneider then called for a detailed examination and discussion of the proposed budget. The Executive Director went over the individual items and compared them with the budget for last year. There was discussion of a number of specific items. Mr. Mansfield recommended that the allowance for his reading assistant be increased from $1,200 to $1,800 and that an additional $500 be included for compensation to the bibliographers and others; at the same time he recommended that the travel item for the REVIEW be cut by $100. The motion was seconded and, after brief discussion, approved unanimously. This action increased the proposed expense item in the total budget by $1,000 to $84,569 and for the REVIEW budget to $35,747. After further brief discussion, the Council unanimously voted to approve the proposed budget with the above revisions. The Council also unanimously approved a resolution allowing the Executive Director, with the advice and consent of the Executive Committee, to make shifts and alterations within the expense items in the budget as might be necessary during the year.

The Executive Director, Evron Kirkpatrick, reviewed the work of the National Office during the past year. He called attention to the minutes of the Executive Committee meetings held during the year which had been submitted to Council members in advance and which reported on most of the activities. He also called attention to the reports of various committees and representatives of the Association to other organizations of which APSA is a constituent member. These documents had been distributed to the Council in advance and contained further reports on the work of the Association during the year. President Schattschneider asked for questions or discussion of

the matters reported in these materials. There were some questions and brief discussion. The Executive Director noted that membership was at the highest point in Association history, almost 7,000. He called attention to the documents on the Congressional Fellowship program that were distributed to the Council in advance of the meeting and which had been used in the efforts of the National Office to raise money to match the Ford Foundation grant of $211,250. He pointed out that the acceptance of the Ford grant (which was conditional on the Association raising a like amount from other sources) had entailed a very heavy work load for the office in its attempt to raise matching funds. In addition to the cost in time, such an effort cost money for the preparation of materials, postage, and travel. It has, he noted, diverted the time and attention of an office staff hardly large enough to keep up with the day-to-day business of the office into money raising activities and thereby prevented the office from effectively doing the regular job it ought to be doing for the Association. He suggested that the Association should consider very carefully before accepting such conditional grants in the future. There was brief discussion of this point and the Council approved unanimously a resolution expressing the view that such grants should be accepted in the future only in exceptional circumstances and after determination that acceptance would not seriously handicap the National Office in performing its regular duties.

Mr. Kirkpatrick went on to point out that the Congressional Fellowship Program had been an outstanding success; he pointed to the increased prestige that had accrued to the Association as a result of the program and the recognition it had won both from the Congress and from the press. He expressed the view that the value of the program probably justified the efforts to raise money for its continuance but at the same time pointed out that it was important to recognize that these efforts were something for which the Association had paid a high price.

The Managing Editor of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Harvey C. Mansfield, presented his report. He explained the departmentalization of the editorial work involved in getting out the REVIEW and the use of about seventy-five persons outside the editorial board to read and appraise articles submitted for publication. Mr. Mansfield reported that about two hundred fifty articles had been submitted during the year, but that space had been available for publication of only thirty-six. Mr. Mansfield also submitted a report and analysis of comparative printing costs of the REVIEW and several similar publications and explained the increased printing costs entailed in getting out the REVIEW. The Managing Editor stated his policy of providing rotation on the Editorial Board each year, and nominated Vincent Ostrom of the University of Oregon as a replacement for Victor Jones of the University of California. The Council approved the general policy, elected Mr. Ostrom to the Editorial Board, and expressed their appreciation to the Editor and Editorial Board by unanimous vote.

President Schattschneider reported the recommendation of the Executive Committee for reappointment of Earl Latham as the representative of the Association on the Social Science Research Council. This recommendation was unanimously approved by the Council.

The invitation to APSA from the American Association for the Advancement of Science to plan a program for Section K of their annual meeting at Indianapolis was discussed. The American Political Science Association is a constituent member of and has a regular representative to the A.A.A.S. The Council unanimously voted to ask Clarence Berdahl, as president of the Midwest Political Science Association, to join the APSA in planning a program for the Indianapolis meeting of the A.A.A.S.

The request from a member of the Association to be nominated for one of the A.C.L.S. research grants was discussed at length. The A.C.L.S. has funds for grants to mature scholars for completion of work already started, but applicants must be nominated by institutions, corporations, organizations, and the deadline for applications was at hand. The President reported that the Executive Committee had suggested nomination of a member of the Association who had retired and was, therefore, without an institutional connection. The Executive Committee also recommended that a regular procedure be established by the Association for nominations next year. Discussion centered around the propriety and significance of the Association's support of an applicant this year, in the absence of any regularized procedures. A motion was approved that the President appoint an *ad hoc* committee of three Council members to make an immediate cursory evaluation of the ap-

plicant's project and report back to the Council forthwith. President Schattschneider appointed William T. R. Fox as chairman, Austin Ranney, and Charles B. Robson to serve on this committee. The committee reported back a motion to forward the application to the A.C.L.S., and after some amendment of the phraseology of this motion it was passed unanimously by the Council. The Council further unanimously voted to authorize the Executive Committee to work out procedures this year for the receipt and evaluation of any future applications by Association members for such A.C.L.S. research grants.

The President expressed the view that Association relations with the American Council of Learned Societies should be further developed. The Executive Committee, he informed the Council, had requested that the APSA representative to the A.C.L.S., Carl J. Friedrich, be asked to report to the Council next year as to how this might best be accomplished. The Executive Director stated that fruitful areas of mutual interest should be explored, and reported that he planned to discuss the matter during the course of the year with the new President of A.C.L.S. with whom he had already corresponded.

President Schattschneider reported that the proposal, which all Council members had received, for an Association program to aid experimentation with the introductory course, was still being actively considered by the Ford Foundation. He told the Council that the Ford Foundation had arranged for a special study of the proposal and of needs in this field by William Beaney of Princeton, and distributed copies of Beaney's study to the Council members. The study confirmed the earlier view of the Executive Committee and Council that there was great interest in this field and that a program could be fruitfully developed. There was discussion of both the proposal and the Ford Foundation study and the Council reaffirmed the decision taken during the year that the Association should make every effort to secure funds to proceed with the project submitted to the Ford Foundation last winter. In doing so, however, the Council expressed the view that the project should not be undertaken unless the funds received are adequate to do the job outlined and unless the Association is free to proceed with the project along the lines set forth in the proposal.

President Schattschneider announced that the Association had now received a grant from Senator William Benton for the Distinguished Congressional Service Awards. He called on Mr. Kampelman, chairman of the committee that developed the project, to report further. Mr. Kampelman explained that the grant was pursuant to Council approval of the project as outlined and approved over a year ago. He reported that the Executive Committee had the previous day approved release of a statement to the press and authorized the President to take steps to inaugurate the program.

The President reported that the Executive Committee, on September 2, approved a request from A.C.L.S. for a revision of the ACLS by-laws. The revision approved by the Executive Committee was read and approved unanimously by the Council.

Upon consideration of a request from an Association member for reimbursement for the cost of duplicating a paper given at the 1956 Annual Meeting, the Council voted unanimously not to make reimbursement.

Cooperation with several other national organizations was discussed; the main discussion centered around cooperation with the American Association of University Professors. The Executive Director called attention to the appointment of Robert K. Carr, long active in the Association, as General Secretary of A.A.U.P. A letter from Allen Saunders, member of the Council, was read by the Executive Director. Professor Saunders suggested working with the A.A.U.P. in a joint research project. Several topics were proposed: democracy in university government, the effect of politics and political pressures on higher education, and the general question of academic freedom. The Council agreed that the Executive Director should discuss cooperation of APSA and A.A.U.P. with Mr. Carr and report to the Executive Committee during the course of the coming year. Cooperation with the Modern Language Association and the National Historical Publications Commission was also discussed. Mr. Binkley, a member of the Commission, explained its purpose and moved that the Association express its interest in the efforts of the Commission to encourage publication of major historical papers. This motion was adopted unanimously by the Council.

The Executive Director reported that the Carnegie Corporation had made a $9,000 grant to APSA and each of the other social science organizations represented in SSRC to help make possible official representation at meetings of the respective international professional organizations. The proposal on which this grant was based was approved by the

Council a year ago and was presented to the Carnegie Corporation by APSA on behalf of all the social science organizations.

President Schattschneider called on Pendleton Herring, President of the SSRC, to report briefly on the grant SSRC received from the Carnegie Corporation to assist scholars in the social sciences in attending international professional meetings. Mr. Herring briefly outlined the purposes of the grant and reported that announcement of further details would be published by SSRC at a later date.

The Executive Director reported on the difficulties of the National Office in getting an important national figure from the Republican Party to address a dinner meeting during the New York convention. A number of prominent Republicans, including President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, Sherman Adams, Governor Dewey, Mrs. Luce, Senator Knowland and Senator Javits had been invited but had been unable to accept. The dinner meeting was cancelled as a result of inability to get an appropriate speaker. An effort had then been made to get a prominent Republican for the luncheon on Friday, September 5, but it had not been possible to do so by the time the Final Program went to the printers. Mr. Kirkpatrick reported, however, that he had been assured by various persons in the Republican Party who had helped in the search for a speaker this year that it should be possible to have one at the meeting next year in St. Louis; similar assurances have been received from the Republican National Committee.

The Executive Director reported that Governor Harriman had consented to address the luncheon on Friday and had invited members of the Council and others to a reception at his New York home on Friday afternoon, September 5.

The Executive Director reported on the need for a new directory, a subject which the Council at its meeting in 1956 had requested be investigated. He reported on the exploration of possibilities for financial assistance, especially from government, a principal user of the directory, to defray costs of publication, and on the demand from all categories of users for a new edition. The directory cannot, from past experience, be considered a self-supporting project, and the national office cannot assume the additional burden of cost of staff time. The Council went on record as approving a Third Edition of the Directory of Political Scientists as early as possible in 1958 or 1959 and authorized the Executive Committee and Executive Director to take the necessary and appropriate action.

President Schattschneider reported that the Executive Committee, pursuant to authorization by the Council at its meeting in 1956, had chosen St. Louis for the 1958 meeting. The 1959 meeting will be in Washington, D. C. in accordance with the established practice of meeting there every three years.

The Council adjourned at 4:00 P.M.

GLADYS M. KAMMERER, *Secretary*

Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting

The Annual Business Meeting of The American Political Science Association was held at 4:30 P.M., Friday, September 6, 1957 in the Henry Hudson Hotel, New York City. The meeting was called to order by President Schattschneider, who reported briefly on the activities of the Association during the preceding year. He called special attention to the work of the Washington office of the Association and expressed the view that the creation and work of the office had been one of the most valuable contributions to the profession in this generation.

Mr. Austin Ranney, Chairman of the Program Committee for the 1957 meeting, reported on the work of his Committee. He expressed the view that the newly instituted practice of holding meetings of the Program Committee was a significant step forward in program planning. He called attention to the fact that the newly adopted procedures permitted the appointment of the Program Chairman for 1958 over a year in advance, that the full Committee for 1958 had been appointed, and that a first meeting of this committee would be held at the end of the 1957 meeting, Saturday, September 7, 1957. He commented on the importance of establishing and meeting deadlines and described the efforts that had been made to draw younger members of the Association into the program as paper readers. He noted that the 1957 Committee had made a concerted effort to avoid the use of any one person as a paper reader or discussant on more than one panel. He stressed the importance of the reproduction and sale of the papers at the meeting and recommended that this be continued even though it requires subsidization on the part of the Association. He concluded by thanking the members of the 1957 Committee and others who had participated in making the meeting a successful one.

At the conclusion of the Report, a resolution thanking the Program Committee and its Chairman for their excellent work was unanimously adopted.

Mr. Harvey Mansfield, Managing Editor of the REVIEW, reported on the work and character of the REVIEW for the preceding year. He noted that most of the articles were volunteered, not solicited. He reported that about one in eight of the articles submitted were printed, described the work of the Editorial Board, and discussed general problems of management and financing. He concluded by thanking the Editorial Board and the many contributors who had done so much to make the REVIEW a success. The meeting voted unanimously to accept the report and to thank the Editor and Editorial Board for their excellent work on the REVIEW.

Mr. Max M. Kampelman, Treasurer, presented the financial report on the preceding fiscal year, ending July 31, 1957. He noted that the Association had operated at a slight deficit but that the Auditor's report showed the Association to be in sound financial condition. He reviewed the Auditor's report briefly, outlined the budget for the coming fiscal year, and reported the minor changes recommended by the Council. Mr. Kampelman commented on the problems arising from increasing costs (rent, REVIEW printing, and salaries) and expressed the view that serious effort should be made to raise funds to put the Association on a firmer base in the future. He reported on the grants from individuals and foundations received in the preceding year (reported more fully in the Council Minutes) and proposed that the Association express its thanks to each of the foundations and individuals who had made grants or contributions. The report, including the proposed budget for the year ending July 31, 1958, was unanimously approved and appreciation expressed to Mr. Kampelman for his work as Treasurer and Counsel.

Miss Gladys M. Kammerer, Secretary, summarized the proceedings and decisions of the Council (reported in the Council Minutes above) at its meeting on September 4, 1957. A resolution accepting the report, approving actions taken by the Council, and expressing appreciation to Miss Kammerer was unanimously adopted.

Mr. David B. Truman, Chairman of the Nominating Committee, presented the committee's unanimous nominations for officers and Council members for 1957–1958 as previously reported to the Council and published in the June issue of this REVIEW. Mr. Truman also reported general satisfaction on the part of the Committee with the nomination and election procedures now followed. The Business Meeting voted to accept the report and to elect unanimously those persons nominated by the Committee. The meeting also voted its appreciation to Mr. Truman and members of the Committee for their work.

By resolution the meeting unanimously voted its thanks to Professor Ruth Weintraub of Hunter College and to members of the Local Arrangements Committee for their excellent work in planning and carrying out the Annual Meeting.

President Schattschneider asked the new President-Elect, Taylor Cole, to come to the platform and turned the gavel over to the new President, V. O. Key.

President Key declared the meeting adjourned at 5:30 P.M.

GLADYS M. KAMMERER, *Secretary*

The fifteenth Annual Institute on World Affairs was held at San Diego State College, August 5–23, under the direction of Professor Minos D. Generales. The theme was "United Nations—Formula for Survival?" Among the speakers who participated were: Georges Barthelemy, Consul of Belgium; R. Bayly Winder, Department of Oriental Studies, Princeton University; Roeslan Baboe, Consul of Indonesia; Avraham Biran, Consul General of Israel; Nicholas Nyaradi, former Finance Minister of Hungary, now at the Institute of International Studies, Bradley University; Shigeru Nakamura, Consul General of Japan; L. Vincent Padgett, department of political science, San Diego State College; Eduard C. Schneider, Consul General of Germany; Roger Revelle, Director, Scripps Institute of Oceanography; Hans Friedrich, Convair-Astronautics; Ambrose R. Nichols, department of chemistry, San Diego State College; Louis Slichter, Institute of Geophysics, University of California at Los Angeles; Oscar Kaplan, department of psychology, San Diego State College; Thomas Pigford, General Atomic; Park Miller, General Atomic; William Rust, president, California Western University; Leonard Binder, department of political science, University of California at Los Angeles; Theodore Chen, department of Oriental studies, University of Southern California; Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, former Prime Minister of Poland, now President of the International Peasants Union; Ned V. Joy, department of

political science, San Diego State College; and Fred W. Neal, department of international relations, Claremont College.

The triennial Congress of the International Political Science Association will be held in Rome September 16–20, 1958. The program will center around six round tables: a) pressure groups; b) local government in underdeveloped countries; c) case studies in interstate conflicts; d) legislative-executive relations; e) political control of public enterprise; f) an undisclosed theme in political theory. For further information write to James Pollock, department of political science, University of Michigan.

The Third Annual Indiana Assessment Institute was held at Indiana University July 29–31st. The Institute was sponsored by the bureau of government research and the State Board of Tax Commissioners. Approximately 160 assessors and other local officials attended the conference which was devoted to discussion of better property assessment techniques. Edwin B. McPheron of Indiana's department of government served as director of the institute.

The Round-Table of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, held at Opatija, Yugoslavia, 20–25 June 1957, attracted about 110 participants from 32 countries, as well as 50 delegates from the host country. A main theme for discussion was Decentralization (deconcentration or devolution) for which Brian Chapman of the University of Manchester served as general rapporteur, and Oberburgomeister Hans Reschke of Mannheim as chairman. Twenty-five speakers were unanimous that this was a central problem under the most diverse systems—Ceylon, Chile, Finland, India, Liberia, Poland, USSR, Yugoslavia, as well as Western Europe—and urged that the problem be discussed at succeeding conferences. The other main theme was automation and the public service.

The Berlin meeting of the Council of the International Federation for Housing and Town Planning, 25–29 August 1957, brought together about 140 delegates from 21 countries, in Latin America, South Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe, as well as 12 countries of Western Europe and the U.S.A. The German Federation held its annual meeting jointly, with another 150 delegates. The substantive theme for discussion was large-scale land assembly for urban redevelopment. The statement of U.S. practice was made by John R. Searles, Jr., of the District of Columbia Land Redevelopment Agency; other statements were made from France, West Germany, The Netherlands and Poland.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The University of Minnesota and the International Cooperation Administration have recently expanded their Korean contract to include the field of public administration. Under this contract a group of faculty members of Seoul National University and officials of the Republic of Korea will study at the Public Administration Center. A team of American professors and specialists will go to Korea to advise in the establishment of a public administration school at Seoul National University and in the work of the National Officers Training Institute in the Korean Government. Research activities will be encouraged. Assistance also will be given in the development of two special public administration libraries. The Korean Program is directed by George A. Warp.

New York City and New York University have been the recipients of a grant of $250,000 from the Ford Foundation to initiate a program for the development of executive and intermediate management in the municipal agencies in the metropolitan New York area. Under the administrative direction of the graduate school of public administration and social service and the New York City personnel department, the project started in September.

The Michigan State Group in Saigon, has had its two year contract to offer public administration technical assistance to the Government of Vietnam extended for another two years. The program is expanding from 30 Michigan State people in Saigon to 54. They are assisting the Vietnam Government in the development of the National Institute of Administration for training civil servants, developing a police administration program, in-service training programs, and public administration consulting services. John T. Dorsey,

Jr. has just rejoined the Project as chief of the public administration division. Howard Hoyt, former chief of police of Kalamazoo is conducting the police program. In the United States 30 Vietnamese governmental officials a year come for observation and internships in various federal and state governmental offices under the supervision of the Coordinator's Office.

The name of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago has been changed to the Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy.

A group of foreign service officers has been assigned by the Department of State to the University of Wisconsin to teach a correspondence study course in visa law and administration in a cooperative program between the Foreign Service Institute and the University. The course is an experimental venture designed to test whether the correspondence study method can be used in carrying on an in-service training program for a far flung staff. About 850 persons are currently enrolled in the course. The group is headed by Robert J. Cavanaugh, a veteran foreign service officer who served last as Consul at Southampton. In addition, the group includes: John J. Degan, Nicholas Lakas, Nancy Rawls, and Howard L. Walker. They have been appointed to the staff of the bureau of government with the rank of lecturer.

Problems of Metropolitan Cleveland are undergoing an intensive examination by the Cleveland Metropolitan Services Commission (METRO). Created by Cleveland civic leaders in response to the challenge presented by the rapid urbanization and sub-urbanization of the metropolitan area, METRO has been given the task of studying all of the governmental functions that have inter-community and regional implications. Support for METRO's two and one-half year effort comes largely from local industry, business and interested individuals. The president of the Cleveland Metropolitan Services Commission is T. Keith Glennan, president of Case Institute of Technology. James A. Norton, formerly of the school of public administration, Florida State University, is METRO's Executive Director. John H. Romani, formerly of Western Michigan University is the associate director for research. Oliver Brooks is METRO's associate director for public information.

The University of South Dakota has received approximately $60,000 from the estate of Mrs. Charles Hall Dillon for the purpose of endowing an annual lecture series in law and government. The lectures will be printed in the *South Dakota Law Review*.

Ernest R. Bartley has been appointed acting director of the University of Florida public administration clearing service for the academic year 1957–58, and Harry Kantor has been appointed acting assistant director for the same period.

John C. Bollens, former executive officer and director of research of the Metropolitan St. Louis Survey, has accepted the directorship of the Metropolitan Survey, Inc. in Dayton, Ohio. He has been granted an additional year's leave of absence from U.C.L.A.

Ardath W. Burks, Rutgers University, served as co-director during the past summer of the Institute on Asian Life at Temple University, which was sponsored jointly by the University, The Asia Foundation, and The Japan Society.

Jeffrey E. Butler of Oxford University has been appointed visiting professor of government at Boston University for 1957–58.

William H. Cape of the University of South Dakota will be visiting professor of political science at the University of Kansas for 1957–58.

Waldo Chamberlain of the department of government at New York University presented a paper at the conference on the North Atlantic Community in Brueges, Belgium in September.

John L. Chase has been appointed visiting associate professor of government at Indiana University.

Ira S. Cohen has accepted a one-semester appointment as instructor at the State College of Washington.

Vernon F. Cook has been appointed visiting instructor of political science at Ohio Wesleyan University.

Rita Nealon Cooley, associate professor of government, New York University, is on sabbatical leave during 1957–58.

Robert H. Connery, professor of political science at Duke University, is on sabbatical leave during the fall semester.

Manning J. Dauer was visiting professor of political science at New York University for the summer session in 1957.

Karl W. Deutsch, professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has been appointed visiting professor of political science at Yale University for the year 1957–58.

Marshall Dimock, chairman of the department of political science at New York University, will spend the spring and summer of 1958 in England on a Sloan Foundation grant.

Alex T. Edelmann, formerly of the University of Tennessee, is serving as visiting professor at the University of Nebraska.

Morton J. Frisch of the College of William and Mary has been appointed acting assistant professor at the University of Minnesota for 1957–58.

Edward M. Goldberg, instructor in political science at the University of Pennsylvania, served as a consultant to the New Mexico Taxpayers' Association during the past summer.

Henry M. Graham has been appointed as visiting professor of social welfare administration under the Indiana University-Thammasat University Public Administration program in Bangkok, Thailand.

John H. Herz of The City College of New York has been appointed visiting associate professor in the school of international affairs, at Columbia, for the winter session.

Roger Hilsman will teach a graduate seminar in international politics at Columbia University for the spring semester, 1958. This is in addition to his regular duties as chief of the foreign affairs division of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.

Charles A. Hollister, associate professor of political science at Bucknell, has been granted a leave of absence of one year to take the position of assistant director, bureau of municipalities, department of internal affairs, of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Eric James of Brooklyn College attended an International Study Conference on Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries in Jamaica, B.W.I. in August.

Scott D. Johnston of Hamline University spent part of the summer of 1957 in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt on a grant from the Louis W. and Maud Hill Foundation as a part of a four-college area study program on the Middle East. At the Second National Conference on Area Studies, which was held in St. Paul in May, he was elected chairman of the National Advisory Committee on Area Studies.

W. Astor Kirk, associate professor of government and chairman of the department of government, at Huston-Tillotson College is on leave during the 1957–58 school term, having been the recipient of a Danforth Teacher Fellowship.

Grant McConnell was appointed visiting associate professor in the department of political science and associate professor of the social sciences in the College of the University of Chicago.

Ellis E. McCune, director of the curriculum in applied politics and economics at Occidental College, is the recipient of a research grant from the John R. and Dora Haynes Foundation.

Norman Meller, chairman of the government department, served as chairman of the week-long Second Management Conference held on the University of Hawaii campus for 230 federal, territorial, and city and county administrators in August. The conference was sponsored by the Hawaii Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration.

William Monat, assistant professor of political science at Wayne State University, Detroit, has been granted leave of absence to accept the position of administrative assistant to the Honorable G. Mennen Williams, Governor of Michigan.

Robert G. Neumann of the University of California at Los Angeles has been made a

Knight (Chevalier) of the Legion of Honor. This past summer he was Fulbright lecturer and director of the American Seminar in political, economic and social studies at the University of Aix-Marseilles.

William Newman, associate professor of government at Boston University, has been granted a sabbatical leave for 1957–58 for research in England. He has been granted faculty status at Oxford University.

H. C. Nixon, professor emeritus of Vanderbilt University, is to be visiting professor of political science at the College of Wooster for the academic year 1957–1958.

Vincent Ostrom, University of Oregon, has been appointed a member of the Oregon State Board of Water Resources by Governor Holmes. When the Board elected its officers, Mr. Ostrom was elected vice-chairman.

Louise Overacker of Wellesley College retired in June and now holds a Whitney teaching award.

Thomas Page, assistant professor of political science and research assistant professor in the institute of government and public affairs at the University of Illinois, has been granted leave for one year from September, 1957 in order to serve as research associate with the National Manpower Council of Columbia University. During the summer of 1957 he served as a personnel consultant with the Department of the Navy in Washington studying career development programs for civilian employees and the related recruitment plans. He has been appointed chairman of a special committee on organization of the personnel function by the Public Personnel Association.

Norman D. Palmer, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania has been appointed a member of the newly established International Committee of the International Section of the American Society for Public Administration.

C. Herman Pritchett of the University of Chicago gave the Bacon Lectures on the Constitution at Boston University in October, on the subject, "The Political Offender and the Warren Court." In November he gave the Dillon Lectures in Law and Government at the State University of South Dakota, with the title, "The Supreme Court Today."

Richard F. Reath, Occidental College, was visiting professor of political science in the summer session at the University of Southern California.

Arnold Rogow of the State University of Iowa has been granted a research assistant professorship and will spend much of his time at Yale University pursuing his studies in the behavioral sciences.

Waldo Schumacher, University of Oregon, has been appointed as a public member of the Interim Committee on Administrative Reorganization by Governor Holmes of Oregon.

O. Glenn Stahl, director, bureau of programs and standards, U. S. Civil Service Commission, was visiting lecturer at the University of Chicago during the summer of 1957, participating in two sessions of the University's Program of Executive Development for Federal Administrators.

Robert B. Stauffer, on sabbatical leave from the government department of the University of Hawaii for the first half of the current year, spent most of the time in New York at United Nations Headquarters where he was engaged on a research project.

H. Arthur Steiner of U.C.L.A. was director of the Western Regional Conference on the United States and the Far East, co-sponsored with the American Assembly of Columbia University, and held at the Lake Arrowhead conference site of the University of California, June 15–16.

Graham H. Stuart is visiting professor of political science at Occidental College during the fall term filling Occidental's newly established Stuart Chevalier Chair of Diplomacy and World Affairs.

Joseph L. Sutton of the department of government at Indiana University has returned to the United States on home leave from his duties as chief of party of the Indiana University staff at the Institute of Public Administration at Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand. Mr. Sutton will return to Bangkok in October.

Thor Swanson has been granted additional leave from the State College of Washington to continue his work as the 1956–57 National Municipal League Staff Fellow. He will resume his duties at the State College in February, 1958.

John Vanderzell, associate professor of government at Franklin and Marshall College, taught at Syracuse University during the past summer session.

P. J. Vatikiotis was a visiting lecturer on Middle East Affairs during special summer program on the Middle East, at the School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University.

Nicholas Wahl, instructor in government at Harvard University, has recently returned from Saigon, Vietnam where he has served as lecturer in political science at the National University of Vietnam under the Smith-Mundt program of the Department of State. He will spend the winter in Paris engaged in research under a Harvard research grant and in the Spring he will serve as lecturer in political science at the University of Lyon under the Fulbright program.

Robert F. Wilcox of the department of political science, San Diego State College, will be on leave during the 1957–58 academic year. For this period he will serve in a teaching and consultative capacity with the government of Thailand.

Pamela Wrinch, formerly of Wellesley College, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Boston University.

Belle Zeller of Brooklyn College attended the sessions of the American Bar Association in London in August.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Albert L. Alford has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

Roy Alton, formerly of M.I.T., has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Western Michigan University.

Thornton H. Anderson has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland. During the academic year 1957–1958 he is on leave of absence engaged on a Rockefeller Foundation research grant.

Chester W. Bain, University of Virginia, has been added to the department of political science, West Virginia University.

Benjamin Baker, Rutgers University, has been promoted to associate professor.

Robert J. Batson formerly on the staff of Public Personnel Association has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Western Michigan University.

Norman Wood Beck has been appointed to a full professorship in the social studies department at Jersey City State Teachers College. During the past year he was and is at present coordinator of the annual conference of college teachers of government and related subjects in New Jersey.

W. Richard Bigger has returned to the department of political science, San Diego State College, where he will assume the duties of coordinator of public administration, replacing Robert F. Wilcox whose three year term has expired.

William J. Block, formerly of The Citadel, Charleston, S. C., has joined the department of history and political science at North Carolina State College with the rank of assistant professor.

Irene Blumenthal has been appointed an instructor in the department of political science at the University of Oregon.

Bernard C. Borning has been promoted from assistant professor to associate professor of political science at the University of Idaho.

Robert Boynton has been appointed to an assistant professorship at the State University of Iowa.

George A. Brinkley, Jr. has received an appointment as instructor in Columbia College.

Leslie R. Bundgaard, who taught in the University of Maryland program in Europe during the past year, has accepted an appointment as assistant director of the Far East Program of the University of Maryland, with headquarters in Tokyo.

Fred G. Burke has been appointed executive officer of the Arneson Institute of Practical Politics at Ohio Wesleyan University with the rank of assistant professor of political science.

Elbert M. Byrd, Jr. has been appointed to the staff of the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

Orin K. Cope has been appointed as lecturer in the department of political science at San Diego College.

Claude J. Davis, University of Tennessee has been appointed to the department of political science, West Virginia University.

Lane Davis has been promoted to associate professor at the State University of Iowa. He will resume his duties in September having returned from a year as a fellow at the center for advanced study in the behavioral sciences.

Eugene P. Dverin of the bureau of governmental research at U.C.L.A. has accepted an appointment as lecturer in the department of political science.

David M. Earl has been appointed to the overseas teaching staff of the department of government and politics of the University of Maryland.

Leo M. Egaud has resigned from the city planning staff of Voorhees, Walker, Smith and Smith to accept an appointment as research associate with the Cleveland Metropolitan Services Commission.

Bernard Fall has joined the department of government at Howard University.

John L. Fletcher, Jr. has been promoted to associate professor of government and named associate dean of the graduate school at Boston University.

Thomas M. Franck, formerly assistant professor of law at the University of Nebraska has become associate professor in the department of government of New York University.

R. C. Gilkey, University of Minnesota, has joined the department of political science at West Virginia University.

William Griffin, school of public administration at Florida State University, has been appointed assistant professor of government and acting assistant director of the governmental research bureau at the University of South Dakota.

William B. Gwyn has been appointed assistant professor of political science for one year at Bucknell.

William Roy Hamilton, Jr. has been appointed to the staff of the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

D. Lincoln Harter resigned his position as assistant professor at the University of Pennsylvania in June, 1957 in order to take a position as assistant to the vice chancellor for planning and development at the University of Buffalo and as director of the office of information services.

John J. Hebal has been appointed to the staff of the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

Robert Holt has been promoted to assistant professor at the University of Minnesota.

Abraham Holtzman has received a promotion from the rank of assistant professor to that of associate professor at North Carolina State College.

John A. Huston, chairman of the department of international relations and political science at Knox College has been promoted to the rank of professor.

Irving Howards, formerly of the institute of government and public affairs, University of Illinois, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of government at Southern Illinois University.

Robert Huckshorn, formerly of U.C.L.A., has been named instructor in the department of social sciences at the University of Idaho.

Harry V. Jaffa has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at Ohio State University.

Henry L. Janssen has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at San Diego State College.

C. Herschel Jones of the political science department at Bucknell has been promoted to professor of political science.

Ned V. Joy has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at San Diego State College.

Eli Kaminsky has been appointed as instructor in political science at the University of Florida.

Harry Kantor has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Florida.

Edgar Kenler has joined the department of government at Howard University.

George C. Keller has received an appointment as instructor in Columbia College.

Jerome G. Kerwin has been appointed dean of students of the social science division at the University of Chicago.

James D. Kitchen has been appointed an assistant professor of political science at San Diego State College.

Richard Kosaki commenced full-time instruction with the government department of the University of Hawaii as of the fall semester.

Donald B. Leiffer has been chosen chairman of the department of political science, San Diego State College, at the expiration of the three year term of Clarence G. Osborn.

George Manner has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Illinois.

Bruce B. Mason has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Florida.

Duncan MacRae, Jr., was appointed assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Chicago.

Fred Warner Neal, formerly of the University of California at Los Angeles, has accepted a position as associate professor of international relations and government at the Claremont Graduate School.

Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at the State College of Washington.

DeVere Pentony has been reappointed to an instructorship in political science at the State University of Iowa.

Eugene S. Powell has been appointed to the overseas teaching staff of the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

Hugh Douglas Price has been appointed as instructor in political science at the University of Florida.

Merton L. Reichler has been appointed instructor in political science at Wellesley College.

Edward B. Richards, formerly of Evansville College, has been appointed assistant professor of government at the University of South Dakota. He held a Foundation for Economic Education fellowship during the past summer.

William E. Rhode has been appointed an assistant professor of political science at San Diego State College.

Richard N. Rosecrance, formerly at Brown University, has accepted an appointment as instructor at the University of California (Los Angeles).

Bernard Rubin, Rutgers University, has been promoted to assistant professor.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein has been appointed a lecturer in political science at the University of Pennsylvania. He was formerly an associate at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

Elmer R. Rusco has been appointed an instructor in political science at San Diego State College.

Mulford Q. Sibley has been promoted to professor at the University of Minnesota.

Phillip Sirotkin, assistant professor of political science at Wellesley College, has ac-

cepted a position as executive director of the Mental Health Program, Western Interstate Commission of Higher Education.

Clyde F. Snider has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at the University of Illinois.

John W. Spanier has been appointed as instructor in political science at the University of Florida.

David Spitz has been promoted to the rank of professor at Ohio State University.

Philip S. Spoerry has joined the staff of the State College of Washington at the rank of instructor following his temporary appointment during 1956–57.

Richard F. Staar has accepted a position as professor of political science and head of the social science department at Arkansas State College.

George Stambuk has been appointed as lecturer in government at Indiana University's South Bend Center.

Leo C. Stine has been promoted to professor of political science at Western Michigan University.

Owen Stratton is now chairman of the department of political science at Wellesley College.

James E. Sullivan was appointed instructor in the department of political science at the University of Chicago.

John Turner has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Minnesota.

Fred R. von der Mehden has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin.

Joseph Willard, a graduate student in the department of government at Indiana University has been appointed to the faculty of political science at Evansville College.

Larman C. Wilson has been appointed to the overseas teaching staff of the department of government and politics of the University of Maryland.

James S. Young has received an appointment as lecturer in government in Columbia College.

IN MEMORIAM

James Duff Barnett, professor emeritus of political science and former department head at the University of Oregon, died in Eugene, Oregon, on July 26, 1957. He was born in Cairo, Egypt, on October 25, 1870, a son of missionary parents. The family returned to the United States in 1873 and settled in Emporia, Kansas, where Mr. Barnett graduated from the College of Emporia in 1890. After teaching in the public schools, he attended the University of Wisconsin from which institution he received his doctorate in 1905. He taught at the University of Oklahoma for several years, after which he accepted a post at the University of Oregon where he served until his retirement in 1941.

He was the author of a number of books, the best known being *The Operation of the Initiative, Referendum and Recall in Oregon*. For many years he was an editor of the *Oregon Law Review* and contributed numerous articles to legal and other learned journals. He was a provocative teacher, was interested in civic affairs, and served his city on the Civil Service Commission for a number of terms.

LUCIAN C. MARVIS

William Bennett Munro, twenty-second president of the American Political Science Association, who died in Pasadena, California, on September 4, 1957 in his 83rd year, was for many years one of the most active and influential members of this Association. Ever ready to do his part in Association work, he served on innumerable committees as well as on the editorial board of the REVIEW. He was a regular attendant at annual meetings from their beginning, and long a valued collaborator in the councils of the leaders of our profession. His text-books on American government and politics went through numerous editions, and were widely used both in this country and abroad. His lectures at Williams, Harvard, and

the California Institute of Technology, on whose faculties he served altogether for forty-four years, were heard by many thousands of students. He was indeed a great teacher.

Munro's special field was municipal government. During his active professional career he witnessed many solid improvements in the government of our cities and, by his writings and through his students, made a substantial contribution to the progress in this field. His books on the government and administration of American and of European cities were outstanding titles in the literature of local government during the period when municipal reformers were trying to create better opportunities in city government for professional administrators and to confine local politicians to their proper sphere of action. He was specially interested in the work of the National Municipal League, and served for many years on the committee which originally framed and subsequently kept up to date the model municipal charter. He remained an honorary vice-president of the League until his death.

Munro's great energy and breadth of view led him into many activities outside the strict limits of his profession. He served for two years as president of the American Association of University Professors and was always deeply interested in the problems of university teachers. He also participated vigorously in the organized activities of the several communities to which he successively belonged. In the latter part of his life, when he was no longer engaged in teaching, he served as treasurer and trustee of the California Institute of Technology, and as chairman of the board of trustees of the Huntington Memorial Hospital in Pasadena, and as chairman also of the Huntington Memorial Library and Art Museum. He was in fact a superb specimen of the classical good citizen about whom he wrote and lectured so much in his productive years as an American scholar.—Arthur N. Holcombe

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

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

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

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

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

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